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Post by bcoopactual on Mar 6, 2019 9:47:44 GMT -6
- Fighter interceptions - You realise that the RN and the RAF are two completely different services? Also, the USN operated far beyond support of land based fighters and had no way to use the huge array of radar stations that the RAF benefited from. For the US this was fully mature technology and doctrine, they were not "figuring it out as they went along" the way every other navy was. There is a lot to unpack there but let's start with these two. There is a lot of condescension inherent in the first statement which is interesting because in fact the Fleet Air Arm of the RN was actually under the control of the RAF until the summer of 1939 shortly before the start of WW2. The Dowding system of radar based fighter direction had already been developed and was in the process of being polished when the RN took back control of the FAA. The transfer of FAA officers to the RN obviously resulted in a considerable transfer of professional knowledge regarding fighter interception because in 1943 when HMS Victorious was loaned to the USN for operation in the South Pacific the American rear admiral in charge of the group was so impressed with the fighter direction of the British carrier (no Chain Home required) that he had an American fighter squadron from USS Saratoga transferred to Victorious while Victorious' squadron of Avengers was transferred to Saratoga. From that point until Victorious transited out of the area in late 1943 the British carrier specialized in Fleet defense while the American carrier handled most of the offensive attack duties. To be fair, the smaller British carrier had some trouble handling the heavy Avenger and that played a part in the admiral's decision but the fact that British fighter direction was easily superior (and was dorn 's point) and that the Americans adopted much of the British system for future operations still stands. As for the second statement, are you trying to claim that American carrier operations and doctrine was unchanged from 1942 to late 1943-45? Because the USN had already figured out carrier doctrine by the start of the war and it was fully mature. I think you need to read up a bit closer on American carrier air group ops in 1942. Far from being mature, American carrier group operations were often a mess and bordered on being a fiasco at Midway. The Americans didn't match Japan's 1941 capability to coordinate the air groups of multiple carriers together until late 1943-early 1944.
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Post by akosjaccik on Mar 6, 2019 10:41:49 GMT -6
I admit, I am overwhelmed by... anecdotal evidences. There is no such thing in this sense as far as I am concerned as "carrier strategy", there is "doctrine", and Japan formed what was esentially the first carrier task force, and they lifted 400 or so aircraft into the air to strike in late '41. And they succeeded. In practice, not in "could have if wanted to". Wars need "realistic long range plans", not war machines, those need suitable tasks. As for long range plans, you and I both know that they had a very good reason to esentially "not have one". Then again, I am not sure what kind of "sustained operation" are you in need of. You want them to build a base on the Pitcairn islands? Build twenty carriers on five slips? [citation needed] Ho boy, we are starting another AoN/turtleback, are we? Problem is, you are cherrypicking. There might be truth to wisely consider in what you are saying, but you are showing it as ultimate truth without context (I'm sure some british gents will talk more about armored decks later), the other thing is that some issue is not directly linked to carrier operations, but US naval strengths in general (f.e. damage control, which was abysmal at the japanese pretty much all around), and thirdly, this game goes both ways. Japanese aerial torpedoes used aerodynamic stabilizer plates and angular acceleration control system on the Type 91 if I recall correctly at the time the US had problems with their torps not exploding upon contact. The vessels got modified in other ways as well, hangar deck catapults were removed, 8" turrets were removed in case of Lexington for example, saying that they had the winning recipe and the work was done and wrapped ten years before the war is visibly not true. Here you can listen - well, more precisely: read - to japanese veterans and servicemen, to grasp the issue better. Japan HAD a system, this is why they had fresh pilots. Japan had a rubbish system, this is due to the aforementioned "martial tradition", which you shoved off the table with western elegance. I seriously recommend to look at the interviews, they are fascinating. For a japanese ace, training "hopeless morons" instead of fighting was borderline humiliating. And it showed. However, the main motive again is that you are damning Japan for not gearing up towards an attritional war they had no capacity, no manpower and no resources for. ...and which they would have lost either way anyway. So, they were very, very good ten years before the war, they just decided not to show it. Pinky promise. They also had no plans in case they lacked the necessary amount of carriers, which was unfortunately the case as you are saying? Meaning that for the fleet they had at the time, they had virtually no operational plans? Huh, strange. Bold move on their part. This is an industrial question, not a doctrinal one. Not to mention that the entire discussion started from RtW's nation traits, kind of, and as such, "building a lot of XY" is not exactly an "advancement in operational expertise".
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 6, 2019 10:43:51 GMT -6
A point that needs to be made here, is that the Japanese carriers had been conducting air operations against China since about 1937 off of the coast. This gave them a lot of experience in day to day carrier operations and what worked but what did not not. Naval War College floor games were very instructive and their transmission of ideas to or Fleet Exercises taught us how to conduct naval air operations. However, real combat is what teaches day to day carrier operations. It will tell you what worked and what does not and that took time. You also now can test the equipment and aircraft that you have developed, to see if it will be effective. Now adaptability is the key.
When you compare real combat times, the Japanese had about five years of combat experience with carrier operations before Coral Sea. The US Navy, except for some carrier operations attacking Japanese islands, had not real experience. The difference in combat experience does make a difference.
The advantage that we had besides industrial power, was that our war games and fleet exercises helped the US Navy develop a very flexible organizational structure and doctrine. We adapted quickly and assessed mistakes faster. Example of this is the number of fighters on board the carriers. We started the war with 18 fighters and the AAR of Coral Sea was adamant that more were needed. However, there was a document that I have, showing that the increase in fighter strength from 18 to 36 had already been authorized before the war. The reason that it had not been completely implement was the lack of available fighters due to the need to provide both the French and British with the F4F Wildcat. This hampered our efforts. At Midway, we had 27 and we added at least 9 more fighters after that battle. At the other battles like Eastern Solomon’s and Santa Cruz, we had 36 fighters. Essentially, two squadrons of 18 fighters.
