|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 2, 2019 21:12:15 GMT -6
Accurately modelling economic resources of nations is a monumental task although it might be interesting. I think if you could at least determine the four most important resources and then give each nation a rating on those resources from say one to ten, this might be doable. The choices might have to change as technology changed so this would complicate the job. The four choices I would want to use would be oil, iron ore, grains and rubber. Copper could be an addition since it is vital in wiring. There are others like nickel for steel, manganese. These are just suggestions. In the food area, you would have to know what were the primary food types that this nation used like rice for Japan, potatoes for Germany etc. It would take a little work, but it might be interesting. I ought to clarify - by 'resources' in this case I was only referring to the figure of 'national resources' which is present in the game to represent total industrial output, and by 'ability to utilise those resources' I meant their budget. However, if we were to look at the potential to go beyond these monetary figures alone, I think that the next step would be to add oil resources to the map, updated, say, every five years, and have the player manage his fuel production and consumption, since that is far and away the most significant part of the total economic equation for the purposes of the game, next to total industrial output. Budget management is complex but might be simplified. The problem is raw data. You would have to investigate how each nation managed their budgets during the period, because from 1900 to 1950 it probably changed depending on many factors such as market prices, gold supply and if they are still on the gold standard. The issues are quite complex and I am not an economist by any standard. If you could possibly design into the game a spreadsheet that could be used to manage the funding, that might help. I don't know if this is possible. |
|
|
|
Post by generalvikus on Feb 2, 2019 21:55:56 GMT -6
Budget management is complex but might be simplified. The problem is raw data. You would have to investigate how each nation managed their budgets during the period, because from 1900 to 1950 it probably changed depending on many factors such as market prices, gold supply and if they are still on the gold standard. The issues are quite complex and I am not an economist by any standard. If you could possibly design into the game a spreadsheet that could be used to manage the funding, that might help. I don't know if this is possible. I don't think it's too desirable to match the historical budgets exactly; if we're going to be playing through 50 years of alternate history, then funding should be shaped by in game events; history should provide nothing more than the most general, over-arching trends. I think that it would be sufficient to give the starting nations their appropriate industrial output (national resources) and budget at the two starting dates, perhaps a separate 'base' budget if the historical budgets were particularly high or low at that time, and allow the economic change model, tensions and wars to take their course. That is a good starting point. Perhaps then you can look at adding a dynamic 'base' budget figure which changes over time for each nation according to history, which will be modified at any given time by the usual combination of factors, but I don't think that is entirely necessary. |
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 2, 2019 22:49:35 GMT -6
Budget management is complex but might be simplified. The problem is raw data. You would have to investigate how each nation managed their budgets during the period, because from 1900 to 1950 it probably changed depending on many factors such as market prices, gold supply and if they are still on the gold standard. The issues are quite complex and I am not an economist by any standard. If you could possibly design into the game a spreadsheet that could be used to manage the funding, that might help. I don't know if this is possible. I don't think it's too desirable to match the historical budgets exactly; if we're going to be playing through 50 years of alternate history, then funding should be shaped by in game events; history should provide nothing more than the most general, over-arching trends. I think that it would be sufficient to give the starting nations their appropriate industrial output (national resources) and budget at the two starting dates, perhaps a separate 'base' budget if the historical budgets were particularly high or low at that time, and allow the economic change model, tensions and wars to take their course. That is a good starting point. Perhaps then you can look at adding a dynamic 'base' budget figure which changes over time for each nation according to history, which will be modified at any given time by the usual combination of factors, but I don't think that is entirely necessary. I believe that the idea has to start with an accurate budget model that is consistent with the nation in question. You will then have to have a starting point; the historical budget in 1900. Now as the budget model operates, the economic model will be based on the world wide economic situation, there is not way around that. You cannot operate in a vacuum with economics. You will have to model population increases, technological changes and world financial issues. Now, with this stuff modelled, you can now establish a budget that might be accurate, not necessarily historically but one that will at least be useable and provide the game with a proper financial support for its operations. |
|
AiryW
Full Member
Posts: 183
|
Post by AiryW on Feb 2, 2019 23:30:28 GMT -6
