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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 18, 2017 11:03:35 GMT -6
Here is the Lexington for a comparison. Please let me know if you want another ship or mods.
USS Lexington, USA Battlecruiser laid down 1922
Displacement: 30,823 t light; 33,016 t standard; 34,448 t normal; 35,594 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep) (874.68 ft / 850.00 ft) x 91.00 ft x (31.30 / 32.05 ft) (266.60 m / 259.08 m) x 27.74 m x (9.54 / 9.77 m)
Armament: 8 - 16.00" / 406 mm 45.0 cal guns - 2,065.47lbs / 936.88kg shells, 150 per gun Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1922 Model 4 x Twin mounts on centreline ends, evenly spread 14 - 6.00" / 152 mm 45.0 cal guns - 108.93lbs / 49.41kg shells, 150 per gun Breech loading guns in casemate mounts, 1922 Model 14 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread Weight of broadside 18,049 lbs / 8,187 kg
Armour: - Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg) Main: 5.00" / 127 mm 382.50 ft / 116.59 m 16.00 ft / 4.88 m Ends: Unarmoured Main Belt covers 69 % of normal length Main belt does not fully cover magazines and engineering spaces
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max) Main: 6.00" / 152 mm 4.00" / 102 mm 5.00" / 127 mm
- Box over machinery & magazines: 5.00" / 127 mm Forecastle: 5.00" / 127 mm Quarter deck: 5.00" / 127 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 5.00" / 127 mm, Aft 5.00" / 127 mm
Machinery: Oil fired boilers, steam turbines, Electric cruising motors plus geared drives, 4 shafts, 140,868 shp / 105,088 Kw = 32.00 kts Range 10,000nm at 10.00 kts Bunker at max displacement = 2,579 tons
Complement: 1,263 - 1,643
Cost: £9.163 million / $36.653 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement: Armament: 2,907 tons, 8.4 % - Guns: 2,907 tons, 8.4 % Armour: 7,247 tons, 21.0 % - Belts: 1,356 tons, 3.9 % - Armament: 1,534 tons, 4.5 % - Armour Deck: 4,128 tons, 12.0 % - Conning Towers: 228 tons, 0.7 % Machinery: 4,778 tons, 13.9 % Hull, fittings & equipment: 15,891 tons, 46.1 % Fuel, ammunition & stores: 3,626 tons, 10.5 % Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0.0 %
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability: Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship): 50,654 lbs / 22,976 Kg = 24.7 x 16.0 " / 406 mm shells or 3.2 torpedoes Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.17 Metacentric height 5.8 ft / 1.8 m Roll period: 15.9 seconds Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 49 % - Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 1.23 Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.83
Hull form characteristics: Hull has a flush deck, an extended bulbous bow and large transom stern Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.498 / 0.503 Length to Beam Ratio: 9.34 : 1 'Natural speed' for length: 33.46 kts Power going to wave formation at top speed: 48 % Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 26 Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 33.00 degrees Stern overhang: -20.00 ft / -6.10 m Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length): Fore end, Aft end - Forecastle: 30.00 %, 38.00 ft / 11.58 m, 32.00 ft / 9.75 m - Forward deck: 30.00 %, 32.00 ft / 9.75 m, 32.00 ft / 9.75 m - Aft deck: 25.00 %, 32.00 ft / 9.75 m, 32.00 ft / 9.75 m - Quarter deck: 15.00 %, 32.00 ft / 9.75 m, 32.00 ft / 9.75 m - Average freeboard: 32.72 ft / 9.97 m
Ship space, strength and comments: Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 89.0 % - Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 258.2 % Waterplane Area: 53,494 Square feet or 4,970 Square metres Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 107 % Structure weight / hull surface area: 192 lbs/sq ft or 936 Kg/sq metre Hull strength (Relative): - Cross-sectional: 0.92 - Longitudinal: 2.19 - Overall: 1.00 Adequate machinery, storage, compartmentation space Excellent accommodation and workspace room Excellent seaboat, comfortable, can fire her guns in the heaviest weather
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 18, 2017 12:59:04 GMT -6
Here is a set of specifications for the Amagi. Unfortunately, lack of information at my disposal has required me to make educated guesses. I will research for more complete information.
