Armored Warfare and the North African Campaign

[cv10]

So I must admit that this is not my area of expertise, however I know a little bit. The thing that strikes me as interesting is that during the North African campaign, armored formations relied on celestial navigation to determine their positions due to the lack of landmarks. An interesting example of when a nautical concept was used by land forces.

In addition, it seems to me that armor superiority was a rather fickle thing during the campaign. At first, the British enjoyed an advantage due to the relatively poor quality of Italian tanks. If I recall correctly, the Matilda II was rather effective in combat, as it had thick armor (light anti-tank shells often bounced right off), but it was limited by poor speed. Then the Germans armor superiority for a time due to their superior tanks and more experienced tank crews. However the Germans were limited by the difficulty of supplying the Africa Korps with supplies, fuel, and replacement parts. The deployment of the American-made Shermans helped even things out for the British, but was quickly outclassed by the deployment of the first Tiger tanks. Yet the Germans were subjected to a two-front campaign after Torch, and were eventually overwhelmed.

At least that's my understanding of it.

[oldpop2000]

Navigation was generally by magnetic compass as you would at sea. You could use a sun compass during the day and there were landmarks to steer by such as Cairns, potholes, birs, and small escarpments. At night, the compass was a good method but if you did not have a compass then celestial navigation was ok except when it clouded up. Rommel and his car got lost because they tried to navigate by the stars and it clouded up on them. At night in the desert it was pitch black, you could not see anything even if it was right in front of your nose. He was trying to find his headquarters south of Tobruk. Rommel was navigating.

The German armor superiority was basically due to better training, better machinery and better communications between the tanks. Their tanks had five men including the tank commander who could look through the cupola in all directions. Their two primary tanks initially were the Panzer II, a light tank with dual 20mm guns. Great for reconnaissance or against infantry that was exposed, but not in a tank dual. Their primary tank was the Panzer Mark III with the 37mm gun. This was the Ausf.g model. Most German tanks were vulnerable at close quarters due to the air louvres at the rear over the engines. Incendiary grenades could destroy or at least disable the tank easily. The early models of the Mark 3 had .59 inches of homogenous armor but by 1941 that had been increased by bolted plates to 1.2 inches of armor. These were face hardened to a brinell hardness of 600-800 . In 1942 this was increased in front to 1.96 inches. Eventually in North Africa the later version had a long barrelled 50-mm gun.

Now to the real meat of the matter.... Rommel's failure to understand logistics and the fact that in the desert, the supply officer ran the game. Let's start with geography.

The area for maneuver warfare in the desert was a strip about 12-38 miles wide bounded on the north by the Med and the south by the desert interior. For Rommel, the main Axis supply port was Tripoli with about 1500 tons per day capability. This translates into 4 to 5 cargo ships a day or 4 troop ships simultaneously. The other ports were Benghazi and Tobruk with rates of 2700 and 1500 tons per day. But due to air attacks, were limited to about 750 to 600 tons per day. After unloading at Tripoli, there was only one road, two lanes titled the Via Balbia. The real problems for the Axis was their poor overland transportation assets. The Italians succeeded in depositing an average of 72,000 tons in four months from July to October 1941. The problem for Rommel was the length of line of communications inside Africa. Here are some examples:

It was 700 miles from Tripoli to Benghazi; 300 miles from Benghazi to Tobruk and another 350 miles from Tobruk to Alamein. In other words, when Rommel was at Alamein, his supply lines were 1400 miles. A motorized force of one division required 350 tons of supplies per day including water. To transport this required thirty-nine columns each of thirty two ton trucks.

After the African Campaign, in his book "The Rommel Papers" he makes this statement:

The reason for giving up the pursuit is almost always the quartermaster's growing difficulty in spanning the lengthened supply routes with his available transport. As the commander usually pays great attention to his quartermaster and allows the latter's estimate of the supply possibilities to determine his strategic plan, it has become the habit for the quartermaster staffs to complain at every difficulty, instead of getting on with the job and using their powers of improvisation, which indeed are frequently nil.

Rommel's greatest failure was the failure to balance his operational plan against his logistical possibilities. He only made his supply problems worse by his failure to understand the logistical problems in the area of his operations... The North African Desert.

