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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2018 7:26:48 GMT -6
www.uboataces.com/uboat-type-xxi.shtml - This article tells me that there were too many NEW items technologically integrated into one boat, far too many at one time. The best way to develop a new weapons system is to install new innovations gradually, so you can test them in service and fix the problems, not install them all in one boat and expect it to work reliability. Reliability comes from gradual testing, and more testing before deployment. The German's never had the time to do that. The boat was too technically complex for reliability in service. There is no question in my mind or any real submarine expert articles that I've read. My point was that it wasn't mainly these NEW technical items that made the uboat revolutionary, it was the application of old and known battery and electric engine techs in larger amounts + optimizing the hull for underwater travel. So we can conceive a similar uboat ( more like the ones the Japanese made from 1938 onwards ) which just focus on the high underwater speed instead, and it would have been almost as revolutionary, but not suffering all these technical issues. The technology in the boat was revolutionary and it was the first real true submarine, there is no doubt about that. The boat, continued in service for years after the war and until the advent of nuclear power, was the best submarine available. It would be nice to be able to duplicate the technology in the game, I agree completely. However, when you are being bombed day and night, you have two armies at your doorstep and your people are suffering, this new technology is useless. The German's continued to develop advanced technological weapons, but they just ate up resources that could have been used in better ways. But it would be nice for the game to allow us to eventually produce a submarine such as this. I think it would be great to be able to build a submarine like this in the late 1930's.
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 7, 2018 8:46:41 GMT -6
When each of your tanks need to fight 10 enemy tanks, why would it be considered useless to use the resources required to build 1 tank to force the enemy to pay 10 times as much as you do?
No German tank or other weapon achieved anything close to a 10:1 kills:losses ratio in terms of resources invested, except the submarine.
It was certainly one of the most effective strategic weapon in the German arsenal, and the only one that really came close to allowing them to win the war against Britain.
For Germany the war was already lost in 1941 when they dragged USA and Soviet into it. I totally agree that most of Germany's "Wunderwaffe" projects had unrealistic goals and could have achieved little even if they got them working, but the submarines is not one of them. The type XXI should be seen as a development of older submarine types, which had been forced to stay in combat far past their best before date. Both the type VII and type IX workhorses of the German Atlantic campaign had first entered service in 1938 already, and there is a limit to how much can be retrofitted to an old design.
For the game I would like to see submarines as an effective weapon if your enemy falls behind in ASW research, so that you can't ignore ASW tech or escort construction pre-war. The paper I linked earlier had the following figures as an example for a proper submarine campaign against an enemy inferior in both ASW tech and escort construction: "Conclusion: The Japanese lost or spent 42.3 times as much as the Americans."
Now I agree that 40:1 would probably be very unbalanced, but maybe about 4:1 damage to enemy ships vs own submarine losses could be expected for submarines that are significantly more advanced tech than the escorts they face ( including the cost of sunk/damaged enemy capital ships ). For a campaign with equal ASW tech and investment in escort vs submarines on both sides it would probably make sense to have the cost be 1:1 for game balance reasons.