Amagi, Japan Battlecruiser laid down 1921
Displacement:
39,079 t light; 41,818 t standard; 44,483 t normal; 46,614 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(832.17 ft / 826.00 ft) x 101.00 ft x (31.00 / 32.17 ft)
(253.65 m / 251.76 m) x 30.78 m x (9.45 / 9.81 m)
Armament:
10 - 16.00" / 406 mm 45.0 cal guns - 2,065.47lbs / 936.88kg shells, 150 per gun
Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1921 Model
5 x Twin mounts on centreline ends, majority forward
16 - 5.50" / 140 mm 45.0 cal guns - 83.91lbs / 38.06kg shells, 150 per gun
Breech loading guns in casemate mounts, 1921 Model
16 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
6 - 4.00" / 102 mm 45.0 cal guns - 32.28lbs / 14.64kg shells, 150 per gun
Breech loading guns in deck mounts, 1921 Model
6 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread
Weight of broadside 22,191 lbs / 10,066 kg
Main Torpedoes
8 - 0.0" / 0 mm, 24.00 ft / 7.32 m torpedoes - 0.000 t each, 0.000 t total
submerged side tubes
Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 9.80" / 249 mm 536.90 ft / 163.65 m 12.06 ft / 3.68 m
Ends: 5.00" / 127 mm 289.08 ft / 88.11 m 12.06 ft / 3.68 m
Upper: 5.00" / 127 mm 536.90 ft / 163.65 m 8.00 ft / 2.44 m
Main Belt covers 100 % of normal length
Main Belt inclined 12.00 degrees (positive = in)
- Torpedo Bulkhead - Additional damage containing bulkheads:
2.90" / 74 mm 536.90 ft / 163.65 m 28.74 ft / 8.76 m
Beam between torpedo bulkheads 90.00 ft / 27.43 m
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 10.0" / 254 mm - 11.0" / 279 mm
- Armoured deck - multiple decks:
For and Aft decks: 3.70" / 94 mm
Forecastle: 3.70" / 94 mm Quarter deck: 3.70" / 94 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 14.00" / 356 mm, Aft 3.00" / 76 mm
Machinery:
Oil fired boilers, steam turbines,
Geared drive, 4 shafts, 136,292 shp / 101,674 Kw = 30.00 kts
Range 8,000nm at 14.00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 4,796 tons
Complement:
1,530 - 1,990
Cost:
£10.240 million / $40.961 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 3,582 tons, 8.1 %
- Guns: 3,582 tons, 8.1 %
Armour: 13,840 tons, 31.1 %
- Belts: 4,249 tons, 9.6 %
- Torpedo bulkhead: 1,656 tons, 3.7 %
- Armament: 3,080 tons, 6.9 %
- Armour Deck: 4,397 tons, 9.9 %
- Conning Towers: 460 tons, 1.0 %
Machinery: 4,693 tons, 10.6 %
Hull, fittings & equipment: 16,964 tons, 38.1 %
Fuel, ammunition & stores: 5,403 tons, 12.1 %
Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0.0 %
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
63,890 lbs / 28,980 Kg = 31.2 x 16.0 " / 406 mm shells or 9.0 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.06
Metacentric height 5.7 ft / 1.7 m
Roll period: 17.8 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 82 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 1.27
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.42
Hull form characteristics:
Hull has a flush deck,
a normal bow and large transom stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.602 / 0.608
Length to Beam Ratio: 8.18 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 32.96 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 50 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 58
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 10.00 degrees
Stern overhang: -10.00 ft / -3.05 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 20.00 %, 35.00 ft / 10.67 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m
- Forward deck: 30.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m
- Aft deck: 35.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m
- Quarter deck: 15.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 30.00 ft / 9.14 m
- Average freeboard: 28.71 ft / 8.75 m
Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 86.0 %
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 222.1 %
Waterplane Area: 63,714 Square feet or 5,919 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 105 %
Structure weight / hull surface area: 199 lbs/sq ft or 970 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0.96
- Longitudinal: 1.45
- Overall: 1.00
Adequate machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Excellent accommodation and workspace room
Ship has slow, easy roll, a good, steady gun platform
Good seaboat, rides out heavy weather easily
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Post by rimbecano on Aug 18, 2017 13:54:40 GMT -6
Fight other battlecruisers acting as raiders or attacking your own smaller cruisers. Scout for the battlefleet and prevent the enemy's scouts from doing the same.Similar requirements. Fast speed to range ahead of the battleline and match enemy battlecruisers but not necessarily as fast as a light cruiser. You need to be able to drive off light cruisers attempting to scout for the enemy but not necessarily run them down and sink them. Guns and armor have to be balanced assuming that the enemy will do the same. So if both sides are carrying 12 inch guns, your armor needs to provide good protection from 12 inch guns. Here is where the Alaska design fails (I'm not as familiar with the B-65 or Deutschland). The Alaska's, in common with most Anglo-American battlecruiser designs, had very limited protection against their own caliber weapons. So if they run up into something their own size and firepower, they are in trouble. I think the German battlecruisers worked well in this role based on the battle of Jutland. [Edit - But the German battlecruisers tended to be more expensive than their equivalent generation German dreadnoughts so that's something to consider.] One thing I'll point out here is that a lot of this depends on the composition of your enemy's scouting and raiding forces. If his scouts and raiders are CLs/CAs/CHs, the requirements for this role are more akin to the CA-hunter role. If they're BCs, the