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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 12, 2018 9:10:50 GMT -6
Marathon and island hopping
My purpose in relating this story is to find comparisons between historical combat operations, strategy and tactics.
As we know, the Battle of Marathon was the first recorded battle in history. There were others, but historians seem to start military history from this point. But what hasn’t been recorded much, is the fact that the Persian invasion force used island hopping to arrive at Marathon, the amphibious land point in Greece. My source is a current book I am reading; Persian Fire.
The two commanders, Datis and Artaphernes strategy was supplied by Darius the ruler of Persia. They would cross the Aegean Sea with an armada carrying 25,000 men, “bringing the benefits of Persian rule and peace to all the islands, then reduce Athens and Eretria to slavery, and bring the slave before the King.” They would eventually conquer the rest of Greece including Sparta and the Peloponnese. They were not to hug the coast, but island hop directly to Greece. As the book says, this was bold and innovative.
The first island was Naxos, whose main city they torched, and rounded up the natives as slaves. The next island was Delos, holy for the Greeks as the birthplace for Artemis and Apollo. Geographically, the island of Naxos is SE of Athens about 103. 11 miles away. It’s about 160 miles from the jump off point, if I have that correct. Delos is about 25 miles NNW of Naxos. From Delos to Athens was about 92 miles. The landing area was about 90 miles to the NW from Delos and about 22 miles from Athens. They were in Euboea which is due north of Athens about 40 miles. They arrived there in late July, having initiated the combat operation in the early weeks of 490 BC. After arrival, eventually the democratic Athenians decided to fight, sent an army up to Marathon quickly to occupy the area between two ridges. The rest is history, Miltiades decided with the rest of the commanders that they could not wait any longer for the Spartans to arrive, so they went into the attack. They lost 169 men, the Persians lost 6500. The Spartans did arrive finally, but the Athenian army had rushed back to Attica to protect Athens for an outflanking movement by the remaining Persian army in their fleet. The Persians decided it was a failure and left to return to Ionia on the Turkish Coast.
The interesting point of this is that this might have been the first use of the concept of operations using island hopping. While it was done to eliminate certain unfriendly islands, it was also done to protect supply lines back to Ionia and point of departure. Fascinating.
The books is “Persian Fire: The first World Empire and the Battle for the West” by Tom Holland. I have it in Ebook on my Kindle.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 12, 2018 9:22:06 GMT -6
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Post by dorn on Jul 12, 2018 23:43:36 GMT -6
Quite interesting and logical. The invasion of that islands could be easier as there were no long range defences. You need just to transport troops and rest could be done by land battle with possible support from the sea.
As attacker you can choose where, when and numbers.
The other point is that sea was the easiest way to transport up to invention of railroad, much easier than by land. So if somebody plans to attack he need to plan logistics and if there is possibility to use sea they would do it. And thus we come back to defend of supply routes and it is much easier to do it if you have bases on the whole way.
I think strategist at that time need to solve same thing as centuries later and so they would come to same conclusions. What they cannot know is the hindsight we have and technology.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 13, 2018 8:44:52 GMT -6
The purpose of the island-hopping campaign by the Persians in 490 BC was both political and strategic. They were trying to close a circle around Athens and convince them to break their alliance with Sparta. It was also the shortest route, which would not give the Athenian’s time to prepare.
In comparison to our island-hopping, ours was for two purposes, similar. The first was the break the Japanese defensive chain of islands and to establish a logistical chain of islands to support our operations near the Japanese home islands. I believe that they were similar island-hopping campaigns.
You are correct, strategist have similar tactical and strategical problems to solve and the sea is one of the best ways to provide a path to your enemy. Geography does play an important part in the planning of these kinds of operations.
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Post by director on Jul 13, 2018 11:49:07 GMT -6
Usual strategy was for an army to march along the coast, with a fleet covering the seaward flank. That allowed an army to be supplied by sea (since stripping the countryside might not provide enough food and forage) and gave the fleet a safe place to camp at night (since sailors and rowers usually camped ashore instead of spending the night on ship). Crossing by islands is a bolder move that would require good seamanship and navigation, good weather and a lot more transport ships since the army would be afloat instead of marching. Expensive, but it does make full use of naval mobility.
i would think the difference here would be that the Persians did not face heavy fortifications. But in terms of logistics and mobility the two campaigns are similar.
