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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2013 11:24:53 GMT -6
The Pearl Harbor generation is almost gone and the association has shut down. The event is now receding into written history and video. It is now time to dispense with the hyperbole, emotion and simply analyze how this event really affected the Pacific War. We don't need to re-analyze the actual event, or the intelligence failures that led to it, there are thousands of pages of both english and japanese language books and documents that have done this. I am going to focus on how the loss of those ships actually affected the strategic and operational plans for the Pacific war. This series of personal monographs will compare what the US fleet consisted of in December of 1941 with what was actually lost in the attack. These monographs will describe what the original Pacific war operational plan consisted of, how it changed and what was the final product. They will also, in a brief manner, attempt to provide a narrative of what transpired in the interwar period and how it affected the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Let's start with the established force level of the US Pacific Fleet as of December 1941. The US Pacific Fleet consisted of 111 ships excluding smaller craft such as mine layers, sweepers and patrol vessels. It had nine battleships and most of the modern submarines. It was organized into three task forces; TF I under Admiral Pye consisting of six battleships, one aircraft carrier, five light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and five mine vessels; TF II under Admiral Halsey consisting of 3 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 4 heavy cruisers, eighteen destroyers and four mine vessels; TF III under Admiral Brown consisting of one aircraft carrier, eight heavy cruisers, nine destroyers, thirteen mine vessels and six attack transports. Records show that half of the total force was absent on December 7th. This left the following ships in the harbor at the time: eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four 10,000 ton cruisers, 2 7000 ton cruisers, 30 destroyers and four submarines. There was also one gunboat, nine minelayers, fourteen minesweepers and twenty seven auxiliaries such as repair ships, tenders, store ships and tubs. Let's examine the results for the battleships. USS Pennsylvania was repaired and rejoined the fleet on 20 December. USS Maryland was fully repaired and ready for action by 20 December. The USS Tennessee was ready for service as of 20 December also. Two battleships; Oklahoma and Arizona were total losses. USS California, West Virginia and Nevada had to be pumped out, holes patched and then were sent to the West Coast for major repairs and upgrades, lost to the fleet until 1944 in the case of the first two, the USS Nevada returned to the fleet by December of 1942 after repairs and upgrades to her AAA gun tubs and other schedule upgrades that were never actuated on. So, out of eight battleships, three were back in the fleet by the end of December and that means the fleet had four battleships ready for action including the one on the West Coast. As to the cruisers, the USS Honolulu was fully repaired and back in the fleet by 12 January 1942. USS Helena was eventually sent to Mare Island for repairs. The USS Raleigh was sent after temporary repairs to Mare Island also. Two other vessels; the Vestal, a repair ships was back in the fleet by 18 February, The Curtis was in the yards until around May 28th, 1942. The destroyer Helm was dry-docked on 15 January and lost to the fleet for a period of months. Besides the Arizona and Oklahoma, the USS Shaw, a destroyer was lost, Floating dry-dock number two, the tub Sotoyomo, destroyers Cassin and Downes, and the USS Oglala, built in 1906. last but not least, the USS Utah, no longer a battleship but a target training ship. She was lost also. Using the first year of the war as the critical time period, we lost at Pearl Harbor, five battleships, three destroyers, one old repair ship and a target training ship. Of course, the 2400 men lost was the greatest tragedy. Not counting the Utah and Oglala, we lost out of 111 ships in the Pacific Fleet, eight ships or 7% of the total fleet. Remember that the number is based on the first year of war, which most assessments was the critical year. In the next personal monograph, I will try to present the context in which those losses should be viewed. What was the original operational plan for the Pacific and how did it evolve.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2013 11:25:40 GMT -6
This second installment in the series will provide the context for the Pacific War. I will begin to explain the plan that was initiated and eventually used to fight the Pacific war in as much detail as I feel is necessary. I don't have to describe the battlefield; the Pacific Ocean. The distances were great; Pearl Harbor to Manila was over 4900 NM. There were no large land masses, only small island chains that in many cases did not have good harbors. Besides Midway, there was Wake Island with no real harbor, and Guam. In latitude, the plan covered a region from the equator to North 35 degrees. . The Southwest Pacific and the Aleutians were never considered in the plan. They were considered as areas of transit or minor areas. As with most plans, they don't survive the first shot and also your opponent has a say in those plans. Time permitting, I will explain some of that. The plan for the Pacific war against Japan was given the title "Plan Orange", orange being the color issued to Japan. There were other colors such as blue for the US, black for Germany, red for Great Britain etc. The formal title was Navy WPL-13 or Fleet Plan O-1. The orange name was dropped in 