You will find this site an excellent source of information especially this particular page. It is used by many books on the market. www.lonesentry.com/intelbulletin/tt_trends.html

www.lonesentry.com/manuals/german-warfare-libyan-desert/index.html

Oh my!! I am lecturing again... Ho Hum  Gosh, I've been studying the North African Campaign since I was about ten years old. My first book was by Paul Carell " The foxes of the Desert" I still have that book.

[cv10]

I think that it's a testament to British organizational and logistics capability that they were able to keep their army reasonably well supplied in spite of the fact that their only two choices for supplying their army in Egypt and Libya was to either send it through the Med. (not really a good option due to the Italian Navy and Air Force) or by sending it around Africa and up the Suez Canal. I think that the old adage goes that "amateurs talk tactics while professionals study logistics".

A fair number of people were/are pretty critical of Montgomery for how slow he was in carrying out offensives (IIRC Churchill was nearly incandescent at points). Yet I'm not sure he had much of a choice, as the army he inherited had been pretty badly mauled when it was forced to retreat to El Alamein. The need to refit the army plus the distances that supplies had to travel were pretty staggering. There's also the manpower consideration: the British did not have a whole lot of spare soldiers to send. Reminds me of something the Duke of Wellington said that I thin Monty would have agreed with. During the winter in the Lines of Torres Vedras, Wellington, observing the French main camp, remarked "I could whip them, but it would take 10,000 men, and as this is the only army England has, it behoves me to take care of it,"

I thin Montgomery understood that while a victory would help public morale a great deal, yet another calamity in the Desert would hurt morale at home, and wanted to make sure that everything was in order.

Fun Fact: Just before the British attack began, soldiers were issued a "fighting dram" of whiskey (Rather odd as I think Monty was a teetotaler). Since many of the Indian troops were muslims who, for religious reasons, did not drink alcohol. The Quartermaster arranged for the Indian units to also receive lemons and oranges, which seemed to answer as a replacement for the Whiskey.

[oldpop2000]

The Mediterranean had always been a competition between the French, Italians and the British. Once the Italians invaded Ethiopia in 1935, this threatened Egypt and the Suez Canal putting them in a clash of interests with the British. This illustrates that the British had an advantage against the Germans since they had a large port and supply center around Cairo plus the newly developed oil fields in Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. Oil for Italy and Germany had to come from the oil fields in Eastern Europe around Romania. With the Russian front, the German's now had a supply problems and could not provide enough air cover for all the convoys plus get the proper supplies to Rommel. The whole North African campaign was never envisaged according to Keitel's diary, the way Rommel pursued it. The German units sent to the Italians were supposed to protect Tripoli and support the Italians, not to take the offensive. General Ritter Von Thoma, who later fought with Rommel and was captured at El Alamein was sent to review the area and needs. He stated that the area and distances could only support two divisions. Eventually the Germans sent the 15th Panzer, 5th light which was converted to the 21st Panzer. They assimilated miscellaneous units into the 90th Light and sent the 164th Light Afrika Division. They also sent the Ramcke Parachute Brigade. When combined with the two Italian armored divisions- Ariete and Littorio plus the numerous infantry divisions which did not have integral transportation you can see that this grouping simply overwhelmed any possible supply system. The distances from Tripoli to Benghazi to Sollum to Alamein required coastal shipping to really perform the movement of sufficient supplies and these were under attack from the Royal Navy and Air Force. Rommel made it to Alamein on captured supplies from their investing Tobruk. They captured 3900 trucks and 1900 tons of fuel. Almost 85% of Rommel's transportation was British and American trucks but then they did not have the available parts necessary to maintain them.

We all must understand that strategy and the operational arts- the latter being the area between strategy and tactics- are tied closely to logistics. If there was a good reason why the Japanese lost WWII, it was their failure to understand that concept. North Africa was a secondary theatre, even for the British although Churchill thought it was the "soft underbelly of Europe" it actually wasn't. He had a fascination with it and Gallipoli in WW1 was an expression of that fascination. It lost him his job at the Admiralty. In North Africa, armies were emancipated from local resources. There were none, except as one author puts it, camel dung. This is the basis for Rommel's failure in North Africa, logistics or his failure to understand the close relationship between the operational arts and supply.

I will make further comments.... lectures on Monty and his approach later. I enjoyed the fun fact, that's interesting.