Historically the effectiveness also depended on how reliant the target was on sealanes for industry and sustaining the population with food, for example both Japan and UK would be very vulnerable while Soviet and USA probably the least vulnerable.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2018 12:17:44 GMT -6
When each of your tanks need to fight 10 enemy tanks, why would it be considered useless to use the resources required to build 1 tank to force the enemy to pay 10 times as much as you do? No German tank or other weapon achieved anything close to a 10:1 kills:losses ratio in terms of resources invested, except the submarine. It was certainly one of the most effective strategic weapon in the German arsenal, and the only one that really came close to allowing them to win the war against Britain. For Germany the war was already lost in 1941 when they dragged USA and Soviet into it. I totally agree that most of Germany's "Wunderwaffe" projects had unrealistic goals and could have achieved little even if they got them working, but the submarines is not one of them. The type XXI should be seen as a development of older submarine types, which had been forced to stay in combat far past their best before date. Both the type VII and type IX workhorses of the German Atlantic campaign had first entered service in 1938 already, and there is a limit to how much can be retrofitted to an old design. For the game I would like to see submarines as an effective weapon if your enemy falls behind in ASW research, so that you can't ignore ASW tech or escort construction pre-war. The paper I linked earlier had the following figures as an example for a proper submarine campaign against an enemy inferior in both ASW tech and escort construction: "Conclusion: The Japanese lost or spent 42.3 times as much as the Americans." Now I agree that 40:1 would probably be very unbalanced, but maybe about 4:1 damage to enemy ships vs own submarine losses could be expected for submarines that are significantly more advanced tech than the escorts they face ( including the cost of sunk/damaged enemy capital ships ). For a campaign with equal ASW tech and investment in escort vs submarines on both sides it would probably make sense to have the cost be 1:1 for game balance reasons. Historically the effectiveness also depended on how reliant the target was on sealanes for industry and sustaining the population with food, for example both Japan and UK would be very vulnerable while Soviet and USA probably the least vulnerable. Since the end of the war, historians and analysts have discussed and argued over how close the U-boat campaign actually came to shut down British war production. You find statistics that will prove either side. But realistically, after the Happy Days on the East Coast of the US ended, which was probably about March 1942, the chance for the U-boats to really make a difference was over. Doenitz is reported to have said that he needed 300 U-boats in order to maintain 100 boats at sea. If that were true, then if the boat they fielded was a Type XXI, would that number have been reduced. While it could stay submerged longer and was faster underwater, it could not carry that many more Torpedoes than the Type VIIC or Type IX. The Type IXC could carry 22 torpedoes. The Type VIIC could carry 14 The Type XXI could carry 23 IMO, even with its better underwater capability and stealthiness, I don’t really see how it could do more damage. With its advanced technology and the problems associated with the technology, its hard to see whether it could have really accomplished much until the technological advancements had matured. As to its effectiveness in the game, would it be more effective in unrestricted submarine warfare or fleet support.
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 7, 2018 12:54:08 GMT -6
IMO, even with its better underwater capability and stealthiness, I don’t really see how it could do more damage. With its advanced technology and the problems associated with the technology, its hard to see whether it could have really accomplished much until the technological advancements had matured. If the increased speed and stealth allowed it to sneak twice as close to targets or close enough to hit twice as many torpedoes, or just make successful attacks twice as often I can certainly see how it could have made a major difference. Submarines were all about stealth. Although later on in the war it was more about being able to attack at all while the other models could not.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2018 13:50:15 GMT -6
IMO, even with its better underwater capability and stealthiness, I don’t really see how it could do more damage. With its advanced technology and the problems associated with the technology, its hard to see whether it could have really accomplished much until the technological advancements had matured. If the increased speed and stealth allowed it to sneak twice as close to targets or close enough to hit twice as many torpedoes, or just make successful attacks twice as often I can certainly see how it could have made a major difference. Submarines were all about stealth. Although later on in the war it was more about being able to attack at all while the other models could not. The common firing range for German torpedo doctrine was 600 yards. It might have been more or less but that was the average. The torpedoes on the Type XXI were not different from other torpedoes and they only carried 23. The torpedo firing system was exactly the same as the other boats and crews were trained and had the same experience. The Allies lost 2,784 ships to submarines during WWII. That is about 46 ships per month, or about 1.53 ships lost per day. Statistics for the number of torpedoes fired and ships lost is about six torpedoes for every ship. It was consistent for all nations. So, at that rate, with 23 torpedoes, we could expect about 3-4 ship sunk for each submarine. Do you think the Type XXI was really going to do any better considering that it carried the same number of torpedoes, and used the same firing system along with the fact that it was cramped and crew efficiency would decrease over time. I don't think it would. The advantage that the technology gave the Type XXI was that it could stay submerged longer and approach the target faster to fire its torpedoes. However, with the same number of torpedoes, same firing system and human error still taking its toll, there was no way it could be expected to change the dynamics of the undersea war.
