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Post by ramjb on Sept 22, 2018 9:15:20 GMT -6
There was nothing orderly about the second turn away from the British line. Desperation, courage and darkness combined with a conservative British doctrine (turning away from a mass torpedo attack) saved the Germans from complete defeat. You're talking about the third battleturn, not the second. First battleturn turned the HSF away from the fleet. Second battleturn turned the HSF again towards the british ships (Scheer noticed that he needed to bid his time before commiting to a retreat to avoid giving the Grand Fleet a much better chance at cutting off his retreat towards the Jade). It's the third battleturn that suffered from confussion, yet given the circunstances and the volume of fire the battlefleet was subjected to, it was an admirable feat. Also the Grand Fleet wasn't kept at a distance by torpedo threat alone. Hipper's battlecruiser squadron was sent off charging down the bearing of the whole british battleline, wich resulted in those brave ships engaging the biggest battleline the world has even seen at ranges down to less than 7000 yards at some points. I don't think Jellicoe made a conservative call there - with german destroyers dropping torpedoes and those battlecruisers coming down at max speed it'd been foolish to pursuit any more agressive course of action at that point - not less because at that point the battle was significantly on the british' favor given the horrible tactical position of the german battlefleet.
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Post by britishball on Sept 22, 2018 9:26:29 GMT -6
Winter War was defensive, doesn't matter if you kill 20,000 Soviets today but retreat one mile because tomorrow the Soviets will have another 20,000 men but you might not have another mile. and the HSF in WW1 was exactly how in an offensive position?. I feel a bit like Basil Fawlty... It's almost comical that I, as a British person, have to say this, but they started it. They were under blockade the onerous was on them to attack, anything less than the status quo (that is to say still being blockaded) would be a loss. Germany's High Seas Fleet intended to lure out, trap, and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet, as the German naval force was insufficient to openly engage the entire British fleet. This formed part of a larger strategy to break the British blockade of Germany and to allow German naval vessels access to the Atlantic. Fourteen British and eleven German ships sank, with a total of 9,823 deaths. After sunset, and throughout the night, Jellicoe manoeuvred to cut the Germans off from their base, hoping to continue the battle the next morning, but under the cover of darkness Scheer broke through the British light forces forming the rearguard of the Grand Fleet and returned to port. It's there in black and white, we wanted to continue the fight, they didn't, they came out, fought and retreated. I don't consider that a victory. If you were German I had a great pun about you just coming across as a "sauer *****" but I think you are Spanish. Correct? Fun puns aside I'm not saying the Finnish never won any battles, just that any battle where they lost ground was a defeat. After all their ambition was to remain an independent country not kill as many Soviets as possible.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 22, 2018 11:17:39 GMT -6
One of the interesting aspects of this discussion about Jutland and its decisiveness, is the fact that it is the same discussion that has been going on since the battle, by historians and naval strategists. They haven’t agreed on the answer either. But the more important discussion, is how the British Fleet was changed radically at the turn of the century, and this change culminated in the Battle of Jutland.
The British were concerned throughout their history with two thoughts: invasion and trade protection. There were the two primary missions assigned to the British Royal Navy. After Trafalgar in 1805, the Royal Navy’s primary mission was to guarantee safe passage to and from their colonies for industrial raw materials and foodstuff, as it was called. This was vital because of the population growth occurring in England. This mission was accomplished by stationing cruisers and other lighter ships around the world to deal with the slave trade and piracy along with enforcement of law and order. The English wanted a balance of power in Europe, independence of the Low Countries and a navy stronger than all other navy’s combined. However, by the arrival of the new century, all this changed radically.
The change was caused by the beginnings of globalization, development of railroads and the rise of other wealthy nations like the US, Russia, Japan, France and of course, the new German state. Where her primary opponent had been the French, with their naval bases on the Atlantic Coast and in the Med, Germany now began its naval development, and now the fleet bases on the southern coast of England were of no real use in keeping the German Fleet caged. New bases had to be found, and there were few harbors on that eastern coastline capable of handling the fleet. The two chosen were Rosyth and the new fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow. Those two bases were improved, and the fleet now deployed in those locations.
