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Post by babylon218 on Sept 6, 2017 14:23:52 GMT -6
I would provide a little information which may be pertinent to this discussion; taken from A Marine Forensic analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismark by Bill Jurens: 1. Hood was sunk at circa 16,650 yards (not at long range). 2. Hood's weight breakdown by weight shows 30% armour which is highly respectable for her day (consistent with a Battleship) but contrasts with circa 40% for Bismark. 3. Hood had a long tradition as acting as a flag ship. Prince of Wales subsequently fulfilled the role of flagship so she was certainly capable of fulfilling the role. Would the raw crew be considered a factor? Good information and thanks for reminding me about all this. I haven't reviewed Juren's article on Navweaps in a while. Here is link for all to use - www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood.phpHere armor scheme was deficient in certain areas though and the Admiralty was aware of it and made comments on it. However, they never did perform the upgrade. I wonder if it was lack of funds because I know that many of the shipyards that had been used to build the naval vessels had gone out of business. Hood's armour was scheduled for upgrading (tragically in the exact area she was fatally hit in 1941), but the outbreak of war forced it to be postponed. It was rescheduled for (I believe) June/July 1941, just a month or so too late to save her. As far as the ballistics go, it's worth noting the hit was on Hood's sloped armour, not the main deck. This armour was designed to repel close range fire but was vulnerable to hits from medium range (where the shells would be travelling at a 45-degree angle - 90-degrees relative to the sloped deck). When Hood was hit, the shell was at a perpendicular angle and penetrated into one of her magazines. The issue for naval designers was that as gunnery ranges increased following WWI so too did the range at which shells fell at a 45-degree angle, rendering the sloped deck not only useless, but an actual liability. This is part of the reason battleship designs adopted flat decks following the activation of the Escalation Clause of the London Naval Treaty in 1936, but Hood was too old to take advantage. The best the RN could do was to increase her deck armour (which was still less than optimal) and plan to boost/rectify the slope armour at a later date - Hood was still the most powerful of the RN's fastest ships at the outbreak of war (the KGV wasn't quite ready yet) and she was needed in case war broke out.
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 6, 2017 14:45:54 GMT -6
I think the Lexington gets somewhat unfairly maligned as a design.
With respect to the roles for large cruisers:
1. Heavy scout 2. Distant projection of naval power 3. Commerce protection 4. Fast wing of the Battlefleet
With respect to Battlecruisers
1. British - all big gun armament and thus developed to fight at long range. 2. German - big guns for long range but higher rates of fire, higher velocity and modest calibre give advantages at closer range. Retention of medium battery and thicker armour for medium/close range action. Probably made consideration of frequent poor visibility in the North Sea.
The principle role of Lexington was 1 but she was also well suited to 2 and 3. Likely to be deployed in Pacific or Atlantic and thus follows similar general design principle to British ships.
The slope of the 7" belt would make it equivalent to a greater thickness of vertical plate but as range increases, so does the probability of hits on horizontal protection and thus deck armour becomes more important (similar rationale to Standard battleships).
When ordered in 1916, the USA lacked modern cruisers and a scouting function would appear somewhat essential if contemplating action in Pacific or Atlantic.
As originally designed and ordered, she was more closely contemporary to Repulse and the original Admiral design than Amagi or G3. Also, the US would (with laid down units) be looking at 3 x 8 ship squadrons of somewhat modern Battleships; this would likely necessitate a British or Japanese force to incorporate their 16" gun Battlecruisers into the line of battle and thus they are rather more optimised for role 4.
Even when operating against Battleships, the Lexington's 16" battery would confer an advantage against all but a few potential foreign opponents (Nagato or Tosa).
The only real downside for these vessels is potentially poor performance of US guns (whilst rangefinders and fire control computers were excellent, US ships operating in WW1 achieved poor results with long range gunnery due to erratic dispersion of their salvos) and poor performance of US shells. Having said that, in the event of a potential war, it is quicker to obtain better shells than to build ships.
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 6, 2017 14:54:17 GMT -6
I have read somewhere (DK Brown I think) that the plans to upgrade Hood kept being put on hold as there was always a reason found to retain her in commission and delay the modernisation. For her day, she was widely viewed as the most powerful ship afloat and the vessel that could least afforded to be done without!!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 14:58:08 GMT -6
I have read somewhere (DK Brown I think) that the plans to upgrade Hood kept being put on hold as there was always a reason found to retain her in commission and delay the modernisation. For her day, she was widely viewed as the most powerful ship afloat and the vessel that could least afforded to be done without!! I have read that same problem as you have. I need to find out where that was mentioned.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 15:35:54 GMT -6
I've been going over some information from a book titled "Killing the Bismarck: Destroying the Pride of Hitler's Fleet.
