|
Post by dorn on Jan 15, 2018 1:29:35 GMT -6
I have read a lot things about RN and find quite interesting how RN was able fight around the globe with such limited resources. I focus on design of RN ships mainly CVs (I will may be put some comment on CV forum on that topic later) however some questions still remains without ability to basic answer. If I compare theatres of operation (eg. North Atlantic, Mediterranean vs. Pacific) I try to compare years 1940-42 of NA, Mediterranean with 1942-43 with Pacific as later stage in Pacific USN has overwhelming force not comparable the time before (similar from 1943 for NA and Mideterranean except Battle of the Atlantic).
I would like to open this topic if anybody knows the answer or could help to analyze.
1. Rodney class battleship deployment Both Rodney class was kept out of Mediterranean early war and mainly QE class was used there. Why RN do not used Rodney class in Mediterranean in early war if we know that Rodney class has superior protection compared to even refitted QE class. We also know that during hunt of Bismarck HMS Rodney achieve speed 2 knots higher than designed even if she was of state needed overhaul. The both ships were used in western Mediterranean to protect convoys from late 1941 but not before.
2. RN heavy cruisers The RN followed strategy to build less capable but more numbers of cruisers. With their need of global trade network protection the strategy was necessary as other navies has not so global needs to protect their global trade network. Their basic class was County class of about 10.000 tons of standard displacement followed by York class. If I compare these design with Japanese or US design I can see that both Japan and USA get more for that tonnage. All three classes Myoko, Pensacola, Northampton have more 8" guns (10,10,9 vs. 8 of County) and armor protection seems that County has the smallest of these four classes. The speed of County class was also the lowest. And only Myoko has higher standard displacement. The ships were designed in the second half of 20s.
The following questions arise: a) for what the displacement of British cruisers was used? b) why does it seem that British cruiser were tonnage inefficient? c) or is there other quality of British cruisers which is not easily been seen?
3. RN fleet carriers deployment I will not dig deep into RN carriers design and doctrine however what is known that RN were pioneering multicarrier operations before WW2 broke out. However during the war RN did not concentrate their carriers till 1942. This seems to me that RN favors doctrine to defend their trade routes, generally defends all areas of operation and that RN do not think that concentration in one theatre could bring additional value higher that of withdrawing carriers from other operation areas. It seems to me that RN pursuit strategy jack of all traders to be everywhere but nowhere has adequate advantage.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 15, 2018 9:13:00 GMT -6
I have read a lot things about RN and find quite interesting how RN was able fight around the globe with such limited resources. I focus on design of RN ships mainly CVs (I will may be put some comment on CV forum on that topic later) however some questions still remains without ability to basic answer. If I compare theatres of operation (eg. North Atlantic, Mediterranean vs. Pacific) I try to compare years 1940-42 of NA, Mediterranean with 1942-43 with Pacific as later stage in Pacific USN has overwhelming force not comparable the time before (similar from 1943 for NA and Mideterranean except Battle of the Atlantic). I would like to open this topic if anybody knows the answer or could help to analyze. 1. Rodney class battleship deploymentBoth Rodney class was kept out of Mediterranean early war and mainly QE class was used there. Why RN do not used Rodney class in Mediterranean in early war if we know that Rodney class has superior protection compared to even refitted QE class. We also know that during hunt of Bismarck HMS Rodney achieve speed 2 knots higher than designed even if she was of state needed overhaul. The both ships were used in western Mediterranean to protect convoys from late 1941 but not before. 2. RN heavy cruisersThe RN followed strategy to build less capable but more numbers of cruisers. With their need of global trade network protection the strategy was necessary as other navies has not so global needs to protect their global trade network. Their basic class was County class of about 10.000 tons of standard displacement followed by York class. If I compare these design with Japanese or US design I can see that both Japan and USA get more for that tonnage. All three classes Myoko, Pensacola, Northampton have more 8" guns (10,10,9 vs. 8 of County) and armor protection seems that County has the smallest of these four classes. The speed of County class was also the lowest. And only Myoko has higher standard displacement. The ships were designed in the second half of 20s. The following questions arise: a) for what the displacement of British cruisers was used? b) why does it seem that British cruiser were tonnage inefficient? c) or is there other quality of British cruisers which is not easily been seen? 3. RN fleet carriers deploymentI will not dig deep into RN carriers design and doctrine however what is known that RN were pioneering multicarrier operations before WW2 broke out. However during the war RN did not concentrate their carriers till 1942. This seems to me that RN favors doctrine to defend their trade routes, generally defends all areas of operation and that RN do not think that concentration in one theatre could bring additional value higher that of withdrawing carriers from other operation areas. It seems to me that RN pursuit strategy jack of all traders to be everywhere but nowhere has adequate advantage. In answer to your first question. Rodney was part of the home fleet and as such was required to stay in Scapa Flow. In May, 1940, she was the Fleet Flagship for the month. With the loss of Royal Oak, then Hood, Prince of Wales, Repulse, then Barham, it became evident that the British were running out of capital ships so she was deployed