On the other side, the Japanese did realize after Coral Sea and especially Midway that they needed more fighters and that their radios were junk which hampered command and control. We did not have that issue as bad, our radios and procedures were much better.
Another issue is that we realized before the war that the torpedo bomber was very vulnerable and that the dive bomber was much more effect against carriers. You don’t have to really sink a carrier, just destroy the deck and it is now mission killed. We accomplished this at Coral Sea, and this helped our victory at Midway. After Midway, the Japanese were in the defensive mode and really did not have any carrier strength to expend and could not build carriers fast enough. Their ability to replace their ships was very low and their pilots, this was another advantage.
However, overall, the Japanese carriers did perform well due to their experience in combat, but we learned faster. They made some mistakes and we took advantage of them. It really boils down to the fact we made fewer mistakes. The initial portion of the war was offensive but transitioned to defensive in the later stages.
War Games and fleet exercises are highly beneficial but are limited in their usefulness in the area of day to day procedures. Only actual combat can reveal deficiencies. For the British Royal Navy, the geostrategic differences as to where they were going to fight, guided their carrier and aircraft development. We also have to understand the economic problems that the experienced after WW1 and psychological issues of a nation that was totally worn out from war.
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Post by dorn on Mar 6, 2019 11:57:13 GMT -6
I am nor British neither American I am from small nation that have only one naval battle at large lake in Middle of Russia.
However when I read what you wrote I just want to point out that your are quite wrong if you look at it only one way.
I will not answer all topics as it is much better for you to read and do your own reasoning. Relating to carriers design of RN you can use this page. It is really excellent reading and even if this is on-line author used mainly orignial reports and documents so I think it is more accurate than a lot of books.
But I will point out one most important thing and it is that every nation builds their force makes their doctrines in context of geographically position and threats the nation faces. IJN and USN has very similar requirements as the both navies envisioned Pacific as main theatre of operations. RN has main theatre of operations Europe with Atlantic, North sea, the Mediterranean, Pacific was quite minor theatre. You can see it by change of design from HMS Ark Royal (designed for Pacific, but still in mind that it need to operate in Europe too thus eg. closed hangar) to Illustrious class which was specially designed for ETO and the Mediterranean. And I think both navies did it well and both navies works better in their planned theatre of operation. The second thing you need your doctrines be in line with your resources, RN has limited resources so they adapt to that and it works well.
"Lightweight hangers and flight decks allowed a far larger air group to be embarked and were far easier to repair if damaged. Blast damage in the hangers was much reduced in this design over armoured hanger carriers, and damaged flight decks could be repaired very quickly, often by the ships crew with no need even to dock. Armoured hanger carriers are often reported as being more resilient to bomb damage but this is incorrect as it took the same amount of damage to make the flight deck unusable and they had to be docked for repair which took much longer. In addition the shocks on the armoured decks actually warped the hulls making almost all of the GB carriers unfit for service long before their US counterparts."
Read link I give you, look at damage reports, look at bomb hits and compare. You will easily find that it is not one sided as the "armoured carriers" withstand hits that no other carrier survives. Than you need to ask what the navy need. Survival or striker? It means to survive even if the strike capacity is lower or striker even if your survival potential is much lower. RN needs survival as it could not replace looses as USN. Read something about British Pacific Fleet, you will find that except HMS Illustrious (but it was not because of the damage get at the time, it was due to accumulated damage through more than 5 years of war service - compare to less than 3 years of the first Essex class) Japanese were not able to do any significant damage outside closing carrier operation of several hours. Look at damage reports of USS Franklin and USS Bunker Hill. You should compare of ordnance which hits those carriers, it is quite difference if you are hit by 250 lb bomb and 1000 kg bomb. USN carriers were not designed to withstand such damage but they do not need as they operate in Pacific (except small exception), RN carriers need to withstand that damage and even if they deck was not armored enought for that bombs they passive features of design help them to survive. You can be sure that Essex class hit by 1000 kg bomb into middle will not easily repair the damage. Last thing you need to compare situation, it is completely different the Mediterranean and first years of Pacific war and last 2 years in Pacific when USN has completely superiority. Look at the damage of USS Hornet and USS Franklin you will find that USS Franklin will be probably abondon too if in same situation as USS Hornet.
Relating to design of carrier deck by superstructure vs. as integral part of the ship. It was just opposite, I do not remember source but when British designed HMS Ark Royal they find out that by closing the hanger and make deck part of the hull they can save tonnage.
I do not understand how is irrelevant night operations from aircraft carriers, it can give you quite advantage if you are able to spot enemy force in sunset and still you can with some reliability strike.
On one side you completely admire ability of USN to make force projection through the Pacific but completely ignore force projection of British Pacific force through half of the globe. It would be same as admiring winner in weightlifting in category 109 kg+ and ignoring winner in category 55 kg. They both are winners, they both did it well on their targets.
In this post I summarize deck area of certain carriers - it is approximation as I do not have access to exact drawings but for gross picture it is quite good. hangar area of USN and RN carriersYou should know it is only hangars not taking into consideration other aspects as deck parks, height of hangar etc.
Another interesting information is that RN plans for carriers were to have 1 maintenance carrier for every 3 fleet carriers however war started earlier than this carrier was ready. So if you look at it in large picture it is clear why RN carriers has no so much space for spares on top of expectation to operate in distance of land bases.
Read the info, you will find that the answer is no black and white and you will be suprised what RN achieved with limited resources.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 6, 2019 13:02:48 GMT -6
Just another point about any comparison between US carriers and the British…. it is a point I and others have mentioned. When we are discussing and analyzing the British versus US carriers, geography makes a big difference. You are comparing a country that was going to conduct naval operations in the North Sea and the Mediterranean. Those are both enclosed and narrow seas.