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Post by Airy W on Jul 13, 2018 15:13:04 GMT -6
The entire peloponnesian war sort of resembles island hopping come to think of it. The Spartans and Athenians can go both attack strongholds all over Greece but only in a brief campaign. Both sides were at risk of attack while travelling but were at least theoretically capable of reaching nearly any location. Many locations were difficult to hold but there was always at least the potential for a friendly puppel government everywhere, even Athens and Sparta themselves. So any polis can be attacked and can be a stronghold. Polis-hopping.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 13, 2018 15:35:44 GMT -6
The entire peloponnesian war sort of resembles island hopping come to think of it. The Spartans and Athenians can go both attack strongholds all over Greece but only in a brief campaign. Both sides were at risk of attack while travelling but were at least theoretically capable of reaching nearly any location. Many locations were difficult to hold but there was always at least the potential for a friendly puppel government everywhere, even Athens and Sparta themselves. So any polis can be attacked and can be a stronghold. Polis-hopping. You are correct, I will have to examine that because come to think of it, you are correct. It is interesting to explore historical similarities and see how later combat operations mirrored earlier actions. Here is a map of the war with dates - brewminate.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/PeloponnesianWar07.png |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 16, 2018 11:16:18 GMT -6
I finished my book on the Persians and I am now starting a new book on the Peloponnesian Wars. The author, Victor David Hansen, makes a very good point. They should be called the Greek Civil Wars which lasted over 27 years and ended with the destruction of Athens. It appears it was initiated to relieve the other city-states like Sparta, Argile, Thessaly etc. of Athenian control.
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Post by Airy W on Jul 17, 2018 7:07:23 GMT -6
It appears it was initiated to relieve the other city-states like Sparta, Argile, Thessaly etc. of Athenian control. Before the war, polis ruled over polis. After the war, the situation was reversed.  |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 17, 2018 9:17:22 GMT -6
It appears it was initiated to relieve the other city-states like Sparta, Argile, Thessaly etc. of Athenian control. Before the war, polis ruled over polis. After the war, the situation was reversed. After the war and Athens was destroyed, things got worse for the other city-states. Apparently they now realized that Athens's wasn't that bad after all. |
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Post by Airy W on Jul 17, 2018 9:53:19 GMT -6
IIRC Thucydides mentions that Athens was able to impose wartime tariffs on all maritime trade by the Aegion. It appears that the eastern city states that were the ones hit by this tax were quite willing to accept it. We dont see mention of garrisons and punitive expeditions to collect the revenues in Asia minor, just Athens sending over tariff officers and a collections fleet. This seems to suggest that while the mainland city states resented the Delian league, the ones closer to Persia were of the opinion that Athens wasn't that bad the whole time. I suppose that from their perspective they were going to be paying tribute to somebody anyway and at least the Athenians would do a better job protecting commerce then the Persians.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 17, 2018 16:35:18 GMT -6
IIRC Thucydides mentions that Athens was able to impose wartime tariffs on all maritime trade by the Aegion. It appears that the eastern city states that were the ones hit by this tax were quite willing to accept it. We dont see mention of garrisons and punitive expeditions to collect the revenues in Asia minor, just Athens sending over tariff officers and a collections fleet. This seems to suggest that while the mainland city states resented the Delian league, the ones closer to Persia were of the opinion that Athens wasn't that bad the whole time. I suppose that from their perspective they were going to be paying tribute to somebody anyway and at least the Athenians would do a better job protecting commerce then the Persians. You make a good observation. I will have tor review my Thucydides to refresh my memory. The book I am in now should make this clear again. Great post. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 20, 2018 9:26:22 GMT -6
In a thread on the RTW2, we began an interesting discussion about decisive naval battles. So, let's continue it here.
Question to answer first: What is a decisive Naval Battle? Is it a naval battle that ends a war? None of them did that? So, let's answer that question before discussing Salamis, Lepanto, Quiberon Bay etc.
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Post by dorn on Jul 22, 2018 23:51:43 GMT -6
In a thread on the RTW2, we began an interesting discussion about decisive naval battles. So, let's continue it here. Question to answer first: What is a decisive Naval Battle? Is it a naval battle that ends a war? None of them did that? So, let's answer that question before discussing Salamis, Lepanto, Quiberon Bay etc. I think common knowledge is that decisive naval battle is battle when one side lost so many ship to continue operation in same scale. It is large tactically victory which is transfer to decisive strategic advantage. However I think there are battles which are not decisive but have same importance but tactically was not decisive. Jutland is perfect example. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 23, 2018 0:30:33 GMT -6
In a thread on the RTW2, we began an interesting discussion about decisive naval battles. So, let's continue it here. Question to answer first: What is a decisive Naval Battle? Is it a naval battle that ends a war? None of them did that? So, let's answer that question before discussing Salamis, Lepanto, Quiberon Bay etc. I think common knowledge is that decisive naval battle is battle when one side lost so many ship to continue operation in same scale. It is large tactically victory which is transfer to decisive strategic advantage. However I think there are battles which are not decisive but have same importance but tactically was not decisive. Jutland is perfect example. First of all, thanks for participating because this avenue of exploration is important. Let's try to simplify a little and generalize the definition. See if you agree with this approach. A decisive battle is a battle in which the objectives of the operation were completely achieved. It completely solves the issue or issues over which the battle was fought. We could say that the decisive battle terminates a particular stage of any conflict. It does not end the conflict, it just ends that stage. How do you like that definition? |
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