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Post by admiralhood on Feb 21, 2019 15:56:29 GMT -6
This is something I would really like to discuss with you history buffs.
What if the Pacific War indeed turned out as the IJN had been planning since 1910. Would the IJN performed better than in the real history against the USN if a full-swing decisive naval battle indeed happened?
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Post by admiralhood on Feb 21, 2019 16:00:56 GMT -6
Actually this plan is not that unrealistic as it seemed. If the USN decided to fight the war as the War Plan Orange, they are going to attack in the exactly same route the Kantai Kessen had predicted.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 21, 2019 17:26:19 GMT -6
We all tend on this forum to focus on naval battles, guns, armor and such. Wars, in the 20th century were won by industrial might. The Japanese had planned that the German’s would prevail in Europe and would therefore be a distraction to the United States. The Japanese leadership never fully understood the economic and industrial capacity of the United States. They never realized that we could build 100,000 aircraft in one year. At the time of Pearl Harbor, we could replace every plane lost at that action within fifteen days. In 1943, fifteen minutes. The Imperial Japanese high command started a war with a nation with two fleets. The navy that stopped the Japanese was the pre-war navy, after that, we had built a war time navy and finished them off.
The Imperial Japanese Command also failed to understand our resolve and decided that we were a passive, isolationist nation. This was cardinal error. Even if the decisive battle expected near the Bonin Islands had been fought and they had won, we would have rebuilt the Navy. That process was already underway, with the war-time navy of fast battleships, Essex class carriers, better heavy cruisers, more submarines, and better carrier and land-based aircraft.
Ok, let's assume that the decisive battle actually occurs. Will it change anything? Well, did Trafalgar, Tsushima or Jutland actually end the wars? No. Were all of those actually decisive battles? No. Trafalgar did not end the Napoleonic Wars, the Battle of Tsushima did not actually end the Russo-Japanese War, economics and politics did, and Jutland was certainly not the decisive battle that everyone had hoped for. So, now the question, based on these battles, would a decisive battle have actually changed anything in the Pacific. I don't believe it would.
Now, if we bypass that information, what about the battle? If the Japanese had been able to fight that battle that would force them to sacrifice the Southern Operation whose objective was to gain natural resources to be able to continue the war in China which was their most important operational theatre. The Japanese industry and economy were in serious decline because of the campaign in China and at home. The Southern Operation utilized 90% of the Japanese fleet. How could they do both. Do you sacrifice a campaign designed to increase your industrial capability to fight a decisive battle that even if you win, defining winning of course, you cannot guarantee that the enemy will quit?
I think we would have to begin by establishing the forces deployable by the Japanese and the US. Keep in mind, we are talking about no Pearl Harbor. We had eight battleships at Pearl Harbor and two carriers available with the third off of San Diego. If we had decided to execute the War Plan Orange, we would have gathered more battleships from the West Coast and brought Yorktown from the Atlantic. The Pacific Fleet would have gathered at Oahu as planned. We also would have had the Asiatic fleet available along with some British ships in Ceylon and Singapore. Those areas would not have been attacked due to the Japanese fleet waiting in the North for our fleet. Now how long will it take us to steam about 5000 miles with battleships that can barely do 15 knots on a good day. It could have take two weeks for us to arrive anywhere near the Bonin's. Now with the interceptive operations and normal losses of 10% per 1000 miles, it could have taken longer. However, the IJN will be taking loses also; loses they cannot replace very quickly. So, what would be the end result? I will leave that as another question.
There would have been no surprise for the United States about the Japanese doctrine of decisive battle. The IJN had translated Alfred Thayer Mahan's book and provided to its Eta Jima students. Our Naval War College had practiced against such a strategy on the floors of the College, so we were very familiar with the doctrine and how to combat it. However the books and documents that I have read, say that there was some hubris in the conduct of the games so the US Navy might have had some real surprises, which in fact, they actually did at the beginning of the war.