and the inability of the French to anticipate or effectively counter it, demonstrates at the very least the superiority of German leadership and strategy over Allied leadership and strategy at this time in the war. But no such inability existed! The Germans were the ones on the all out attack. Battles like Stonne and Hannut were exactly what the French needed. The French were capable of that. What they weren't capable of doing was defending with no troops at all, which is the situation that was created by a coincidence. If they had attacked a couple days sooner their offensive would have ran right into the French mobile reserve and we would be talking about all the flaws in the German army while ignoring all the flaws in the French one. |
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 3, 2019 9:42:13 GMT -6
…..As for the Battle of France - I'll certainly not dispute that the German plan was a gamble, but it was a calculated one, and I think that if you examine the causes of German victory and French defeat you can identify important underlying factors other than chance. Most obviously, the ability of the German army to devise the plan, the fact that Hitler adopted it and not the more popular inferior plans, and the inability of the French to anticipate or effectively counter it, demonstrates at the very least the superiority of German leadership and strategy over Allied leadership and strategy at this time in the war. ….. If I may, I would like to comment on the Battle of France. It's been one of my main areas of study since I was about 16 years old. I wish I could visit the battlefields and the Maginot Line. The Battle of France was an example of fighting the last war. The Allies; France, Britain, Holland and Belgium were the victors in the last war, and the failure in May of 1940 started right there. They had the tactics and strategy of the last war entrenched in their minds and Germans were starting with a clean piece of paper. The Allies were expecting the Schlieffen plan and the German's were actually going to implement that plan until the plane went down with the plans on board and now they had to come up with a new plan. The Allied command and control which is the key to any strategy was based on the slow movements of land armies with trenches. The French and British tanks had one flaw, lack of command and control via the radio. The French had just developed one armored division which was still in training and another was being assembled. However all the Allies still thought of tanks as infantry support or cavalry. There was no real pattern of combined arms, such as the German's developed. This is the real key to the failure in France. Yes, the Ardennes center of attack was brilliant and the Allies had no reason to believe that tanks could get through that region, and if they tried the Allies would be able to turn and cut them off. Unfortunately that is easy to do in board games, not in combat. The counterattack at Arras started out positively and scared the hell out of the German's but it was repulsed due to lack of support. In fact, the Arras counterattack succeeded in slowing the German advance and this gave the BEF time to retreat to Dunkirk. Allied planning was slow to exploit any opportunity to cut off the German corridor since the German's actually did not have adequate motorized support or un-motorized support. So, the failures in the Battle of France were Allied lack of any proper command and control at the front, lack of coordination between infantry, artillery and armor, and complete lack of proper assessment of the how the German's were going to fight. These are sources of the failure for the Allies. BTW, even though I have studied this combat operation and armored warfare along with combined arms, it does not make me an expert. I would love to all your opinions because I will learn things. If anyone is interested in this study subject, I can provide some good books and documents. |
|
AiryW
Full Member
Posts: 183
|
Post by AiryW on Feb 3, 2019 10:44:56 GMT -6
The French had just developed one armored division which was still in training and another was being assembled. 1st DLR formed in 1935 2nd DLR formed in 1937 3rd DLR formed in February 1940 4th DLR under the process of formation in May Division Cuirassée1st DCR formed January 1940 2nd DCR formed January 1940 3rd DCR formed March 1940 4th DCR under process of formation in May I count 6 with 2 more under formation. I think perhaps what is confusing is the term "Light Mechanized Division." These were fully armored formations. However all the Allies still thought of tanks as infantry support or cavalry. Every single one of their modern tanks were in the six armored formations. The tanks that were assigned to the infantry divisions were older tanks which were of no use to the armored formations or sometimes light H-35 tanks of which the armored formations had no shortage. A French cavalry division had about 1200 cavalrymen. They were motorized divisions with a small cavalry component for use in the ardennes forest where horses would be more mobile then trucks at times. There was no real pattern of combined arms, such as the German's developed. This is the real key to the failure in France. At Stonne, the French tanks outran the infantry. At Hannut, the German tanks outran the infantry. Of the two of these, Hannut was the far larger engagement. IRRC it was the largest armored engagement until Kursk. Yet the German failure of combined arms at Hannut is not remembered while the French failure at Stonne is. This is what starts to happen when the historical consensus settles upon a fundementally inaccurate thesis. The events that dont fit the narrative get overlooked while the events that conform to the narrative are remembered. Through selective retelling, new facts can be created. The fact that the French had old tanks serving in an infantry role eventually becomes the "fact" that they turned all their tanks into penny packets. The Allied command and control which is the key to any strategy was based on the slow movements of land armies with trenches. The French and British tanks had one flaw, lack of command and control via the radio. ...and the fact that their older, infantry support tanks lacked radios becomes exaggerated to a general problem and then exaggerated to a blanked statement. The Somua and B1-bis tanks had radio operators in the crew. It would be very strange for them to have a seat for a man if they were incapable of understanding the value of radios. It's true that there were production delays which meant that they didn't have enough radios for all the S35 tanks however every nation had various production hiccups. The S35 tanks with the radio shortage appear to have been more effective then the B1-bis tanks equipped with the radios. |