1940 however the actual details was incorporated into the Rainbow plans under their specific Navy titles. The premise of the plan was that war would occur between Japan and the US due to her aggressiveness in attempting to dominate the Far East. With the US considering itself the guardian of that region, a conflict was inevitable. According to Edward Miller, whose book "War Plan Orange" is the definitive source, "the plan was, on the whole, remarkably predictive." Plan Orange originated from a request by Teddy Roosevelt in 1906. It was always a three phase plan, whose operational objective was the defeat of Japan but who initial objective was to either relieve the Philippines or retake them. Then proceed north to blockade and defeat Japan. It was, as one author puts it, maritime force defeating land force. The most important and difficult phase, was phase II - the advance across the Central Pacific. There were two competing plans for this phase- the through-ticket and the cautionary. As the term denotes, the through-ticket plan called for the fleet to mobilize and sail across the Central Pacific, possibly engaging the IJN in a decisive battle near the Marianas or Bonin's, then heading south toward the Philippines. This particular plan, required pre-existing naval bases with all the functions to support the fleet. The second was the cautionary or as later called, the step by step, plan. It was predicated on the idea of invading and occupying islands along the path, such as the Gilberts, Marshalls, building bases and then finally arriving at the Southern Philippine islands. The first plan was designed to end the war quickly, because it was felt the nation had a short attention span, and a long war would not be tolerated. The second plan was an attrition based plan, designed to arrive in the Western Pacific in about one to two years. Amazingly, a comment by one of the General Board members in 1914 stated that the Japanese would not be stupid enough to land or raid the Hawaiian Islands, which the American people felt was US soil, thereby eliminating the problem of the attention span of the US nation. How prophetic because that is exactly what Yamamoto did in 1941. The through-ticket plan did not survive for long although it did rise periodically in the interwar. The fortification clause in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, essentially eliminated it, and the step by step plan won by default. In order to implement the step by step, islands would have to be invaded, conquered and bases built to provide the fleet with repair and support. In the interwar period, the General Board, Naval War College and War Plans innovated by developing a mobile base project consisting of repair ships, aviation support ships, mobile dry docks of various sizes, fast fleet tankers and other logistical support systems necessary for the fleet as it moved from island to island. In order to invade those islands, the US Marines were tasked with developing amphibious doctrine and weapons for such missions. Ships like LST's and such had to be designed and built. To support the invasion force, shore bombardment was necessary. What better ship to perform that mission than the battleship, especially the older ships that could not effectively sail with the carrier groups. So the battleship had a new job. This is the context in which the battleships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet would sail and fight in the coming war. The plan was, and did become logistics heavy. The Naval Treaty of 1922 and the 1930 forced the naval planners to innovate, developing mobile bases along the path of movement of the US PacFleet. This generated a new job for the older battleships, shore bombardment. However, decisive battle as per Mahan was also part of naval doctrine, but it did undergo many chances.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2013 11:26:04 GMT -6
The Mandates were island chains, Micronesian Islands, that were administered by the Japanese after the Versailles Treaty and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. They consisted of the Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands and the Marianas. The Mandate was a class C meaning they could adminster them, but not fortify them. The value of these island chains especially the Marshall's was their large lagoons. There were thirty-one atolls with narrow reefs which had numerous islets surrounding them. Some of the lagoons had over two to three hundred square miles of calm waters, deep and no shoals. They were excellent mid-ocean anchorages As we know, the thrusters wanted to mobilize the fleet and sail within 16 days of the start of the war. This was actually never possible, but we will leave that. The cautionaries on the other hand, wanted to wait for full mobilization and assemblage of the entire fleet with the supply train. The thrusters would move by the great polar route past Midway, Aleutians, Wake and Guam, stopping for refueling, rest and replenishment. The distance via that route was over 5000 miles to Luzon, the ultimate destination. For the Japanese, Luzon would be 850 miles a ratio of 8.8 to 1. For the cautionaries, the Eastern Marshalls would be 2050 miles away but for the Japanese they would be 2500 or about .8 to 1. The Western Marshalls those numbers would be 2450 to 2100 or 1.2 to 1. For the Carolinas, the ratio was about 1.6 to 1 or 3150 to 1950. All these numbers show that the cautionary path, step by step across the Central Pacific is logistically a much better and safer path forcing the logistically strained, IJN to attempt to supply those outer island thereby extending their defense line across the Pacific. This puts their already strained shipping within easy reach of our submarines. The Japanese fleet was not equipped well for ASW nor convoy