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Post by kyle on Sept 27, 2018 20:40:23 GMT -6
There are indications that the Japanese battleships had surface search radar at the time of the Midway battle - but I have not found anything convincing about any carrier having a set. What they needed is air search and then of course the doctrine to use it - which takes time to refine. Of course some radios on their fighters could have been somewhat useful (he says sarcastically) too.
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Post by aeson on Sept 27, 2018 21:39:28 GMT -6
My understanding is that Japan did have radios for their aircraft; it's just that the radios were unreliable and heavy, and as a result tended to be removed at the request of pilots who cared more about aircraft performance than about an unreliable ability to communicate with ships and other aircraft.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 27, 2018 21:44:20 GMT -6
There are indications that the Japanese battleships had surface search radar at the time of the Midway battle - but I have not found anything convincing about any carrier having a set. What they needed is air search and then of course the doctrine to use it - which takes time to refine. Of course some radios on their fighters could have been somewhat useful (he says sarcastically) too. According to Nihon Kaigun, there were two radars installed, one on the Ise on 25 May 1942. This was the experimental Model 21 air search set. She used them to test detection of Hyuga at Iyo Nada. Neither ship was involved in Midway. In August of 1942, both were converted to hybrid battleship carriers. The Ise did not undock until 23 August 1943. She was finally recommissioned into the IJN on 5 September 1943. After this she was a training ship for Etajima Naval Academy.
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Post by axe99 on Sept 28, 2018 17:10:45 GMT -6
There are indications that the Japanese battleships had surface search radar at the time of the Midway battle - but I have not found anything convincing about any carrier having a set. What they needed is air search and then of course the doctrine to use it - which takes time to refine. Of course some radios on their fighters could have been somewhat useful (he says sarcastically) too. According to Nihon Kaigun, there were two radars installed, one on the Ise on 25 May 1942. This was the experimental Model 21 air search set. She used them to test detection of Hyuga at Iyo Nada. Neither ship was involved in Midway. In August of 1942, both were converted to hybrid battleship carriers. The Ise did not undock until 23 August 1943. She was finally recommissioned into the IJN on 5 September 1943. After this she was a training ship for Etajima Naval Academy. Iirc this is consistent with the info in Shattered Sword. Late-war they did start putting radar on ships and subs, but the quality of their radar remained pretty poor during the period (relative to the Allies at any point in time).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 28, 2018 17:43:02 GMT -6
The two radars for shipboard use were the Model 21 and the Model 22. The Model 22 was the best. The Model 21 was an anti-air similar to our SCR-270 and the Model 22 was an anti-surface warning radar. Frequency for the Model 21 was 200 MHZ, power output of 5 KW with a range of about 62 miles. Accuracy was about plus or minus .62 miles to 1.24 miles. There were 250 built. The Model 22 used a magnetron with a superhet receiver. The range was about 15 miles with an azimuth of 2-3 degrees and range accuracy of about 100-250 meters. pwencycl.kgbudge.com/T/y/Type_21_general_purpose_radar.htm
An A-Scope uses range or velocity in the X axis and amplitude in the Y axis. The higher the amplitude above the noise, identifies the target. The azimuth must be read off of the manual dial since there types of radar were manually rotated. The SCR-270 at Pearl Harbor was the same but the other radar operated had to read the azimuth from the ring on the antenna above the set.. There are other kinds of scopes, B-scope/E-scope and C-Scope along with the PPI or plan position indicator. The latter is the best for search sets with auto rotate. The distance from the center of the beam on the scope to the target which termed a paint is the range and can be determined by range lines and the azimuth can be read from the beam location on the screen.
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 1, 2018 5:44:40 GMT -6
Think about the most memorable naval battles of the 20th century. I believe they are Jutland and Midway. We could include Leyte Gulf and Marianna's but seriously, the Japanese never had a chance at either of those. But look at those two battles. Both had one item in common; signal intelligence. Room 40 for Jutland and Station Hypo for Midway. Both of those organizations give their fleet an advantage in coming operation. Regardless of how they eventually turned out, one side did have an advantage and used it to stop their opponents. Coral sea also was due to signal intelligence, and was equally important as Midway IMO. Without Coral Sea the Midway battle becomes 6 IJN vs 4 USN Carriers ( A 50% IJN advantage instead of a 33% one in Carrier numbers ). But again. Signal Intelligence is still not Electronic Warfare... Just like radar, HF and UHF Radios, radio direction finders, radio homing devices, radio bombing systems, IFF, SONAR is not Electronic Warfare either. I am not saying any of these systems were unimportant, I agree they were vital, just that it's wrong to classify them as Electronic Warfare.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 1, 2018 8:01:32 GMT -6
Think about the most memorable naval battles of the 20th century. I believe they are Jutland and Midway. We could include Leyte Gulf and Marianna's but seriously, the Japanese never had a chance at either of those. But look at those two battles. Both had one item in common; signal intelligence. Room 40 for Jutland and Station Hypo for Midway. Both of those organizations give their fleet an advantage in coming operation. Regardless of how they eventually turned out, one side did have an advantage and used it to stop their opponents. Coral sea also was due to signal intelligence, and was equally important as Midway IMO. Without Coral Sea the Midway battle becomes 6 IJN vs 4 USN Carriers ( A 50% IJN advantage instead of a 33% one in Carrier numbers ). But again. Signal Intelligence is still not Electronic Warfare... Just like radar, HF and UHF Radios, radio direction finders, radio homing devices, radio bombing systems, IFF, SONAR is not Electronic Warfare either. I am not saying any of these systems were unimportant, I agree they were vital, just that it's wrong to classify them as Electronic Warfare. I am just trying to simplify the new additions. Electronic warfare does include signal intelligence because it uses electronics in most cases to gather the raw data for decryption. The part that isn't, is the actual feet on the ground like spy's and such which could still be added.