requirements are more akin to the fast battle division role. I'll also note that even once everybody is using turbines, the physics of water drag make larger ships more efficient at reaching a given speed than smaller ships, so a CL is not necessarily going to outpace a contemporary battlecruiser. In my most recent game, even having saturated the tech tree, I only have a 2-knot difference between my most modern CLs and my fleet BCs, and only one knot over a class of down-gunned BCs meant to put me nearer to speed parity with even more underarmed enemy BCs that do match my CLs. The CLs could be made faster by making them bigger, but then again, I might squeeze another knot out of the BCs by bringing them fully up to the 52000 ton limit. I could certainly make the BCs faster if I could build them up to my 70kton+ nominal size limit rather than the game's hard coded limit. With only 4k remaining below the limit, and with no opponents pushing the limit, however, I see no reason to do a tonnage increment. So a lot depends on how many CLs your opponent needs, and how expensive you can afford your BCs to be: if your opponent is Britain, with the need to cover a lot of ocean, and you're the US, with plenty of budget, your BCs have a good chance of being faster than Britain's CLs. If your opponent is Austria, and you're Italy, Austria may not be building many CLs, but what CLs he builds will be heavier and faster, and you may not have the budget to build BCs that will be fast enough to catch those CLs without heavy compromises.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 18, 2017 18:48:08 GMT -6
Any ship moving through the water generates a wave system as its called that operates in a transverse manner in other words cross wise or outward from the hull. The velocity of the wave system is equal to the ships speed. This wave system uses energy from the propulsion system and you can't recover that lost energy. As the ships speed increases so does the length of this transverse wave. There is a ratio titled speed/length ratio and it is directly proportional to the speed in knots divided by the square root of the water line length. Another ratio or theorem was the length to beam. This ratio was optimized at 7.96 for battleships and 8.85 for cruisers. The Lexington's had a length to beam of 8.85 and their turning characteristics were poor. ( Just like pop said). The LtoB for the Iowa's was 7.96 but they had extended forecastles and amidships along with dual rudders and five bladed props inboard and four bladed outboard and a bulbous bow which greatly reduced drag at high speed. At 51,000 tons, they could achieve 35.4 knots. However, the Lexington's were clocked at much higher speeds on occasion. I will say that while we have dramatically improved propulsion, the physics of motion through water has not changed dramatically. The Length to Speed ratios of the 1930's still stand today. The Nimitz class carriers have a waterline length of 7.78 and develop 260,000 s.h.p. via four steam turbines. This lies between the Iowa's and the Midway's. Here endeth the lesson. Sorry for the lecture, I just love this stuff.
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Post by rimbecano on Aug 18, 2017 20:43:56 GMT -6
Any ship moving through the water generates a wave system as its called that operates in a transverse manner in other words cross wise or outward from the hull. The velocity of the wave system is equal to the ships speed. This wave system uses energy from the propulsion system and you can't recover that lost energy. As the ships speed increases so does the length of this transverse wave. There is a ratio titled speed/length ratio and it is directly proportional to the speed in knots divided by the square root of the water line length. Yep. Building a very light CL in RTW and trying to give it any kind of speed without making it hideously undergunned and underprotected is an exercise in frustration on account of this.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 18, 2017 20:54:14 GMT -6
Any ship moving through the water generates a wave system as its called that operates in a transverse manner in other words cross wise or outward from the hull. The velocity of the wave system is equal to the ships speed. This wave system uses energy from the propulsion system and you can't recover that lost energy. As the ships speed increases so does the length of this transverse wave. There is a ratio titled speed/length ratio and it is directly proportional to the speed in knots divided by the square root of the water line length. Yep. Building a very light CL in RTW and trying to give it any kind of speed without making it hideously undergunned and underprotected is an exercise in frustration on account of this. If RTW does model all of this correctly, you are correct. You can't sacrifice armament and protection for speed because you will lose the battle. A ship is a balanced system... or at least it should be. That's the way I build my ships.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 19, 2017 11:27:04 GMT -6
Just for curiosity and to learn, I have designed a light cruiser from Great Britain circa 1916. Generally, when I have a problem getting the composite strength to 1.00 which means a well balanced ship, I change the block coefficient. However, in the real world, it would mean changing the hull design so I am going to try other ways unless they don't work. I am going to change the maximum speed from 32.5 to 34.
Removing the torpedoes had no effect.
Decreasing the Conning tower armor had a minor effect.
Reducing the maximum thickness of the main armor from 4 inches to 2 almost fixed the problem. I reduced the armor belt height from 12 feet to 7 feet and that fixed the problem. As a bonus, I reduced the length of the armor belt from 420 feet to 400 and gained 500 miles in range.