escort. Something they did not implement until 1943. For both the cautionaries and the thrusters, September 3, 1939 changed the plan. It now became policy that Europe would be the priority and the new CinC Pacific Fleet had to stay close to Pearl Harbor and the Panama Canal in case the Atlantic needed more ships. War Plan Orange was disestablished as of 17 December 1940. Rainbow 5, a eurocentric plan, took control and any Asiatic Reenforcement plan was cancelled. The US Pacific Fleet was restricted to the eastern Pacific, making hit and run raids on the IJN outer perimeter. The thrust across Central Pacific was delayed possibly as long several years. The Philippines and Singapore were abandoned, there would be no relief for either by the US Navy. The situation in the spring of 1941 was a paradox. There was no way that Kimmel, the new CinCPac could protect anything except the Eastern Pacific because one quarter of the fleet had been sent to the Atlantic. Although he was informed that he should " act offensively" , he did not have the elements to act in such a manner. He also did not have the logistical support to preform such operations with only four tankers available. Here are his exact orders from WPPac-46 or Navy Basic War Plan O-1 from Rainbow Five: Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defen- [20] sive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East
Here is the outline of tasks essentially the basic mission plan: A. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
B. b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk; c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy; d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155 east; e. Defend Samoa in category "D"; f. Defend Guam in category "F"; g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces; h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere; i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces; j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require; k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.
So this is the paradox. Kimmel has orders, signed by the President to "act offensively" to draw the Orange fleet away from the Malay barrier by attacking and possibly invading the Mandates from a position near Wake Island yet he also has conflicting orders to stay near in the Eastern Pacific for defensive purposes and in case more ships needed to be sent to the Atlantic. This information sets the stage for our assessment of whether the loss of four battleships at Pearl Harbor, had any appreciable effect on these orders.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2013 11:26:33 GMT -6
We are now at a point, where we can tie all this together and answer the question of whether the loss of the battleships at Pearl Harbor really had any effect on the Pacific war operations. We are handicapped by the clairvoyance of hindsight; because we know what really happened, it is difficult to assess whether a possible alternative history would have been possible. We know the strengths of both the Japanese fleet and the US Pacific Fleet on 7 December, we have the plan that was authorized and we know of the paradox in those plans; the fact that despite WPPac-46, Kimmel was ordered by Stark, CNO, to stay close in case some of his ships were needed in the Atlantic. We have some inferences to a thrusters type plan to sail the battleships to a location titled Point Tare NE of Wake to ambush the Japanese fleet, but no actual documents or testimony from the former CNO, CinCPacFleet or his planner after the war during the PH Hearings. Richmond Kelly Turner and others, who had distinguished themselves during the war, certainly did not want to taint their reputations by revealing a hairbrained scheme that was doomed to failure, after the war. So, we are stuck with testimony that might not be the complete truth. One interesting issue, which has a little bearing on our answer to the question, is that within one year; 11 November 1940, 7 December 1941 and 10 December 1040, the vulnerability of the battleship to air power was completely confirmed, rather than suspected as it was during the 1930's. On those three days, six battleships were destroyed, one battlecruiser, four battleships badly damaged for a loss to the attackers of less than one hundred aircraft. It is my personal opinion that if the PH attack had not occurred, but the war had begun in the Pacific anyway, that it would have taken at least 14 days to get the battle fleet ready for movement which would have been after the December 10th destruction of the two British ships. This action could have made Kimmel think twice about any movement of the battle fleet to the Central Pacific without air cover. Now, my answer to the question originally posed; Did the loss of the battleships at Pearl Harbor really have any effect on Pacific War operations? My answer is in two parts; pschological and actual. For the first I believe that it did have an effect on the psychological aspect of the Pacific War. The battleship club finally had the nail driven into the coffin for the battleship. They now realized that without carrier aircraft coverage or land based coverage, the battleship was a sitting duck. If there were no carriers available, the battle fleet could not venture farther than land based air support could be provided. The mere fact that after PH, a submariner was given command of the Pacific Fleet and a carrier man was made CNO, should be enough to tell us that the day of the battleship was gone. The fact that the two main task force commanders were carrier and cruiser men, not battleship men, is another sign. Actually, the loss had no appreciable affect the Pacific War strategy. No offensive action was planned until 180M or later. In fact, the first offensive action was 240M, to the day. That was the invasion of Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942. By that time, the North Carolina and South Dakota class battleships were active in the fleet, with the Iowa's under construction. The loss of those four ships, made no different in actual fact. That is my answer to the question. The Pearl Harbor attacks real contribution was to remove the problem of the American people and their attention span, a problem the thrusters had concerned themselves with, since 1904. Now, there was no reason to hurry and risk the fleet. We could defend the Eastern Pacific, build up a superior fleet and then retake the Pacific and defeat the IJN. After that, we could surround Japan and finish the war. It was now a fight to the finish, a fight that the IJN and the people of Japan were never equipped to fight.