elsewhere. She was over twenty-years old by this time. Keep in mind, that at this time in the war, especially after Dunkirk, the British were very concerned about the future Operation Sealion, the German invasion of England, so they kept as many heavy ships as she could nearby in the Northern reaches. The Mediterranean really did not become an issue until Rommel deployed the Africa Korps to Libya. Rodney had orders to stay at Rosyth in October 1940 to intercept any attempt by German major warships attempting to enter the English Channel or take passage for attacks on Atlantic shipping. She was also under refit. After the Bismarck action, she went to South Boston Navy Yard, in the US for engine repairs and installation of 8 barreled 40 mm Bofors guns. These guns had been stored in boxes on her decks. The Rodney at the beginning of the war needed a refit, as did more British capital ships. She had defects in her rudder and a leaking bulkhead. In December makeshift repairs to her bulkheads snapped flooding two compartments. It was found that poor riveting had caused the issue. She had numerous machinery issues, leaking hull etc. Not the ship you want in a major sea battle.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 15, 2018 10:13:39 GMT -6
As to the issue of cruisers, post WW1 cruiser construction was in a very big state of flux due to re-evaluation of strategic post war requirements. Keep in mind the war-weariness of the British nation and the downturn in economics following the war. With the advent of submarines and aircraft plus new armaments, it was hard to justify the construction of cruisers. One of the primary missions; reconnaissance had been supplanted by the aircraft and was now redundant. However, the cruiser was still required for trade protection, convoy escort, commerce raiding and shore bombardment. The British design criteria was based on the need to protect the guns and to house aircraft on board. The British were slow to build cruisers after the Washington Naval Treaty, but continued to build five light cruisers for guarding the shipping lanes. Their designs after the treaty stressed speed and you have to sacrifice something and that ended up being armor protection. They would utilize as much armor as possible without the loss of appreciable speed or armament. Between 1931 and 1936, the British built more light cruisers, eleven in four classes. These were designed for trade protection. Most cruisers built for and during WWII were mirror images of those built for WW1. The heavily strained economy of Great Britain is the real consideration for how ship built her cruisers. I hope this helps in the understanding of British cruisers. If you want to see how all the factors affect British cruisers, use Springsharp to design a County class cruiser, then play with the factors such as speed, armor and hull design such as LtoB. I have a Springsharp thread on this forum, just read through it and practice. nws-online.proboards.com/thread/228/springsharp-designsJust a brief note: the County class heavy cruisers were based on a staff requirement for ships with a high endurance, speed of 33kts. good seakeeping qualities and an armament of eight 8in guns in four twin turrets with an elevation of 70 degrees. Unfortunately, this requirement did not leave much weight available for armor so the speed was dropped to 31Kts. Not much extra protection was achieved and the speed was eventually raised to 31.5kts. It is now obvious the priorities for British cruisers; range, speed and good seakeeping qualities plus good fire power. You can duplicate this in Springsharp.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 15, 2018 19:07:01 GMT -6
I just thought this might be interesting to you. It is a design for the County class heavy cruiser using Springsharp. I have left out the 40mm Bofors later installed and the armor configuration is as close as I can get it with my sources.
County , Great Britain Heavy Cruiser laid down 1928
Displacement: 9,875 t light; 10,274 t standard; 10,795 t normal; 11,211 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep) (592.97 ft / 590.00 ft) x 68.00 ft x (21.50 / 22.08 ft) (180.74 m / 179.83 m) x 20.73 m x (6.55 / 6.73 m)
Armament: 8 - 8.00" / 203 mm 45.0 cal guns - 258.18lbs / 117.11kg shells, 150 per gun Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1928 Model 4 x 2 row twin mounts on centreline, evenly spread 4 - 4.00" / 102 mm 45.0 cal guns - 32.28lbs / 14.64kg shells, 150 per gun Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1928 Model 4 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread Weight of broadside 2,195 lbs / 995 kg Main Torpedoes 12 - 21.0" / 533 mm, 23.00 ft / 7.01 m torpedoes - 1.512 t each, 18.148 t total In 4 sets of deck mounted side rotating tubes
Armour: - Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg) Main: 4.50" / 114 mm 383.50 ft / 116.89 m 9.90 ft / 3.02 m Ends: 1.00" / 25 mm 206.48 ft / 62.94 m 9.90 ft / 3.02 m Main Belt covers 100 % of normal length Main belt does not fully cover magazines and engineering spaces
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max) Main: 1.00" / 25 mm 1.00" / 25 mm 1.00" / 25 mm 2nd: 0.50" / 13 mm 0.50" / 13 mm 0.50" / 13 mm
- Armoured deck - multiple decks: For and Aft decks: 1.25" / 32 mm Forecastle: 1.25" / 32 mm Quarter deck: 1.25" / 32 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 1.00" / 25 mm, Aft 1.00" / 25 mm
Machinery: Oil fired boilers, steam turbines, Geared drive, 4 shafts, 87,598 shp / 65,348 Kw = 32.00 kts Range 8,500nm at 10.00 kts Bunker at max displacement = 938 tons
Complement: 529 - 688
Cost: £3.565 million / $14.259 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement: Armament: 654 tons, 6.1 % - Guns: 617 tons, 5.7 % - Weapons: 36 tons, 0.3 % Armour: 1,542 tons, 14.3 % - Belts: 784 tons, 7.3 % - Armament: 146 tons, 1.4 % - Armour Deck: 590 tons, 5.5 % - Conning Towers: 21 tons, 0.2 % Machinery: 2,727 tons, 25.3 % Hull, fittings & equipment: 4,952 tons, 45.9 % Fuel, ammunition & stores: 920 tons, 8.5 % Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0.0 %