In geographic terms, a narrow sea encompasses enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. The North Sea is a semi-enclosed sea. The Med is a large enclosed sea.
Another factor that isn’t mentioned all the time, is the area a territory or country occupies in relation to an adjacent sea or land area. Is it in a central position or semi-central? Is it on the peripheral?
All of these geographic areas will dictate how a nation designs, builds and deploys its fleet including aircraft carriers.
When you examine the Japanese carriers, don’t forget that they were planning for the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan, both are semi-enclosed seas. So their designs will resemble the British carriers.
Any discussion of carrier design, building and deployment including doctrine and aircraft must start right at geography. There is no other way.
Now, as to the strategy in RTW and RTW2, I consider where my nation is located, who might be her three top opponents and that is how I design, build and deploy my ships. It guides my strategy and doctrine for how I fight wars. It is difficult to believe but IMO the three hardest nations to play are: Japan, Italy and Germany. This is due to their economic level and more importantly, their geography. Austria-Hungary can be a problem but it essentially on has one major enemy; Italy. The British and French do sometimes present problems but they are easy to handle. I played the US, Great Britain and France and have found them very easy.
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imryn
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Post by imryn on Mar 7, 2019 3:54:51 GMT -6
- Fighter interceptions - You realise that the RN and the RAF are two completely different services? Also, the USN operated far beyond support of land based fighters and had no way to use the huge array of radar stations that the RAF benefited from. For the US this was fully mature technology and doctrine, they were not "figuring it out as they went along" the way every other navy was. There is a lot to unpack there but let's start with these two. There is a lot of condescension inherent in the first statement which is interesting because in fact the Fleet Air Arm of the RN was actually under the control of the RAF until the summer of 1939 shortly before the start of WW2. The Dowding system of radar based fighter direction had already been developed and was in the process of being polished when the RN took back control of the FAA. The transfer of FAA officers to the RN obviously resulted in a considerable transfer of professional knowledge regarding fighter interception because in 1943 when HMS Victorious was loaned to the USN for operation in the South Pacific the American rear admiral in charge of the group was so impressed with the fighter direction of the British carrier (no Chain Home required) that he had an American fighter squadron from USS Saratoga transferred to Victorious while Victorious' squadron of Avengers was transferred to Saratoga. From that point until Victorious transited out of the area in late 1943 the British carrier specialized in Fleet defense while the American carrier handled most of the offensive attack duties. To be fair, the smaller British carrier had some trouble handling the heavy Avenger and that played a part in the admiral's decision but the fact that British fighter direction was easily superior (and was dorn 's point) and that the Americans adopted much of the British system for future operations still stands. As for the second statement, are you trying to claim that American carrier operations and doctrine was unchanged from 1942 to late 1943-45? Because the USN had already figured out carrier doctrine by the start of the war and it was fully mature. I think you need to read up a bit closer on American carrier air group ops in 1942. Far from being mature, American carrier group operations were often a mess and bordered on being a fiasco at Midway. The Americans didn't match Japan's 1941 capability to coordinate the air groups of multiple carriers together until late 1943-early 1944. I apologise if I sounded condescending, however my point stands. The RAF had control of the FAA and had zero interest in operating aircraft off ships. This resulted in the RN entering the war with a tiny air arm and obsolete aircraft. The RAF system of radar based fighter direction absolutely relied on chain home, and also on having a large number of fighters, a situation that the FAA did not enjoy. You might find this article informative USNHistory where it explains why USS Saratoga swapped squadrons of F4F's for TBM's with HMS Victorious - The TBM's were to big for the available hanger space, to big for the deck lifts, too heavy for the arrester gear, and too heavy for the cranes on the RN ship. There is no mention of US admiration for RN fighter direction methods in that article, and seeing as both her air and surface search radars were immediately replaced when she joined US service, I find it doubtful that she could have achieved a superior level of expertise so quickly with new equipment. It follows that unable to safely operate TBM's, and with fighters embarked to replace them, the RN ship should "specialise" in fleet defence - not because she was especially good at it but because it was the only role she was serviceable for. US carrier operation doctrine was fully formed before WW2, just as I claimed. It was developed in war games at the war college and tested in fleet problems using the limited number of available carriers. The doctrine called for larger carriers than were in service, and therefore there was no way to test the doctrine on the larger carriers until the Essex ships were available. A doctrine is just a piece of paper until it is applied to a real fleet and it is not surprising that the USN had plenty of teething problems when applying it to their new ships. The fact remains that the USN knew exactly how they intended to operate their large carrier forces before the war, and despite any teething problems with operating much larger air groups than ever before, the doctrine worked. The other point is that the doctrine was developed at the war college in war games up to about 1934. I am not sure if the college continued development past this point, but it certainly lost most of its influence over navy planning then. War college graduates from before 1934 were senior officers by WW2 and it is not clear if the doctrine was broadly circulated before WW2. This means that even though the doctrine was clearly understood by senior officers it still had to be applied, and most of the USN junior officers and men were not familiar with it at all.