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 7, 2018 14:12:01 GMT -6
The Allies lost 2,784 ships to submarines during WWII. That is about 46 ships per month, or about 1.53 ships lost per day. Statistics for the number of torpedoes fired and ships lost is about six torpedoes for every ship. It was consistent for all nations. So, at that rate, with 23 torpedoes, we could expect about 3-4 ship sunk for each submarine. Do you think the Type XXI was really going to do any better considering that it carried the same number of torpedoes, and used the same firing system along with the fact that it was cramped and crew efficiency would decrease over time. I don't think it would. The advantage that the technology gave the Type XXI was that it could stay submerged longer and approach the target faster to fire its torpedoes. However, with the same number of torpedoes, same firing system and human error still taking its toll, there was no way it could be expected to change the dynamics of the undersea war. Yes, I think that during 1943-45 when Type VII submarines could achieve very few sunk ships, the type XXI could have been able to bring back the "happy times" and again be able to sink as many convoys per submarine as the type VII had during 1939-42. Keep in mind that in 1944 the Type VII or Type IX submarines sunk very very few allied ships, despite several times having over 100 subs active in the Atlantic, and having many times more active submarines than during 1939-41: If the Type VII submarines are not able to attack 9 times out of 10 due to enemy escorts but the Type XXI can attack 10 times out of 10 it means the Type XXI would be 10 times as effective.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 8, 2018 9:20:45 GMT -6
I want to throw out an idea of mine about the beginning of the end of the German U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic. They are based two important dates:
December 7th, 1941 – The day Pearl Harbor was attacked, and the US was brought into the war. While there was a happy time along our eastern coast for months, it ended before June 1942. Now US naval escorts and our industrial capacity were involved in the war. This was something the German's had hoped to prevent until Great Britain fell, it did not. 30 October 1942 – This was the day that a British destroyer aided in the capture of the U-boat codes on U-559 enabling Bletchley Park to finally begin to read the communications between U-boat headquarters and the U-boats at Sea.
I am going to read Doeniz’s diary, but I can’t help but believe that these two dates were vital in the failure of the U-boat campaign. A campaign that Doenitz himself ended by withdrawing all U-boats from the North Atlantic. The Type XXI was a tremendous advancement in the history the submarine, however, these two dates are both game changers and I don’t see how this boat, no matter when it was launched could have made a difference. It technological advancements were only possible in the mid-war period, I don’t see them being them available before 1943. By that time, both of these dates and their events had occurred.
I would like to see the game provide something along the lines of these two events in some way.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 8, 2018 11:04:22 GMT -6
I went through my memoirs of Karl Doenitz. He states that U-boats successes dropped off sharply during the last six months of 1941, but the USA entry opened up a fourth phase; from January to July 1942. In that July 1942, sightings dropped off and he switched the submarines to the North Atlantic. He states that it was hoped that the new Type XXI would open up a new phase to prevent an invasion of Europe. Written orders were provided to the U-boats before they left harbor, and fewer changes could be sent by radio communications all because of the Enigma code breaking. He does state that radio-intelligence was indeed the most important and decisive factor in the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic. He also states that on the Allied side, there was apprehension about the new submarines but that was laid to rest due to the messages from and to Japan sent in Magic, which could be read by the US code breakers. The heavy air raids against the building yards, by minelaying campaigns and the loss of the training areas in the Baltic all caused the failure of the Type XXI and other new boats. The bottom line, in my opinion, is as I thought, there is more to this whole issue than just the advanced technology in the new boats. I hope that the team can include some of this complexity of issues to provide a sense of realism to this issue of submarine operations. I am uploading an article which I believe expresses my feelings about the U-boat campaign, that it was not just one issue but many issues. DTIC_ADA409138.pdf (754.53 KB)
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Post by axe99 on Oct 8, 2018 16:39:35 GMT -6