Anyway, just some of my thoughts. I hope we can continue to pursue this fascinating counterfactual history idea.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 21, 2019 22:28:37 GMT -6
In line with this thread’s discussion points, here is something interesting. In the 1933 class at the Naval War College at Newport Rhode Island, the major game was Blue against Orange OP IV. The concept of the operation was the Blue Force attempting to use another route to get to the Philippines, in line with War Plan Orange’s idea of "through to the Philippines". The new route was to stay well south of the Mandated Island and skirting north of New Guinea. The results were that the Blue force was fifteen hundred miles short of their objective by the end of the game with the following losses; Of the fifteen battleships, only seven were undamaged, Two of the four Blue carriers were damaged, half of the aircraft were lost. The Orange battleships never entered the fray and all the Blue losses were by daylight air attacks and nighttime torpedo attacks by cruisers. The strategy used by the Orange side was exactly how the Japanese using their interceptive operation, would have conducted their operation. After this and other results in previous games, the doctrine of “through to the Philippines” was eliminated and the strategy of island hopping was adopted. The Navy had eliminated any idea of a decisive battle near the Bonin's. Admiral Hart, CINC of the Asiatic Fleet, did state that the Philippines could not last long enough for the fleet to make the trip. This was sort of straw that broke the camel's back. There was no more talk of the "through to the Philippines".
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 22, 2019 13:31:29 GMT -6
I used Google Earth Pro and plotted the distance from Oahu/Pearl Harbor to the soutwest then across to the Philippines sailing over New Guinea. The distance is 5719.20 miles or 4969.85 Nautical Miles. At 12 knots, it would have taken 17 days, and that is without stopping to refuel, which might have lost them at least three to four days. We have to figure the IJN would be attacking them during their voyage and that would slow them down. It might take them at least 20-30 days to make the voyage.
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Post by admiralhood on Feb 22, 2019 14:23:23 GMT -6
The results were that the Blue force was fifteen hundred miles short of their objective by the end of the game with the following losses; Of the fifteen battleships, only seven were undamaged, Two of the four Blue carriers were damaged, half of the aircraft were lost. The Orange battleships never entered the fray and all the Blue losses were by daylight air attacks and nighttime torpedo attacks by cruisers. The strategy used by the Orange side was exactly how the Japanese using their interceptive operation, would have conducted their operation. Can these footnote be taken as a piece of supporting evidence that Kantai Kessen might be effective in tactical terms? By the way, to your knowledge, is the USN aware of the existence of the Kantai Kessen? Or, is the IJN aware of the War Plan Orange? The reason why I am asking this question is because Kantai Kessen and War Plan orange matched with each other so well as if one was made upon the knowledge as the other.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 22, 2019 16:04:24 GMT -6
The results were that the Blue force was fifteen hundred miles short of their objective by the end of the game with the following losses; Of the fifteen battleships, only seven were undamaged, Two of the four Blue carriers were damaged, half of the aircraft were lost. The Orange battleships never entered the fray and all the Blue losses were by daylight air attacks and nighttime torpedo attacks by cruisers. The strategy used by the Orange side was exactly how the Japanese using their interceptive operation, would have conducted their operation. Can these footnote be taken as a piece of supporting evidence that Kantai Kessen might be effective in tactical terms? By the way, to your knowledge, is the USN aware of the existence of the Kantai Kessen? Or, is the IJN aware of the War Plan Orange? The reason why I am asking this question is because Kantai Kessen and War Plan orange matched with each other so well as if one was made upon the knowledge as the other. The answer to your second question is that both sides understood the operational plan and doctrine of the other. The Naval War College gamed the Japanese "interceptive operation" many times and with the distance to the Philippines, it was all this plus changes in our geopolitical stance in the world, that finished off the "through to the Philippines". Now, when Admiral Kimmel took over the US Pacific Fleet, both he and his COS developed many different strategies but all were found wanting. None would accomplish anything except lose more ships. The answer to the first question should be evident. The NWC gamed that particular response many times and it would have been effective. You are correct, that both WPO and the Japanese doctrine did match which would make sense. Always keep this in mind about the strategic operations in the Pacific War, at least in the planning by the Japanese and initially by the US Navy. They were both working off of the same playbook; Alfred Thayer Mahan's " The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783" The problem with this is that Mahan was against trade wars and was using as historical evidence, the Age of Sail. The Age of Steam and Iron changed everything. The US Navy realized this, but Mahan's were perfect for the Japan. The enemy always has a say in your plans, and no plan survives contact with the enemy. I hope all this is helping you to understand, I enjoy helping. Here is a link to a document that you might find interesting about the Naval War College games. It is located on the Internet Archive and it is free - archive.org/details/blueswordnavalwa00vlah/page/196?q=War+Plan+Orange
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 22, 2019 19:58:38 GMT -6
In the interest fairness, the Japanese attack on the Philippines began on December 8th, 1941 with bombings from Formosa. The first land invasion occurred on the same day, at Batan Island in the Luzon Strait. The main landings occurred in Langayen Gulf on 21 December 1941. On December 26th Manila was declared an open city. The Japanese continued operations throughout the Philippines including Bataan and Corregidor until the middle of April 1943. The surrender occurred in that month. So, the actual length of the Philippines operation was four months, but in point of fact, the whole campaign was over in thirteen days when the capital surrendered. Keep in mind that we had had time to send more aircraft and combat troops to defend the islands. It's hard to know whether they would have been able to be send those additional forces without adequate warning. Also, the Japanese forces were spread out in Malaya, New Guinea, Dutch East Indies in further combat operations.