[oldpop2000]

Just wanted to present a bit of tactical doctrine into this discussion. Rommel's successes did not come from his strength but from his Panzer tactics. He used very mobile recce units followed by AT guns escorted by infantry. However, behind that infantry was the main body; the Panzers and his motorized infantry.

Rommel and his men developed a defensive maneuver that lured the British forward onto the German AT screen. They would charge with their tanks generally unsupported without infantry. They would breakthrough the outer screen and encounter the batteries of 88 mm flak guns and other AT guns like the 50mm. These would be on the flanks. At the same time, then the Panzers would attack the flanks and rear, while motorized forces would cut the attackers lines of communications and retreat. The Panzers were used like cavalry attacking in different directions, feints, and sudden withdrawals.

There were other factors that many historians and tank experts bring to the forefront. Most of the British tanks were exhausted mechanically and generally were not as reliable as the German vehicles.

In answer to the question about El Alamein, here is Rommel's first problem. Look at a map. Is there an open southern flank to swing around like Rommel had done before? No. The Qattara Depression eliminated any possible swing around the flank of the Eighth Army. Once Monty had been installed, he and staff knew that Rommel would attack. Rommel launched his attack swinging north as he had always done but Monty had setup a trap on the Alam Halfa Ridge and down each side. The British now had effective 57 mm AT guns, Sherman tanks and they were dug-in along the flank. Remember also that Rommel did not have air superiority and the British did. The airfields were close so they could launch repeated sorties. All this caused Rommel much difficulty.

The second problem and this might be the worst was the long supply lines. Benghazi and Tobruk were both damage and under air attacks. This prevented a continuous unloading of supplies and many were lost sitting outside the harbor waiting to be unloaded. The trucks that moved the supplies to the front used over fifty percent of fuel that they transported, so logistics again was the issue.

The third problem was that the US was now in the war and had used the Wasp to move aircraft to Malta in April.. These were 47 Spitfire MK V. These would now escort and conduct raids on the convoys leaving Naples for Tripoli and the supplies began to dwindle.

Of these three issues, it is my opinion that the last two were the most important for Monty. He did reorganize his army and had not been infected with "Rommel's disease". He had changed the issues and the structure but did have a much shorter supply line and US equipment like the Sherman's and Priest mobile artillery. Rommel was at the end of his tether, and was a very sick man. He actually said that he "did not know what to do" Well, a retreat to Sollum or Bardia might have been better but as we know, Hitler refused to allow it so much of the losses could be placed on his head.

[oldpop2000]

Here is something to look at.... your sun compass.




One more picture for my lecture - Cross section of the North Africa area -

[cv10]

They had such a strangely narrow front when you look at a map of North Africa, but then you look at the terrain, and you've only got a fairly narrow strip of land to fight on. To one side, the Med. and to the other, the Quetta Depression (just try to blitz through that!) and it all makes sense

[oldpop2000]

Aug 15, 2017 20:11:48 GMT -6 cv10 said:

They had such a strangely narrow front when you look at a map of North Africa, but then you look at the terrain, and you've only got a fairly narrow strip of land to fight on. To one side, the Med. and to the other, the Quetta Depression (just try to blitz through that!) and it all makes sense

Now you see the problems, and the biggest was logistics which was hampered or should we say, made almost impossible by the terrain. This is why I stress maps and gave you that cross-section. You saw what I was trying to get across. Good work.

[cv10]

Aug 15, 2017 20:49:02 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

Aug 15, 2017 20:11:48 GMT -6 cv10 said:

They had such a strangely narrow front when you look at a map of North Africa, but then you look at the terrain, and you've only got a fairly narrow strip of land to fight on. To one side, the Med. and to the other, the Quetta Depression (just try to blitz through that!) and it all makes sense

Now you see the problems, and the biggest was logistics which was hampered or should we say, made almost impossible by the terrain. This is why I stress maps and gave you that cross-section. You saw what I was trying to get across. Good work.

I've read a bit on the North African Campaign, but little specific (Memoirs of people who served [Monty and Ike] and other more general works]. Yet all of these books spelled out that the Geography of the theater, such as Quetta Depression and the Sahara essentially forced the campaign to be fought near the coast, as that was the only place where troops could be supplied and actually fight.