HMS Pendragon, Great Britain light cruiser laid down 1916
Displacement: 7,819 t light; 8,086 t standard; 9,021 t normal; 9,768 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep) (548.36 ft / 547.00 ft) x 55.00 ft x (19.15 / 20.35 ft) (167.14 m / 166.73 m) x 16.76 m x (5.84 / 6.20 m)
Armament: 9 - 6.00" / 152 mm 45.0 cal guns - 108.93lbs / 49.41kg shells, 150 per gun Quick firing guns in deck and hoist mounts, 1916 Model 9 x Single mounts on centreline ends, majority forward 3 - 3.00" / 76.2 mm 45.0 cal guns - 13.62lbs / 6.18kg shells, 150 per gun Breech loading guns in deck mounts, 1916 Model 3 x Single mounts on side ends, majority aft 12 - 1.57" / 39.9 mm 45.0 cal guns - 1.94lbs / 0.88kg shells, 150 per gun Anti-air guns in deck mounts, 1916 Model 12 x Single mounts on side ends, evenly spread Weight of broadside 1,045 lbs / 474 kg
Armour: - Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg) Main: 2.00" / 51 mm 400.00 ft / 121.92 m 7.00 ft / 2.13 m Ends: Unarmoured Main Belt covers 113 % of normal length Main belt does not fully cover magazines and engineering spaces
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max) Main: 2.00" / 51 mm - -
- Armoured deck - multiple decks: For and Aft decks: 2.00" / 51 mm Forecastle: 2.00" / 51 mm Quarter deck: 2.00" / 51 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 2.00" / 51 mm, Aft 2.00" / 51 mm
Machinery: Oil fired boilers, steam turbines, Geared drive, 4 shafts, 92,764 shp / 69,202 Kw = 34.00 kts Range 5,500nm at 15.00 kts Bunker at max displacement = 1,682 tons
Complement: 462 - 601
Cost: £1.397 million / $5.588 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement: Armament: 273 tons, 3.0 % - Guns: 273 tons, 3.0 % Armour: 1,129 tons, 12.5 % - Belts: 227 tons, 2.5 % - Armament: 51 tons, 0.6 % - Armour Deck: 814 tons, 9.0 % - Conning Towers: 37 tons, 0.4 % Machinery: 3,456 tons, 38.3 % Hull, fittings & equipment: 2,961 tons, 32.8 % Fuel, ammunition & stores: 1,202 tons, 13.3 % Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0.0 %
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability: Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship): 6,698 lbs / 3,038 Kg = 62.0 x 6.0 " / 152 mm shells or 1.0 torpedoes Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.33 Metacentric height 3.4 ft / 1.0 m Roll period: 12.5 seconds Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 46 % - Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.26 Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 0.84
Hull form characteristics: Hull has a flush deck, a normal bow and large transom stern Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.548 / 0.558 Length to Beam Ratio: 9.95 : 1 'Natural speed' for length: 26.56 kts Power going to wave formation at top speed: 63 % Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 50 Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 3.00 degrees Stern overhang: -2.00 ft / -0.61 m Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length): Fore end, Aft end - Forecastle: 20.00 %, 26.00 ft / 7.92 m, 23.00 ft / 7.01 m - Forward deck: 65.00 %, 23.00 ft / 7.01 m, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m - Aft deck: 0.00 %, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m - Quarter deck: 15.00 %, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m - Average freeboard: 19.44 ft / 5.93 m
Ship space, strength and comments: Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 134.1 % - Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 169.0 % Waterplane Area: 21,817 Square feet or 2,027 Square metres Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 101 % Structure weight / hull surface area: 89 lbs/sq ft or 434 Kg/sq metre Hull strength (Relative): - Cross-sectional: 0.96 - Longitudinal: 1.48 - Overall: 1.00 Cramped machinery, storage, compartmentation space Excellent accommodation and workspace room Poor seaboat, wet and uncomfortable, reduced performance in heavy weather
Here is the original design. HMS Arthur, Great Britain light cruiser laid down 1916
Displacement: 7,835 t light; 8,102 t standard; 9,021 t normal; 9,755 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep) (548.36 ft / 547.00 ft) x 55.00 ft x (19.15 / 20.33 ft) (167.14 m / 166.73 m) x 16.76 m x (5.84 / 6.20 m)