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Post by dorn on Mar 7, 2019 4:57:58 GMT -6
There is a lot to unpack there but let's start with these two. There is a lot of condescension inherent in the first statement which is interesting because in fact the Fleet Air Arm of the RN was actually under the control of the RAF until the summer of 1939 shortly before the start of WW2. The Dowding system of radar based fighter direction had already been developed and was in the process of being polished when the RN took back control of the FAA. The transfer of FAA officers to the RN obviously resulted in a considerable transfer of professional knowledge regarding fighter interception because in 1943 when HMS Victorious was loaned to the USN for operation in the South Pacific the American rear admiral in charge of the group was so impressed with the fighter direction of the British carrier (no Chain Home required) that he had an American fighter squadron from USS Saratoga transferred to Victorious while Victorious' squadron of Avengers was transferred to Saratoga. From that point until Victorious transited out of the area in late 1943 the British carrier specialized in Fleet defense while the American carrier handled most of the offensive attack duties. To be fair, the smaller British carrier had some trouble handling the heavy Avenger and that played a part in the admiral's decision but the fact that British fighter direction was easily superior (and was dorn 's point) and that the Americans adopted much of the British system for future operations still stands. As for the second statement, are you trying to claim that American carrier operations and doctrine was unchanged from 1942 to late 1943-45? Because the USN had already figured out carrier doctrine by the start of the war and it was fully mature. I think you need to read up a bit closer on American carrier air group ops in 1942. Far from being mature, American carrier group operations were often a mess and bordered on being a fiasco at Midway. The Americans didn't match Japan's 1941 capability to coordinate the air groups of multiple carriers together until late 1943-early 1944. I apologise if I sounded condescending, however my point stands. The RAF had control of the FAA and had zero interest in operating aircraft off ships. This resulted in the RN entering the war with a tiny air arm and obsolete aircraft. The RAF system of radar based fighter direction absolutely relied on chain home, and also on having a large number of fighters, a situation that the FAA did not enjoy. You might find this article informative USNHistory where it explains why USS Saratoga swapped squadrons of F4F's for TBM's with HMS Victorious - The TBM's were to big for the available hanger space, to big for the deck lifts, too heavy for the arrester gear, and too heavy for the cranes on the RN ship. There is no mention of US admiration for RN fighter direction methods in that article, and seeing as both her air and surface search radars were immediately replaced when she joined US service, I find it doubtful that she could have achieved a superior level of expertise so quickly with new equipment. It follows that unable to safely operate TBM's, and with fighters embarked to replace them, the RN ship should "specialise" in fleet defence - not because she was especially good at it but because it was the only role she was serviceable for. US carrier operation doctrine was fully formed before WW2, just as I claimed. It was developed in war games at the war college and tested in fleet problems using the limited number of available carriers. The doctrine called for larger carriers than were in service, and therefore there was no way to test the doctrine on the larger carriers until the Essex ships were available. A doctrine is just a piece of paper until it is applied to a real fleet and it is not surprising that the USN had plenty of teething problems when applying it to their new ships. The fact remains that the USN knew exactly how they intended to operate their large carrier forces before the war, and despite any teething problems with operating much larger air groups than ever before, the doctrine worked. The other point is that the doctrine was developed at the war college in war games up to about 1934. I am not sure if the college continued development past this point, but it certainly lost most of its influence over navy planning then. War college graduates from before 1934 were senior officers by WW2 and it is not clear if the doctrine was broadly circulated before WW2. This means that even though the doctrine was clearly understood by senior officers it still had to be applied, and most of the USN junior officers and men were not familiar with it at all. From your link: Victorious’s first deployment with an operational U.S. Navy task force was beneficial for both British and American crews. Victorious’s superior fighter direction, founded on extensive combat experience in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, was noted by all.
I will just note that RN knows (by excersices and later by experience) that even low numbered fighters can disrupt attack. As war progress it was know that point is to disrupt attack that the attack will have lesser accuracy, bombs will be needed to drop lower and thus having lower penetration ability.
Here you can find comparison of closed and opened hangar by British DNC - quite interesting
point 4-27 - you can read some information about design on Midway class was incorporated 2 design features studying HMS Illustrious as repaired in USA - armor deck, sectionalization of hangar.
Relating to USN doctrine was fully formed of WW2. I do not think USN was such part of idiots not adapting doctrine thourgh the war experience, on opposite I think USN was ahead of adapting and doctrine adapt and changed through the war. Just one example, look at TF composition at start of war - single carrier on opposite to doctrines of RN and IJN to have multiple carriers together in one force for better protection. USN learnt this lesson and adapt through the war in same way.
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imryn
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Post by imryn on Mar 7, 2019 5:15:35 GMT -6
I admit, I am overwhelmed by... anecdotal evidences. There is no such thing in this sense as far as I am concerned as "carrier strategy", there is "doctrine", and Japan formed what was esentially the first carrier task force, and they lifted 400 or so aircraft into the air to strike in late '41. And they succeeded. In practice, not in "could have if wanted to". Wars need "realistic long range plans", not war machines, those need suitable tasks. As for long range plans, you and I both know that they had a very good reason to esentially "not have one". Then again, I am not sure what kind of "sustained operation" are you in need of. You want them to build a base on the Pitcairn islands? Build twenty carriers on five slips? Japan had no long range strategy of any kind. Their naval leaders admitted that if they failed to defeat the US in the first few months of the war they would ultimately lose. The US had a workable war plan that lead step by step to ultimate victory. The first is not a strategy, its not even a plan, its a roll of the dice. The US war plan clearly identified the force levels that would be needed, and they were realistically achievable force levels not pie in the sky.