[Start Rant]I swear probably the most frustrated I've ever been with a wargame with Hearts of Iron IV because from its release in 2014 to earlier this year, the game did not really model how impassible the desert was. After all, there are several good reasons that neither side ever tried to invade North/South though the Sahara! [End rant] Then they fixed it!

It's much like the Burma theater in World War II. One of the (numerous) reasons that the Allies needed 3 years to throw the Japanese out was that it just wasn't practical to try and push big units though the Burmese Jungle, and the terrain and lack of infrastructure between India and Burma made supplying forces exceedingly difficult. The Japanese, who never seemed to master logistical planning, actually had troops suffering from starvation/malnourishment during the battles of Kohima and Imphal because supply lines were so hard to maintain.

[oldpop2000]

You are correct, the coastal region was the only place combat and supply could actually take place. If you examine period maps ( I have them) you will see that there are few spots to move from the escarpment down to the coast. Halfaya Pass is one of them, the others are Matruh, Sidi Barrani. However most are not fit for heavy motor transport. Most are tracks. This should tell you why so much fighting was seen at those locations.

Here is a link to an index of period maps. Just put the cursor on the map section and click. Enjoy.

www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/africa_1m/index_map.html

I will "lecture" more later. Is this interesting?

[cv10]

Aug 16, 2017 0:18:34 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

I will "lecture" more later. Is this interesting?

I think it is! 

[vonfriedman]

Your "lectures" are certainly interesting for me also.
Regarding intelligence that the British and the Axis had during the North African campaign, I have often read that a source of Rommel's intelligence was US Col. Fellers. How important was it, in your opinion?

[oldpop2000]

Oct 7, 2017 3:59:00 GMT -6 vonfriedman said:

Your "lectures" are certainly interesting for me also.
Regarding intelligence that the British and the Axis had during the North African campaign, I have often read that a source of Rommel's intelligence was US Col. Fellers. How important was it, in your opinion?

Military intelligence is always very important especially in a theatre of war that was so dependent on supplies and troop arrivals. North Africa was very different region to fight in, and all your supplies for modern war had to be brought in via ship. Any information as to when, where and how was critical. This is also true of troop deployments and positions. Fellers information was gathered by the Italians, but was not always provided to the Germans, however, they had actually broken the code themselves via a listening post in Nuremburg. Fellers was his own worst enemy by repeating the same address on a report over and over. I would say that both sides gained advantages by their ability to read the others mail. The British ability to use ULTRA and our ability to read the Japanese Operational Naval Code JN-25 contributed much to the eventual failure of the Axis powers. I have read that Fellers was an avowed Anglophobe and have always wondered if he actually knew the Black Code book had been taken and copied, but because of his hatred of the British decided to allow them to steal information. We will never know.

Just some information on what they were able to gather from the German Army Intelligence. In the Rommel Papers, he relates that in October 1941, at the time of the British Crusader operation, a circular was sent that notified all German formations of large quantities of enemy war material and strong contingent of troops steadily pouring into Egypt. It was surmised that a major offensive was about to be launched. They had been detecting the movement of several British divisions from the Nile Delta area to Mersa Matruh. Now, from this point, it was up to German air reconnaissance to spot these movements and their direction along with the supply dumps that would be required. However, weather grounded the planes and even with flights the dumps were never located.

Von Mellinthin was the IC for the Afrika Korps in November 1941 and relates that the head of Afrika Korps Intelligence Service discussed with an Italian Liaison officer, Major Revetria, and made the statement that he was "too nervous". Rommel too measures to meet this offensive which from other sources he was sure was coming. This was why 21st Panzer was not ordered to attack Tobruk and was place near Gambut to attack any units in the coming offensive in the flank. This offensive did not surprise Rommel. He had deployed his troops to prepare for the offensive, however attrition of his forces forced him to retire back to El Agheila. The question then is what could have happened if the signal intelligence had been backed up by sufficient air reconnaissance. This is the crux of the matter. It is one thing to have good intelligence; a knowledge of the enemy's location and supplies, its another thing to be able to deduce from that, what his operational objectives might be and how he will use his forces. As I have said on this forum more than once, no plan survives contact with the enemy and an enemy always has a say in your plans.

[zardoz]

Do not forget "ENIGMA".

During the battle of Alamein, the British know exactly the number of German tanks on a daily basis as they could decode all messages.