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 3, 2019 11:07:23 GMT -6
The French had just developed one armored division which was still in training and another was being assembled. 1st DLR formed in 1935 2nd DLR formed in 1937 3rd DLR formed in February 1940 4th DLR under the process of formation in May Division Cuirassée1st DCR formed January 1940 2nd DCR formed January 1940 3rd DCR formed March 1940 4th DCR under process of formation in May I count 6 with 2 more under formation. I think perhaps what is confusing is the term "Light Mechanized Division." These were fully armored formations. However all the Allies still thought of tanks as infantry support or cavalry. Every single one of their modern tanks were in the six armored formations. The tanks that were assigned to the infantry divisions were older tanks which were of no use to the armored formations or sometimes light H-35 tanks of which the armored formations had no shortage. A French cavalry division had about 1200 cavalrymen. They were motorized divisions with a small cavalry component for use in the ardennes forest where horses would be more mobile then trucks at times. There was no real pattern of combined arms, such as the German's developed. This is the real key to the failure in France. At Stonne, the French tanks outran the infantry. At Hannut, the German tanks outran the infantry. Of the two of these, Hannut was the far larger engagement. IRRC it was the largest armored engagement until Kursk. Yet the German failure of combined arms at Hannut is not remembered while the French failure at Stonne is. This is what starts to happen when the historical consensus settles upon a fundementally inaccurate thesis. The events that dont fit the narrative get overlooked while the events that conform to the narrative are remembered. Through selective retelling, new facts can be created. The fact that the French had old tanks serving in an infantry role eventually becomes the "fact" that they turned all their tanks into penny packets. The Allied command and control which is the key to any strategy was based on the slow movements of land armies with trenches. The French and British tanks had one flaw, lack of command and control via the radio. ...and the fact that their older, infantry support tanks lacked radios becomes exaggerated to a general problem and then exaggerated to a blanked statement. The Somua and B1-bis tanks had radio operators in the crew. It would be very strange for them to have a seat for a man if they were incapable of understanding the value of radios. It's true that there were production delays which meant that they didn't have enough radios for all the S35 tanks however every nation had various production hiccups. The S35 tanks with the radio shortage appear to have been more effective then the B1-bis tanks equipped with the radios. The two types of French tank divisions doctrine was to support the infantry, not combined arms. Once in battles these overgrown cavalry divisions fell apart due to lack of command and control from their high command. Numbers are nice and they make for a great post, but they do not get to the heart of the problem for the Allies. The British were a little farther along but not much. It may seem that the historians are focusing too much on the German combined arms, and that is entirely true. As I have studied this over the years, I have seen this over-emphasis on the German side. But the failures in the Allied command and control along with their emphasis on infantry support was the deciding factor. Having all those overgrown cavalry divisions does not mean you understand the concept of combined arms and how to use motorized infantry, tanks and self-propelled artillery along with close air support. This was the key. That's enough from me. |
|
|
|
Post by williammiller on Feb 3, 2019 11:22:56 GMT -6
Guys, interesting conversation, but we are moving pretty far away from naval-related matters, especially RTW2-related. Perhaps move this to a new thread?
|
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 3, 2019 11:30:33 GMT -6
Guys, interesting conversation, but we are moving pretty far away from naval-related matters, especially RTW2-related. Perhaps move this to a new thread? I agree but I've tried doing that and it does not work. But, I have done as you have directed so let's see how this works this time. |
|
|
|
Post by generalvikus on Feb 10, 2019 9:49:02 GMT -6
Just a heads up to everyone: while I appreciate that at this stage, fundamental changes to the game's economic systems and balance are unlikely, and this thread certainly has not demonstrated widespread support for the ideas I have raised, right now I'm considering the possibility of developing a 'historical resources' mod to provide an alternative which some players at least will hopefully find an interesting alternative to the base game. Potential goals include:
1. Adjusting the 'national resources' and budgets of all nations so that the relative size of the economic resources and budgets remain within the bounds of historical plausibility over the course of the game.