I went through my memoirs of Karl Doenitz. He states that U-boats successes dropped off sharply during the last six months of 1941, but the USA entry opened up a fourth phase; from January to July 1942. In that July 1942, sightings dropped off and he switched the submarines to the North Atlantic. He states that it was hoped that the new Type XXI would open up a new phase to prevent an invasion of Europe. Written orders were provided to the U-boats before they left harbor, and fewer changes could be sent by radio communications all because of the Enigma code breaking. He does state that radio-intelligence was indeed the most important and decisive factor in the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic. He also states that on the Allied side, there was apprehension about the new submarines but that was laid to rest due to the messages from and to Japan sent in Magic, which could be read by the US code breakers. The heavy air raids against the building yards, by minelaying campaigns and the loss of the training areas in the Baltic all caused the failure of the Type XXI and other new boats. The bottom line, in my opinion, is as I thought, there is more to this whole issue than just the advanced technology in the new boats. I hope that the team can include some of this complexity of issues to provide a sense of realism to this issue of submarine operations. I am uploading an article which I believe expresses my feelings about the U-boat campaign, that it was not just one issue but many issues. If you look at sinkings per month per u-boat, it was highest in the second half of 1940 and the first half of 1941 - ie, Britain had got themselves into a 'not terrible' position and had started to get the measure of the u-boats at their current numbers - in the first half of 1941, the average number of ships sunk per month was 43.8, and the average number of u-boats at sea was 18. In the second half of 1941, the average number of ships sunk per month was 27.7, while the average number of u-boats at sea was 33. In the six months to June 1942, the average number of ships sunk per month was 97.5, with the average number of u-boats at sea 51.5 - however, even in the second half of 1942, the losses were on the high side, with average number of ships sunk per month at 95.8, although this took a lot more u-boats at sea (92.2 on average). Data from Showell's Hitler's Navy. The other big thing to keep in mind is the other side of the ledger - new-build merchant ships. Even in the position of the second half of 1941, with losses dropping, the number of merchant ships sunk was still more than the Allies (iirc almost entirely Britain and Canada) were building. However, despite the far higher losses in the second half of 1942, by the end of this period replacement merchant tonnage was outstripping losses due to the flat-out bonkers building program of the US Maritime Commission - such that even if the Type XXI had been as successful (or more successful) than during the second Happy Time off the US Eastern Seaboard, the size of the Allied merchant fleet would have continued growing (the losses of ships would still have been painful, but not war-ending painful). Data from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/ASW-51/ASW-8.html
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 8, 2018 16:49:58 GMT -6
I went through my memoirs of Karl Doenitz. He states that U-boats successes dropped off sharply during the last six months of 1941, but the USA entry opened up a fourth phase; from January to July 1942. In that July 1942, sightings dropped off and he switched the submarines to the North Atlantic. He states that it was hoped that the new Type XXI would open up a new phase to prevent an invasion of Europe. Written orders were provided to the U-boats before they left harbor, and fewer changes could be sent by radio communications all because of the Enigma code breaking. He does state that radio-intelligence was indeed the most important and decisive factor in the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic. He also states that on the Allied side, there was apprehension about the new submarines but that was laid to rest due to the messages from and to Japan sent in Magic, which could be read by the US code breakers. The heavy air raids against the building yards, by minelaying campaigns and the loss of the training areas in the Baltic all caused the failure of the Type XXI and other new boats. The bottom line, in my opinion, is as I thought, there is more to this whole issue than just the advanced technology in the new boats. I hope that the team can include some of this complexity of issues to provide a sense of realism to this issue of submarine operations. I am uploading an article which I believe expresses my feelings about the U-boat campaign, that it was not just one issue but many issues. If you look at sinkings per month per u-boat, it was highest in the second half of 1940 and the first half of 1941 - ie, Britain had got themselves into a 'not terrible' position and had started to get the measure of the u-boats at their current numbers - in the first half of 1941, the average number