[citation needed] [Citation Provided]Ho boy, we are starting another AoN/turtleback, are we? Problem is, you are cherrypicking. There might be truth to wisely consider in what you are saying, but you are showing it as ultimate truth without context (I'm sure some british gents will talk more about armored decks later), the other thing is that some issue is not directly linked to carrier operations, but US naval strengths in general (f.e. damage control, which was abysmal at the japanese pretty much all around), and thirdly, this game goes both ways. Japanese aerial torpedoes used aerodynamic stabilizer plates and angular acceleration control system on the Type 91 if I recall correctly at the time the US had problems with their torps not exploding upon contact. The vessels got modified in other ways as well, hangar deck catapults were removed, 8" turrets were removed in case of Lexington for example, saying that they had the winning recipe and the work was done and wrapped ten years before the war is visibly not true. Nope, no more tilting at windmills I am cherrypicking, I admit, but I am talking about the context of the Pacific war, and the US plan to fight and win it. There are arguments for armoured hangers and decks in the context of the ETO and the Med, however even in those contexts the armoured hangers and decks, as implemented in the RN carriers, were still a sub optimal solution. The ships were not structurally sound and repeated bomb hits caused warping throughout the hull which resulted in the ships being removed from service far sooner than their US counterparts. The US did implement armoured flight decks late in the war with the Midway class, but did it in such a way that it did not limit air group size or compromise the structural integrity of the ship. I doubt that they would have done that earlier in the war even if they could because in the first years the ability to repair the deck quickly and using the ships own resources would have outweighed the benefit of an armoured deck. I did mention that the US had underestimated the effect of aerial torpedoes elsewhere. In fact the US underestimated the effect of airpower across the board. I am not sure that airbourne torpedos had the same issues that surface launched ones did, but it seems reasonable to assume they did. Just as well the NWC emphasised dive bombing as the primary way of mission killing enemy ships, not torpedos. hanger deck catapults got removed, all the worlds AA guns got piled on, the Essex's got stretched - these are all minor adjustments, not fundamental changes.Here you can listen - well, more precisely: read - to japanese veterans and servicemen, to grasp the issue better. Japan HAD a system, this is why they had fresh pilots. Japan had a rubbish system, this is due to the aforementioned "martial tradition", which you shoved off the table with western elegance. I seriously recommend to look at the interviews, they are fascinating. For a japanese ace, training "hopeless morons" instead of fighting was borderline humiliating. And it showed. However, the main motive again is that you are damning Japan for not gearing up towards an attritional war they had no capacity, no manpower and no resources for. ...and which they would have lost either way anyway. A system that is totally incapable of doing what it is designed to do is a failure. Japan had no system to replace pilots losses in the numbers that were needed, the US did. For a pilot to claim he was "humiliated" by having to train new pilots, I have to ask, how did he get trained? If an experienced pilot has to be "humiliated" to train replacement pilots this is a key failure in the system which should have been identified and eliminated long before war broke out. Ultimately you make my point for me - Japan had no strategy or plan that would allow them to win, only a vague hope that they could knock the US out in one blow. I am damning Japan for starting a war they had no realistic chance of winning.So, they were very, very good ten years before the war, they just decided not to show it. Pinky promise. They also had no plans in case they lacked the necessary amount of carriers, which was unfortunately the case as you are saying? Meaning that for the fleet they had at the time, they had virtually no operational plans? Huh, strange. Bold move on their part.
The NWC and the war plans division had the plan for the Pacific war years before it broke out. The requirements for those plans to be implemented were clearly understood, and the Fleet was conducting exercises and landing exercises to practice and develop the skills that would be needed. The problem was that at this time the US politicians were obsessed with maintaining a "Treaty Navy" even though the treaties were crumbling around them. This resulted in them only authorising new ships that fell within treaty limits, and the US had no capacity within the treaty structure to replace any of its existing carriers or build any new ones. I know it sounds stupid, but that's the way it was. I did use the word "lobotomise" when I talked about the NWC's loss of influence. This is an industrial question, not a doctrinal one. Not to mention that the entire discussion started from RtW's nation traits, kind of, and as such, "building a lot of XY" is not exactly an "advancement in operational expertise".
I shouldn't have used the word "build", I should have said "operate". You are right, building the ships is a question of industrial capacity, and the US does have a large advantage there. That said, the US ability to operate and maintain such a large force across such enormous distances was unique and unparalleled in that time.
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Post by dorn on Mar 7, 2019 5:59:33 GMT -6
I would just point out that even if USN starts the war with 0 ships, they would win the war.
If the sides fight the war and one of the side have 10 times higher production potential than the smaller side can only win by:
1. Blitzkrieg (Germany strategy) 2. Doing enough damage to force negotiation
As USN in terms of geographic against Japan was one super large island there is not possibility of either. Japan can conquer any island outside the USA home soil, even Alaska and still cannot do anything more. I think that even if they were able to invade USA soil at day 1 with all soliders for Pacific campaign they would have no chance to win the war either.
It is same even against UK, Japan cannot jeopardize industrial potential of British Empire significantly and industrial potential and manpower of British Empires was something that Japan could never face alone. They started the war when British were occupied somewhere else.
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imryn
Full Member
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Post by imryn on Mar 7, 2019 6:37:35 GMT -6
I am nor British neither American I am from small nation that have only one naval battle at large lake in Middle of Russia.
However when I read what you wrote I just want to point out that your are quite wrong if you look at it only one way.
I will not answer all topics as it is much better for you to read and do your own reasoning. Relating to carriers design of RN you can use this page. It is really excellent reading and even if this is on-line author used mainly orignial reports and documents so I think it is more accurate than a lot of books.
But I will point out one most important thing and it is that every nation builds their force makes their doctrines in context of geographically position and threats the nation faces. IJN and USN has very similar requirements as the both navies envisioned Pacific as main theatre of operations. RN has main theatre of operations Europe with Atlantic, North sea, the Mediterranean, Pacific was quite minor theatre. You can see it by change of design from HMS Ark Royal (designed for Pacific, but still in mind that it need to operate in Europe too thus eg. closed hangar) to Illustrious class which was specially designed for ETO and the Mediterranean. And I think both navies did it well and both navies works better in their planned theatre of operation. The second thing you need your doctrines be in line with your resources, RN has limited resources so they adapt to that and it works well.