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2013 11:26:53 GMT -6
I thought I would discuss some alternatives to the Pearl Harbor attack. Were there alternative operations? Yes, there were. The first is more of an addition, not an alternative. Had Nagumo decided to stay in the area, level Midway then seek and destroy the two carriers, more could have been accomplished. In fact, Yamamoto probably should have ordered him to pursue this course of action. This is a standard adjunct to the PH attack. However, were there alternative operations to the raid, and what would have been there effects; strategically and tactically? I believe that there were and Minoru Genda has confirmed that in 1935, there was a plan titled Zengen Zakusen which meant slashing attacks by submarines and land based aircraft stationed on the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands. The purpose was to reduce our battle strength before the decisive engagement near the Bonins. The Japanese had read Mahan and had, we believe a copy of War Plan Orange. There would a series of night engagements with light vessels using torpedoes. All these actions would be directed at our carrier forces, but this did not imply that the IJN felt carriers were more important, they were always focused on the battleships. So, what would have been a viable alternative to the Pearl Harbor operation based on this. I believe that one good alternative based on the IJN view of our pre-war strategy, would be to station Carrier Division 1 and 2; Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu at Truk in the Caroline Islands. This island was always a focal point for War Plan Orange and it does command the approaches to the Philippines which means that it could perform the same mission of protecting the eastern flank of the southern operations into the South Pacific as the attack on PH. Carrier division five with Shokaku and Zuikaku, the two least experienced carriers would be retained at Formosa to backup this force possibly being used to soften up Singapore, or the Dutch East Indies. The two other carrier division consisting of the four light carriers would be assigned to the southern operations as necessary. The placement of the two best carriers at Truk provides an alternative operational force for movement to Rabaul or farther south to attack Australia or movement to the west into the Indian Ocean, after the successful capture of the Philippines and the assurances that our carriers and battle force are still in the Eastern Pacific. This is a conservative alternative but is in line with Japanese thinking pre-war. Another alternative that I've seen suggested is to use the carriers to attack Russia especially Vladivostok. I don't think this alternative is possible with the problems of coordination between the IJN and IJA. It flies in the face of everything we know of that relationship. There are other possibilities such as using the full force of the five carrier divisions in the Southern operation but that leaves the Eastern flank open, something the Imperial Naval Staff was against completely. They had to prepare for a possible thruster operation by the US across the Pacific. They could have sent the six carriers used in the Pearl Harbor attack eastward to draw our carriers into a carrier battle with an attempt to destroy them. They would have had a six to two advantage which is a 3:1 ratio, completely consistent with what most militaries believe is the best ratio for victory. Would Halsey and Newton have taken the bait? Possibly, especially with the land based VPONS still available at Pearl Harbor and the submarines. Kimmel might have felt he had the advantage and ordered the battleships out also. You can devise many different alternative plans but as we know, alternative history must use the factual evidence available and just pursue the alternative choices. The ones I have offered, generally stay within those facts.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2013 15:38:55 GMT -6
Here is some information to consider in this question of the battleships:
From the 1941 SecNav Annual Report - Under construction as of 30 June 1941 in private yards:
South Dakota - New York ShipBuilding Indiana - Newport News Massachusetts - Bethlehem Steel
Under construction in Navy Yards
North Carolina Washington Alabama Iowa New Jersey Missouri Wisconsin
There were seven battleships besides these, that were not completed. That is ten battleships, four were not completed until around the end of 1943, however the other six were completed. With the four pre-war battleships that survived PH, that is ten battleships. At this time, the Japanese had only the following:
Ise and Hyuga Yamashiro and Fuso Nagato and Mutsu In 1942, Yamato and Musashi
Battlecruisers - Kongo, Haruna, Hiei and Kirishima. These four could not engage in surface combat in the battle line because of their thin armor as was proved at the First Battle of Guadalcanal when Kirishima was blown out of the water by Washington.