2. Implementing mechanics which accurately represent wartime mobilisation, creating a greater discrepancy between peacetime and wartime budgets and production which more closely mirrors the experience of World War II, and potentially changing those mechanics over the course of the game according to time and circumstance where possible.
3. Implementing more in-depth mechanics for oil and potentially coal.
If anybody would be interested in being involved in such a project, please let me know.
|
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 10, 2019 11:16:23 GMT -6
Just a heads up to everyone: while I appreciate that at this stage, fundamental changes to the game's economic systems and balance are unlikely, and this thread certainly has not demonstrated widespread support for the ideas I have raised, right now I'm considering the possibility of developing a 'historical resources' mod to provide an alternative which some players at least will hopefully find an interesting alternative to the base game. Potential goals include: 1. Adjusting the 'national resources' and budgets of all nations so that the relative size of the economic resources and budgets remain within the bounds of historical plausibility over the course of the game. 2. Implementing mechanics which accurately represent wartime mobilisation, creating a greater discrepancy between peacetime and wartime budgets and production which more closely mirrors the experience of World War II, and potentially changing those mechanics over the course of the game according to time and circumstance where possible. 3. Implementing more in-depth mechanics for oil and potentially coal. If anybody would be interested in being involved in such a project, please let me know. I've been reviewing the internet for game theory and economics concepts and ideas. It is a very complex subject and the gist of the information says that most games can't really model economics that well and don't because of the complexity. I am going to continue with my review of the ideas on the internet. However, trying to model food production, natural resources, industrialization, population growth etc. is very difficult and I would suggest letting the team continue with this. I am not disagreeing with you but having played games for over forty years or more, this is what I've seen. |
|
|
|
Post by generalvikus on Feb 10, 2019 16:40:58 GMT -6
@oldpop
I don't think it's desirable or necessary to establish more complex economic systems than what we already have, or to explore resources other than oil. First of all, I simply want to modify the systems we already have - national resources and naval budgets - so that the relative strengths of each nation in peace and in war are more closely aligned with historical plausibility.
I intend to start by adjusting the 'national resources' in the 1900 and 1920 start dates to be in line with Kennedy's 'industrial potential' figures, and to reserve judgement on whatever model for economic growth over time the team has implemented until I've actually seen it. If changes are desired, my first step would probably be to tweak that system rather than replace it altogether. I'll then adjust the starting budgets as necessary to correspond with the actual budgets of the nations at the start dates, and it's here that some more research would be helpful.
|
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 10, 2019 16:55:38 GMT -6
@oldpop I don't think it's desirable or necessary to establish more complex economic systems than what we already have, or to explore resources other than oil. First of all, I simply want to modify the systems we already have - national resources and naval budgets - so that the relative strengths of each nation in peace and in war are more closely aligned with historical plausibility. I intend to start by adjusting the 'national resources' in the 1900 and 1920 start dates to be in line with Kennedy's 'industrial potential' figures, and to reserve judgement on whatever model for economic growth over time the team has implemented until I've actually seen it. If changes are desired, my first step would probably be to tweak that system rather than replace it altogether. I'll then adjust the starting budgets as necessary to correspond with the actual budgets of the nations at the start dates, and it's here that some more research would be helpful. Well, you have a plan so good luck. |
|
|
|
Post by generalvikus on Feb 10, 2019 17:06:49 GMT -6
Thanks! If you do eventually have some good ideas on how to implement the finer details, I'd love to discuss them.
|
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 10, 2019 17:13:01 GMT -6
Thanks! If you do eventually have some good ideas on how to implement the finer details, I'd love to discuss them. I certainly will, no problem with that. Good luck on your project. |
|