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability: Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship): 16,415 lbs / 7,446 Kg = 64.1 x 8.0 " / 203 mm shells or 1.6 torpedoes Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.12 Metacentric height 3.5 ft / 1.1 m Roll period: 15.3 seconds Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 91 % - Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.69 Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.98
Hull form characteristics: Hull has a flush deck, a normal bow and a cruiser stern Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.438 / 0.443 Length to Beam Ratio: 8.68 : 1 'Natural speed' for length: 24.29 kts Power going to wave formation at top speed: 56 % Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 46 Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 5.00 degrees Stern overhang: -10.00 ft / -3.05 m Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length): Fore end, Aft end - Forecastle: 30.00 %, 34.00 ft / 10.36 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m - Forward deck: 30.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m - Aft deck: 25.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m - Quarter deck: 15.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m - Average freeboard: 28.72 ft / 8.75 m
Ship space, strength and comments: Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 100.0 % - Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 250.3 % Waterplane Area: 25,347 Square feet or 2,355 Square metres Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 120 % Structure weight / hull surface area: 111 lbs/sq ft or 542 Kg/sq metre Hull strength (Relative): - Cross-sectional: 0.87 - Longitudinal: 3.69 - Overall: 1.00 Adequate machinery, storage, compartmentation space Excellent accommodation and workspace room Ship has slow, easy roll, a good, steady gun platform Excellent seaboat, comfortable, can fire her guns in the heaviest weather
County , Great Britain Heavy Cruiser laid down 1928
Displacement: 9,875 t light; 10,274 t standard; 10,795 t normal; 11,211 t full load
Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep) (592.97 ft / 590.00 ft) x 68.00 ft x (21.50 / 22.08 ft) (180.74 m / 179.83 m) x 20.73 m x (6.55 / 6.73 m)
Armament: 8 - 8.00" / 203 mm 45.0 cal guns - 258.18lbs / 117.11kg shells, 150 per gun Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1928 Model 4 x 2 row twin mounts on centreline, evenly spread 4 - 4.00" / 102 mm 45.0 cal guns - 32.28lbs / 14.64kg shells, 150 per gun Breech loading guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1928 Model 4 x Single mounts on sides, evenly spread Weight of broadside 2,195 lbs / 995 kg Main Torpedoes 12 - 21.0" / 533 mm, 23.00 ft / 7.01 m torpedoes - 1.512 t each, 18.148 t total In 4 sets of deck mounted side rotating tubes
Armour: - Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg) Main: 4.50" / 114 mm 383.50 ft / 116.89 m 9.90 ft / 3.02 m Ends: 1.00" / 25 mm 206.48 ft / 62.94 m 9.90 ft / 3.02 m Main Belt covers 100 % of normal length Main belt does not fully cover magazines and engineering spaces
- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max) Main: 1.00" / 25 mm 1.00" / 25 mm 1.00" / 25 mm 2nd: 0.50" / 13 mm 0.50" / 13 mm 0.50" / 13 mm
- Armoured deck - multiple decks: For and Aft decks: 1.25" / 32 mm Forecastle: 1.25" / 32 mm Quarter deck: 1.25" / 32 mm
- Conning towers: Forward 1.00" / 25 mm, Aft 1.00" / 25 mm
Machinery: Oil fired boilers, steam turbines, Geared drive, 4 shafts, 87,598 shp / 65,348 Kw = 32.00 kts Range 8,500nm at 10.00 kts Bunker at max displacement = 938 tons
Complement: 529 - 688
Cost: £3.565 million / $14.259 million
Distribution of weights at normal displacement: Armament: 654 tons, 6.1 % - Guns: 617 tons, 5.7 % - Weapons: 36 tons, 0.3 % Armour: 1,542 tons, 14.3 % - Belts: 784 tons, 7.3 % - Armament: 146 tons, 1.4 % - Armour Deck: 590 tons, 5.5 % - Conning Towers: 21 tons, 0.2 % Machinery: 2,727 tons, 25.3 % Hull, fittings & equipment: 4,952 tons, 45.9 % Fuel, ammunition & stores: 920 tons, 8.5 % Miscellaneous weights: 0 tons, 0.0 %
Overall survivability and seakeeping ability: Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship): 16,415 lbs / 7,446 Kg = 64.1 x 8.0 " / 203 mm shells or 1.6 torpedoes Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1.12 Metacentric height 3.5 ft / 1.1 m Roll period: 15.3 seconds Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 91 % - Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0.69 Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1.98
Hull form characteristics: Hull has a flush deck, a normal bow and a cruiser stern Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0.438 / 0.443 Length to Beam Ratio: 8.68 : 1 'Natural speed' for length: 24.29 kts Power going to wave formation at top speed: 56 % Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 46 Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 5.00 degrees Stern overhang: -10.00 ft / -3.05 m Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length): Fore end, Aft end - Forecastle: 30.00 %, 34.00 ft / 10.36 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m - Forward deck: 30.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m - Aft deck: 25.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m - Quarter deck: 15.00 %, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m, 28.00 ft / 8.53 m - Average freeboard: 28.72 ft / 8.75 m
Ship space, strength and comments: Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 100.0 % - Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 250.3 % Waterplane Area: 25,347 Square feet or 2,355 Square metres Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 120 % Structure weight / hull surface area: 111 lbs/sq ft or 542 Kg/sq metre Hull strength (Relative): - Cross-sectional: 0.87 - Longitudinal: 3.69 - Overall: 1.00 Adequate machinery, storage, compartmentation space Excellent accommodation and workspace room Ship has slow, easy roll, a good, steady gun platform Excellent seaboat, comfortable, can fire her guns in the heaviest weather
|
|
|
Post by dorn on Jan 16, 2018 1:15:35 GMT -6
