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Post by srndacful on Mar 17, 2019 22:45:41 GMT -6
Sooo - is it just me, or does anyone else find it interesting that the BB/BC merger coincides with the rise of those pesky, newfangled flying machines? And, (again) is it just me, or does this 'merger also coincide with the disappearance of (actual) cavalry from the ground forces of major nations? And, (yet again - let me know when I get boring) is it just me, or did the BC's and cavalry fulfill a similar role in their respective forces: a role those pesky, newfangled flying machines could do much better, I might add? (Yes, I know this is obvious, but I just wanted see your views on it, since it's not discussed as much.) Cheers! (and thanks!) (snip) Again, just my opinion - but I think the BC was originally conceived of as an 'ultimate weapon': a ship that could accurately smash enemy ships with long-range fire while using its superior speed to hold the range open or escape as needed. I think the type was re-conceptualized as a cruiser-killer and then used for scouting for the battle line, a role the slow armored cruisers were not suited for. As with all 'ultimate weapon' development, it ceased to control its battlefield once everyone had turbine-propelled capital ships. Actual cavalry probably ceased to be useful on the battlefield some time after the Napoleonic wars - it was not very useful in combat in the Franco-Prussian War, for example - but the arm continued to be useful for scouting, guards, combat with indigenous forces and so forth. All armies expected a cavalry exploitation to lead to victory in WW1 through (I think) 1916. Supply of forage for horses was the single biggest tonnage allocation for the British Army well into WW1, and many divisions of cavalry were kept in reserve. The last 'great' cavalry charge was (I think) the British turning the Ottoman line during the Jerusalem campaign in 1917, though some sources list cavalry operations in Russia in 1942. Cavalry ceased to be useful for a couple of reasons, most of which boil down to the fact that infantry could reload and kill big horses faster than the horses could ride over the infantry. (snip) Apologies for the snipping and reshuffling, but I find these two parts the most curious. Naturally, I agree that Fisher thought he made a super-battleship when he 'invented' the battlecruiser - but then (IMHO - and what ultimately sold it to the rest of the world) the battlecruiser was nothing more than what Dreadnought was to pre-Dreads: a replacement for a specific battlefield role - in this case, a powerful scout unit in the same vein as Armored Cruiser it replaced - and which, previously, replaced Frigates of the Age-of-Sail era. Now, naturally, as engines (and their power output) increased, the speed of ships continued to rise - but, what catches my eye here is this: if the 'scout' (aka cruiser) portion of the fleet (including, obviously, the battlecruisers) operated on speeds about 20% higher than the battlefleet - and the battleships (fast as though they may be) had a speed of 27-32 knots in general: where are all the 32-38 knot battlecruisers? (with an honourable exception of Iowa and possibly Alaska classes) After all, there are plenty of heavy and light cruisers built in this speed range - it would be obvious a battlecruiser would have to have a similar speed to keep up with them. IMHO, armed forces (of any kind) are, basically, made out of two basic parts: 'Light' troops - here to find the enemy, and pursue (or stop pursuit) once the battle was won (or lost), and 'Heavy' troops - designed to defeat the enemy in the slugging match - and thus win the battle. Now, correct me if I'm wrong here, but both Battlecruisers and Cavalry fell under the 'Light' category - fast but weak - here to find the enemy, evade the strong opponents (and leave them to the 'Heavies') or defeat the weaker (2nd rate - or possibly weakened 1st rate) ones during pursuit. But, with aircraft becoming ever more capable, and - more importantly - being obviously superior in all the jobs of the 'Light' category, the Battlecruisers' only possible 'successors' to the super-'Light' category would have to be the Aircraft Carrier - which I hereby pose as the 'Battlecruiser' (so to speak) of the (pre-jet) aircraft era. (A bit convoluted point, I know, but - just my 2 cents, anyway) Oh, and: who else is hyped for CA/BC/CV only run in RtW2?
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Post by klavohunter on Mar 18, 2019 0:07:52 GMT -6
Interesting, I very much prefer fast BB than BCs in late game when the speed of BBs increase to a point that they can catch up with enemy BCs via the assistance of my better trained own light forces. The BBs survive exchange of fire with enemy BCs that are equipped with same or larger caliber guns and allow me to win the battle with less capital ships than my enemy. Playing rich country like USA, I usually build more fast BBs than BCs from mid to late game. Fast BBs aren't bad, I've used them in a few games.