Armament: 9 - 6.00" / 152 mm 45.0 cal guns - 108.93lbs / 49.41kg shells, 150 per gun Quick firing guns in deck and hoist mounts, 1916 Model 9 x Single mounts on centreline ends, majority forward 3 - 3.00" / 76.2 mm 45.0 cal guns - 13.62lbs / 6.18kg shells, 150 per gun Breech loading guns in deck mounts, 1916 Model 3 x Single mounts on side ends, majority aft 12 - 1.57" / 39.9 mm 45.0 cal guns - 1.94lbs / 0.88kg shells, 150 per gun Anti-air guns in deck mounts, 1916 Model 12 x Single mounts on side ends, evenly spread Weight of broadside 1,045 lbs / 474 kg Main Torpedoes 8 - 21.0" / 533 mm, 0.00 ft / 0.00 m torpedoes - 0.000 t each, 0.000 t total In 1 sets of deck mounted side rotating tubes 2nd Torpedoes 21 - 21.0" / 533 mm, 0.00 ft / 0.00 m torpedoes - 0.000 t each, 0.000 t total submerged side tubes
Armour: - Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg) Main: 4.00" / 102 mm 420.00 ft / 128.02 m 12.00 ft / 3.66 m Ends: Unarmoured Main Belt covers 118 % of normal length
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max) Main: 2.00" / 51 mm - -
- Armoured deck - multiple decks: For and Aft decks: 2.00" / 51 mm Forecastle: 2.00" / 51 mm Quarter deck: 2.00" / 51 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 4.00" / 102 mm, Aft 4.00" / 102 mm
Machinery: Oil fired boilers, steam turbines, Geared drive, 4 shafts, 77,328 shp / 57,687 Kw = 32.50 kts Range 5,400nm at 15.00 kts Bunker at max displacement = 1,653 tons
Complement: 462 - 601
Cost: £1.266 million / $5.064 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement: Armament: 273 tons, 3.0 % - Guns: 273 tons, 3.0 % Armour: 1,750 tons, 19.4 % - Belts: 811 tons, 9.0 % - Armament: 51 tons, 0.6 % - Armour Deck: 814 tons, 9.0 % - Conning Towers: 75 tons, 0.8 % Machinery: 2,881 tons, 31.9 % Hull, fittings & equipment: 2,930 tons, 32.5 % Fuel, ammunition & stores: 1,186 tons, 13.1 % Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0.0 %
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability: Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship): 9,078 lbs / 4,118 Kg = 84.1 x 6.0 " / 152 mm shells or 1.2 torpedoes Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.27 Metacentric height 3.1 ft / 1.0 m Roll period: 13.1 seconds Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 52 % - Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.28 Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.03
Hull form characteristics: Hull has a flush deck, a normal bow and large transom stern Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.548 / 0.558 Length to Beam Ratio: 9.95 : 1 'Natural speed' for length: 26.56 kts Power going to wave formation at top speed: 60 % Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 50 Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 3.00 degrees Stern overhang: -2.00 ft / -0.61 m Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length): Fore end, Aft end - Forecastle: 20.00 %, 26.00 ft / 7.92 m, 23.00 ft / 7.01 m - Forward deck: 65.00 %, 23.00 ft / 7.01 m, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m - Aft deck: 0.00 %, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m - Quarter deck: 15.00 %, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m, 15.00 ft / 4.57 m - Average freeboard: 19.44 ft / 5.93 m
Ship space, strength and comments: Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 113.7 % - Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 169.0 % Waterplane Area: 21,817 Square feet or 2,027 Square metres Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 107 % Structure weight / hull surface area: 88 lbs/sq ft or 429 Kg/sq metre Hull strength (Relative): - Cross-sectional: 0.96 - Longitudinal: 1.48 - Overall: 1.00 Cramped machinery, storage, compartmentation space Excellent accommodation and workspace room
UPDATE: I went back and increased the HMS Arthur's max speed to 34 knots but only changed the length of the armor and the height, and that got me very close. I did not have to change the thickness. However, after putting the armor setting back to original HMS Arthur settings and changing the draught from 19.5 to 21.4, I got my 1.00 reading that I needed and 34 knots of speed. Just changing the draught fixed the problem. Interesting and I will have to research this more carefully.