So, around the turn-of-the-century the British fleet had neglected science and its application to warfare. Officers and men were still training on sailing ships. Officers were not being traded and educated on tactics and the new strategy of the age. The war colleges were not training officers on the steam engine, long-range ordnance, torpedoes, mines submarines, wireless and high-explosive shells. This kind of training was neglected. Naval strategy was also neglected. There were no actual war plans. In the 1899-1900 timeframe, things began to change with Admiral Sir John Fisher as CinC of the Mediterranean fleet. He forced officers under his command to begin to study naval strategy and tactics. He emphasized naval gunnery and provided award for superior gunnery to men and ships. He trained his men on long-distance, high-speed steaming trials to get them to understand how to perform such important maneuvers in war time.
When Fisher became the First Sea Lord, he reformed dockyards and eliminated redundant workers along with reducing the number of foreign dockyards that were useless and simplified the stocks of supplies and stores that were not required. However, his four major reforms are what was important for the British Royal Navy.
1. He changed the breadth of the men inducted into the Navy from the elite rich to all men to enlarge the possibility of superior officers 2. He developed and introduced the nucleus-crew system that meant that ship would have a nucleus of sailors and officers ready if war came. 3. He scrapped obsolete ships and redistributed the fleet based on the new geostrategy. 4. He began the introduction of the All-big-gun type of battleship and cruisers
The new geostrategy was his realization that Germany was now their primary opponent and they had to move the main portion of the fleet to the new bases in Scapa Flow and Rosyth.
Now, this process of radical change to the British Navy began about 1903-1904. However, such radical changes take time, and the war began about a decade later, which was a surprise for the British and especially the Navy.
The officers of the Royal Navy above possibly commander-level had been trained in the old school and had only a few years to adapt to the new ships, gunnery and tactics. The old idea that you fight like your train, now comes into play. Why do we expect the Royal Navy to fight better, when it had less than a decade to change its ships, tactics and training? We can’t and shouldn’t. The same goes for the Germans, they were new to naval warfare, and only started to build and train a fleet since around 1894 when the first naval building plan was started. Tirpitz only began his reign as the State Secretary of the Imperial German Navy in 1897. So, the German Navy had about nineteen years to build ships, develop a naval cadre of officers and men and naval strategy. That is not much, in my opinion.
So now it is 1914 and war starts. It’s now a little late to make major changes, you win with what you bring, comes to mind. This is the situation as of May 31, 1916 when the two fleets met. One fleet had only had a decade to develop new ships, officers and a new naval strategy. It’s higher officers were still trained in old tactics with new ships facing an enemy that had no naval warfare experience and was being directed by an idiot….. Kaiser Wilhelm.
So, what we saw at Jutland is exactly the result. All navies want to fight decisive battles, it is part of their strategy, to fight and defeat the enemy. However, battles must contribute to the overall naval strategy and grand strategy. The Jutland operation and subsequent battle did just that, it maintained the status quo for the British. For the Germans, while they did attrite the British fleet, it was never enough to really affect the overall strategy they had adopted, a strategy that was flawed from the beginning. The examination and analysis of the Battle of Jutland cannot be performed in a vacuum. It must be studied as a part of the overall changes that both fleets experienced prior to the war and went to war with.
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Post by oaktree on Sept 22, 2018 11:43:57 GMT -6
Fisher was also a supporter of the RN adapting torpedoes and submarines. I believe he foresaw the effects that torpedoes would have on engagement distances and the need for the all-big gun ship as well as anti-torpedo boat armament.
And as the new geostrategy came into play the RN shifted from the majority of their fleet being in the Med to direct defense of England. They also had an ongoing issue with the fact that the requirements for trade protection and fleet battle were a conflict in terms of cruiser design. Which they definitely did not solve between WW1 and WW2.
And one reason the RN was willing to go along with the naval treaties is that they pretty much decided in the 1920s that a war against a growing USN was not a winning proposition. The UK colonies in the Caribbean and elsewhere within reach of the USA could probably not be held for any length of time if hostilities broke out.
And you could start separate threads on how Germany under the Kaiser and Japan under the militarists both formed and followed naval policies that really did not fit their longterm strategic interests.