He makes the comment that "faith in the concept having been broken" referring to the fact that Hood was the last battlecruiser built. He goes on to say that due to the economic draining after the war, Hood, Renown and Repulse were retained. He states that from 1921 thru 1937 she toured the world, flying the flag of the British Empire. She was externally impressive, seemingly invulnerable and still the biggest, but actually a thin shell, an illusory gloss hiding vulnerabilities that would be starkly exposed during the Second World War. His best comment was " a heavyweight boxer with a glass jaw". I thought it was interesting that of the three remaining battlecruisers, two were sunk by the end of 1941. He states that in early 1939 it was suggested that Hood go into a deep refit that would rectify her vulnerabilies..... She was actually stationed with Force H and was headed back there when the Bismarck situation occurred and she was diverted to the North. According to the last surviving member of the crew, when Admiral Whitworth explained that if it came to a battle, the battlecruiser would close fast, bow on to present a narrow profile. Briggs states that this was the first indication that the ship was very vulnerable to plunging fire.
While Briggs information is interesting, it does come long after the event and I wonder how much of the history written after the war had an effect on his thoughts. He's gone now, so we will never know.
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Post by cv10 on Sept 6, 2017 17:38:22 GMT -6
I would provide a little information which may be pertinent to this discussion; taken from A Marine Forensic analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismark by Bill Jurens: 1. Hood was sunk at circa 16,650 yards (not at long range). 2. Hood's weight breakdown by weight shows 30% armour which is highly respectable for her day (consistent with a Battleship) but contrasts with circa 40% for Bismark. 3. Hood had a long tradition as acting as a flag ship. Prince of Wales subsequently fulfilled the role of flagship so she was certainly capable of fulfilling the role. Would the raw crew be considered a factor? Good information and thanks for reminding me about all this. I haven't reviewed Juren's article on Navweaps in a while. Here is link for all to use - www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood.phpHere armor scheme was deficient in certain areas though and the Admiralty was aware of it and made comments on it. However, they never did perform the upgrade. I wonder if it was lack of funds because I know that many of the shipyards that had been used to build the naval vessels had gone out of business. I've read from a few British sources that her upgrades were planned because the Admiralty realized what a time-bomb that defect was, but kept getting pushed back because the British were desperately short of capital ships. After a convoy got trashed by the two German battlecruisers and HMS Rawalpindi was sunk trying to distract them from the Merchantmen in November of 1939, Admiralty policy required that the larger convoys be escorted by at least one battleship, which really thinned out the battle squadrons. As such, the Admiralty felt that it could not spare HMS Hood.
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Post by cv10 on Sept 6, 2017 17:49:20 GMT -6
Getting back to the Lexington-Class, I've actually come across an interesting document. In the aftermath of the Washington Naval Treaty, the Navy was very worried about the fact that Japan had 4 battlecruisers while the United States had none, as We would not be able to complete them as battlecruisers. The big fear was that they could be used to cut our supply lines to the Philippines and we''d have no effective countermeasure. Some people in the Navy actually came up with a compromise that they felt should have been made where in exchange for a further reduction in the size of the U.S Fleet (We'd scrap the Wyoming and New York Class as well as both Florida Class and the USS Oklahoma [We'd keep the Nevada]) in exchange for the Japanese scrapping the Kongo-Class (We'd also let them complete the Mutsu in exchange for the USS Colorado). The Agreement did not come to fruition, though the Mutsu/Colorado deal ended up working out in a different form.
[Note: the 1st bolded statement's accuracy has been called into question due to the memorandum that informed it. While it is entirely possible that the Navy did worry about not having any battlecruisers while it's primary planned enemy had 4, the memorandum has not been identified as having come from within the navy, and as such, I'd like to state that my comment is not supportable by the evidence that I based it on]
[Note: the 2nd bolded characterization of these documents is not accurate. I apologize for having mischaracterized the following memorandum as having even come from inside the Navy. The author of the memorandum has not been connected to the Navy in any way aside from having produced this memo and brought it to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy]
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 18:06:48 GMT -6
Getting back to the Lexington-Class, I've actually come across an interesting document. In the aftermath of the Washington Naval Treaty, the Navy was very worried about the fact that Japan had 4 battlecruisers while the United States had none, as We would not be able to complete them as battlecruisers. The big fear was that they could be used to cut our supply lines to the Philippines and we''d have no effective countermeasure. The Navy actually came up with a compromise that they felt should have been made where in exchange for a further reduction in the size of the U.S Fleet (We'd scrap the Wyoming and New York Class as well as both Florida Class and the USS Oklahoma [We'd keep the Nevada]) in exchange for the Japanese scrapping the Kongo-Class (We'd also let them complete the Mutsu in exchange for the USS Colorado). The Agreement did not come to fruition, though the Mutsu/Colorado deal ended up working out in a different form. Is that a paper document from the archives or is it available on line. I would like to read it if possible.
