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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2013 7:48:54 GMT -6
I assume the rules are the same for the new forum, so I've created a thread for historical discussions linked to Steam and Iron. Any and all discussions concerning historical aspects of the era in question are possible including Technical, strategic, tactical and personalities of the era.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 28, 2013 21:27:43 GMT -6
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jhs
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Post by jhs on Nov 9, 2013 12:04:38 GMT -6
Thanks!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 18, 2013 13:16:34 GMT -6
This is a continuation discussion from SAI, tracks thread about navigation and maneuvering in the dreadnought era.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 6, 2014 11:38:15 GMT -6
Here is a virtual strategic plan for the Japanese at the start of the Russo-Japanese War. First, Vladivostok is a far better port than Port Arthur, so why not use monitor like the ones I've suggested and some cruisers/torpedo boats to mask Port Arthur. Use the bulk of the fleet to take Chemulpo then invade and take Vladivostok. This eliminates it as a future port for the Baltic fleet, eliminating any need for them to continue to the Pacific. This eliminates the Battle of Tsu-shima and could shorten the war by six months giving the Japanese a clear victory. Without those two ports, the Russian fleet is now bottled up, and with the monitors bombarding it, the fleet almost has to either scuttle or come out and be destroyed by the entire Japanese navy which now can focus its strength at that point. |
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zac
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Post by zac on Jan 30, 2014 3:48:08 GMT -6
I had problems with the link but searched for James Goldrick Kings College London and there it was - opened it and read a very interesting article that I hope someone is already working on. Revelations about station keeping and navigation were very interesting as was the idea that 'coaling' brought about a greater unit cohesion that 'oiling' did not, an idea I suspect that cannot be proven one way or the other. One thing is not mentioned by Admiral Goldrick is the way that the change to oil as the prime source of propulsion for the RN focused Imperial 'need' or greed on the middle east. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 30, 2014 11:26:21 GMT -6
I had problems with the link but searched for James Goldrick Kings College London and there it was - opened it and read a very interesting article that I hope someone is already working on. Revelations about station keeping and navigation were very interesting as was the idea that 'coaling' brought about a greater unit cohesion that 'oiling' did not, an idea I suspect that cannot be proven one way or the other. One thing is not mentioned by Admiral Goldrick is the way that the change to oil as the prime source of propulsion for the RN focused Imperial 'need' or greed on the middle east. I haven't had any problems with the link but I am glad you found it. One interesting point is that even with oil there is a quality issue. Example is the oil from many areas such as Borneo are higher in sulfur and if it isn't cracked it will greatly affect the engines. The Japanese had this problem in WWII because the cracking plants in Borneo were wrecked by the plant personnel when they left. The Japanese had to use the oil straight from the ground and it did cause engine issues. Of course, it didn't make any real difference because many of those ships did not survive Leyte Gulf. Interesting issues in the article, I am not certain I am in agreement with the concept that other areas of the WWI naval war should be examined. I think we have enough information to do a good analysis. Plenty of books etc. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 20, 2014 20:41:43 GMT -6
We talk about modeling damage in SAI about making it realistic. Here is one for you. In the NWC maneuver and firing rules of 1940, there is a table that was derived from a formula that calculated the number 14 inch shells that it would take to sink a particular ship. For the USS Colorado, it was 18.6. The Colorado was launched in 1921. As a comparison, the USS Arizona was launched in 1915. She was only six years older so I am figuring that her "Ship Life" as it is called would be approximately the same, 18 - 14 inch shells. Remember that this is a model using various ratios of the ship. I have included a picture at the end of the formula for you to copy and play with.
Now to my point. Remember the ship life for the Colorado which we have estimated to very applicable to the Pennsylvania class battleship, they were close in age. On December 7th, 1941, the Arizona was struck by one bomb, a modified 16.1 inch Nagato class battleship armored piercing shell dropped from 3000 meters. Now, the Arizona was struck by four other bombs of the same size, but they did not cause the catastrophic explosion which destroyed her, but must be counted. All in all, five bombs or 16.1 inch shells hit that ship, and destroyed her.
The bombs dropped were Type 99 800 Kg bombs and many were dropped that day and were duds. It's exact name was the Type 99 Model 80 Mark 5. It was a converted 16.14 inch APC projectile. Most of the bomb was solid metal. The old explosive was replaced by trinitroanisol which was much more powerful than the Shimose that was in the original shell. The explosive filler was less. As a contrast our 1600 lb or 725.7 KG AP bomb carried 240 pounds of explosive. The Japanese testing confirmed that this bomb, when dropped from 3000 meters would penetrate the deck armor of the US battleships.