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Post by ramjb on Sept 22, 2018 11:50:45 GMT -6
I feel a bit like Basil Fawlty... It's almost comical that I, as a British person, have to say this, but they started it. They were under blockade the onerous was on them to attack, anything less than the status quo (that is to say still being blockaded) would be a loss. Germany's High Seas Fleet intended to lure out, trap, and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet, as the German naval force was insufficient to openly engage the entire British fleet. This formed part of a larger strategy to break the British blockade of Germany and to allow German naval vessels access to the Atlantic. Fourteen British and eleven German ships sank, with a total of 9,823 deaths. After sunset, and throughout the night, Jellicoe manoeuvred to cut the Germans off from their base, hoping to continue the battle the next morning, but under the cover of darkness Scheer broke through the British light forces forming the rearguard of the Grand Fleet and returned to port. It's there in black and white, we wanted to continue the fight, they didn't, they came out, fought and retreated. I don't consider that a victory. If you were German I had a great pun about you just coming across as a "sauer *****" but I think you are Spanish. Correct? Fun puns aside I'm not saying the Finnish never won any battles, just that any battle where they lost ground was a defeat. After all their ambition was to remain an independent country not kill as many Soviets as possible. Hehehehe OK, I guess that's fair enough . I concede that the german pursuit of an aggresive fleet expansion didn't look very defensive on paper...even while it actually was strategically wise. Germany never really intended to challenge the UK at sea. It'd been foolish to do so anyway as it was beyond it's capability. as for who started that war...it's still a matter of contention but at any rate for sure UK was the only nation not rushing straight into it, so they are the only ones that for sure had no blame in starting the whole mess . As for me , correct, I'm spanish. Though in a very very happy relationship with a splendid British girl . figures, huh? XD Trust me, coming as a "sauer *****"...not new to me (my favorite all time aircraft is the Fw190D9...and you know how prophead fanboy flamewars are). Nor it's new to be seen as an american fanboy (because I think the US Navy was by far the best naval power of WWII, not without faults, but still), or a british lover (because I consider the Merlin powerplant as, by far, the best aero engine of WWII, and because I've gone to very long strides to put in perspective the excellent quality of the british soldiers and sailors specially, but not exclusivelly, during WWII. Specially when people begin talking smuck about how amazing ,say, the Waffen SS were, to remind them the kind of action movie stuff the british SAS pulled off and got away with doesn't win you any friends. Just to name an instance). Funny enough I've been called a "German hater" before - in discussions about the Bismarcks and Scharnhorst classes, or in discussing how stupidly idiotic german leadership was since Bismarck was ousted until...well, until the end of WWII. Just to name a few) And I've been called an american hater - because I dared to say that the P-51 wasn't the best fighter of WW2 (that honor belongs imo to the Fw190D9, with the F4U corsair and P-47 in hot pursuit). Obviously I've been labelled as a british hater too - guess why reading this thread XD. But it seems that putting the Spitfire in proper historical perspective doesn't win you any friends either XDDDD. It heavily depends on the topic we're talking about, and who is taking part on it . I don't side with nationalities, I side with history, to the extent of what my knowledge and my unavoidable subjectivity as human being allows . I'll have to admit, however, you won't find me defening much stuff of french origin though. Well, some minor stuff here and there but...yeah xD. I guess that makes me a "frog hater" XD. As for the rest I try to be as objective as I can within the realm of what I've learned and read about historical conflicts - and trust me on this one...it is a lot XD I still don't think my finnish chaps (not kidding here, I have some very good finnish friends, long story there xD) would be, let's say, highly amused by your assessment of finnish victories, or lack thereof. Man, finns are awesome .
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 22, 2018 12:13:58 GMT -6
Fisher was also a supporter of the RN adapting torpedoes and submarines. I believe he foresaw the effects that torpedoes would have on engagement distances and the need for the all-big gun ship as well as anti-torpedo boat armament. And as the new geostrategy came into play the RN shifted from the majority of their fleet being in the Med to direct defense of England. They also had an ongoing issue with the fact that the requirements for trade protection and fleet battle were a conflict in terms of cruiser design. Which they definitely did not solve between WW1 and WW2. And one reason the RN was willing to go along with the naval treaties is that they pretty much decided in the 1920s that a war against a growing USN was not a winning proposition. The UK colonies in the Caribbean and elsewhere within reach of the USA could probably not be held for any length of time if hostilities broke out. And you could start separate threads on how Germany under the Kaiser and Japan under the militarists both formed and followed naval policies that really did not fit their longterm strategic interests. I think your suggestion is a good one, and I have done so.