I have read a lot things about RN and find quite interesting how RN was able fight around the globe with such limited resources. I focus on design of RN ships mainly CVs (I will may be put some comment on CV forum on that topic later) however some questions still remains without ability to basic answer. If I compare theatres of operation (eg. North Atlantic, Mediterranean vs. Pacific) I try to compare years 1940-42 of NA, Mediterranean with 1942-43 with Pacific as later stage in Pacific USN has overwhelming force not comparable the time before (similar from 1943 for NA and Mideterranean except Battle of the Atlantic). I would like to open this topic if anybody knows the answer or could help to analyze. 1. Rodney class battleship deploymentBoth Rodney class was kept out of Mediterranean early war and mainly QE class was used there. Why RN do not used Rodney class in Mediterranean in early war if we know that Rodney class has superior protection compared to even refitted QE class. We also know that during hunt of Bismarck HMS Rodney achieve speed 2 knots higher than designed even if she was of state needed overhaul. The both ships were used in western Mediterranean to protect convoys from late 1941 but not before. 2. RN heavy cruisersThe RN followed strategy to build less capable but more numbers of cruisers. With their need of global trade network protection the strategy was necessary as other navies has not so global needs to protect their global trade network. Their basic class was County class of about 10.000 tons of standard displacement followed by York class. If I compare these design with Japanese or US design I can see that both Japan and USA get more for that tonnage. All three classes Myoko, Pensacola, Northampton have more 8" guns (10,10,9 vs. 8 of County) and armor protection seems that County has the smallest of these four classes. The speed of County class was also the lowest. And only Myoko has higher standard displacement. The ships were designed in the second half of 20s. The following questions arise: a) for what the displacement of British cruisers was used? b) why does it seem that British cruiser were tonnage inefficient? c) or is there other quality of British cruisers which is not easily been seen? 3. RN fleet carriers deploymentI will not dig deep into RN carriers design and doctrine however what is known that RN were pioneering multicarrier operations before WW2 broke out. However during the war RN did not concentrate their carriers till 1942. This seems to me that RN favors doctrine to defend their trade routes, generally defends all areas of operation and that RN do not think that concentration in one theatre could bring additional value higher that of withdrawing carriers from other operation areas. It seems to me that RN pursuit strategy jack of all traders to be everywhere but nowhere has adequate advantage. In answer to your first question. Rodney was part of the home fleet and as such was required to stay in Scapa Flow. In May, 1940, she was the Fleet Flagship for the month. With the loss of Royal Oak, then Hood, Prince of Wales, Repulse, then Barham, it became evident that the British were running out of capital ships so she was deployed elsewhere. She was over twenty-years old by this time. Keep in mind, that at this time in the war, especially after Dunkirk, the British were very concerned about the future Operation Sealion, the German invasion of England, so they kept as many heavy ships as she could nearby in the Northern reaches. The Mediterranean really did not become an issue until Rommel deployed the Africa Korps to Libya. Rodney had orders to stay at Rosyth in October 1940 to intercept any attempt by German major warships attempting to enter the English Channel or take passage for attacks on Atlantic shipping. She was also under refit. After the Bismarck action, she went to South Boston Navy Yard, in the US for engine repairs and installation of 8 barreled 40 mm Bofors guns. These guns had been stored in boxes on her decks. The Rodney at the beginning of the war needed a refit, as did more British capital ships. She had defects in her rudder and a leaking bulkhead. In December makeshift repairs to her bulkheads snapped flooding two compartments. It was found that poor riveting had caused the issue. She had numerous machinery issues, leaking hull etc. Not the ship you want in a major sea battle. Thanks a lot for explanation. I know that Rodney class was not refitted for so long time however their condition was much worse I have thought. It is clear now that before KGV the RN has only 3 fast ships (Hood, Renown, Repulse) which only one of them has some large refit between wars. However non of them can stand for ne generation battleships, all 3 ships were good mainly as carrier escort which they were extensively used. Than RN has QE class, some of the ships modernized or under modernization and old R class. All these ships still have punch however their protection scheme was absolute. As I can see RN has 15 capital ships (BB/BC) before WW2, however none of them with ability to fight Bismarck class battleships. Their fight Italian but there tactics and experience of RN prevail quality of the ships. On opposite ordering KGV class try to remedy this issue together with modernization of the old battleships however British shipyards and were unable handle the tempo as building all new battleships, refitting old battleships, new construction of Illustrious class were just to much for interwar deprived shipbuilding industry from lack of orders in interwar period. And as I know even armor production from deprived industry was not enough for all these ship and RN ordered some of armor plates abroad. So main problems were not RN but politics. And at time when money was available the UK industry was not able to fulfill all the orders. Quite interesting that RN start preparing for war from the Abysmal crisis but it has been already too late to catch. USA has similar issues however they start war operations 2 years later they have time to prepare themselves. And they partially did it, some of new class of battleships were ready at beginning of 1942, the new carriers did not. It is interesting note that even if USA considered aircraft carriers much important than UK they start they construction (Essex class) quite late even they can do it using "escalator clause".