Did the Naval Warfare Center maneuvering and firing rules allow for this type of destruction, I can't say for certain but my guess is they did. But rules at the NWC, the maneuver rules and fire effect tables of that period, said it would take seven to fourteen of these size shells to sink it. The NWC calculated that the magazine areas of the BB's were 23% of the total battleship target area and six hits would give a 79% chance of sinking the ship. We know that the other four hits really did very little damage, so in fact, it only took one. Modeling of ship damage is difficult. You can model the cumulative effects of hits, a shot or shots that cause a catastrophic explosion or a loss of buoyancy. You can combine these into what is termed a hybrid. But they are all statistical averages or means. Since the development of simulations in 1824, damage has always been subjective and statistical, not exacting. In fact, even with supercomputers, it still is. Keep this in mind when play SAI and other wargames, modeling damage is not a precise science.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 24, 2014 12:08:14 GMT -6
The introduction of a dedicated carrier after WWI was a major development in fleet operations. This was true of all nations with battle fleets and naval aviation. The period of the 1920's through the 1930's and into WW2, saw a tremendous technological revolution in naval aviation and all aviation for that matter. The carrier went from a scout and gunfire observer to a major battle force of its own, eventually supplanting the battleships. How to introduce this technological revolution into SAI will be a daunting task. This thread is for discussions of the actual historical timeline and technological innovations that proceeded WW2. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 25, 2014 10:09:53 GMT -6
I wonder how the Battle of Denmark straights would have resolved itself with HMS Hood still in the water. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 17, 2015 18:32:54 GMT -6
With the advent of Rule The Waves, here is something of interest about how business was conducted prior to WW1. It hasn't changed by the way. The Japanese Army tank engines were Ford F head engines and the Japanese Zero used Hamilton Standard three bladed auto pitch props. There are more, believe me. armingallsides.on-the-record.org.uk/case_studies/vickers-and-krupp/I verified this information in Arms of Krupp by William Manchester. It happened just as this article says. BTW, there was a book written about arms merchants in the interwar period titled "The Merchants of Death". Interesting book. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 23, 2015 8:08:46 GMT -6
For those of you interested in the historical lineage of the Fighting Instructions issued by CinC Grand Fleet Jellicoe, the first issuance of those Fighting Instructions was in March of 1653. They provided for the line ahead formation which would put all the ships of the line in a line ahead formation, allowing them to concentrate all their broadsides on the opposing fleet. The first use was on June 2-3 in the Battle of Gabbard Bank when an English fleet commanded by Monck and Deane engaged Admiral Tromp of the Dutch Fleet. The maneuver was highly successful until the Dutch under De Ruyter and Tromp adopted the same maneuvers including the turning of the battle line 180 degrees with the last ship leading the turn. This was in the First Anglo-Dutch War from 1652-1654.
Here is the actual Fighting Instructions - bcw-project.org/texts/fighting-instructions
In the three Anglo-Dutch Wars, the Dutch had the same strategic problem that the German's did in both World Wars. In order to get trading ships and the fleet out of Holland they either had to sail through the channel, staying near the English coast or sail up the North Sea and around Scotland. This gave the English fleet, which was home fleeted on the eastern coast, the weather gage, important during the Age of Sail. |
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Post by vonfriedman on Jun 26, 2018 3:00:41 GMT -6
I assume the rules are the same for the new forum, so I've created a thread for historical discussions linked to Steam and Iron. Any and all discussions concerning historical aspects of the era in question are possible including Technical, strategic, tactical and personalities of the era. In the scenario "The Last sortie 1918", about the operation of the Hochseeflotte on April 23-25 2018, the main covering force of the british convoys is composed by some old dreadnoughts, namely Hercules, St Vincent, Agincourt. I have read somewhere that in those months the bulk of this covering force was composed either by the 2nd battlecruiser squadron (Australia, New Zealand, Inflexible, Indomitable) or by the US Navy battleship squadron (New York, Wyoming, Florida, Delaware). If this is true, it seems to me that the scenario does not represent the situation that could have been present with better timing of the operation by part of the german naval staff. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 26, 2018 15:04:12 GMT -6
I assume the rules are the same for the new forum, so I've created a thread for historical discussions linked to Steam and Iron. Any and all discussions concerning historical aspects of the era in question are possible including Technical, strategic, tactical and personalities of the era. In the scenario "The Last sortie 1918", about the operation of the Hochseeflotte on April 23-25 2018, the main covering force of the british convoys is composed by some old dreadnoughts, namely Hercules, St Vincent, Agincourt. I have read somewhere that in those months the bulk of this covering force was composed either by the 2nd battlecruiser squadron (Australia, New Zealand, Inflexible, Indomitable) or by the US Navy battleship squadron (New York, Wyoming, Florida, Delaware). If this is true, it seems to me that the scenario does not represent the situation that could have been present with better timing of the operation by part of the german naval staff. The force that would have to intercept the Germans would have been the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron led by HMS Australia with New Zealand, Indomitable and Inflexible. |
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Post by vonfriedman on Jun 27, 2018 2:26:14 GMT -6
Do you know which was exactly the composition of Hipper forces? Is the SAI scenario correct about this point?
I only know that SMS Moltke was one of the BCs and that she lost one of her propellers with serious damage in the engine room early on April 24th.
This does not happen in the scenario, making the Germans even stronger.
It also seems that the SAI scenario is wrong about the date, since it starts in the night of April 24 while I know that the Hochseeflotte sailed in the evening of April 23.
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