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Post by bcoopactual on Sept 22, 2018 17:31:57 GMT -6
There was nothing orderly about the second turn away from the British line. Desperation, courage and darkness combined with a conservative British doctrine (turning away from a mass torpedo attack) saved the Germans from complete defeat. You're talking about the third battleturn, not the second. First battleturn turned the HSF away from the fleet. Second battleturn turned the HSF again towards the british ships (Scheer noticed that he needed to bid his time before commiting to a retreat to avoid giving the Grand Fleet a much better chance at cutting off his retreat towards the Jade). It's the third battleturn that suffered from confussion, yet given the circunstances and the volume of fire the battlefleet was subjected to, it was an admirable feat. Also the Grand Fleet wasn't kept at a distance by torpedo threat alone. Hipper's battlecruiser squadron was sent off charging down the bearing of the whole british battleline, which resulted in those brave ships engaging the biggest battleline the world has even seen at ranges down to less than 7000 yards at some points. I don't think Jellicoe made a conservative call there - with german destroyers dropping torpedoes and those battlecruisers coming down at max speed it'd been foolish to pursuit any more aggressive course of action at that point - not less because at that point the battle was significantly on the british' favor given the horrible tactical position of the german battlefleet. I believe that Agreed, the third battle turn was the second turn away from the British line. I could have said last turn instead to avoid confusion. The deathride of the battlecruisers was what I was referring to by courage and desperation. I only mean conservative versus aggressive (turning towards the attack) not saying it was right or wrong. As you are no doubt aware, it's the part of the battle that Jellicoe is routinely blamed for "not winning" the battle even though his choice of the conservative tactic was pre-approved by the admiralty and was in keeping with the strategic situation where England needed only maintain the status quo to continue to the blockade. I do believe but can't confirm because I can't remember where I saw or read it that the official position of the Royal Navy is that in hindsight it would have been better to turn towards the enemy. Risking three to four dreadnoughts being struck by torpedoes would have allowed the British to maintain contact with Scheer's forces and then possibly finish them off. Of course that's with the benefit of hindsight.
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Post by ramjb on Sept 22, 2018 17:43:45 GMT -6
As you are no doubt aware, it's the part of the battle that Jellicoe is routinely blamed for "not winning" the battle even though his choice of the conservative tactic was pre-approved by the admiralty and was in keeping with the strategic situation where England needed only maintain the status quo to continue to the blockade. I do believe but can't confirm because I can't remember where I saw or read it that the official position of the Royal Navy is that in hindsight it would have been better to turn towards the enemy. Risking three to four dreadnoughts being struck by torpedoes would have allowed the British to maintain contact with Scheer's forces and then possibly finish them off. Of course that's with the benefit of hindsight. I completely agree with your opinion here. Jellicoe was under very heavy flak from the Admiralty very early on after the battle was over, but of all the things that went wrong for the British that day his command wasn't one of them. He conducted himself very well, he had to deal with constant confusing reports, and during the nighttime phase (probably the most critical of the whole engagement) he never received word of the sightings made by his own ships. So blame was very early shifted off him as soon as the admiralty inquiries about the battle began giving out conclussions. But you know how it is, the stigma was however still attached to his name and in some ways endure to this day, unfair as it is. And I totally disagree with the "hindsight" opinion that the british battleline should've turned towards the enemy at that part of the battle. the Grand Fleet was in firm control of the tactical situation, the germans were in a desperate situation and turning towards them would've probably been unwise. Besides, there was no need to. Jellicoe's intention wasn't to engage in a hot chase trying to catch the Germans as they were retreating to port- He intended to completely cut off their retreat towards the Jade and utterly destroy them the next morning giving them no way to escape. His moves were aimed towards that goal: stay in tactical control of the fight while forcing the german fleet away from the Jade's direction, while moving towards a position to cut them off. It was perfect. Of course he couldn't predict the complete breakdown of fleet communications that happened during the night and that allowed the german fleet to sneak past the british line without him even knowing what was going on. That wasn't his fault, and he couldn't know it would happen as it did. Besides I remember a quote that made an impression on me, I can't recall the book nor author (have read so many about that battle that it's a pointless exercise in narrowing it down right now). Jellicoe was in a risky position during the battle of Jutland - he was in a position where he couldnt' win the war for the UK no matter he sank the HSF or not ,but he also was in a position that could cost defeat to the UK if he acted wrong. Certainly under that perspective running the risk of catching torpedoes on several of his battleships chasing german shadows wasn't a wise proposition, specially not when his goal didn't involve chasing german ships and sinking some of them in their retreat: it involved crushing them all. I think Jellicoe's command during the whole battle was one made of good decisions, common sense, and good leadership. What failed in that battle wasn't him ,he performed perfectly in my view.