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 1, 2018 8:56:19 GMT -6
I am just trying to simplify the new additions. Electronic warfare does include signal intelligence because it uses electronics in most cases to gather the raw data for decryption. The part that isn't, is the actual feet on the ground like spy's and such which could still be added. No. Electronic warfare does not include Strategic Signal Intelligence. Electronic warfare concerns only the weapons and units in the frontline battle ( under tactical command at the actual battle ). So if Midway had been won because the US Carriers or US Airplanes intercepted Japanese signals (Electronic warfare Support), jammed signals ( Electronic warfare Attack ) or could prevent the Japanese from jamming their signals ( Electronic warfare Defense ), then the victory could have been said to be thanks to Electronic Warfare.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 1, 2018 9:14:56 GMT -6
I am just trying to simplify the new additions. Electronic warfare does include signal intelligence because it uses electronics in most cases to gather the raw data for decryption. The part that isn't, is the actual feet on the ground like spy's and such which could still be added. No. Electronic warfare does not include Strategic Signal Intelligence. Electronic warfare concerns only the weapons and units in the frontline battle ( under tactical command at the actual battle ). So if Midway had been won because the US Carriers or US Airplanes intercepted Japanese signals (Electronic warfare Support), jammed signals ( Electronic warfare Attack ) or could prevent the Japanese from jamming their signals ( Electronic warfare Defense ), then the victory could have been said to be thanks to Electronic Warfare. Strategic signal intelligence as a separate part of warfighting has only come into play in the last half century. The operations that were conducted by the base in Australia and Station HYPO were a part of the US Navy and Army Air Force activities. They were used for strategic operations and tactical advantages. They were strictly for operational use. US carrier task forces had their own intelligence officer on board to interpret and decode signals detected by US naval ships. All this aside, I believe for simplification of the game, all signal intelligence should be covered under one umbrella; electronic warfare.
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 1, 2018 13:31:27 GMT -6
All this aside, I believe for simplification of the game, all signal intelligence should be covered under one umbrella; electronic warfare. Hold your horses here. Now your making up your own definition for concepts that already have a clear ( and quite different ) meaning! This is the same as if I would suddenly define a "Carrier" as "A ship which can carry planes", and then go on to say that the Liberty ship was the most produced Carrier of WW2. This is clearly false, even if the Liberty ship fits my new invented definition of what a Carrier is. I hope you see how confusing this would become? To have any structure to both the game and our discussions on the forum we can't just go around and invent our own definitions for things..
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 1, 2018 13:36:39 GMT -6
All this aside, I believe for simplification of the game, all signal intelligence should be covered under one umbrella; electronic warfare. Hold your horses here. Now your making up your own definition for concepts that already have a clear ( and quite different ) meaning! This is the same as if I would suddenly define a "Carrier" as "A ship which can carry planes", and then go on to say that the Liberty ship was the most produced Carrier of WW2. This is clearly false, even if the Liberty ship fits my new invented definition of what a Carrier is. I hope you see how confusing this would become? To have any structure to both the game and our discussions on the forum we can't just go around and invent our own definitions for things.. I will leave the definitions for the game to the team. I just believe that signal intelligence should be folded into electronic warfare if the team wants to add electronic warfare to the other two additions: air warfare and undersea warfare. It is their choice, not mine. This is all I have to say.
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Post by forcea1 on Oct 2, 2018 13:16:32 GMT -6
I've finally got around to typing up the list that I promised a week ago.
Type 91 operated at 200-600 MHz with an output of 8-22 watts.
Type 91M had a wider frequency range of 90-600 MHz.
Type 650: Radio Jammer to counter German Guided missiles.
Type 651: Same purpose as Type 651. 1 kW output
Type 652 (Jostle): Aircraft Jammer
Types 653/1 & 653/2 (known as Naval Carpet II): Automatic swept-frequency jammer. 100 watts, 350-750 MHz.
Type 654 (American Carpet I): Spot or barrage jammer. 5 watts, 480-700 MHz.
Type 655 (Carpet III): No other information provided.
Type 656 (American Rug): Pre-spot or barrage jammer. 8-20 watts, 200-550 MHz.
Type 657 (Pimpernel/Carpet I): No other information provided.
Type 658 (British Mandrel): 10 watts, 100-152 MHz
Type 659 (American Mandrel): Aircraft jammer.