Point is that it did not take that long for the Japanese to take the core of the islands. The US fleet, even without the Pearl Harbor attack just could not get to the Philippines even if they had left on 8 December. It would not have been possible, because the bulk of the fleet would have to sail from San Pedro and San Diego, arrive in Pearl Harbor, then that whole force would then sail. It's well over 2200 miles from the West Coast to Oahu. It would take about ten days to make that trip at the speeds of the battleships. Add the time of travel to the Philippines, about seventeen days, and you have 27 days; another month. By that time, the Japanese would have taken the islands and prepared for its defense.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 23, 2019 11:02:54 GMT -6
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Post by vonfriedman on Jan 4, 2020 10:54:50 GMT -6
Very interesting readings. Best wishes for a happy 2020
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 4, 2020 13:09:40 GMT -6
Very interesting readings. Best wishes for a happy 2020 Best wishes to you and your family for a Happy and Prosperous New Year. Glad you liked the documents.
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Post by vonfriedman on Jan 12, 2020 8:14:38 GMT -6
With regard to the implementation of the Orange Plan through the Philippines, it is not clear to me what route the US fleet would have taken. From the US East Coast to Manila it is 12915 miles via the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. That's about 45 days at 12 knots and even more stopping to refuel. Of course I assume that the European powers are neutral. Perhaps with the possibility of multiplying the refuelling stops it would have been possible to sail at more than 12 knots, but I cannot calculate the possible time advantege if any. Starting from the West Coast, in order to avoid the shorter route that passes close to Japan the US fleet would have to travel a longer route. Stopping at Pearl Harbour and perhaps Guam and passing south of the Marquesas Islands, which were Japanese possessions, this is about 14500 miles to the Philippines, following Google Maps. That's 50 days and more. It also seems to me that the first of the two routes would have been safer, at least as far as Singapore, since the Japanese had a base in Palau and would have probably quickly conquered Guam.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 12, 2020 10:21:24 GMT -6
With regard to the implementation of the Orange Plan through the Philippines, it is not clear to me what route the US fleet would have taken. From the US East Coast to Manila it is 12915 miles via the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. That's about 45 days at 12 knots and even more stopping to refuel. Of course I assume that the European powers are neutral. Perhaps with the possibility of multiplying the refuelling stops it would have been possible to sail at more than 12 knots, but I cannot calculate the possible time advantege if any. Starting from the West Coast, in order to avoid the shorter route that passes close to Japan the US fleet would have to travel a longer route. Stopping at Pearl Harbour and perhaps Guam and passing south of the Marquesas Islands, which were Japanese possessions, this is about 14500 miles to the Philippines, following Google Maps. That's 50 days and more. It also seems to me that the first of the two routes would have been safer, at least as far as Singapore, since the Japanese had a base in Palau and would have probably quickly conquered Guam. Here are some maps to illustrate the paths that were considered for War Plan Orange. The actual plan that was executed by the Pacific Fleet actually corresponds to War Plan Orange. Keep in mind that for every 1000 miles you travel, you will lose about 10% of your fleet to breakdowns etc. Source: War Plan Orange by Edward S. Miller
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 12, 2020 12:27:24 GMT -6
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Post by vonfriedman on Jan 13, 2020 8:41:18 GMT -6
This monograph should be interesting. We can continue this discussion is you wish. I began to read Pedler's thesis with real interest. The author and his tutors deserve my compliments as an old teacher (of a completely different subject). I found a single mention to the Suez route, relating to a proposal by Mac Arthur and limited to sending troopships. I assume that even after the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance it was unthinkable to remove the bulk of the US naval forces from the eastern Pacific in order to send them to the Atlantic and finally make them reappear in the western Pacific, after having traveled the long route to Suez and Manila. This is apart from the lack of repair capacity in the Philippine bases. Leaving the theme of this Thread, I wonder if documents on war plans and wargames, similar to those you have suggested here but relating to more recent periods in history, are accessible on the Net. A long time ago I read a translation of Andrew Wilson's book The Bomb and the Computer: The History of Professional Wargaming 1780- 1968
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