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Post by oaktree on Oct 29, 2018 22:37:45 GMT -6
Something that oldpop2000 might know more about - or if not possibly be interested in. In Friedman's _Fighters Over the Fleet_ in the early chapters the notes made reference to "Progress in Tactics" which appears to be an annual(?) Admiralty publication of some sort. The notes were referring to entries there that referred to carrier and/or naval aircraft development. I presume there would also be content there to other Royal Navy developments in the same time period, presumably for the 1920s and 1930s.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2018 8:42:18 GMT -6
Something that oldpop2000 might know more about - or if not possibly be interested in. In Friedman's _Fighters Over the Fleet_ in the early chapters the notes made reference to "Progress in Tactics" which appears to be an annual(?) Admiralty publication of some sort. The notes were referring to entries there that referred to carrier and/or naval aircraft development. I presume there would also be content there to other Royal Navy developments in the same time period, presumably for the 1920s and 1930s. I would be interested in those publications. I saw the references in the book. I searched the British National Archives and found this - discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C2488073
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Post by oaktree on Oct 30, 2018 13:42:25 GMT -6
I also came across a few "Progress in Naval Gunnery" documents that appear to be transcriptions of some Admiralty documents as well. A bit too detailed for my sort of reading, but probably a source for some interesting tidbits and a look at internal critique of the RN. www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm186/adm186-339.pdf
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Post by dorn on Oct 31, 2018 0:29:03 GMT -6
I also came across a few "Progress in Naval Gunnery" documents that appear to be transcriptions of some Admiralty documents as well. A bit too detailed for my sort of reading, but probably a source for some interesting tidbits and a look at internal critique of the RN. www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm186/adm186-339.pdfThanks for the link. I find this document quite an interesting. I have just quick look and even there I find quite interesting info. Spotting (observation of fire) was extremely difficult, hits and "overs" could rarely be observed, and, therefore "shorts" were the only guide to the fall of shot relative to the target.It "again" shows that usually comparison capital ships by their immunity zones of armor, their main guns is not justified simplification.
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Post by dorn on Oct 31, 2018 14:07:12 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 31, 2018 17:16:18 GMT -6
I also came across a few "Progress in Naval Gunnery" documents that appear to be transcriptions of some Admiralty documents as well. A bit too detailed for my sort of reading, but probably a source for some interesting tidbits and a look at internal critique of the RN. www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm186/adm186-339.pdfExcellent find, keep it up. All of us are and will benefit from our sources and research.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 31, 2018 17:18:07 GMT -6
I've seen those but its nice to have them on this thread to research later. Good find, keep it up.
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Post by dorn on Nov 1, 2018 0:20:14 GMT -6
I've seen those but its nice to have them on this thread to research later. Good find, keep it up. I found it interesting that different points of view comes to different conclusions as both articles are correct in their arguments.
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Post by dorn on Nov 1, 2018 8:25:00 GMT -6
In Friedman The British battleships 1906-1946 is statement about HMS Hood.
The design of Hood reflected the combination of war experience and extensive testing of alternative forms of underwater protection. The buoyancy space was filled with crushable tubes, to absorb the shock of torpedo explosion and also to stop fragments of the ships side from penetrating inboard. Note the extensive inboard splinter protection, the object of which was to stop the fragments of AP shells which penetrated the main armour. DNC considered Hood by far the best-protected of any British First World War capital ships. Ironically, the excellent protection designed into Hood helped justify the decision not to provide additional armour during the inter-war period.
So RN considered HMS Hood so well protected that she do not need refit. And at the time she was needed her protection was still good however after 20 years has some weaknesses which resulted in quickly dismiss of this first fast battleship.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 1, 2018 13:02:05 GMT -6
I've seen those but its nice to have them on this thread to research later. Good find, keep it up. I found it interesting that different points of view comes to different conclusions as both articles are correct in their arguments. The study of history and historical analysis is always that way. Three authors can read the same information, and derive three different answers. I study the US Civil War and especially Gettysburg. I have visited the battlefield along with many others. All the historians read the same letters home from soldiers, memoirs, and official documents but all blame different men for the failure. Some blame JEB Stuart, Ewell, Longstreet, D.H. Hill, Jefferson Davis and finally, one book actually blames the correct man; Robert E. Lee. I was offered a job at the Gettysburg Battlefield as a docent, but did not accept the job partially because my views might not coincide with others. Anyway, it is all interesting and that is how we learn. I hope.