The tyranny of the battle generator makes a BC more useful than a BB, by dint of showing up in more battles. If your Fast BB fleet is supported only by CAs and/or CLs, enemy BCs are going to do extremely rude things to your Cruisers in Cruiser Battles and Raider Intercepts.
Any old BCs you may have made back in the day are now pitted against the AI's modern BCs and beaten up for heaps of Victory Points.
Getting Fast BBs to show up in battles where they would dominate is a rarity.
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Post by aeson on Mar 18, 2019 2:20:34 GMT -6
where are all the 32-38 knot battlecruisers? (with an honourable exception of Iowa and possibly Alaska classes) For ships actually built and completed as battlecruisers or battlecruiser-adjacent types, there's Renown, Repulse, Courageous, Glorious, Furious, and Hood. There's also the Lexington-, Amagi-, and G3-class battlecruisers, which died to economics and politics at the conference table in Washington in 1921-1922 rather than to aircraft supplanting them in the scouting role, the Kronshtadt-class battlecruisers, which died to the lack of Soviet shipbuilding capacity and the minor issue of the German invasion, and the Stalingrad-class battlecruisers, which is probably the only class of battlecruiser which really can be said to have been killed by aircraft (and missiles) doing its job better than it could.
Additionally, what's driving the construction of these hypothetical 32- to 38-knot fast battlecruisers? The fast battleships are mostly just getting laid down in the mid- to late-1930s, a combination of treaty restrictions, economics, and the Second World War mean that most of the navies that have them never really have that many in service simultaneously - only the USA and Japan ever really had more than about half a dozen simultaneously in service, and even that's only if you count Japan's rebuilt First World War-era battleships and battlecruisers, some of which topped out at 25 or 26 knots - and between treaty limitations and economics it's unlikely that fast battlecruisers could have been built except at the expense of the fast battleships, so if the driving force is the fast battle line ... what fast battle line?
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Post by director on Mar 18, 2019 8:06:41 GMT -6
srndacful - the roots of Invincible and Dreadnought lie in Cuniberti's Ultimate Battleship (as you probably know). One feature of that design, like all Italian designs of the period, was superior speed. Fisher strongly believed that the Invincible-type was the true capital ship of the future but the rest of the Admiralty opted for Dreadnought (while permitting him to build Invincible on cruiser-lines) with slower speed but more armor. That's why I say the battlecruiser was conceived as the ultimate, battle-ship-destroying weapon. It was the proliferation of Dreadnought-types that forced the battlecruiser into other roles. As you say, scouting... originally, light cruisers (scout cruisers) were intended to be the fast, frigate-like 'eyes of the fleet'. When battleship secondary batteries, more powerful protected cruisers and armored cruisers proliferated, then heavier forces (like armored cruisers) were deployed to brush aside or bull through the enemy's light forces. Battlecruisers looked ideal as an armored-cruiser replacement, though if it had come down to a one-on-one between, say, Invincible and Blucher, I'd give the German ship a 1-in-three or four chance of winning. Comparisons of light ground forces and light naval forces with aircraft fail on one count: endurance. Cavalry and cruisers can move and fight for weeks or days, aircraft for minutes or a few hours. Even zeppelins in WW1 suffered from a lack of endurance compared to ships. Light naval forces of the period are indeed arranged like cavalry: scout cruisers are the light cavalry, bigger and more powerful light cruisers are standard cavalry, armored cruisers are cuirassers or lancers. Battlecruisers (if I may greatly stretch the point) are dragoons: able to move swiftly but capable of standing off infantry (battleships) for a limited time. Really fast battlecruisers did not develop for three reasons (again, in my opinion): 1) technology of metallurgy, steam propulsion and hull design couldn't be pushed that far 2) end of WW1, economic depression and Treaties sharply limited or ended new construction 3) the tactical value of high speed faded for capital ships as gunnery ranges increased and the demands for tonnage for underwater protection and AA armament grew An examination of ships under design or construction at the end of WW1 shows that battlecruisers were getting bigger, better armored