Japan's Naval Strategy in the 20th Century

[oldpop2000]

I am breaking out Japan but we must include the Sino-Japanese War as it did have an effect on Japanese 20th century strategy.

[oldpop2000]

Japan, the nation we know today, began with the Meiji Restoration. The idea was to strengthen the rule of the emperor and eliminate the shogun rule which was essentially, like the Medieval period in Europe. The opening up to foreigners caused this complete change and the new ruler decided bring in foreign help to bring his nation into the Industrial age. This event begins the development of the Japan that we now know. The only problem for the Japanese was their lack of natural resources like iron ore, nickel, chromium, rubber, copper and many other vital natural resources upon which the industrialization would be built. So, Japan looked westward toward Korea, Manchuria and Northern China. This started a ball rolling which eventually ended in WWII in the Pacific.

Japan is a maritime nation of around 6852 islands, with the main island of Honshu and cities like Tokyo, Kobe and Osaka. The other main islands are Hokkaido, Shikoku and Kyushu. Her main naval bases were Hiroshima, Kure, Maisuru, Atsugi Naval Air base, Oroku Naval Air base, Kochi airfield and Truk Islands Naval Base. Her main dockyards were Yokosuka, Ishikawajima Naval Yard, Kure Naval Dockyards, Sasebo and Maizuru. 

Japan is mountainous, with volcanoes due to her position on a subduction fault where the Pacific plate subducts the Asiatic plate. Such locations are very susceptible to strong earthquakes. Tokyo was destroyed by one in 1923.

The first naval training center was established at Nagasaki with the help of the Dutch. In 1865 a new naval yard at Yokosuka was established with the help of the French. Most of her ships were purchased from other nations in the 1860's which consisted of eight western-style warships. The Meiji period was from 1868 to 1912. In 1912 The new Emperor was Hirohito. The model for the IJN was the British Navy and the Japanese at the turn of the century were able to establish an agreement to assist the British in the defense of their Far East colonies and they would provide technical assistance. This dependence on foreign assistance began to be eliminated in the 1870's.

I will leave this opening piece at this point. We should begin to discuss the first major naval war, the Sino-Japanese and then in 1905 the Russo-Japanese war.

[oaktree]

I will mention that _Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941_ by Evans and Peattie (https://www.usni.org/store/books/holiday-catalog-2017/kaigun) is a book that runs right up the alley of this thread in my opinion.

And I think the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) pretty much set the foundation of a lot of what was going to come.
(wikipedia page on the conflict: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Sino-Japanese_War)

For the most part the IJN was taking part in army support of their efforts to push the Chinese army out of Korea. The main fleet engagement was the Battle of the Yalu River were the Japanese Combined Fleet defeated the Chinese Beiyang Fleet which included the the two Chinese battleships for which the Japanese had no corresponding fleet. In any case, the Japanese defeated what the Western powers considered a superior navy and thus gained considerable prestige. And later in the war the Japanese captured one of the two Chinese battleships and the other was scuttled.

And there were a number of results from this war that are of importance to later events:
1. Japan gains much more influence over Korea (events in Korea were the main lead-ins to the war)
2. Japan invades and takes over Taiwan in 1895
3. Due to the Triple Intervention Japan has to give up Port Arthur and Weihaiwei - which are then occupied by Russia and Great Britain by 1898.

So, the IJN decides that they are capable of beating "superior"* enemies by taking decisive action and using small ships with rapid-fire guns to overwhelm their enemy. And that quality can defeat quantity. Which fits with their adaptation of a number of traditions from the RN.

* - Superior in some senses, but also overlooking a lot of the shortcomings the Chinese had in terms of leadership, crew quality, ammo supplies and quality, and that the Chinese government was also dealing with a number of other issues and results at the time. (The last will be a factor in the next war as well I believe.)

Also of note is that to date the IJN is largely acting as an supporting force for army activities. They do not have their own independent mission yet making them a worthy equal partner to the army in terms of resources. Though were this goes is a future development as well.

[oldpop2000]

Sept 24, 2018 11:15:00 GMT -6 oaktree said:

I will mention that _Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941_ by Evans and Peattie (https://www.usni.org/store/books/holiday-catalog-2017/kaigun) is a book that runs right up the alley of this thread in my opinion.

And I think the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) pretty much set the foundation of a lot of what was going to come.
(wikipedia page on the conflict: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Sino-Japanese_War)

For the most part the IJN was taking part in army support of their efforts to push the Chinese army out of Korea. The main fleet engagement was the Battle of the Yalu River were the Japanese Combined Fleet defeated the Chinese Beiyang Fleet which included the the two Chinese battleships for which the Japanese had no corresponding fleet. In any case, the Japanese defeated what the Western powers considered a superior navy and thus gained considerable prestige. And later in the war the Japanese captured one of the two Chinese battleships and the other was scuttled.