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Post by oaktree on Aug 22, 2017 19:22:32 GMT -6
oldpop2000 I always enjoy discussing/debating with you, as you always provide interesting information and food for thought. I agree that Japan was not going to keep her Alliance with Britain, primarily due to the opposition of the Commonwealth nations (Australia was particularly vehement). However since we were postulating a world where the Washington Treaties did not come to pass, I felt that it was at least worthy of consideration. Though even with the Washington Treaties not happening, I'd still agree that the alliance was most likely dead in the water, as the 1921 Conference revealed deep misgivings about it on the part of the Dominions, and the British would have prioritized their relationship with the dominions over that of their alliance with Japan (they had to try to keep the Empire united). However I still felt it worthy of consideration, at least as a remote possibility. Even if it had lasted though, since the war we postulated was sparked by the Japanese invading Manchuria, the British (even in the unlikely event that they still were allied) would probably not felt obliged to declare war on the U.S, as it would have been a hostile act on the part of Japan that caused it, much like in 1905 with the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan declared war on Russia, and attacked the Russian fleet 3 hours before war was declared. I think it was Willmott in _The Last Century of Sea Power_ that wrote that Britain essentially decided that a war with the US was something to be totally avoided by 1910. (I need to see if I can find the exact reference. Too many books read on the subject recently.) I suspect the main thought was that the RN and Britain could not sufficiently harm the US and its continental heartland while the US could and would probably attack Canada and sweep up British possessions in the Caribbean at the very least. So treaty aside, how is supporting Japan in a war against the US over China really in Britain's best interests?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 22, 2017 20:13:38 GMT -6
oldpop2000 I always enjoy discussing/debating with you, as you always provide interesting information and food for thought. I agree that Japan was not going to keep her Alliance with Britain, primarily due to the opposition of the Commonwealth nations (Australia was particularly vehement). However since we were postulating a world where the Washington Treaties did not come to pass, I felt that it was at least worthy of consideration. Though even with the Washington Treaties not happening, I'd still agree that the alliance was most likely dead in the water, as the 1921 Conference revealed deep misgivings about it on the part of the Dominions, and the British would have prioritized their relationship with the dominions over that of their alliance with Japan (they had to try to keep the Empire united). However I still felt it worthy of consideration, at least as a remote possibility. Even if it had lasted though, since the war we postulated was sparked by the Japanese invading Manchuria, the British (even in the unlikely event that they still were allied) would probably not felt obliged to declare war on the U.S, as it would have been a hostile act on the part of Japan that caused it, much like in 1905 with the Russo-Japanese War, when Japan declared war on Russia, and attacked the Russian fleet 3 hours before war was declared. I think it was Willmott in _The Last Century of Sea Power_ that wrote that Britain essentially decided that a war with the US was something to be totally avoided by 1910. (I need to see if I can find the exact reference. Too many books read on the subject recently.) I suspect the main thought was that the RN and Britain could not sufficiently harm the US and its continental heartland while the US could and would probably attack Canada and sweep up British possessions in the Caribbean at the very least. So treaty aside, how is supporting Japan in a war against the US over China really in Britain's best interests? It is in Willmott The Last Century of Sea Power: From Port Arthur to Chanak, 1894-1922 Volume 1. The gist is that the American Civil War created a few problems but the United States was Britain's most imoprtant single market and was critical in terms of overseas earnings with reference to property, investments, and carrying trade. After 1900 Britain decided to seek any political and peaceful solution to any problem that arose between itself and the United States rather than go to war with that country. In other words, don't bite the hand that feeds you.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 23, 2017 9:07:10 GMT -6
Just some more information on this subject of a possible conflict between the British and the US. In The Rise and Fall of British Naval Master by Paul Kennedy, he states that the growth of American power by the turn of the century was making the British position in the Western Hemisphere increasingly untenable. The problem of the defense of Canada was always an insoluble one. In the Western Hemisphere, a large navy was of slight value, according to the Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office Godley. He goes on to say that any conflict with the US would be financially disastrous for both sides. Eventually the suspicion and antagonism was slowly replaced by a pride in the racial and cultural similarities of the two Anglo-Saxon powers; many Britons, he states saw the US as an ally in the troubled times ahead and the US Anglophobia eventually retreated to an understanding of British imperial problems. The naval aspect was that after the 1898 Spanish American War, the US became fascinated with naval power and increased its number of battleship. The discussion and explanations go on and it is a very good explanation.
It is my belief that the British realized their waning economic and naval strength in the world, and that there were now more nations with increasingly larger navies including Russia, Germany, Italy and Japan. They began to realized that we were never their natural enemy but in fact, their natural ally. In the area of Naval strength, we must realize that with the advent of oil-powered ships, not coal, the British now had supply issues. The Middle Eastern oil had not been fully developed yet, so we were their best source of oil. The Germans and Russia's had access in Romania for the Germans and the Ukraine and Kazakh for the Russian's. Geostrategy and economics had changed everything.
The reference is in Chapter four, The Shifting Balance of Power, start at the beginning of the chapter because it does have some other information as preliminary information such as "By 1900 the world was capable of building more ships more quickly than at any time over the previous century...". This is a key statement. I can't give you exact page numbers since this is an Ebook.
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Post by oaktree on Aug 23, 2017 20:04:12 GMT -6
More countries getting industrialized along with the capability to build large ships, and eventually at speeds competitively with the British.* And in an area that was of utmost strategic importance to the British nation and empire since they were not a land military power and were still dependent on the isolation and protection being an island nation gave them. Along with the economic benefits of the empire and being a major trading and finance nation.**
And Britain also realized that the two-power standard was not going to be doable much longer. Even more so if you counted the USA in the equation since they were starting to go into a period where they were looking international in order to find new frontiers and markets to exploit.