and better-armed but only slightly faster. The reason? Designers were trying to fix the perceived and real problems with the BC concept, and additional speed wasn't one of the priorities. (With the exception of the Lexington class BCs which managed to combine all the flaws of HMS Hood with half the armor). To build a faster ship you need a longer hull and enormously more horsepower, which means a longer, harder-to-protect hull that requires more tonnage for armor, more tonnage devoted to propulsion, higher fuel consumption, more manpower and so forth. Most big ships can make 3/4 of their top speed on a fraction of their full power - it's the last 2 or 3 knots that really max the engines out. Moving up from the 26-27 knots of the North Carolina and South Dakota classes to the 32 knots of the Iowa class required 10,000 tons of additional machinery (130k hp to 212k hp or over 50% more), 200 feet of additional hull (680 to about 880, rounded for simplicity) and NO real increase in armor, main or secondary armament. And that's with a state-of-the-art, 1940's-era high-pressure steam plant and good geared turbines. HMS Hood shows the compromises necessary to get up to just 30 knots with a WW1-era propulsion plant... Compare the hull, horsepower and tonnage of - say - Renown and Repulse to Hood, then compare her to King George V or North Carolina. Or compare the hull form, propulsion plant and passenger capacities of Lusitania and the slightly-slower Titanic (or to the much-later United States, who still had to make drastic savings in the weight of superstructure and fittings to achieve her high speed). Building a 30-32 knot ship would mean extremely large size or compromises in armament and protection. Building a 27-knot fast BB (or a 24-knot Queen Elizabeth in an earlier era) gains you most of the tactical advantage and lets you have better protection and armament. So the really fast BB(BC) was not built for the same reason that racehorses haven't gotten markedly faster: very high speed imposes compromises with other factors and extreme stress on components. Short answer: the Admiralties that were building battleships decided an extra 6 knots weren't worth the sacrifices required. An analysis of capital-ship combat in WW2 bears this out: no Japanese, German or Italian capital ship was able to use its faster speed to tactical advantage (other than permitting Italian BBs to escape slower British BBs). Every action from Jutland on was settled by superior fire control, armament and/or protection, with speed advantage useful to prolong or cut short the action, not to fight it. I quite agree with aeson - I think the designers of the period used their scant capital-ship tonnage pretty well. In my opinion, the reduced number of capital assets on the battlefield, the great number of light assets available for scouting, the increased effective range of armament and of course the development of useful aircraft all mitigated against high speed... unless of course you had money to burn, as the US did when creating the Two Ocean Navy. The only fast battle-line I know of would have been the Pacific get-together of the North Carolina, South Dakota and Iowa classes. Nobody else could manage that many ships able to make 26-plus knots.
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Post by srndacful on Mar 18, 2019 9:30:01 GMT -6
Aaand, it looks like (once again) I fall victim to my poor skills at articulating stuff: aeson and director - I'm truly sorry if all you managed to take out of my rant was: "I want really fast BattleCruisers!" - that wasn't my point at all. Both of you raised some valid points - and I appreciate them - but the point I was trying to make was this: Even without Washinton Naval Treaty, the BC's days were numbered simply because it's basic function (it's raison d'etre - so to speak) that divided it from the 'common' battleship (due to speed required) was being taken over by the airplanes flying off the Aircraft Carrier. (and yes, director - you are quite right - a single plane does not have more than a couple of hours' endurance - but there are other planes on that Carrier that can take over the search once the first plane's fuel is spent - and this can be repeated over and over again) So, basically, what I'm asking is: would you agree that CV/CVL (and especially planes operating off of them) took over the BC's function as the 'top dog' (Ace?) of the fleet's scouting contingent, and (since BC was not really good at anything else) thus rendered it obsolete? (Much like BC took over from CA) Again, this seems kind of obvious, but I'm still curious why people never seem to connect these events. Hope this clears up some of the confusion. Cheers!