And there were a number of results from this war that are of importance to later events:
1. Japan gains much more influence over Korea (events in Korea were the main lead-ins to the war)
2. Japan invades and takes over Taiwan in 1895
3. Due to the Triple Intervention Japan has to give up Port Arthur and Weihaiwei - which are then occupied by Russia and Great Britain by 1898.

So, the IJN decides that they are capable of beating "superior"* enemies by taking decisive action and using small ships with rapid-fire guns to overwhelm their enemy. And that quality can defeat quantity. Which fits with their adaptation of a number of traditions from the RN.

* - Superior in some senses, but also overlooking a lot of the shortcomings the Chinese had in terms of leadership, crew quality, ammo supplies and quality, and that the Chinese government was also dealing with a number of other issues and results at the time. (The last will be a factor in the next war as well I believe.)

Also of note is that to date the IJN is largely acting as an supporting force for army activities. They do not have their own independent mission yet making them a worthy equal partner to the army in terms of resources. Though were this goes is a future development as well.

The book you referenced is excellent and I have the other on the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Service

The Japanese lack of natural resources was always a driving force for movement into Korea, Manchuria and eventually into Northern. The problems occurred when a semi-autonomous force called the Kwantung Army arose. The control over them was never firm and the Japanese Army was even upset over what they were doing and they moved into areas they were not supposed to venture. It was this movement that caused trade issues with the Japanese nations primary suppliers like the US and Great Britain. The War in China eventually severed supplies from the US to Japan and forced us to freeze their gold supplies in the US Federal Reserve Bank. This essentially bankrupted the Japanese. The fall of France allowed the Japanese to move into Indochina, and occupy bases near Saigon. It was from these bases that the Nell bombers flew to destroy POW and Repulse. It was like a set of dominos falling, one triggering another. 

The Southern Operation, developed by the IJN was simply a method to gain funding by moving south to gain oil, and other natural resources and secure the southern region. Yamamoto was happy with the move, but when ordered he realized that if they had 90% of the fleet in the South Pacific supporting invasions of the Philippines, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, Borneo and eventually Rabaul, the US would have a great advantage if they moved westward. The Pearl Harbor operation was the result of this.

[oaktree]

Right. I see that as something to cover further into the thread. For the 1984-1906 period Japan is still essentially concentrating on Korea and the area around Port Arthur. As industrialization proceeds apace the demand for resources make them look at China and then southward for oil and rubber. This is further friction with the USA, plus Russia as well on the Manchurian border. The Kwantung Army going rogue added a layer of complication and also showed how the Japanese government and army command lost control of its military.

And the IJN seeking a purpose also lead them into having to have the USA as the enemy since Japan had good relations with the UK into the early 1920s.

[oldpop2000]

Sept 24, 2018 12:32:24 GMT -6 oaktree said:

Right. I see that as something to cover further into the thread. For the 1984-1906 period Japan is still essentially concentrating on Korea and the area around Port Arthur. As industrialization proceeds apace the demand for resources make them look at China and then southward for oil and rubber. This is further friction with the USA, plus Russia as well on the Manchurian border. The Kwantung Army going rogue added a layer of complication and also showed how the Japanese government and army command lost control of its military.

And the IJN seeking a purpose also lead them into having to have the USA as the enemy since Japan had good relations with the UK into the early 1920s.

One comment, we must include in discussions and analysis other factors such as geography, economics, social issues etc. War's are not fought in isolation, they are generally a result of many other factors coming together. I believe the one person, at fault for the Japanese, was Emperor Hirohito who knew because he had been told, that the move against Pearl Harbor was the death knell of the Japanese nation. As one of their admirals stated, in the final meeting that included the Emperor so he could give his ok: Do you have any idea what these people(the US) are going to do to us? We must expand our views of grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. It is important for the understand of war.

[oaktree]

Sept 24, 2018 17:52:40 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

Sept 24, 2018 12:32:24 GMT -6 oaktree said:

Right. I see that as something to cover further into the thread. For the 1984-1906 period Japan is still essentially concentrating on Korea and the area around Port Arthur. As industrialization proceeds apace the demand for resources make them look at China and then southward for oil and rubber. This is further friction with the USA, plus Russia as well on the Manchurian border. The Kwantung Army going rogue added a layer of complication and also showed how the Japanese government and army command lost control of its military.

And the IJN seeking a purpose also lead them into having to have the USA as the enemy since Japan had good relations with the UK into the early 1920s.