of ships sunk per month was 43.8, and the average number of u-boats at sea was 18. In the second half of 1941, the average number of ships sunk per month was 27.7, while the average number of u-boats at sea was 33. In the six months to June 1942, the average number of ships sunk per month was 97.5, with the average number of u-boats at sea 51.5 - however, even in the second half of 1942, the losses were on the high side, with average number of ships sunk per month at 95.8, although this took a lot more u-boats at sea (92.2 on average). Data from Showell's Hitler's Navy. The other big thing to keep in mind is the other side of the ledger - new-build merchant ships. Even in the position of the second half of 1941, with losses dropping, the number of merchant ships sunk was still more than the Allies (iirc almost entirely Britain and Canada) were building. However, despite the far higher losses in the second half of 1942, by the end of this period replacement merchant tonnage was outstripping losses due to the flat-out bonkers building program of the US Maritime Commission - such that even if the Type XXI had been as successful (or more successful) than during the second Happy Time off the US Eastern Seaboard, the size of the Allied merchant fleet would have continued growing (the losses of ships would still have been painful, but not war-ending painful). Data from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/ASW-51/ASW-8.htmlThat is exactly the problem for the German's. They did not plan for building more submarines that would have been needed to overcome the building of the merchant ships. In a game of attrition, as the article I uploaded states, any losses whether in battle or in transit or in port must be avoided. The lack of cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine was a fundamental error for the Germans. However, one must understand that the long range patrols were much too far for the Luftwaffe. I honestly don't see how this new technological submarine could have overcome the failure in the numbers game. The German's lost the numbers game on the Eastern Front against the Russians. I am reminded of Napoleon's favorite phrase - God fights on the side of the bigger battalions.
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Post by dorn on Oct 9, 2018 0:33:39 GMT -6
If you look at sinkings per month per u-boat, it was highest in the second half of 1940 and the first half of 1941 - ie, Britain had got themselves into a 'not terrible' position and had started to get the measure of the u-boats at their current numbers - in the first half of 1941, the average number of ships sunk per month was 43.8, and the average number of u-boats at sea was 18. In the second half of 1941, the average number of ships sunk per month was 27.7, while the average number of u-boats at sea was 33. In the six months to June 1942, the average number of ships sunk per month was 97.5, with the average number of u-boats at sea 51.5 - however, even in the second half of 1942, the losses were on the high side, with average number of ships sunk per month at 95.8, although this took a lot more u-boats at sea (92.2 on average). Data from Showell's Hitler's Navy. The other big thing to keep in mind is the other side of the ledger - new-build merchant ships. Even in the position of the second half of 1941, with losses dropping, the number of merchant ships sunk was still more than the Allies (iirc almost entirely Britain and Canada) were building. However, despite the far higher losses in the second half of 1942, by the end of this period replacement merchant tonnage was outstripping losses due to the flat-out bonkers building program of the US Maritime Commission - such that even if the Type XXI had been as successful (or more successful) than during the second Happy Time off the US Eastern Seaboard, the size of the Allied merchant fleet would have continued growing (the losses of ships would still have been painful, but not war-ending painful). Data from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/ASW-51/ASW-8.htmlThat is exactly the problem for the German's. They did not plan for building more submarines that would have been needed to overcome the building of the merchant ships. In a game of attrition, as the article I uploaded states, any losses whether in battle or in transit or in port must be avoided. The lack of cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine was a fundamental error for the Germans. However, one must understand that the long range patrols were much too far for the Luftwaffe. I honestly don't see how this new technological submarine could have overcome the failure in the numbers game. The German's lost the numbers game on the Eastern Front against the Russians. I am reminded of Napoleon's favorite phrase - God fights on the side of the bigger battalions. I would try to do a little different reasoning on that topic. I would start with global picture. Problem of Germany was industrial capacity. They could win the war only if they are able to do ratio Allies