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Post by oaktree on Nov 1, 2018 13:16:06 GMT -6
I found it interesting that different points of view comes to different conclusions as both articles are correct in their arguments. The study of history and historical analysis is always that way. Three authors can read the same information, and derive three different answers. I study the US Civil War and especially Gettysburg. I have visited the battlefield along with many others. All the historians read the same letters home from soldiers, memoirs, and official documents but all blame different men for the failure. Some blame JEB Stuart, Ewell, Longstreet, D.H. Hill, Jefferson Davis and finally, one book actually blames the correct man; Robert E. Lee. I was offered a job at the Gettysburg Battlefield as a docent, but did not accept the job partially because my views might not coincide with others. Anyway, it is all interesting and that is how we learn. I hope. I find it interesting that a lot of what I read on Gettysburg seems to concentrate on where and how the Confederate Army failed and spends a lot less time on the things that the Union Army did well in that battle. That side was the focus in Coddington's book since he picked out and spent time on the places where regimental and higher commanders made good decisions and took actions that covered for mistakes, or took advantage of opportunities offered by the Confederate operations.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 1, 2018 14:15:30 GMT -6
The study of history and historical analysis is always that way. Three authors can read the same information, and derive three different answers. I study the US Civil War and especially Gettysburg. I have visited the battlefield along with many others. All the historians read the same letters home from soldiers, memoirs, and official documents but all blame different men for the failure. Some blame JEB Stuart, Ewell, Longstreet, D.H. Hill, Jefferson Davis and finally, one book actually blames the correct man; Robert E. Lee. I was offered a job at the Gettysburg Battlefield as a docent, but did not accept the job partially because my views might not coincide with others. Anyway, it is all interesting and that is how we learn. I hope. I find it interesting that a lot of what I read on Gettysburg seems to concentrate on where and how the Confederate Army failed and spends a lot less time on the things that the Union Army did well in that battle. That side was the focus in Coddington's book since he picked out and spent time on the places where regimental and higher commanders made good decisions and took actions that covered for mistakes, or took advantage of opportunities offered by the Confederate operations. Coddington's book is, in my opinion, the best. It rests next to my reading chair in the living room. I am reminded of what George Pickett said after the war, when asked about why the South Lost; He stated "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it. " I think that says it all. The Union Army fought better, and was better led. However, as you say, most of the books focus on the South. Stephan Sears writes good Civil War Books. I have whole list of good authors. Anyway, back to warships.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 1, 2018 17:38:06 GMT -6
I've seen those but its nice to have them on this thread to research later. Good find, keep it up. I found it interesting that different points of view comes to different conclusions as both articles are correct in their arguments. The first article was really using the battle cruiser concept as a lead in to criticize the F-35 and the warships currently being built. I think it was a real stretch of the truth. You cannot use the Battle cruiser concept to illustrate the possible problems with a stealth fighter and light weight modern cruisers. It is just like you can't use the Age of Sail frigate as a criticism of the early 20th century cruisers, they are in a totally different world.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 1, 2018 21:39:52 GMT -6
In Friedman The British battleships 1906-1946 is statement about HMS Hood. The design of Hood reflected the combination of war experience and extensive testing of alternative forms of underwater protection. The buoyancy space was filled with crushable tubes, to absorb the shock of torpedo explosion and also to stop fragments of the ships side from penetrating inboard. Note the extensive inboard splinter protection, the object of which was to stop the fragments of AP shells which penetrated the main armour. DNC considered Hood by far the best-protected of any British First World War capital ships. Ironically, the excellent protection designed into Hood helped justify the decision not to provide additional armour during the inter-war period.
So RN considered HMS Hood so well protected that she do not need refit. And at the time she was needed her protection was still good however after 20 years has some weaknesses which resulted in quickly dismiss of this first fast battleship. Well, not according this document; ADM 229/20: DNC's Reports (1938-1939) which says "(c). Increased protection. The two schemes, viz, extra deck protection on the upper deck or the main deck, were examined. Controller preferred the former. The only other item discussed in some detail was the removal of the conning-tower and the reconstruction of the bridges. D.N.O. would wish to have an armoured director aft, if the present director over the conning-tower were removed. The impression I received was that Controller thought the laying up of this valuable ship at the present or at any time in the near future on the score of policy."
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Post by dorn on Nov 2, 2018 1:41:53 GMT -6
In Friedman The British battleships 1906-1946 is statement about HMS Hood. The design of Hood reflected the combination of war experience and extensive testing of alternative forms of underwater protection. The buoyancy space was filled with crushable tubes, to absorb the shock of torpedo explosion and also to stop fragments of the ships side from penetrating inboard. Note the extensive inboard splinter protection, the object of which was to stop the fragments of AP shells which penetrated the main armour. DNC considered Hood by far the best-protected of any British First World War capital ships. Ironically, the excellent protection designed into Hood helped justify the decision not to provide additional armour during the inter-war period.
So RN considered HMS Hood so well protected that she do not need refit. And at the time she was needed her protection was still good however after 20 years has some weaknesses which resulted in quickly dismiss of this first fast battleship. Well, not according this document; ADM 229/20: DNC's Reports (1938-1939) which says "(c). Increased protection. The two schemes, viz, extra deck protection on the upper deck or the main deck, were examined. Controller preferred the former. The only other item discussed in some detail was the removal of the conning-tower and the reconstruction of the bridges. D.N.O. would wish to have an armoured director aft, if the present director over the conning-tower were removed. The impression I received was that Controller thought the laying up of this valuable ship at the present or at any time in the near future on the score of policy."
You are right but in 1938-39 has been already late and was known that the protection was not adequate, but I do not think that at beginning of 30s her protection was thought as non adequate as she was still one of the bests protected ship. But it is true that if we look at reconstruction of battleships and battlecruisers of RN the there were not finished even all older vessels. So I expect that because Hood has best protection from all WW1 capital ships except Nelsons it has sense that she would be the last one to consider reconstruction.
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