One comment, we must include in discussions and analysis other factors such as geography, economics, social issues etc. War's are not fought in isolation, they are generally a result of many other factors coming together. I believe the one person, at fault for the Japanese, was Emperor Hirohito who knew because he had been told, that the move against Pearl Harbor was the death knell of the Japanese nation. As one of their admirals stated, in the final meeting that included the Emperor so he could give his ok: Do you have any idea what these people(the US) are going to do to us? We must expand our views of grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. It is important for the understand of war.

From reading various books I get the impression that the Japanese nation spent the 1930s painting themselves into a strategic and economic corner that they were not willing or able to get themselves out of. 

Refusal to accept a status of being a secondary power to the USA and UK with the attached limitations of how far they could push being a regional power in Asia.  Wanting the resources of Manchuria, and then those of more and more of China, leading down a rabbit hole of a war that was essentially unwinnable as long as the Chinese government refused to concede.  (And said war and increased militancy in Asia cost them the UK as an ally and was also viewed in alarm by the USA and its "Open Door" trade policy regarding China.

Southern expansion towards the DEI and Malaya involved passing by the Philippines, and those could not be left athwart the Japanese supply and resource routes.  Which, combined with the longterm policy of the USN being the prime IJN foe made a war with the USN almost inevitable if that route was chosen.  

And then as a means of increasing diplomatic pressure the USA embargoed scrap metal and then oil deliveries to Japan.  The former hurt their military industry and economy in general.  The latter put their military on a ticking clock since Japan had practically no native oil production and very limited reserves.  Plus they underestimated what their usage would be once the war started.

And another shortcoming was that their shipbuilding capacity was rather limited.  Once the war started they lost all merchant capacity of USA, UK, and most neutrals.  Plus they took over a lot of civilian merchant shipping for military transport requirements.  Captured merchant hulls added some tonnage, but was a stopgap at best.  So then as the war progressed they had a continuing need to replace military losses, merchant losses to submarines, and a need for repair capacity for both types. 

[oldpop2000]

Sept 24, 2018 18:40:42 GMT -6 oaktree said:

Sept 24, 2018 17:52:40 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

One comment, we must include in discussions and analysis other factors such as geography, economics, social issues etc. War's are not fought in isolation, they are generally a result of many other factors coming together. I believe the one person, at fault for the Japanese, was Emperor Hirohito who knew because he had been told, that the move against Pearl Harbor was the death knell of the Japanese nation. As one of their admirals stated, in the final meeting that included the Emperor so he could give his ok: Do you have any idea what these people(the US) are going to do to us? We must expand our views of grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. It is important for the understand of war.

From reading various books I get the impression that the Japanese nation spent the 1930s painting themselves into a strategic and economic corner that they were not willing or able to get themselves out of. 

Refusal to accept a status of being a secondary power to the USA and UK with the attached limitations of how far they could push being a regional power in Asia.  Wanting the resources of Manchuria, and then those of more and more of China, leading down a rabbit hole of a war that was essentially unwinnable as long as the Chinese government refused to concede.  (And said war and increased militancy in Asia cost them the UK as an ally and was also viewed in alarm by the USA and its "Open Door" trade policy regarding China.

Southern expansion towards the DEI and Malaya involved passing by the Philippines, and those could not be left athwart the Japanese supply and resource routes.  Which, combined with the longterm policy of the USN being the prime IJN foe made a war with the USN almost inevitable if that route was chosen.  

And then as a means of increasing diplomatic pressure the USA embargoed scrap metal and then oil deliveries to Japan.  The former hurt their military industry and economy in general.  The latter put their military on a ticking clock since Japan had practically no native oil production and very limited reserves.  Plus they underestimated what their usage would be once the war started.

And another shortcoming was that their shipbuilding capacity was rather limited.  Once the war started they lost all merchant capacity of USA, UK, and most neutrals.  Plus they took over a lot of civilian merchant shipping for military transport requirements.  Captured merchant hulls added some tonnage, but was a stopgap at best.  So then as the war progressed they had a continuing need to replace military losses, merchant losses to submarines, and a need for repair capacity for both types. 

A good book on this subject is "Bankrupting the Enemy" By Edward Miller. It really explains this whole process. But you are correct. By moving into Manchuria and Northern China, the expenses began to climb, and now their best sources of materials were closed to them due to the freezing of their gold in our banks. The situation got steadily worse, and the Emperor never took any steps to stop the decay. His people began to starve due to lack food and resources. Keep this in mind, Japan was a constitutional monarchy. As to the shipbuilding, it was very limited. During wartime, you either repair damaged ships or build new ones but you can't do both with their limited resources. Their repair ships were limited and they lost one of them early in the war.

I will summarize the Japanese attitude and results: Pride goeth before the fall. 

Japanese Economy Interwar.pdf (411.06 KB)

Nice work.