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Post by director on Mar 18, 2019 10:23:24 GMT -6
srndacful - No, I didn't read that into your comments at all - just taking you at face-value on a subject I really like. I'd say that the carrier (and land-based air operations over naval theaters) went from being a valued auxilliary in the 1930s to the queen of the seas in the 1940s. The reasons for this are mixed and progress was uncertain, but basically a carrier group can hit targets outside naval artillery's ability to reply. It is difficult to see how a battle group can survive sustained attacks long enough to reach a carrier group, unless the carriers are forced to steam toward the enemy to conduct air operations or otherwise not as fast as the battleships. Even the slow escort carriers kept fast battleships at bay at Samar; one can argue that the Japanese side was not brilliantly conducted, which just brings up the fact that most battles aren't. There's usually a lack of information, bad decision-making and so forth - he who makes the fewest mistakes usually wins. The death of Yamato is often cited as evidence that the carrier had taken over from the battleship; I am not convinced that is the moment. Given how many carriers were required to do the job, an equal number of battleships could have sunk her just as well... but the effective range of ordinance is the key. If I have a slingshot and you have a rifle, I can only bring you down if I can get into slingshot range. And if you have a dozen people with rifles, my chances become very small. I think my point about aircraft endurance should have been elaborated a bit more, but the post was already too long. Aircraft endurance in an operational sense is not just a function of time aloft but also reliability, quality of support personnel, availability of parts and sheer number of aircraft. If you have 10 aircraft and 3 are down for repair, the amount you can scout is limited by that number. If you have 40 aircraft for scouting and 36 are available, your effective endurance is much higher - you can perhaps not scout any farther, but you can scout more thoroughly and more often in the available area. So aircraft scouting improved during WW2 due to better and faster aircraft, drop tanks, good maintenance personnel and good availability of spares, better pilot and observer training, and a ten-fold or hundred-fold increase in planes dedicated to the job. Warships can do a better job of scouting than a handful of aircraft; warships with aircraft can do better than that and large numbers of aircraft are better still. The fleet operational purpose of the battlecruiser (as I understand it) was not really to scout so much as to clear away the light forces that prevented one's own light forces from scouting. In that sense they were the heavy cavalry used to blow a hole for the light and regular cavalry to exploit. Not to say that they wouldn't report what they saw, if they thought about it. British light forces were much better at reporting scouting info precisely and in detail than, say, Beatty's battlecruisers. Mostly the consensus of historians - as far as I've read - is that the carrier took over as the capital ship, displacing battleships, during WW2. I think the assumption is that the post-Treaty fast battleship had already put-paid to the battlecruiser - certainly that's what I think. Another element is the rise of the relatively large Treaty cruiser; most navies assumed those would be used for scouting and skirmishing and ended up using them when capital ships were not available or could not be risked.
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Post by dorn on Mar 18, 2019 12:48:05 GMT -6
And there are money. It was something that limited a lot of things.
Just look at HMS Hood. At time she was launched she has advantages of battlecruiser, firepower of battleship without minimum sacrifices in armour. And these sacrifices are more link with her pre-Jutland concept of protection than possible protection.
But as N3 and G3 design shows there would be still difference between battlecruisers and battleships but these differences is mainly due to financial limitation. I think good example is different variants of designing HMS Dreadnought. Some of variants was fusion of battlecruiser and battleship however it was denied mainly for financial reasons. At that time there was not seen advantage of that for that finance burden.
And as it has been already mentioned Iowa class is good example as there is no significant increase of firepower and protection.
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Post by aeson on Mar 18, 2019 12:55:10 GMT -6
The fleet operational purpose of the battlecruiser (as I understand it) was not really to scout so much as to clear away the light forces that prevented one's own light forces from scouting. In that sense they were the heavy cavalry used to blow a hole for the light and regular cavalry to exploit. Not to say that they wouldn't report what they saw, if they thought about it. British light forces were much better at reporting scouting info precisely and in detail than, say, Beatty's battlecruisers Also, if you look at how the battlecruisers were used historically, they're less a 'heavy scout' than a fast battle group used to back up the scout forces. Battlecruisers were not used to form search lines ahead of the main battle line or the columns composed of battleships, they're formed up into their own battle line or in columns which can quickly and easily become a battle line awaiting a report from the lighter warships that actually are deployed in search lines which is worth their time to respond to. The battlecruiser's fleet role is probably better summarized as "fast heavy responder/striker" than as "heavy scout," at least as it was historically used within a fleet context as at for example Jutland. Their job isn't finding the enemy in the first place so much as it is to run in and help the scouts out when the scouts get into trouble, or to hit the enemy fleet's advanced screen hard enough to shatter it or push it back onto the enemy fleet. As such, aircraft can't really replace battlecruisers - or at least are not generally recognized as being capable of replacing battlecruisers - until the 1930s and 1940s, because they don't have the payload capacity and they don't have the accuracy to be (readily recognized as) a heavy strike force. By the time that aircraft do have the payload capacity and the accuracy to supplant the battlecruiser in the fast heavy striker/responder niche, they have the payload capacity and accuracy to supplant the battleship as the primary offensive unit, and the only question is how quickly it's recognized that a carrier whose aircraft can repeatedly drop capital ship-killing firepower on targets anywhere within a couple hundred miles of its current position within hours of becoming aware of the target has reduced the big gun capital ship to a heavy escort protecting the carriers.