* - D K Brown in _Warrior to Dreadnought_ mentions the build time of British and French capital ships in the late 19th century and how the British could simply build their ships faster. With HMS Dreadnought then being a special case as well that any other nation would have probably had trouble doing at the time. And by World War II the United States was getting that sort of advantage. Though I don't have any data on relative warship construction times for ships in the 1930s and 1940s. I expect the US was able to martial materials and manpower for construction much better than Japan.
** - Which was the root of British foreign policy in the late 18th and early 19th century. Use the navy to keep England secure and support taking out your enemies colonies and trade. And give financial aid to whichever European land power that was your current ally since your army was not that large.
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Post by babylon218 on Aug 26, 2017 17:43:33 GMT -6
One thing I should point out as I read this thread: I see some criticism of the Lexington as being little improvement on previous designs (namely HMS Hood): Hood was completed in 1920, Lexington laid down in 1921; while Hood was designed in 1914, she was massively redesigned between May-August 1916 in the wake of Jütland. Lexington was designed in 1918. Based on this, I would tend to regard Lexington as a contemporary of Hood and not a next-gen BC. Yes, this does make the situation worse since she would be entering service alongside the next-gen BCs of Britain and Japan, but food for thought when considering the Lexington design - she was designed to face Hood, not G3.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 26, 2017 19:12:31 GMT -6
The original requirements from the Bureau of Construction in 1911 for these battle-cruisers was in response to the IJN Kongo's. In fact the studies conducted by the Naval War College over several years predated the HMS Invincible class. A design was submitted in 1909 to the General Board but was not approved for construction. They later became part of the Naval Act of 1916. However due to the needs of the war, they were postponed to build escorts and ASW ships. It is true that characteristics of the HMS Hood were used and adopted in their updated designs, but by the time they were started, Japan was our primary enemy, not the British. The US Navy used assessments developed by the British Royal Navy of the performance of their different class's of battlecruisers. The British had reasoned that the lack of armor was not the issue in the losses at that battle but the flash protection. You could stretch the point that they were contemporary but in fact, that is not true. The Lexington's had already been designed and the designs were modified based on the British assessments. Hood was also, but the Lexington's were ahead of that ship by over 10 years. The Admiral class of ships, of which Hood was the first, was finally ordered in April of 1916 but the design was altered after the problems at Jutland. Her keel was laid in September 1, 1916. My judgement is that the Lexington's were ahead of Admiralty class but like Hood, modified to capture the problems recognized in the Jutland After Action reports and investigations. I believe that I have posted this already, but here is the link to the original design drawing of October 12, 1912. These were to be the Lexington class battlecruisers. www.shipscribe.com/styles/S-584/images/s-file/s584024.jpg
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Post by cv10 on Sept 1, 2017 8:38:39 GMT -6
I’m going to reiterate that I think that the Lexington-Class Battlecruisers must also be compared to the British as well as the Japanese battlecruisers. While I think that a war between the two during the 1920s/early 1930s was (very) unlikely, I also feel that such a war would be nearly as unlikely as the U.S going to war with Japan during that same period.
Why do I think that the Lexington-Class must also be compared to the British? Because the United States Navy felt that the other country that it would most likely fight during this period, after Japan, was the British Empire. Yes, most of the U.S War Games in the 1920s and 1930s predicted an “Orange War”, and truth be told, that was the one that was most likely, which is to say highly unlikely of actually happening. I've been digging around a trove of documents I acquired while on a research trip to the National Archives concerning interwar naval policy. I think what I found does support my examination of the Lexington-Class in terms of comparing them to British battlecruisers as a theoretical opponent.
Note: For ease of reading, direct quotations of the document are in bold.
The document itself is a memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations concerning war plans, and was approved the 17th of March in 1924. The introduction follows:
"Japan and the British Empire are the only nations whose naval strength is sufficiently great to permit them to dispute with the United States control of sea areas that are important to the United States. Although our relations with both of these countries are friendly at present, causes of friction exist that render war with either or both of these nations a possible eventuality that must be recognized and provided for."