"Lightweight hangers and flight decks allowed a far larger air group to be embarked and were far easier to repair if damaged. Blast damage in the hangers was much reduced in this design over armoured hanger carriers, and damaged flight decks could be repaired very quickly, often by the ships crew with no need even to dock. Armoured hanger carriers are often reported as being more resilient to bomb damage but this is incorrect as it took the same amount of damage to make the flight deck unusable and they had to be docked for repair which took much longer. In addition the shocks on the armoured decks actually warped the hulls making almost all of the GB carriers unfit for service long before their US counterparts."
Read link I give you, look at damage reports, look at bomb hits and compare. You will easily find that it is not one sided as the "armoured carriers" withstand hits that no other carrier survives. Than you need to ask what the navy need. Survival or striker? It means to survive even if the strike capacity is lower or striker even if your survival potential is much lower. RN needs survival as it could not replace looses as USN. Read something about British Pacific Fleet, you will find that except HMS Illustrious (but it was not because of the damage get at the time, it was due to accumulated damage through more than 5 years of war service - compare to less than 3 years of the first Essex class) Japanese were not able to do any significant damage outside closing carrier operation of several hours. Look at damage reports of USS Franklin and USS Bunker Hill. You should compare of ordnance which hits those carriers, it is quite difference if you are hit by 250 lb bomb and 1000 kg bomb. USN carriers were not designed to withstand such damage but they do not need as they operate in Pacific (except small exception), RN carriers need to withstand that damage and even if they deck was not armored enought for that bombs they passive features of design help them to survive. You can be sure that Essex class hit by 1000 kg bomb into middle will not easily repair the damage. Last thing you need to compare situation, it is completely different the Mediterranean and first years of Pacific war and last 2 years in Pacific when USN has completely superiority. Look at the damage of USS Hornet and USS Franklin you will find that USS Franklin will be probably abondon too if in same situation as USS Hornet.
Relating to design of carrier deck by superstructure vs. as integral part of the ship. It was just opposite, I do not remember source but when British designed HMS Ark Royal they find out that by closing the hanger and make deck part of the hull they can save tonnage.
I do not understand how is irrelevant night operations from aircraft carriers, it can give you quite advantage if you are able to spot enemy force in sunset and still you can with some reliability strike.
On one side you completely admire ability of USN to make force projection through the Pacific but completely ignore force projection of British Pacific force through half of the globe. It would be same as admiring winner in weightlifting in category 109 kg+ and ignoring winner in category 55 kg. They both are winners, they both did it well on their targets.
In this post I summarize deck area of certain carriers - it is approximation as I do not have access to exact drawings but for gross picture it is quite good. hangar area of USN and RN carriersYou should know it is only hangars not taking into consideration other aspects as deck parks, height of hangar etc.
Another interesting information is that RN plans for carriers were to have 1 maintenance carrier for every 3 fleet carriers however war started earlier than this carrier was ready. So if you look at it in large picture it is clear why RN carriers has no so much space for spares on top of expectation to operate in distance of land bases.
Read the info, you will find that the answer is no black and white and you will be suprised what RN achieved with limited resources.
I am working my way through the links you provided, however I think you are placing my claims and statements into a wider context than I intended. I was talking about the US Pacific campaign specifically, not WW2 in a general sense. I know there are good arguments for armoured hangers and decks in the context of the ETO and other campaigns in relatively constricted waters, however these arguments are not pertinent to the Pacific theater. I didn't claim that the US carriers were better protected, I claimed that they could be repaired and brought back into service quicker than armoured carriers, and this was the case. My comments were a criticism of the RN carriers, but mostly this was meant to be taken as a criticism of their suitability to operate in the Pacific theater, not a general criticism. My comments on the RN carriers being removed from service due to hull warping was a general criticism. This was a flaw in the design that was not identified until the end of the war when the RN was seeking to refit ships for angled decks and it was found that all of the ships that had received extensive bomb hits suffered from warping that made them unsuitable for refit. This did not have an effect on their serviceability during the war, as far as i know. Your comment about being able to save tonnage by incorporating the hanger sides and deck in the strength girder is correct, however the trade off is that it restricts the number of aircraft that can be carried. The RN accepted this trade off, the USN didn't. In general the RN was better at night fighting than the US because the US considered training for night fighting to be too dangerous during peace time. Carrier operations were rarely conducted at night and mainly consisted of aircraft flying on after dusk. Any such operations were horrifically risky for any navy and were avoided if at all possible. The British had no real ability to project force across any distance. They could send ships anywhere but they had little capability to build up forward bases and no capability to conduct large scale amphibious operations. The RN had no requirement to develop such capabilities because the had basing available around the globe, and their expected enemies were right on their doorstep. I was surprised to see that comparison of hanger space you linked, particularly the figures quoted for HMS Ark Royal. I then looked up the air group sizes for each ship: Essex - 90 Ark Royal - 72 designed, 60 operational Illustrious - 36 Indomitable - 55 (1943 this dropped to 45) Implacable - 81 Midway - 137 designed, 100 operational Only the Implacable came close to equaling the air group size of the Essex and as a late war design it would be reasonable to compare her to the Midway not the Essex. The reason that the RN chose to build carriers with smaller air groups is outside the scope of my argument, however in the context of the Pacific theater and the US war plans, carriers with anything less than the absolute maximum air group size made no sense. I am not sure how the US handled the issue of ferrying replacement aircraft and crew out to frontline units, however I can't find any record of them being short of aircraft or crew so I assume they had a plan for that and the plan worked.
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imryn
Full Member
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Post by imryn on Mar 7, 2019 8:57:08 GMT -6
From your link: Victorious’s first deployment with an operational U.S. Navy task force was beneficial for both British and American crews. Victorious’s superior fighter direction, founded on extensive combat experience in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, was noted by all.
I will just note that RN knows (by excersices and later by experience) that even low numbered fighters can disrupt attack. As war progress it was know that point is to disrupt attack that the attack will have lesser accuracy, bombs will be needed to drop lower and thus having lower penetration ability.