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Post by aeson on Sept 22, 2018 17:56:47 GMT -6
Winter War was defensive, doesn't matter if you kill 20,000 Soviets today but retreat one mile because tomorrow the Soviets will have another 20,000 men but you might not have another mile. and the HSF in WW1 was exactly how in an offensive position?. For them it didn't matter if they sank a coupe british dreadnoughts at any given time because the british would still have double the number of dreadnoughts as the germans anyway. So ,if Jutland was a german defeat, the Finnish achieved not a single victory during the Winter War. Again I'm sure some finnish friends I know will love the concept. The problem with ignoring the strategic situation and only considering losses, as you appear to be advocating, is that there are a great many victories where the victor sustained heavier losses than the vanquished and yet is still the victor because they came out in better position than did the vanquised, or because they attained their objectives or prevented the vanquished from attaining theirs. If considering losses alone: - The Normandy landings on 6 June 1944 are probably an Allied defeat - The Battle of Stalingrad is a Soviet defeat - The Battle of the Bulge might be an American defeat, depending on what end of the Axis casualty estimates you believe - The Battle of Kursk is a Soviet defeat - The Battle of Verdun is a French defeat - The Siege of Sevastopol (1854-1855) is a British-French defeat - The Battle of Moscow (1941) is a German victory The list goes on. Losses are not irrelevant, but they are also not the whole story, nor are they the most important aspect. What matters most isn't who took the heaviest losses or even to some extent who held the field at the end of the engagement but rather how the battle shaped the strategic picture and the overall course of the war.
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Post by ramjb on Sept 22, 2018 18:26:30 GMT -6
Those are well presented and well made points I agree with - yes, battles are more than losses involved. Yet one can't lose sight on the fact that Jutland was a very particular battle for many reasons, and very different from almost all the others. It was a battle the germans couldn't win in strategic terms - in that level the Germans were simply in no position whatsoever to change the strategic balance. They just were too outnumbered to change that, short of a total cataclysm befalling the whole british fleet.
that on one hand.
on the other hand one has to understand what really went on when the Grand Fleet finally contacted the HSF battleline. At that point the german fleet was facing complete anihilation. Not some losses - it could've very well ended up with it removed from existance by the very next day. And given the tactical situation the germans found themselves into, it actually seemed the most likely outcome at that point.
Given those stakes, getting out of there sustaining some losses but avoiding total anihilation was already a big accomplishment and highly unlikely, given the respective force numbers, and the tactical picture. Getting out of there while avoiding significant losses was, at best, an extremely optimistic hopeful scenario.
And getting out of there relatively unscathed while inflicting more punishing losses to the enemy than they themselves suffered seemed almost a miracle the second the Grand Fleet became visible for the German fleet. An impossible feat. A completely unachievable task.
And they achieved just that.
Sorry, that's a victory for me, and not a small one. Trying to apply common military principles to the very unique situation that battle represents just doesn't cut it for me. Exceptional situations demand different analysis principles than "common" battles do. And Jutland certainly demand them, at least in my opinion.