While the Navy planned for war against Japan, it did recognize that war with the British was also a (remote) possibility. However the Navy does note that war with both powers was unlikely. The document goes on:
"Our conflict of policy with Japan is more acute than our conflict of policy with the British Empire. Should we become involved in a war against the British Empire, Japan may be expected to join with her against us. Should we become involved in a war against Japan, it is possible that the British Empire might join Japan. It is therefore, of first importance that our Navy should be developed and maintained in a state of readiness to support our national policies against Japan. It is next in importance that our navy should be prepared to operate against the British Empire or a combination of the British Empire and Japan"
Again, there's the recognition that Japan is the primary "enemy" that the United States would face. However the second enemy is Great Britain. In addition, Navy felt that while it was remotely possible that the British might join Japan in a war against us, that the Japanese would likely join in if the UK went to war with Britain. Now, in hindsight we know that this would almost certainly not have happened: however for the purposes of the United States Navy during this period, it was something to consider/worry about. The Document goes on:
"In reference to the general subject of strategic disposition, the Director of War Plan Division invites attention to importance of having the U.S Fleet visit all important concentration points at frequent intervals in order that undue importance cannot be necessarily attached to such concentrations in times of strained relations"
What this little bit indicates is that the Fleet needed to regularly visit the places that would be its war stations so that if tensions became high, the deployment of the fleet to a forward base would be construed as normal, rather than provocative. So the document goes on to recommend that the Fleet concentrate at Hawaii and Manila within the next year, and suggests that at some later date, it should concentrate in New York. I’m not sure that would have followed: even if routine, the deployment of the Fleet to either New York or Hawaii/Manila would have been seen as alarming by the British/Japanese if tensions between either of the two countries and the U.S had deteriorated. Again, the Navy considers the need to concentrate at points during peace that would enable them to concentrate it against Japan and/or the British if war seemed imminent.
“The immediate task that confronts the U.S Navy is, therefore, to attain and maintain a state of readiness hat will permit us to gain and exercise control of (1) the Western Pacific against Japan or (2) of the Western Atlantic against the British Empire. Our state of readiness should be such that it will enable us to exert our full naval strength at the moment and in the place where its use will be most effective. In the case of a war with Japan our strength should be exerted in the Western Pacific before Japan can capture the Philippines, and persistently maintained there. In the case of a war with the British Empire our strength should be exerted in the Western Atlantic before the British Fleet can become established in Canadian bases. Anything short of these will undoubtedly lead to a long an exhausting of doubtful outcome. We cannot conscientiously recommend any lower standard of readiness”
So the point I’m getting at here is that even though the risk of war with the British was highly unlikely (the Navy acknowledges this), the Navy did consider that the British were one of the only two powers that it could reasonably expect to face in battle. Naval strategic thinking insisted that after Japan, it was most important for the USN to plan for a war against the British. I’m not trying to come off as stubborn or insinuate that war was likely between the United States and the United Kingdom (it wasn’t). However, as the U.S Navy listed the Royal Navy as one of the two navies that it should actively plan to have to fight, the Lexington-Class battlecruisers must be compared to their British counterparts, at least in my opinion.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 1, 2017 9:40:25 GMT -6
...... So the point I’m getting at here is that even though the risk of war with the British was highly unlikely (the Navy acknowledges this), the Navy did consider that the British were one of the only two powers that it could reasonably expect to face in battle. Naval strategic thinking insisted that after Japan, it was most important for the USN to plan for a war against the British. I’m not trying to come off as stubborn or insinuate that war was likely between the United States and the United Kingdom (it wasn’t). However, as the U.S Navy listed the Royal Navy as one of the two navies that it should actively plan to have to fight, the Lexington-Class battlecruisers must be compared to their British counterparts, at least in my opinion.
It is well known that you plan for any contingency but you prioritize. In fact we had to assume that Great Britain could be a possible opponent but in terms of priority, they were at the bottom of the list. Japan was accepted as the priority one opponent, we built our ships to deal with theirs and we gamed our possible conflict with them both at sea and on the game tables at the Naval War College. I am certain, Britain was gamed also. At the time of this memorandum, there was no two ocean navy. there was the Pacific fleet and the Atlantic but they were commanded as one force. It was called the United States Fleet under CINCUS. The structure was the Battle Fleet and the Scouting Fleet. During the early fleet problems, the Scouting fleet would move from Virginia to the Central American waters, while the Battle Fleet would sail from California to the same location. I will concede that in the 1923 fleet problem and 1924, the Black Fleet which consisted of the Scouting fleet was to represent the British which meant that the US Navy still considered them a possible opponent. However, the fleet problems of 1925 and after, Black was the Japanese Navy. Funding and planning for a fleet problem had to be finished by October of the previous year since that is when the new budget took effect. This would mean that 1923 would have been the last year the US Navy and possibly the US government felt that the British could be an adversary. . They would have started budget planning for the 1925 fiscal year in June of 1924. It would appear that the British were off the hit list by that date. Your memorandum was written before the change in priorities for opponents. It was dated March of 1924, but planning for the new budget and hence, the new fleet problem for 1925 would have started in June, as I have indicated. I suspect the General Board was considering the issue of priorities at the time of the memo but that later documents might show their change in that priority. Just my assessment.
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