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Post by mobeer on Mar 18, 2019 13:07:14 GMT -6
As I understand the progression: Long ago ships of the line formed a battlefleet. Frigates scouted for the enemy and prevented the enemy frigates finding the friendly battlefleet. Later small protected (and unprotected) cruisers took over the job of finding the enemy fleet. Larger protected cruisers and then armoured cruisers were then needed to destroy the enemy cruisers. In particular, the armoured cruiser needs to be able to destroy its equivalent enemy armoured cruiser to subsequently allow friendly scouts to track the enemy and to force enemy scouts away. Building larger and larger armoured cruisers becomes massively expensive. For example the last Royal Navy armoured cruisers are not far off the size of the last pre-dreadnoughts: Minotaur class armoured cruiser - 14,800 ton, 158m long, 800 crew Lord Nelson class battleship - 15,600 ton, 135m long, 800 crew The battlecruiser then becomes a low cost solution to the requirement to destroy the enemy armoured cruisers, allowing the friendly scouts to do their work, and also chasing off any enemy scouts. In particular the battlecruiser is cheap because if it destroys the enemy at range without taking damage it can be quickly turned around for the next engagement. The Battle of the Falkland Islands indicated that this idea was correct, though not without a few flaws being exposed. The flaw in the concept appeared to be shown up in the Battle of Jutland, when battlecruisers were required to fight other battlecruisers (or battleships). In reality the lack of armour wasn't the worst design flaw in the battlecruisers, but it seems to have drawn most attention at the time and led to subsequent designs being much better armoured. At the same time the advance of aircraft makes the scounting role less relevant - but that's the subject for a different game
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Post by srndacful on Mar 18, 2019 22:05:07 GMT -6
Alright! Now that I finally have you on the right track: mobeer director and aeson : yes, I fully agree with the progression and the role - however, you seem to forget the quantum leap aircraft-based scouting made by taking it (literally) to another dimension: - by the virtue of it's greatly enhanced horizon (from it's lofty 5000 feet up) and greater area to cover (due to greater speed) even a single plane (and much more planes are available for any given displacement) is superior to any single ship in the scouting role. - with aircraft now taking over all scouting, the only way to break up the enemy scouting flights (i.e."blow a hole through the enemy's screen") is to either shoot them down using fighters - or disable the CV's using bombers - both being the kinds of attack that only CV's can do. (Barring, of course, a freakish accident like BC's stumbling into the CV's during the night, for example ... ) - other than BC or CV - the only other ships regularly used in scouting roles were the CL/CA's - and (IMHO, at least) they would be much easier to sink by air than a BB/BC. - that's assuming you really, really, need them sunk, of course - otherwise it's just as easy to shoot down their floatplanes and leave them (effectively, in the age of aircraft) blind and therefore (at the very least) a lot less useful in the scouting role. Basically - to sum it up: it's not all about ships anymore. (or not as much, anyway) Now, this state of affairs effectively begins in (about) 1920's - while naval aviation is still 'in it's diapers' (so to speak) and isn't yet nearly as capable of sinking a damaged or crippled BC or BB (let alone a 'healthy' one) - but it is very much capable of spotting, shooting down said spotters or blowing a hole in the flight deck so as to keep the spotters from taking off in the first place - i.e. assisting the 'heavies' (BB's) in screwing over the enemy as hard as they can in any way they can - which is the basic job of the 'lights' in any time and place. So, starting at that time, and keeping this in mind - which would you rather have: a 45 ktonne BC or 2 22,5 ktonne CV's? In other words: is there any reason to keep building BC's with CV's available? Every navy needs at least some justification for spending money on ships of a certain type - what would that BC be useful for? What would be it's justification? It can't be to stand in line-of-battle with the BB's, as it's (obviously) too weak for that. And, barring any other compelling reason, I don't see how any navy would build BC's after about 1925 - even with unlimited money at it's disposal - let alone when cash-starved as they were after WW1.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 18, 2019 22:23:30 GMT -6