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Post by cv10 on Sept 6, 2017 18:48:05 GMT -6
Getting back to the Lexington-Class, I've actually come across an interesting document. In the aftermath of the Washington Naval Treaty, the Navy was very worried about the fact that Japan had 4 battlecruisers while the United States had none, as We would not be able to complete them as battlecruisers. The big fear was that they could be used to cut our supply lines to the Philippines and we''d have no effective countermeasure. The Navy actually came up with a compromise that they felt should have been made where in exchange for a further reduction in the size of the U.S Fleet (We'd scrap the Wyoming and New York Class as well as both Florida Class and the USS Oklahoma [We'd keep the Nevada]) in exchange for the Japanese scrapping the Kongo-Class (We'd also let them complete the Mutsu in exchange for the USS Colorado). The Agreement did not come to fruition, though the Mutsu/Colorado deal ended up working out in a different form. Is that a paper document from the archives or is it available on line. I would like to read it if possible. It's from the National Archives, which in my experience, does not have a good track record with Digitalization. However, I've got pictures of it (it was a short memorandum that was forwarded to Admiral Coontz from the Secretary of the Navy). I've not been able to track down any information on the Author: Brandon Barringer, except that his father was the noted Geologist David M. Barringer. I would be careful about reading too much into it: this was a memorandum of a suggestion, and it is entirely possible that Coontz noted that he received it and then simply ignored its suggestions. I did not find anything that indicated that it was seriously considered. Here are the pictures that I have:
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Post by cv10 on Sept 6, 2017 18:52:16 GMT -6
I want to emphasize that the memorandum above was a suggestion that was not official naval policy. I fear that I may have inadvertently implied that it was accepted as such. The worry that we lacked any kind of battlecruisers to counter Japan did exist, as the author of this memorandum notes. However his opinion as to how to rectify that should not be taken as official naval policy, as I do not have any documents which indicate what became of it.
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Post by cv10 on Sept 6, 2017 18:56:38 GMT -6
As a corker, perhaps I should throw in the memorandum where the Navy General Board explained to a Senator why his idea of scrapping all of the Navy's capital ships was a bad idea.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 20:06:20 GMT -6
Is that a paper document from the archives or is it available on line. I would like to read it if possible. It's from the National Archives, which in my experience, does not have a good track record with Digitalization. However, I've got pictures of it (it was a short memorandum that was forwarded to Admiral Coontz from the Secretary of the Navy). I've not been able to track down any information on the Author: Brandon Barringer, except that his father was the noted Geologist David M. Barringer. I would be careful about reading too much into it: this was a memorandum of a suggestion, and it is entirely possible that Coontz noted that he received it and then simply ignored its suggestions. I did not find anything that indicated that it was seriously considered. Here are the pictures that I have:
Excellent work and thank you for taking the time to scan and present the document. In the history of these ships, this is an important piece for the path of history. I doubt the Japanese would have ever responded to this idea, personally.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 20:14:00 GMT -6
As a corker, perhaps I should throw in the memorandum where the Navy General Board explained to a Senator why his idea of scrapping all of the Navy's capital ships was a bad idea. I've heard about that one.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 20:14:35 GMT -6
I want to emphasize that the memorandum above was a suggestion that was not official naval policy. I fear that I may have inadvertently implied that it was accepted as such. The worry that we lacked any kind of battlecruisers to counter Japan did exist, as the author of this memorandum notes. However his opinion as to how to rectify that should not be taken as official naval policy, as I do not have any documents which indicate what became of it. I am still trying to determine who exactly he was, it might help us.
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Post by cv10 on Sept 6, 2017 21:23:23 GMT -6
I want to emphasize that the memorandum above was a suggestion that was not official naval policy. I fear that I may have inadvertently implied that it was accepted as such. The worry that we lacked any kind of battlecruisers to counter Japan did exist, as the author of this memorandum notes. However his opinion as to how to rectify that should not be taken as official naval policy, as I do not have any documents which indicate what became of it. I am still trying to determine who exactly he was, it might help us. These were actually pictures I took of them at the national archives, so it was no trouble! I actually found a cover for the memorandum that could possibly shed some light on the author. From it, I'm not sure who he was, but it does not seem that he was in the Navy, as his father forwarded the letter to SecNav, who then sent it to Coontz. While it is not unheard of for people to buck the chain of command and write directly to the boss, the fact that his father forwarded it for him seems to be evidence that he was otherwise not someone who would be consulted by the higher ups in the Navy. Coontz's writing on it is to request that a reply be drafted to the person who wrote the memo saying it will be given "due consideration", however one of the words is very hard to read, and it might be the word "never" or "receive". I think "receive" makes more sense. However "matter will receive due consideration" is one of those phrases that can indicate that the paper in question is to be ignored, but the sender cannot be. Since his father was influential enough to get a memo to the SecNav, it could be fair to say that Coontz felt some reply was needed, as in this case, not replying was not an option. Again, I have found nothing on the author aside from this cover letter. If he was not otherwise connected to the Navy, than in a sense, this memorandum is largely worthless: another example of a civilian interloper who felt the Navy needed his sage advice. If he was connected to the Navy, than his ideas were certainly novel, however since this did not happen and there was no further mention of it (as far as I know), than it was likely that this was simply one officer's idea who used family connections to try and bring his ideas to the highest level of policy-making.
I really hope that I have not over-represented this memo: given my observations of above, I feel that I have seriously mischaracterized this memo even just in attributing it to someone in the Navy. The mistake on my part was not looking into the author a bit more. To be frank, I should have been a bit interested in why the author did not have a naval rank (which would have otherwise been listed). Most of the documents have some sort of paper at the end that says to the effect "this memo/paper/plan was approved by _____". The lack of this should have also caused me to look at this a bit harder before posting it.
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