Type 660 (British Moonshine): No other information provided.
Type 661 (Peter): Apparently abortive.
Type 662: Abortive Countermeasures set developed by the Admiralty Signal Establishment.
Type 663 (American Carpet IV): Pre-spot or barrage jammer. 5-40 watts, 350-1400 MHz.
Type 664 (Carpet IIA): Non-tropicalised version of Type 653.
The Royal Navy also used the American TDY trainable jammer (360-800 MHz).
Most sets used at D-Day were automatic and were fitted on craft as small as LCTs.
Sets present at D-Day on Battleships and Cruisers are listed below:
Type 91, 21 sets.
TDY, 24 sets total (19 on British ships & 5 on American ships.)
Type 650, 26 sets.
Type 654, 12 sets.
In the Autumn of 1944, three Eastern Fleet ships had Naval Mandrel (presumably Type 658).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 12, 2018 19:53:04 GMT -6
I was not certain where to put these thoughts, but here they are. Trade warfare is one of the oldest forms of naval warfare in the history of Mankind. Both stronger and especially weaker fleets have utilized this type of naval warfare to gain an advantage. It has always been considered an important aspect of the war at sea. I think we all understand the objectives- reduce trade traffic in a specific area for a certain period of time. In most cases it is not eliminating it, just hampering it or interfering with it. When we think of trade warfare we think of privateers, and pirates attacking merchant ships at sea. However, let me point out that there is one area of trade warfare that has a ripple effect. That area would be the ports, anchorages, offloading facilities, shipyards and ship-repair facilities. For enclosed seas and narrow seas, the advent of the aircraft and submarine have added two more tools to the tool box. One of the biggest requirements is to identify, before the war, the biggest ports and facilities that conduct the trade for a nation and plan for their attacks both with submarines, surface ships and aircraft like twin-engine and multi-engine bombers and dive bombers. We can see examples of this in the War in the Mediterranean during WWII and to a certain extent, WW1. We can see some of this in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea in the Russo-Japanese War. We can also see it in the War in the Pacific. The key is good pre-war planning and use of all the tools in the toolbox to attack enemy centers of shipping and the lanes they use.
I don't know what the new game will provide for this type of warfare but the tools should be there. I hope that it will allow some peace time investigation and planning of a possible opponents ports and trade routes along with shipyards etc.
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Post by corsair on Jan 5, 2019 3:08:30 GMT -6
There aren't many instances (if any) where ship to ship jamming of radar took place in WW2, at least I can't think of any. There were several where ESM (Electronic Surveillance Measures - Radar direction and identification to more or less summarize it) were used: Bismarck picking or British radar and thinking they're still being shadowed so send a long message back to Germany comes to mind. Several instances where radar was left off in fear of enemy ESM picking it up. Then of course the radio direction finding of comm's (HFDF) got more and more capable over the war. That is more of a strategic impact than tactical but could provide some intelligence along with signal analysis of what you're going to face in battle. Signal analysis is very interesting - good operators could identify the platform even when they couldn't decode the message itself. I was an EW back quite a while ago. Obviously this field intersts me and the baby steps taken during WW2 are very interesting. Naval EW wasn't used to the extent of land/air based - but it was evolving rapidly along with everything else. Brings an interesting idea - while at war technology tends to rapidly evolve. Less so when at peace. Something RTWII could consider modeling.
Considering the RAF first deployed chaff to (very successfully) jam German radars on a bombing raid on Hamburg in 1943, I'm wondering why that wasn't used on raids by, or against, a carrier task force. Although perhaps the fact that attacks by or against carriers usually took place in daylight largely negated the usefulness of jamming radar.
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Post by axe99 on Jan 5, 2019 23:23:55 GMT -6
There aren't many instances (if any) where ship to ship jamming of radar took place in WW2, at least I can't think of any. There were several where ESM (Electronic Surveillance Measures - Radar direction and identification to more or less summarize it) were used: Bismarck picking or British radar and thinking they're still being shadowed so send a long message back to Germany comes to mind. Several instances where radar was left off in fear of enemy ESM picking it up. Then of course the radio direction finding of comm's (HFDF) got more and more capable over the war. That is more of a strategic impact than tactical but could provide some intelligence along with signal analysis of what you're going to face in battle. Signal analysis is very interesting - good operators could identify the platform even when they couldn't decode the message itself. I was an EW back quite a while ago. Obviously this field intersts me and the baby steps taken during WW2 are very interesting. Naval EW wasn't used to the extent of land/air based - but it was evolving rapidly along with everything else. Brings an interesting idea - while at war technology tends to rapidly evolve. Less so when at peace. Something RTWII could consider modeling.
Considering the RAF first deployed chaff to (very successfully) jam German radars on a bombing raid on Hamburg in 1943, I'm wondering why that wasn't used on raids by, or against, a carrier task force. Although perhaps the fact that attacks by or against carriers usually took place in daylight largely negated the usefulness of jamming radar
I'm fairly sure I've read of the Japanese using chaff or similar late-war when attacking Allied forces to confuse air warning radar - I can try and dig up the reference if that'd be helpful?
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