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Post by aeson on Sept 22, 2018 19:32:48 GMT -6
Except the High Seas Fleet failed to inflict sufficiently-disproportionate losses on the Grand Fleet to meaningfully affect the naval balance of power in the North Sea, and in fact arguably lost in terms of the balance of power between battlecruiser forces as the loss of Invincible and Indefatigable increased the average quality of the British battlecruiser force while the loss of Lutzow decreased the average quality of the German battlecruiser force while the commissioning of Renown and Repulse before the Germans were finished repairing their ships brought the British:German battlecruiser ratio above what it had been prior to the Battle of Jutland and the commissioning of Courageous and Glorious further tilted that ratio in the British favor (arguably, though the armor of the 'large light cruisers' was extremely thin for such major warships). Despite the loss of three British battlecruisers at Jutland to only one German, the battlecruiser situation is generally more favorable to Britain after Jutland than it was before, and in my opinion is at least as good as it would have been had Jutland never happened except maybe in the period between the commissioning of Repulse in August 1916 and the commissioning of Hindenburg in May 1917.
At most, Jutland's a tactical victory and a strategic draw for Germany; relative to the High Seas Fleet, the Grand Fleet wasn't any weaker after Jutland than it was before and may actually have been stronger, especially considering the reforms put in place to prevent future flash fires and improve the gunnery of the British battlecruiser squadrons. Some 'victory' that is for Germany.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 22, 2018 20:37:19 GMT -6
I’ve been doing some research into the dispatches from Jellicoe and a couple of my books on the second crossing of the T and subsequent German battle turn-away which was preceded by a smoke screen and flotillas of German destroyers launching torpedoes at the British battle line. A couple of things to note. According to Jellicoe, in fleet exercises, his turn away from the torpedoes instead of combing them, was planned. He had planned to perform this maneuver because generally the German battleships could also launch torpedoes and drop mines which would be covered by the smoke screen. In other words, had he turned toward the torpedoes, he might have run into the smoke screen, mines and more torpedoes plus close the range which would have been to the advantage of the Germans with their smaller guns.
Jellicoe, by turning away, eliminated that mine and torpedo threat, and increased the range which was to his advantage. We need to remember, as we have said, he did not have to win the battle just maintain numerical superiority over the German High Seas Fleet. The British Navy had newer more powerful battleships and battlecruisers being built, so by performing this maneuver, he saved ships and men’s lives yet still accomplished his primary operational goal which was to push the German Fleet back into its harbors and not allow them to run free in the North Sea. It is important for a commander to protect the lives of the men entrusted to him, it is a grave responsibility.
His maneuver was the correct one, just not the one, the British people had expected of their 20th century Nelson.
Another issue for me to research is the aftermath of Trafalgar. As I have said, the British nation and the Royal Navy were all hoping for a quick decisive Trafalgar-like battle at the beginning of the war. The problem with that is, did they understand what happened after the great victory at Trafalgar? Well, privateering was increased and this caused the Royal Navy and the English nation even more grief than Villeneuve's fleet. Big fleet engagements rarely solved the issue of trade protection and the safety of shipping. Could the decisive victory at Jutland at the beginning of the war simply turned the German submarines loose which is underwater privateering, in my opinion. This would be interesting to game out.
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Post by director on Sept 23, 2018 19:00:22 GMT -6
I'd spitball the outcome from Jutland as a tactical victory for Germany and a strategic victory for Britain, with the single greatest outcome the sidelining of the High Seas Fleet and the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. I would offer that a victor in battle doesn't usually drop his victorious arm and take up another; like an American football team he continues to pound on the same weak points until his foe leans to counter or is defeated.
Despite what I think was Beatty's criminal mismanagement of his scouting unit, Britain had three opportunities to soundly defeat the High Seas Fleet, but arteriosclerosis of the command systems, bad weather and a bit of bad luck undid Jellicoe's superlative handling of the battle line (I refer to the first time Scheer ran headlong into the battle line, the second time he ran headlong into the battle line, and the night passage astern of the Grand Fleet). In the actual circumstances of the battle, Germany had one chance at a solid victory - to crush Beatty, exposed as he was, and that chance faded as soon as Jellicoe showed up.
What would a German victory have looked like? Without British signals intelligence, the entire High Seas Fleet might have caught Beatty's battlecruisers, or the battlecruisers and a battle squadron (5th most likely). If the High Seas Fleet had been able to bring its full power to bear and crush 8-12 British capital ships without taking crippling damage themselves, then Jutland would be a clear German victory... and even then, the strategic position might not change by much unless the Germans went raiding against the BEF supply line.
So: given that Germany abandoned capital ship operations for the rest of the war and took up submarine warfare, yes: Jutland was a British victory in every way that matters.