Alright! Now that I finally have you on the right track: mobeer director and aeson : yes, I fully agree with the progression and the role - however, you seem to forget the quantum leap aircraft-based scouting made by taking it (literally) to another dimension: - by the virtue of it's greatly enhanced horizon (from it's lofty 5000 feet up) and greater area to cover (due to greater speed) even a single plane (and much more planes are available for any given displacement) is superior to any single ship in the scouting role. - with aircraft now taking over all scouting, the only way to break up the enemy scouting flights (i.e."blow a hole through the enemy's screen") is to either shoot them down using fighters - or disable the CV's using bombers - both being the kinds of attack that only CV's can do. (Barring, of course, a freakish accident like BC's stumbling into the CV's during the night, for example ... ) - other than BC or CV - the only other ships regularly used in scouting roles were the CL/CA's - and (IMHO, at least) they would be much easier to sink by air than a BB/BC. - that's assuming you really, really, need them sunk, of course - otherwise it's just as easy to shoot down their floatplanes and leave them (effectively, in the age of aircraft) blind and therefore (at the very least) a lot less useful in the scouting role. Basically - to sum it up: it's not all about ships anymore. (or not as much, anyway) Now, this state of affairs effectively begins in (about) 1920's - while naval aviation is still 'in it's diapers' (so to speak) and isn't yet nearly as capable of sinking a damaged or crippled BC or BB (let alone a 'healthy' one) - but it is very much capable of spotting, shooting down said spotters or blowing a hole in the flight deck so as to keep the spotters from taking off in the first place - i.e. assisting the 'heavies' (BB's) in screwing over the enemy as hard as they can in any way they can - which is the basic job of the 'lights' in any time and place. So, starting at that time, and keeping this in mind - which would you rather have: a 45 ktonne BC or 2 22,5 ktonne CV's? In other words: is there any reason to keep building BC's with CV's available? Every navy needs at least some justification for spending money on ships of a certain type - what would that BC be useful for? What would be it's justification? It can't be to stand in line-of-battle with the BB's, as it's (obviously) too weak for that. And, barring any other compelling reason, I don't see how any navy would build BC's after about 1925 - even with unlimited money at it's disposal - let alone when cash-starved as they were after WW1. Well, let's discuss the weather, you know meteorology. The state of the atmosphere. Atmospherics plays heck with aviation. If the ceiling is low then you have a problem for your scouts because the distance to the horizon is based on the height of the aircraft or radar. In clouds, you can fly right over and past your opponent or worse, the ceiling is so low that you can't fly at all. Now what do you do? Even submarines have a problem as scouts, in fact all ships have a problem. Don't be too certain that aircraft depending on where they are flying are always going to find the opposing fleet. If you decide to use floatplanes, then you should read about the IJN and Midway because they had two issues with their floatplanes and missed Hornet and Enterprise. That mistake cost them three carriers. The bottom line is that carriers need escorts and anti-aircraft ships like our AA cruisers. However, battlecruisers will suffice. I never hear anyone on this forum discuss the effects of meteorology on flying.