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 16, 2018 12:36:54 GMT -6
The real issue with the British was the rise of globalization which affected their export market and the rise of the middle class in England. Tired of expending money for expensive warships, disappointed by the failures of the Royal Navy to provide the long sought decisive battle like Trafalgar and simply tired of "making the world safe for democracy". The middle class took power, reduced defense spending and in an era of a poor economy spent the money to improve the lot of the average worker. The slaughter of a generation in the trenches and the losses in warships had soured the average middle class Englishman to war.
As far as the Royal Navy, I think it was a bit much under the economic conditions and geostrategic situation to expect to maintain a fleet of fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines with 438,000 men included. The naval threat from Germany was gone, the French were prostrate, so were the Italians. The only real threats were from the US and Japan. British economic power was fading, with the US rising, so justifying a large navy was impossible.
This decline, BTW, in the export industries was not a new problem but had been growing steadily in a visible trade gap since the 1870's. However earnings had covered it from shipping, insurance and overseas investments. The world economic crises and globalization changed all that.
I highly recommend reading "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery" by Paul Kennedy. Most of information comes from that book and many others.
Now as to the question of British carriers, they were well built ships but to ensure their survival, they were armored and enclosed which reduced their air wing size and the move of RN pilots to the Royal Air force did not help. The carriers were good, but the aircraft were deplorable to the extent that they had to buy our carrier aircraft. They eventually adopted the deck park and solved the air wing size issue.
|
|
|
Post by dorn on Jan 17, 2018 1:32:31 GMT -6
As to the issue of cruisers, post WW1 cruiser construction was in a very big state of flux due to re-evaluation of strategic post war requirements. Keep in mind the war-weariness of the British nation and the downturn in economics following the war. With the advent of submarines and aircraft plus new armaments, it was hard to justify the construction of cruisers. One of the primary missions; reconnaissance had been supplanted by the aircraft and was now redundant. However, the cruiser was still required for trade protection, convoy escort, commerce raiding and shore bombardment. The British design criteria was based on the need to protect the guns and to house aircraft on board. The British were slow to build cruisers after the Washington Naval Treaty, but continued to build five light cruisers for guarding the shipping lanes. Their designs after the treaty stressed speed and you have to sacrifice something and that ended up being armor protection. They would utilize as much armor as possible without the loss of appreciable speed or armament. Between 1931 and 1936, the British built more light cruisers, eleven in four classes. These were designed for trade protection. Most cruisers built for and during WWII were mirror images of those built for WW1. The heavily strained economy of Great Britain is the real consideration for how ship built her cruisers. I hope this helps in the understanding of British cruisers. If you want to see how all the factors affect British cruisers, use Springsharp to design a County class cruiser, then play with the factors such as speed, armor and hull design such as LtoB. I have a Springsharp thread on this forum, just read through it and practice. nws-online.proboards.com/thread/228/springsharp-designsJust a brief note: the County class heavy cruisers were based on a staff requirement for ships with a high endurance, speed of 33kts. good seakeeping qualities and an armament of eight 8in guns in four twin turrets with an elevation of 70 degrees. Unfortunately, this requirement did not leave much weight available for armor so the speed was dropped to 31Kts. Not much extra protection was achieved and the speed was eventually raised to 31.5kts. It is now obvious the priorities for British cruisers; range, speed and good seakeeping qualities plus good fire power. You can duplicate this in Springsharp. Thanks for the information. Their strategy proved correct against surface riders and even as carriers, fleet or convoy escort they were very valuable. As I know the second important issue were they crews and command officers they were quite experienced and proved superior to their Italian and German counterparts in Mediterranean, Arctic convoys, against surface German raiders. As they did not fight Japanese except part of ABDA it is difficult to asses their fight capabilities against Japanese but it seems that Japanese were better than Europeans (Italy and German cruisers taking consideration crew and command).
|
|
|
Post by dorn on Jan 17, 2018 1:46:52 GMT -6
The real issue with the British was the rise of globalization which affected their export market and the rise of the middle class in England. Tired of expending money for expensive warships, disappointed by the failures of the Royal Navy to provide the long sought decisive battle like Trafalgar and simply tired of "making the world safe for democracy". The middle class took power, reduced defense spending and in an era of a poor economy spent the money to improve the lot of the average worker. The slaughter of a generation in the trenches and the losses in warships had soured the average middle class Englishman to war. As far as the Royal Navy, I think it was a bit much under the economic conditions and geostrategic situation to expect to maintain a fleet of fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines with 438,000 men included. The naval threat from Germany was gone, the French were prostrate, so were the Italians. The only real threats were from the US and Japan. British economic power was fading, with the US rising, so justifying a large navy was impossible. This decline, BTW, in the export industries was not a new problem but had been growing steadily in a visible trade gap since the 1870's. However earnings had covered it from shipping, insurance and overseas investments. The world economic crises and globalization changed all that. I highly recommend reading "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery" by Paul Kennedy. Most of information comes from that book and many others. Now as to the question of British carriers, they were well built ships but to ensure their survival, they were armored and enclosed which reduced their air wing size and the move of RN pilots to the Royal Air force did not help. The carriers were good, but the aircraft were deplorable to the extent that they had to buy our carrier aircraft. They eventually adopted the deck park and solved the air wing size issue. Yes, I am just reading The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery is going to be next. It is true that completely dominance of UK in first half of 18th century was unique and could not be sustained for long time as UK itself has not enough population and technology advantage could not be sustained, the others caught up, especially USA and Germany. And the second important issue is what you have written that middle class rose in power and their economic standard too. They do not want to spent that money on global commitment so much. So even the UK was still rich country and their total economic power was still impressive they have difficulties use reasonable high percentage of this economic power for military purposes. On opposite any less liberate regime has much easier to spend more on military (Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union before WW2). The last thing was that the economic crisis between wars was something new, they did not know how to dealt with and UK was more affected as they depended more on global trade. Just a little thought what could happen if Washington and London naval treaties did not exist. As UK (politics and public) wanted these treaties however at the it even worsened UK navy power and industrial might.