Here you can find comparison of closed and opened hangar by British DNC - quite interesting
point 4-27 - you can read some information about design on Midway class was incorporated 2 design features studying HMS Illustrious as repaired in USA - armor deck, sectionalization of hangar.
Relating to USN doctrine was fully formed of WW2. I do not think USN was such part of idiots not adapting doctrine thourgh the war experience, on opposite I think USN was ahead of adapting and doctrine adapt and changed through the war. Just one example, look at TF composition at start of war - single carrier on opposite to doctrines of RN and IJN to have multiple carriers together in one force for better protection. USN learnt this lesson and adapt through the war in same way.
"Victorious’s first deployment with an operational U.S. Navy task force was beneficial for both British and American crews. Victorious’s superior fighter direction, founded on extensive combat experience in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, was noted by all."Ok, I can see how that line might be interpreted as saying that the RN had superior methods or doctrine for fighter direction. I can also interpret it as saying that Victorious's extensive combat experience enabled their crew to execute the task of fighter direction in a superior fashion - the same methods and doctrine just executed in a more efficient and well practiced fashion. I can also see that sentence being added to an official document because the USN didn't want to seem ungrateful when Britain had lent them a carrier that they couldn't really afford to do, and so the USN heaped praise on Victorious's conduct of the only task they had found the ship fit for. I am not claiming any of those options is correct, but I don't see anything that says RN fighter control methods, doctrine, or abilities, was significantly superior to the USN equivalent, and nothing to indicate that the USN adopted any changes as a result of these events. The Midway class did incorporate the changes you describe, but critically retained the position of the strength deck below the hanger deck, just like the Essex class. The Essex class was built using theoretical information obtained through war-gaming to determine the best ship design for conduct of the Pacific campaign. For that purpose the USN determined that it was more important that the ship should be able to repair bomb damage to its flight deck quickly and out of its own resources. A further requirement that was determined by war-gaming was that any carriers should be built to carry the largest possible air group. The Essex class was also the cheapest possible ship that could be built within the first two constraints, so that the maximum number of them could be built. The Midway class was built to satisfy a whole different set of criteria - essentially it was the USN's post-war carrier. A bigger ship which could incorporate protective features not possible within the limits of what could be accomplished in the Essex class. No doctrine that has not been tested in combat can be considered to be fully formed. The US doctrine and strategic plan at the start of WW2 was as fully formed as possible through peacetime methods, however of course they made changes as and when reality turned out to differ from theory. The most obvious difference between the pre war plans and the actual war is that the end game envisioned in the plans never happened. The plans called for an island hopping advance to inflict attritional losses and constrict Japanese freedom to maneuver, eventually forcing a definitive battleship engagement to eliminate Japans battleline, and then a blockade to force surrender. As it turned out air power was more effective than pre war gaming suggested and the attritional losses inflicted during the island hopping included most of Japans battle line, and then the blockade phase was found to be unworkable in the face of Japanese resistance. The question of operating carriers either dispersed or concentrated is interesting because pre war gaming indicated strengths and weaknesses in both strategies. In pre war games it was thought that any carrier, once found, would quickly have its deck wrecked and be mission killed. Operating singly it was harder for the enemy to find a carrier, and once one was found it wouldn't follow that all the others were found. On the other side pre war gaming indicated that carriers operating in groups were able to coordinate larger and more effective air strikes. In the early war years the US often had very few carriers available and so was forced to operate them singly, however once they had the numbers they always operated in concentration so I guess the pre war questions got answered. The remarkable thing about US pre war planning is that so much of it turned out to be accurate and workable, but of course they adapted it as necessary.
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Post by bcoopactual on Mar 7, 2019 9:03:04 GMT -6
imryn , I'm done with the cherry picking and shifting goal posts so I'm not repeating the mistakes we made in engaging you in the AoN/turtleback thread. You have the right idea about some things but others you are dead wrong (e.g. such as the RN being ahead in fighter direction or the fact that Implacable was a 1939 design whose construction was delayed by the needs of the Battle of the Atlantic and so design-wise was in no way contemporary with Midway. Malta would have been the better choice) and when confronted you either cherry pick sources that agree while ignoring information in the same source that doesn't (see your link regarding HMS Victorious' operation with 3rd Fleet in 1943) or you try to shift the goalpost by claiming that you were only taking about Pacific operations when the topic of the thread makes no such specification and neither did you until contradicted. So what should and could be an intelligent discussion about a topic ends up being a useless game of whack-a-mole. So this is my position on the thread's topic. There is no need and no justification for any nation to be given a specific advantage in initial aerial technology. The RTW research system is already well set up for the task and mentioned additions for RTW2 like requiring a commissioned fleet carrier in the fleet to place related research areas to High priority just makes it that more suited. Individual bonus techs for certain nations like dive bombing for the USN or torpedo bombing for Japan or the UK would be in keeping with the premise of RTW1 but needs to be used with caution because of the sandbox nature of the game and the fact there is no WW1 scripted for the overall game (1900-1950) to relieve Germany of it's Pacific possessions and the subsequent need for an empire spanning fleet including carriers. So care needs to be taken not to penalize players of non-historical carrier nations when the alternative history of the game would not justify it.