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Post by srndacful on Mar 18, 2019 23:02:38 GMT -6
Alright! Now that I finally have you on the right track: mobeer director and aeson : yes, I fully agree with the progression and the role - however, you seem to forget the quantum leap aircraft-based scouting made by taking it (literally) to another dimension: - by the virtue of it's greatly enhanced horizon (from it's lofty 5000 feet up) and greater area to cover (due to greater speed) even a single plane (and much more planes are available for any given displacement) is superior to any single ship in the scouting role. - with aircraft now taking over all scouting, the only way to break up the enemy scouting flights (i.e."blow a hole through the enemy's screen") is to either shoot them down using fighters - or disable the CV's using bombers - both being the kinds of attack that only CV's can do. (Barring, of course, a freakish accident like BC's stumbling into the CV's during the night, for example ... ) - other than BC or CV - the only other ships regularly used in scouting roles were the CL/CA's - and (IMHO, at least) they would be much easier to sink by air than a BB/BC. - that's assuming you really, really, need them sunk, of course - otherwise it's just as easy to shoot down their floatplanes and leave them (effectively, in the age of aircraft) blind and therefore (at the very least) a lot less useful in the scouting role. Basically - to sum it up: it's not all about ships anymore. (or not as much, anyway) Now, this state of affairs effectively begins in (about) 1920's - while naval aviation is still 'in it's diapers' (so to speak) and isn't yet nearly as capable of sinking a damaged or crippled BC or BB (let alone a 'healthy' one) - but it is very much capable of spotting, shooting down said spotters or blowing a hole in the flight deck so as to keep the spotters from taking off in the first place - i.e. assisting the 'heavies' (BB's) in screwing over the enemy as hard as they can in any way they can - which is the basic job of the 'lights' in any time and place. So, starting at that time, and keeping this in mind - which would you rather have: a 45 ktonne BC or 2 22,5 ktonne CV's? In other words: is there any reason to keep building BC's with CV's available? Every navy needs at least some justification for spending money on ships of a certain type - what would that BC be useful for? What would be it's justification? It can't be to stand in line-of-battle with the BB's, as it's (obviously) too weak for that. And, barring any other compelling reason, I don't see how any navy would build BC's after about 1925 - even with unlimited money at it's disposal - let alone when cash-starved as they were after WW1. Well, let's discuss the weather, you know meteorology. The state of the atmosphere. Atmospherics plays heck with aviation. If the ceiling is low then you have a problem for your scouts because the distance to the horizon is based on the height of the aircraft or radar. In clouds, you can fly right over and past your opponent or worse, the ceiling is so low that you can't fly at all. Now what do you do? Even submarines have a problem as scouts, in fact all ships have a problem. Don't be too certain that aircraft depending on where they are flying are always going to find the opposing fleet. If you decide to use floatplanes, then you should read about the IJN and Midway because they had two issues with their floatplanes and missed Hornet and Enterprise. That mistake cost them three carriers. The bottom line is that carriers need escorts and anti-aircraft ships like our AA cruisers. However, battlecruisers will suffice. I never hear anyone on this forum discuss the effects of meteorology on flying. I agree as to how bad weather effects aircraft: that's quite true - but, in any kind of low visibility, ocean (or even sea) is still just big - even with the BC's advantage of being able to operate in bad weather (as opposed to aircraft) it's still on par with CV when it comes to spotting stuff. Even if it sports a radar set, chances are good CV will be sporting one as well - so, unfortunately, we're back to square one. And, please note that I'm not just talking about floatplanes - I'm pitting BC's vs. CV's exclusively, (in the battle for survival, so to speak) here. Naturally, if it chances to spot something in bad weather, BC will be able to sink it more reliably - so, there's another advantage there - but, is it really enough of an advantage to spend money on? Also: there is a reason most of the fleets waited for clear weather to do battle - and the only ones that wanted to operate in bad weather (poor visibility) are the ones that either wanted to avoid being seen so they can safely slip into and/or out stuff - i.e. to avoid combat in the first place (I don't need to mention Guadalcanal here, do I?) - and/or the ones that wanted to get a jump on the enemy in order to, say, use their torpedoes more easily (Savo Island). Now, if the goal (or start) of that kind of mission is unknown - and the area is relatively open (no islands to funnel the side avoiding the fight into easily-blocked lanes) then the avoiding side is likely to succeed - however, if the other (blockading) side can spot it (and/or) block it - then it becomes a slugging match (machineguns at 20 paces) which a BB (fast or otherwise) is more likely to win than a BC.
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Post by srndacful on Mar 18, 2019 23:32:09 GMT -6
Now that I think about it, I see that I confused the whole issue by posting in this thread. What I should've done is make a new thread in RtW2 titled: "Is BC still a necessity in 1920's when CV is so awesome?" Is there any way to transfer it?