|
|
|
Post by Enderminion on Jan 17, 2018 7:24:19 GMT -6
The real issue with the British was the rise of globalization which affected their export market and the rise of the middle class in England. Tired of expending money for expensive warships, disappointed by the failures of the Royal Navy to provide the long sought decisive battle like Trafalgar and simply tired of "making the world safe for democracy". The middle class took power, reduced defense spending and in an era of a poor economy spent the money to improve the lot of the average worker. The slaughter of a generation in the trenches and the losses in warships had soured the average middle class Englishman to war. As far as the Royal Navy, I think it was a bit much under the economic conditions and geostrategic situation to expect to maintain a fleet of fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines with 438,000 men included. The naval threat from Germany was gone, the French were prostrate, so were the Italians. The only real threats were from the US and Japan. British economic power was fading, with the US rising, so justifying a large navy was impossible. This decline, BTW, in the export industries was not a new problem but had been growing steadily in a visible trade gap since the 1870's. However earnings had covered it from shipping, insurance and overseas investments. The world economic crises and globalization changed all that. I highly recommend reading "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery" by Paul Kennedy. Most of information comes from that book and many others. Now as to the question of British carriers, they were well built ships but to ensure their survival, they were armored and enclosed which reduced their air wing size and the move of RN pilots to the Royal Air force did not help. The carriers were good, but the aircraft were deplorable to the extent that they had to buy our carrier aircraft. They eventually adopted the deck park and solved the air wing size issue. Yes, I am just reading The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery is going to be next. It is true that completely dominance of UK in first half of 18th century was unique and could not be sustained for long time as UK itself has not enough population and technology advantage could not be sustained, the others caught up, especially USA and Germany. And the second important issue is what you have written that middle class rose in power and their economic standard too. They do not want to spent that money on global commitment so much. So even the UK was still rich country and their total economic power was still impressive they have difficulties use reasonable high percentage of this economic power for military purposes. On opposite any less liberate regime has much easier to spend more on military (Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union before WW2). The last thing was that the economic crisis between wars was something new, they did not know how to dealt with and UK was more affected as they depended more on global trade. Just a little thought what could happen if Washington and London naval treaties did not exist. As UK (politics and public) wanted these treaties however at the it even worsened UK navy power and industrial might. umm, the American congress wanted 60 capital ships by 1925, Britian had like, eight new capital ships planned for the same time period
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 17, 2018 9:59:30 GMT -6
The real issue with the British was the rise of globalization which affected their export market and the rise of the middle class in England. Tired of expending money for expensive warships, disappointed by the failures of the Royal Navy to provide the long sought decisive battle like Trafalgar and simply tired of "making the world safe for democracy". The middle class took power, reduced defense spending and in an era of a poor economy spent the money to improve the lot of the average worker. The slaughter of a generation in the trenches and the losses in warships had soured the average middle class Englishman to war. As far as the Royal Navy, I think it was a bit much under the economic conditions and geostrategic situation to expect to maintain a fleet of fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines with 438,000 men included. The naval threat from Germany was gone, the French were prostrate, so were the Italians. The only real threats were from the US and Japan. British economic power was fading, with the US rising, so justifying a large navy was impossible. This decline, BTW, in the export industries was not a new problem but had been growing steadily in a visible trade gap since the 1870's. However earnings had covered it from shipping, insurance and overseas investments. The world economic crises and globalization changed all that. I highly recommend reading "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery" by Paul Kennedy. Most of information comes from that book and many others. Now as to the question of British carriers, they were well built ships but to ensure their survival, they were armored and enclosed which reduced their air wing size and the move of RN pilots to the Royal Air force did not help. The carriers were good, but the aircraft were deplorable to the extent that they had to buy our carrier aircraft. They eventually adopted the deck park and solved the air wing size issue. Yes, I am just reading The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery is going to be next. It is true that completely dominance of UK in first half of 18th century was unique and could not be sustained for long time as UK itself has not enough population and technology advantage could not be sustained, the others caught up, especially USA and Germany. And the second important issue is what you have written that middle class rose in power and their economic standard too. They do not want to spent that money on global commitment so much. So even the UK was still rich country and their total economic power was still impressive they have difficulties use reasonable high percentage of this economic power for military purposes. On opposite any less liberate regime has much easier to spend more on military (Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union before WW2). The last thing was that the economic crisis between wars was something new, they did not know how to dealt with and UK was more affected as they depended more on global trade. Just a little thought what could happen if Washington and London naval treaties did not exist. As UK (politics and public) wanted these treaties however at the it even worsened UK navy power and industrial might. Great, both are excellent books and great references. Another book that deals directly with the interwar period finances is "Lords of Finance:The Bankers who broke the world" by Liaquat Ahamed. Another good source for understanding the interwar economic situation and the building programs of the navies. Here is a link to lectures at the Naval War College - www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6XNQqXlcco