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Post by archelaos on Mar 7, 2019 9:08:40 GMT -6
I admit, I am overwhelmed by... anecdotal evidences. There is no such thing in this sense as far as I am concerned as "carrier strategy", there is "doctrine", and Japan formed what was esentially the first carrier task force, and they lifted 400 or so aircraft into the air to strike in late '41. And they succeeded. In practice, not in "could have if wanted to". Wars need "realistic long range plans", not war machines, those need suitable tasks. As for long range plans, you and I both know that they had a very good reason to esentially "not have one". Then again, I am not sure what kind of "sustained operation" are you in need of. You want them to build a base on the Pitcairn islands? Build twenty carriers on five slips? Japan had no long range strategy of any kind. Their naval leaders admitted that if they failed to defeat the US in the first few months of the war they would ultimately lose. The US had a workable war plan that lead step by step to ultimate victory. The first is not a strategy, its not even a plan, its a roll of the dice. The US war plan clearly identified the force levels that would be needed, and they were realistically achievable force levels not pie in the sky.[citation needed] [Citation Provided]Here you can listen - well, more precisely: read - to japanese veterans and servicemen, to grasp the issue better. Japan HAD a system, this is why they had fresh pilots. Japan had a rubbish system, this is due to the aforementioned "martial tradition", which you shoved off the table with western elegance. I seriously recommend to look at the interviews, they are fascinating. For a japanese ace, training "hopeless morons" instead of fighting was borderline humiliating. And it showed. However, the main motive again is that you are damning Japan for not gearing up towards an attritional war they had no capacity, no manpower and no resources for. ...and which they would have lost either way anyway. A system that is totally incapable of doing what it is designed to do is a failure. Japan had no system to replace pilots losses in the numbers that were needed, the US did. For a pilot to claim he was "humiliated" by having to train new pilots, I have to ask, how did he get trained? If an experienced pilot has to be "humiliated" to train replacement pilots this is a key failure in the system which should have been identified and eliminated long before war broke out. Ultimately you make my point for me - Japan had no strategy or plan that would allow them to win, only a vague hope that they could knock the US out in one blow. I am damning Japan for starting a war they had no realistic chance of winning.
Japan war plan:
It is not the point that Japan had no long term plan. The problem is there no such plan was imaginable and Japanese (at least military, maybe not civilian officials) knew it. That's why they had not created such plan, as their only hope was to force US to accept peace due to the cost of war. Essentially, Japanese wanted to achieve what Vietnamese later did but they had no idea how many years and variables are needed to achieve victory - for example USA was not willing to invade North Vietnam for political reasons and they were fighting Chinese and USSR industry, not Vietnamese one.
Japanese pilot training:
This problem was impossible to identify before war. You do not really understand underlying thought process. At peace, experienced pilots trained young ones and everything worked fine, but at war those same experienced pilots wanted to be at the front, fighting and not behind, training. For them, to sit behind was to act like a coward, no matter what they were doing there. And being considered coward was the worst thing that could happen to them.
Besides Japanese pilots were not the only ones who tried to avoid training - many British and Polish pilots despised training duties, and tried to stay in line squadrons as long as possible.
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imryn
Full Member
Posts: 156
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Post by imryn on Mar 7, 2019 9:12:40 GMT -6
I would just point out that even if USN starts the war with 0 ships, they would win the war.
If the sides fight the war and one of the side have 10 times higher production potential than the smaller side can only win by:
1. Blitzkrieg (Germany strategy) 2. Doing enough damage to force negotiation
As USN in terms of geographic against Japan was one super large island there is not possibility of either. Japan can conquer any island outside the USA home soil, even Alaska and still cannot do anything more. I think that even if they were able to invade USA soil at day 1 with all soliders for Pacific campaign they would have no chance to win the war either.
It is same even against UK, Japan cannot jeopardize industrial potential of British Empire significantly and industrial potential and manpower of British Empires was something that Japan could never face alone. They started the war when British were occupied somewhere else.
Japan didn't go to war with the US to "beat" the US, they went to war to secure natural resources in SEA that the US was denying them through trade embargos. If the US had 0 ships then there is no war, and Japan is able to expand its economy through peaceful trade and doesn't have to resort to conquest. In the event Japan attempted to try option 2. I think they miss read the US character badly, and even if they had managed to catch the carriers with the battleships at Pearl Harbour they would not have achieved anything other than enraging the US population, as they did. I suppose it is possible that if their declaration of war had not been as tardy, and if they had eliminated the US ability to effectively respond they might have been able knock the US back for a longer period, but eventually the US would have crushed them.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 7, 2019 9:41:06 GMT -6
imryn , I'm done with the cherry picking and shifting goal posts so I'm not repeating the mistakes we made in engaging you in the AoN/turtleback thread. You have the right idea about some things but others you are dead wrong (e.g. such as the RN being ahead in fighter direction or the fact that Implacable was a 1939 design whose construction was delayed by the needs of the Battle of the Atlantic and so design-wise was in no way contemporary with Midway. Malta would have been the better choice) and when confronted you either cherry pick sources that agree while ignoring information in the same source that doesn't (see your link regarding HMS Victorious' operation with 3rd Fleet in 1943) or you try to shift the goalpost by claiming that you were only taking about Pacific operations when the topic of the thread makes no such specification and neither did you until contradicted. So what should and could be an intelligent discussion about a topic ends up being a useless game of whack-a-mole. So this is my position on the thread's topic. There is no need and no justification for any nation to be given a specific advantage in initial aerial technology. The RTW research system is already well set up for the task and mentioned additions for RTW2 like requiring a commissioned fleet carrier in the fleet to place related research areas to High priority just makes it that more suited. Individual bonus techs for certain nations like dive bombing for the USN or torpedo bombing for Japan or the UK would be in keeping with the premise of RTW1 but needs to be used with caution because of the sandbox nature of the game and the fact there is no WW1 scripted for the overall game (1900-1950) to relieve Germany of it's Pacific possessions and the subsequent need for an empire spanning fleet including carriers. So care needs to be taken not to penalize players of non-historical carrier nations when the alternative history of the game would not justify it. I fully support your position, I believe we should keep the game's premise of an alternative history and let things play out. Good comments. There is no need for more debating, as it detracts from the discussion.
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