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Post by aeson on Mar 19, 2019 9:22:14 GMT -6
So, starting at that time, and keeping this in mind - which would you rather have: a 45 ktonne BC or 2 22,5 ktonne CV's? You'd probably be using the same slipways and dockyards to build 45,000-ton battleships and battlecruisers as you'd be using to build 22,500-ton carriers - Yorktown (CV-5) and Ark Royal (91) are about as long and as wide as Hood is. Without treaties prohibiting or significantly curtailing the construction of traditional capital ships, do you use one of your limited number of large slipways/dockyards to build a battleship or battlecruiser, with their tested and proven value, or do you use it to build an as yet untested and unproven large aircraft carrier when you could instead use one of your more numerous smaller slipways to build a carrier the size of, say, Hermes or Hosho and still get a carrier with enough aircraft capacity to adequately fulfill the fleet scout role - the only thing a lot of the naval tacticians of the late 1910s and early 1920s think carriers and naval aviation are really good for anyways - while keeping the larger, more valuable slipways and dockyards available for construction and servicing of traditional capital ships?
Also, without the reasonably good large carriers like Lexington, Akagi, and Courageous resulting from Treaty-mandated conversions with which to compare and contrast the initial relatively small purpose-built carriers, how long does it take before the first carriers the size of Yorktown or Ark Royal are laid down? The first British, Japanese, and American purpose-built carriers were all relatively small - Hosho was less than 7,500 tons (standard) and is only 552 feet long by 59 feet wide, Hermes is a little heavier at about 10,900 tons (standard) and a bit larger at 600 feet long by 70 feet wide, and even a decade or more later Ranger's only slightly heavier at about 14,600 tons (standard) and a bit larger at about 769 feet long by 80 feet wide while Soryu's a bit heavier than Ranger at about 16,000 tons (standard) but not quite as large at around 746 feet long by 70 feet wide. This assumption you seem to have made - that the relatively large fleet carrier is just going to pop up immediately in the 1920s - seems ill-founded to me; the large carrier's value is as yet theoretical, a relatively small carrier like Hermes or Hosho is probably adequate for scouting duties, and if you want to build a big fleet carrier you're going to have to convince someone to let you use a slipway or a dockyard that could instead be used for a battleship or battlecruiser. Incremental growth in carrier size as larger and heavier aircraft are developed seems more likely in the absence of treaties forcing the creation of the first generation of large fleet carriers, especially with the gun school's dominance in naval circles into the '40s.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 19, 2019 10:00:44 GMT -6
Just a few more simple comments about the issue of battle cruisers versus carriers. As we are all aware technology evolves and this is very true of the concept of the battlecruiser; a lightly armored, fast heavily gunned ship. Well, by 1940 with the increased use of test tanks like the David Taylor and others, improvements in hull design, and propellers helped to increase speed along with improvements in gearing, boilers and turbines. This allowed larger guns which necessitated wider beams and hence longer ships to maintain the length to beam ratios that accompanied the speed requirements for battle cruisers. In WWII, we had battlecruisers but they had been updated and given the name fast battleships. The Kongo's were an example. The Renown's consisting of Repulse and Renown both served in WW2. Repulse was of course sunk with Prince of Wales. Hood was an upgraded battle cruiser; she paid a price for an incomplete upgrade.
So, there were battlecruisers still in service but most had been upgraded. There was also the specter of Jutland hanging over the name battle cruiser. This was hard to overcome. Could a battlecruiser have been valuable, maybe. However, do I want to risk a lightly armored ship in the Mediterranean with land based aircraft surrounding the Mediterranean? I wouldn't. Would I want to risk a battle cruiser in the Solomon Island and the dangerous straits like the Florida Strait? Well, the Japanese did. They lost Hiei and Kirishima in those straits. Hiei was sunk outside the strait but was crippled while in the straits. Do I want to risk battle cruisers in the Malacca Straits near Singapore or the straits in the Philippines? No.
While the battle cruiser concept was good for England as a ship to deal with trade warfare problems, in fact, trade warfare as implemented by the submarine was far more effective and in this case, except for the Falklands, was useless.
Just some "simple comments". Keep in mind that we have hindsight to guide us. Also keep in mind the economic conditions prevalent after WW1. They make a difference along with social unrest and anti-war sentiments.
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