|
|
|
Post by dorn on Jan 17, 2018 12:01:20 GMT -6
Yes, I am just reading The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery is going to be next. It is true that completely dominance of UK in first half of 18th century was unique and could not be sustained for long time as UK itself has not enough population and technology advantage could not be sustained, the others caught up, especially USA and Germany. And the second important issue is what you have written that middle class rose in power and their economic standard too. They do not want to spent that money on global commitment so much. So even the UK was still rich country and their total economic power was still impressive they have difficulties use reasonable high percentage of this economic power for military purposes. On opposite any less liberate regime has much easier to spend more on military (Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union before WW2). The last thing was that the economic crisis between wars was something new, they did not know how to dealt with and UK was more affected as they depended more on global trade. Just a little thought what could happen if Washington and London naval treaties did not exist. As UK (politics and public) wanted these treaties however at the it even worsened UK navy power and industrial might. Great, both are excellent books and great references. Another book that deals directly with the interwar period finances is "Lords of Finance:The Bankers who broke the world" by Liaquat Ahamed. Another good source for understanding the interwar economic situation and the building programs of the navies. Here is a link to lectures at the Naval War College - www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6XNQqXlccoThanks for another tip, it will take me time to go through all the books. Do you know some sources for these building program in one place? I found this information: "Adding the new 1939 program to the previous programs, British dockyards and shipyards in the course of the year were engaged in constructing some 200 vessels, or a total of 870,000 tons. An achievement like this had never been approached before in peace-time. The British were building, in the course of the year 1939, nine battleships, six aircraft carriers, 25 cruisers, 43 destroyers, 19 submarines, and a large number of small vessels. The annual tonnage output in 1940 and 1941 will be greater by no less than 30 per cent, than the annual tonnage output in those three pre-war years, 1912–14. In "The World Crisis," Churchill referred to "the mightiest Fleet laid down in 1912–13 and 1914, the greatest ever built by any Power in an equal period." The British planned to complete on an average, in 1940–41, 220,000 tons a year, as compared with 170,000 tons, which was the average of those years before the Great War." Quite interesting comparison. So it was not "so bad" as I thought.
|
|
|
Post by dorn on Jan 17, 2018 12:05:43 GMT -6
Yes, I am just reading The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery is going to be next. It is true that completely dominance of UK in first half of 18th century was unique and could not be sustained for long time as UK itself has not enough population and technology advantage could not be sustained, the others caught up, especially USA and Germany. And the second important issue is what you have written that middle class rose in power and their economic standard too. They do not want to spent that money on global commitment so much. So even the UK was still rich country and their total economic power was still impressive they have difficulties use reasonable high percentage of this economic power for military purposes. On opposite any less liberate regime has much easier to spend more on military (Germany, Italy, Japan, Soviet Union before WW2). The last thing was that the economic crisis between wars was something new, they did not know how to dealt with and UK was more affected as they depended more on global trade. Just a little thought what could happen if Washington and London naval treaties did not exist. As UK (politics and public) wanted these treaties however at the it even worsened UK navy power and industrial might. umm, the American congress wanted 60 capital ships by 1925, Britian had like, eight new capital ships planned for the same time period I do not think 60 capital ships are realistic if you compare completion time of Colorado class, preparation stage of Lexington class.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 17, 2018 12:27:12 GMT -6
Great, both are excellent books and great references. Another book that deals directly with the interwar period finances is "Lords of Finance:The Bankers who broke the world" by Liaquat Ahamed. Another good source for understanding the interwar economic situation and the building programs of the navies. Here is a link to lectures at the Naval War College - www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6XNQqXlccoThanks for another tip, it will take me time to go through all the books. Do you know some sources for these building program in one place? I found this information: "Adding the new 1939 program to the previous programs, British dockyards and shipyards in the course of the year were engaged in constructing some 200 vessels, or a total of 870,000 tons. An achievement like this had never been approached before in peace-time. The British were building, in the course of the year 1939, nine battleships, six aircraft carriers, 25 cruisers, 43 destroyers, 19 submarines, and a large number of small vessels. The annual tonnage output in 1940 and 1941 will be greater by no less than 30 per cent, than the annual tonnage output in those three pre-war years, 1912–14. In "The World Crisis," Churchill referred to "the mightiest Fleet laid down in 1912–13 and 1914, the greatest ever built by any Power in an equal period." The British planned to complete on an average, in 1940–41, 220,000 tons a year, as compared with 170,000 tons, which was the average of those years before the Great War." Quite interesting comparison. So it was not "so bad" as I thought. Well, it depends on your era of course. 1. Treaty Cruisers: The First International Warship Building Competition - Leo Marriot 2. Innovation in Carrier Aviation: Aircraft Carrier History, World War I and II - BuAer, Royal Navy, American Navy - US Government Document 3. Warships After Washington; The Development of the Five Major Fleets 1922-1930 - John Jordan 4. Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control Between the Wars: Emily O. Goldman 5. The Battleship Builders: Constructing and Arming British Capital Ships - Ian Johnston Ian Buxton. You can review this list and see if it meets your requirements.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Jan 17, 2018 20:04:48 GMT -6