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Post by ramjb on Sept 24, 2018 0:24:25 GMT -6
Except the High Seas Fleet failed to inflict sufficiently-disproportionate losses on the Grand Fleet .... Didn't we just agree that losses aren't what matter the most in a victory or a defeat?. The HSF made it out alive, relatively unscathed. It not only did that, but it did so while dealing a tremendous hit to the Grand Fleet's prestige and morale, while being in a massive tremendous numerical and tactical inferiority. In football (soccer) terms this is a 2nd division team going home after having won 0-1 against FC Barcelona, in their home turf, and playing with 8 players only against 11.... Yes, Barcelona will still win the league... But you still won the game. Bigtime too, as you were not only not supposed to win, you were supposed to lose bigtime, 5-0 or more, at their far superior hands.
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Post by aeson on Sept 24, 2018 11:57:52 GMT -6
Except the High Seas Fleet failed to inflict sufficiently-disproportionate losses on the Grand Fleet .... Didn't we just agree that losses aren't what matter the most in a victory or a defeat?. The HSF made it out alive, relatively unscathed. It not only did that, but it did so while dealing a tremendous hit to the Grand Fleet's prestige and morale, while being in a massive tremendous numerical and tactical inferiority. In football (soccer) terms this is a 2nd division team going home after having won 0-1 against FC Barcelona, in their home turf, and playing with 8 players only against 11.... Yes, Madrid will still win the league... But you still won the game. Bigtime too, as you were not only not supposed to win, you were supposed to lose bigtime, 5-0 or more, at their far superior hands. The reason why the High Seas Fleet's failure to inflict sufficiently-disproportionate losses on the Grand Fleet to materially reduce the Grand Fleet's margin of superiority matters is that the entire reason why the High Seas Fleet went to sea in the first place was to do exactly that. They didn't go out on a pleasure cruise, and they sure as hell didn't go out with the intention of fleeing before the full Grand Fleet; they went out with the intention of baiting Beatty and his battlecruisers into a situation where they could isolate and destroy a large part of his force at relatively little risk and without any serious loss of major warships. Had Lutzow survived and especially had the surviving battlecruisers not been so damaged that only Moltke and Von der Tann were serviceable a month and a half later for the raid on 19 August, they might have accomplished this at least on a short-term basis, but Lutzow didn't survive and Derfflinger and Seydlitz were under repair until October, so the Grand Fleet after Jutland temporarily enjoyed a greater superiority over the High Seas Fleet than it had held before Jutland despite the permanent loss of three battlecruisers, and by the time that Derfflinger and Seydlitz were out of the yards two new British battlecruisers had joined the Grand Fleet, bringing the absolute numerical superiority back to and the relative superiority above what it had be before Jutland.
The High Seas Fleet failed to accomplish the objective which it had set out to achieve at Jutland, and the losses it sustained probably left it relatively worse off after the battle than it was before despite the Grand Fleet suffering greater losses in an absolute sense. If you want to use a sports analogy, this is like a sport where your league standing depends on point totals and you need a shutout or a truly impressive point lead to improve your league standing but instead only "win" 3-1, one of your best offense players injured himself badly enough that he'll never play again, and half the rest of the offense players are out with injuries that'll prevent them from playing in the next game or two. Your league standing isn't any better and might be worse after the game, and your future ability to improve your league standing is reduced. If you look at the game in isolation and don't consider anything else, sure, you 'won' the game, but you failed to attain your immediate objective and the results of the game and what happened during it rendered your long-term objective less attainable.
Jutland was a tactical success for the High Seas Fleet inasmuch as the Grand Fleet suffered heavier permanent losses than the High Seas Fleet did and inasmuch as the High Seas Fleet avoided destruction despite encountering pretty much the full Grand Fleet, but it was a tactical failure for the High Seas Fleet as the High Seas Fleet failed to accomplish the objective which it set out to achieve when it left port, and it was a strategic failure for the High Seas Fleet as the Grand Fleet's margin of superiority over the High Seas Fleet was not any worse and was probably better after Jutland than before. This is at best a tactical victory but considering the High Seas Fleet's failure to attain its immediate objective is as reasonably a tactical draw for Germany, and at the strategic level I cannot see any reasonable argument to call it anything less than a draw for Great Britain.
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