vs. Nazi losses above ratio of industrial capacity of Allies vs. Nazi. They need to sustain it for long time if they are not able to knock one of the allies quickly as it happened with France. But the advantage of operational flexibility, quality of equipment do not remain for long time as they had not enough resources to compete with Allies research so you could not do it long enough to win. So what does remain of your options if Allies outproduces you? The answer is having local advantage. As long as Allies could not use their advantage in industrial capacity in combat this is capacity is irrelevant. There are 3 centers of industrial capacity of Allies - Russia, UK, overseas (USA, Commonwealth). Nazis could not effectively destroy it on front as for long time it was out of question to be so effective. So you need to destroy production of equipment on transfer to front. UK production need to be bombed and Luftwaffe failed this task early in the war (Germany did not realized that if you are not able to blitzkrieg your opponent, the numbers, industrial capacity wins so you need to focus on destroying it They do not developed strategic bomber as Allies did). Russia was the problem that could not be solved easily as production capacity was out of reach so you need to destroy production on transfer to front. Again Nazis do not see that issue and was not able to cope with that (again no strategic bombers). Overseas production could be targeted by aircraft (limited range) and by submarines which was weapon platform Germany knows best. However the issue is here again it changed battlefield from Europe land to seas and oceans. Germany built submarines to destroy shipping, Allies built countermeasures (escorts, planes, carriers) to destroy submarines. However the most important factor is that Germany has no weapon platform which can fight the countermeasures and destroy them (submarines were not effective against this). So it is lost from the beginning if you are not able to quickly knock your opponent as there is not close triangle. Germany destroy shipping, Allies countermeasures (planes, escorts) destroys submarines but there is nothing which could effectively destroys these countermeasures so they numbers increased rapidly for Germany to win that war they would need to have much higher production capacity than allies as they could destroy shipping but not countermeasures. This is the main issue I can see on Atlantic battle. Even if Germany is able to sink more shipping that allies produced increasing countermeasures which Germany could not fight will finally destroy German submarines even if they production would be quite higher. For starving UK you need much more tonnage destroyed which was out of possibility. And XXI submarine could do just decreasing effectiveness of Allies countermeasures against submarine. But XXI submarine was not invincible against planes and could not destroy them so the power of countermeasure (air power) would effectively win again. So again Germany had no weapon against planes in battle of Atlantic, you cannot win if you are not able to destroy force which can hurt you most.
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Post by forcea1 on Oct 9, 2018 2:34:18 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 9, 2018 7:56:46 GMT -6
That is exactly the problem for the German's. They did not plan for building more submarines that would have been needed to overcome the building of the merchant ships. In a game of attrition, as the article I uploaded states, any losses whether in battle or in transit or in port must be avoided. The lack of cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine was a fundamental error for the Germans. However, one must understand that the long range patrols were much too far for the Luftwaffe. I honestly don't see how this new technological submarine could have overcome the failure in the numbers game. The German's lost the numbers game on the Eastern Front against the Russians. I am reminded of Napoleon's favorite phrase - God fights on the side of the bigger battalions. I would try to do a little different reasoning on that topic. I would start with global picture. Problem of Germany was industrial capacity. They could win the war only if they are able to do ratio Allies vs. Nazi losses above ratio of industrial capacity of Allies vs. Nazi. They need to sustain it for long time if they are not able to knock one of the allies quickly as it happened with France. But the advantage of operational flexibility, quality of equipment do not remain for long time as they had not enough resources to compete with Allies research so you could not do it long enough to win. So what does remain of your options if Allies outproduces you? The answer is having local advantage. As long as Allies could not use their advantage in industrial capacity in combat this is capacity is irrelevant. There are 3 centers of industrial capacity of Allies - Russia, UK, overseas (USA, Commonwealth). Nazis could not effectively destroy it on front as for