The real issue with the British was the rise of globalization which affected their export market and the rise of the middle class in England. Tired of expending money for expensive warships, disappointed by the failures of the Royal Navy to provide the long sought decisive battle like Trafalgar and simply tired of "making the world safe for democracy". The middle class took power, reduced defense spending and in an era of a poor economy spent the money to improve the lot of the average worker. The slaughter of a generation in the trenches and the losses in warships had soured the average middle class Englishman to war. As far as the Royal Navy, I think it was a bit much under the economic conditions and geostrategic situation to expect to maintain a fleet of fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines with 438,000 men included. The naval threat from Germany was gone, the French were prostrate, so were the Italians. The only real threats were from the US and Japan. British economic power was fading, with the US rising, so justifying a large navy was impossible. This decline, BTW, in the export industries was not a new problem but had been growing steadily in a visible trade gap since the 1870's. However earnings had covered it from shipping, insurance and overseas investments. The world economic crises and globalization changed all that. I highly recommend reading "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery" by Paul Kennedy. Most of information comes from that book and many others. Now as to the question of British carriers, they were well built ships but to ensure their survival, they were armored and enclosed which reduced their air wing size and the move of RN pilots to the Royal Air force did not help. The carriers were good, but the aircraft were deplorable to the extent that they had to buy our carrier aircraft. They eventually adopted the deck park and solved the air wing size issue. It seems that to some extent those pressures were already being felt immediately prior to WWI - the Revenge-class BBs were an "economized" follow-on to the Queen Elizabeth class, going back to a 21-knot top speed, coal as a fuel option, and a simpler armor scheme to reduce costs. The result was five hulls - one-third of the RN's BB/BC force at the opening of WWII - that were too slow for the battle line and too cramped to effectively modernize. Both classes were intended to include more ships, but those hulls were either cancelled ( Agincourt, Resistance) or converted to battlecruisers ( Renown, Repulse) once the war started. The only capital ships the RN actually laid down during WWI were the three Courageous-class BCs and Hood (the latter of which was not completed until 1920). Likewise, in WWII the RN had plans to build a total of 11 new battleships (five KGVs and six Lion-class); the Lions were cancelled after only two keels had been laid down.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 17, 2018 22:47:56 GMT -6
The real issue with the British was the rise of globalization which affected their export market and the rise of the middle class in England. Tired of expending money for expensive warships, disappointed by the failures of the Royal Navy to provide the long sought decisive battle like Trafalgar and simply tired of "making the world safe for democracy". The middle class took power, reduced defense spending and in an era of a poor economy spent the money to improve the lot of the average worker. The slaughter of a generation in the trenches and the losses in warships had soured the average middle class Englishman to war. As far as the Royal Navy, I think it was a bit much under the economic conditions and geostrategic situation to expect to maintain a fleet of fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines with 438,000 men included. The naval threat from Germany was gone, the French were prostrate, so were the Italians. The only real threats were from the US and Japan. British economic power was fading, with the US rising, so justifying a large navy was impossible. This decline, BTW, in the export industries was not a new problem but had been growing steadily in a visible trade gap since the 1870's. However earnings had covered it from shipping, insurance and overseas investments. The world economic crises and globalization changed all that. I highly recommend reading "The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery" by Paul Kennedy. Most of information comes from that book and many others. Now as to the question of British carriers, they were well built ships but to ensure their survival, they were armored and enclosed which reduced their air wing size and the move of RN pilots to the Royal Air force did not help. The carriers were good, but the aircraft were deplorable to the extent that they had to buy our carrier aircraft. They eventually adopted the deck park and solved the air wing size issue. It seems that to some extent those pressures were already being felt immediately prior to WWI - the Revenge-class BBs were an "economized" follow-on to the Queen Elizabeth class, going back to a 21-knot top speed, coal as a fuel option, and a simpler armor scheme to reduce costs. The result was five hulls - one-third of the RN's BB/BC force at the opening of WWII - that were too slow for the battle line and too cramped to effectively modernize. Both classes were intended to include more ships, but those hulls were either cancelled ( Agincourt, Resistance) or converted to battlecruisers ( Renown, Repulse) once the war started. The only capital ships the RN actually laid down during WWI were the three Courageous-class BCs and Hood (the latter of which was not completed until 1920). Likewise, in WWII the RN had plans to build a total of 11 new battleships (five KGVs and six Lion-class); the Lions were cancelled after only two keels had been laid down. Here is a good quote from "The Great Naval Race " that seems to follow that line of thought. One last quote: These comments and others seem to indicate a changing time for the Navy, Naval race or not. Padfield, Peter. The Great Naval Race: Anglo-German naval rivalry 1900-1914 (p. 136). Thistle Publishing. Kindle Edition. Padfield, Peter. The Great Naval Race: Anglo-German naval rivalry 1900-1914 (p. 135). Thistle Publishing. Kindle Edition.
|
|