Now the point to consider. This report is dated six months before Pearl Harbor. Doesn't it seem likely that the Navy Department and the administration would know, that the eight battleships, in Pearl Harbor were not going to be used and that by the time that the Rainbow Plan or Navy Plan O-1 was implemented, that the replacements were going to be available, as they were. So, except for the loss of the 2450 men, then the emphasis on the losses was just a smoke screen. In fact, why place the old ships in Pearl, since the plan was never to use them except for shore bombardment through the Mandates, as they were intended by 1940? I am not a conspiracy theorist or advocate, in fact I am the opposite. This was a conscious political decision, that the Naval commanders knew was a mistake because the Hawaiian Islands were vulnerable and we ourselves had proved that in pre-war fleet problems. The battleships never should have been at Pearl Harbor. Carriers, treaty cruisers and escorts along with subs, yes. But the BB's were not needed, not one bit. This isn't hindsight, it was known at the time.
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Post by ksbearski on Oct 25, 2013 5:21:15 GMT -6
Dennis, I think the speculation regarding IJN deployments after Pearl Harbor makes a lot of sense. In my mind it would have made much more sense to strengthen the southern thrust and isolate or knock out Australia and new Zealand instead of pursuing Midway and the Aleutian Islands, at least at that point in the war.
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Post by ksbearski2000 on Oct 25, 2013 9:11:34 GMT -6
Sorry, I meant to say your conservative approach makes very good sense, the deployments make sense...but do you think the Japanese were more inclined to take the fight to the US and do grevious damage to the USN in the hopes that a "pacifist" US electorate would demand a negotiated peace?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 25, 2013 11:44:00 GMT -6
Sorry, I meant to say your conservative approach makes very good sense, the deployments make sense...but do you think the Japanese were more inclined to take the fight to the US and do grevious damage to the USN in the hopes that a "pacifist" US electorate would demand a negotiated peace? Oh sure, that was the idea behind the whole war. They knew that they could not defeat us in a long war and they hoped that by a quick victory or two at the beginning would force us to seek a negotiated peace. The US Naval planners throughout the early part of the twentieth century, up until PH, were concerned about the American people and their lack of patience and short attention span. The Japanese attack on PH eliminated that problem and doomed the Japanese from the start. After that, all they could hope to do is destroy the Pacific Fleet quickly, reinforce their outer and inner island chains for defense and then wait for the onslaught that they knew would be coming in a few short years. They weren't wrong about that, the seeds of that were already on the drawing boards with the Vinson two ocean navy bill. Here is something to consider, and I think I've mentioned it before. What if all of Kido Butai: AKagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Ryujo and Shoho had been present at Coral Sea. That is almost 450 aircraft against about 160 for us, roughly. They would have had land based air reconnaissance and land based attack aircraft to support the operation. Possibly this might have been a better location for a decisive battle. It would have eliminated at least two of our carriers and maybe they could have hung around to get Enterprise and Hornet racing back from the Doolittle Mission. So, the question for the IJN becomes, is Port Moresby valuable enough for the US to risk its carrier force. Well, we know that it was, but only two. Now if they do destroy two of our carriers leaving us with two fleet carriers and Saratoga heading to Hawaii, what to do now? Remember that they thought they had destroyed both carriers and that's why they were not concerned about two of their fleet carriers being damaged and out of the Midway Operation. They assumed it would be four against two and that was sufficient to move ahead with the operation. Does the picture actually change much? No. Unless we scrap the Doolittle operation and have four fleet carriers in the Coral Sea, nothing really changes.
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