long time it was out of question to be so effective. So you need to destroy production of equipment on transfer to front. UK production need to be bombed and Luftwaffe failed this task early in the war (Germany did not realized that if you are not able to blitzkrieg your opponent, the numbers, industrial capacity wins so you need to focus on destroying it They do not developed strategic bomber as Allies did). Russia was the problem that could not be solved easily as production capacity was out of reach so you need to destroy production on transfer to front. Again Nazis do not see that issue and was not able to cope with that (again no strategic bombers). Overseas production could be targeted by aircraft (limited range) and by submarines which was weapon platform Germany knows best. However the issue is here again it changed battlefield from Europe land to seas and oceans. Germany built submarines to destroy shipping, Allies built countermeasures (escorts, planes, carriers) to destroy submarines. However the most important factor is that Germany has no weapon platform which can fight the countermeasures and destroy them (submarines were not effective against this). So it is lost from the beginning if you are not able to quickly knock your opponent as there is not close triangle. Germany destroy shipping, Allies countermeasures (planes, escorts) destroys submarines but there is nothing which could effectively destroys these countermeasures so they numbers increased rapidly for Germany to win that war they would need to have much higher production capacity than allies as they could destroy shipping but not countermeasures. This is the main issue I can see on Atlantic battle. Even if Germany is able to sink more shipping that allies produced increasing countermeasures which Germany could not fight will finally destroy German submarines even if they production would be quite higher. For starving UK you need much more tonnage destroyed which was out of possibility. And XXI submarine could do just decreasing effectiveness of Allies countermeasures against submarine. But XXI submarine was not invincible against planes and could not destroy them so the power of countermeasure (air power) would effectively win again. So again Germany had no weapon against planes in battle of Atlantic, you cannot win if you are not able to destroy force which can hurt you most. I am in total agreement, even with the advantages of the Type XXI U-boat, as I have stated, there were other issues that would affect its effectiveness. The German's did not go to full wartime production until Speer took control, in around 1942-1943. We get back to the same issue: Germany was not a maritime nation, but a continental nation. It affected how they think. Another issue, which is amazing is that the Kriegsmarine did not have an internal engineering department like the US Naval Engineering or the Royal Navy. That has got to be important when you don't have maritime engineers working to improve your naval equipment and tactics.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 9, 2018 21:29:50 GMT -6
I just wanted pass along some interesting information, at least, I think it is interesting. The earliest submarine snorkel was designed by a Scotsman named James Richardson in early 1916. It was patented but the RN never used it. The next attempt was by Captain Pericle Ferretti of the Italian Navy and it was successful.
Now the German snorkel was invented and developed by the Dutch and two of their submarines were captured with them in 1940, by the German’s. This system had been invented by Jan Jacob Wichers. It was used to charge up the batteries while submerged. The Kriegsmarine did take the idea but did not feel it was necessary until 1943 when many U-boats were being lost. The snorkel was retrofitted to the Type VIIC and IXC but the Type XXI and XXIII had snorkels built into them.
While the snorkel did solve one problem; that of being able to pump fresh air into the submarine and run the diesels while submerged to charge the batteries, the submarine could only make 6 knots while using it. There was a flap built into it, which would close to prevent water from entering, but that caused the diesel to draw air from inside the submarine, which is not good for the men inside. The last issue is that when the diesels were running underwater, the hydrophones were useless due to the noise. In clear weather, the smoke from the diesel was easily seen from about 3 miles.
The snorkel did help the German U-boats to avoid being detected, it was not perfect and had its drawback.
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Post by marcorossolini on Oct 10, 2018 5:44:52 GMT -6
In relation to the number of U-boats vs number of tanks built remarks a couple of pages ago, I'd just like to make the comment that Germany would've been far better served building trains than it would've building tanks. That is all, continue offering knowledge to less knowledgable people like myself. I want it all!
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