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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 10, 2014 9:11:43 GMT -6
I thought I would provide some information on the Me-262, information that does have a bearing on her use in ground attack at Normandy. The above quote does show that this person did not do his homework, or he would not have put the above statement into his piece
The cruising speed was 465 mph, with normal flight duration being 45 minutes to 90 minutes. As I stated in an earlier post, it varies with altitude. At low altitudes, below 10,000 feet, the flight duration was 45 to 50 minutes. That means a 20-25 minute flight out with a return of equal time; remember reserve fuel for landing. At landing speeds this engine will suck fuel in large quantities. At her normal cruising speed, that gives you a low altitude range of about 160 miles, if you want to get home. Now, you could stretch that and land at an auxiliary base but then jet fuel would have to be available at that base. She required concrete runways, not dirt or asphalt. The latter she would set on fire. As a Jabo, the best weapon would be the 30mm cannon, which was prone to jamming. The four 30mm cannons had about 500 rounds of ammo, at 600 RPM, she would have had limit usefulness as a ground attack. Here is a quote about her bomb carrying capability: The jets needed special concrete aprons to line up for scramble and there was a shortage of tugs to tow the aircraft to and from the hangers. In my opinion, the ME-262 would have been at a severe disadvantage in ground attack due to these limitations. I will try to find data on concrete runways in France in June 1944. Remember the closer she was to Normandy, the more susceptible she would be to fighter-bomber and medium bomber attacks. She could be forward deployed on call, but again the concrete runway, tow tug and fuel issues now come into play. All that being said, if you are in critical situation where you have lost or losing air superiority over the battlefield, you will resort to using all that you have including the fastest most advanced fighter. Whether or not it is the best candidate for the mission, you have to use it. |
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Post by sirchaos on Jun 10, 2014 15:15:41 GMT -6
"She required concrete runways, not dirt or asphalt. The latter she would set on fire."  That could on occasion prove problematic, I suppose... As a side note: a lot of highways in Germany are built with concrete, not asphalt. I heard that those date back to the Third Reich, and the choice of material was because producing asphalt takes oil, so concrete was used to reduce oil expenditure. I have no idea if the same is true for airbase runways. And in either case, that´s Germany, not France. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 10, 2014 18:17:14 GMT -6
"She required concrete runways, not dirt or asphalt. The latter she would set on fire." That could on occasion prove problematic, I suppose... As a side note: a lot of highways in Germany are built with concrete, not asphalt. I heard that those date back to the Third Reich, and the choice of material was because producing asphalt takes oil, so concrete was used to reduce oil expenditure. I have no idea if the same is true for airbase runways. And in either case, that´s Germany, not France. The ME-262 could use grass fields if needed but who knows how that worked. Most of the concrete runways in NW France were already built when the German's invaded in 1940. They upgraded many of the asphalt runways to concrete, added new runways, underground storage, new hangers etc. But the major Luftwaffe problem was fuel. The Allies had been focusing on aircraft production facilities, fuel storage and fuel generation plants in the previous months, and I have read messages sent out in March 1944 to all commands to reduce gasoline usage by eliminating unnecessary trips. The best defense for the Luftwaffe would have been in January of 1944, to have used the bombers sent to England to cause moral issues, to simply drop naval mines in the channel and along the coast. That might not have stopped the invasion, but it would have slowed its progress. |
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Post by spook053 on Jun 11, 2014 19:48:55 GMT -6
The ME-262 could use grass fields if needed but who knows how that worked. Most of the concrete runways in NW France were already built when the German's invaded in 1940. They upgraded many of the asphalt runways to concrete, added new runways, underground storage, new hangers etc. But the major Luftwaffe problem was fuel. The Allies had been focusing on aircraft production facilities, fuel storage and fuel generation plants in the previous months, and I have read messages sent out in March 1944 to all commands to reduce gasoline usage by eliminating unnecessary trips. The best defense for the Luftwaffe would have been in January of 1944, to have used the bombers sent to England to cause moral issues, to simply drop naval mines in the channel and along the coast. That might not have stopped the invasion, but it would have slowed its progress.
The Germans were already attempting "interdiction" per se with mines, E-boats, and whatnot. HMS Warspite struck a mine while enroute for a refit at Rosyth after the Normandy landings. And it was an E-boat raid that was the catalyst for the tragic Slapton Sands invasion exercise months before D-Day. The destroyer USS Meredith also struck a mine, and was ultimately doomed by a bombing raid later on.
But my recollection is that the invasion fleet was fitted out to include minesweeper ships. Therefore, with that counter, and the channel currents, I'm exceedingly doubtful that it was anywhere in the Luftwaffe's means to effectively and consistently mine the cross-channel invasion routes as would've mattered to overall invasion progress. For that matter, to effectively interdict/bomb the invasion support ports in the UK was also beyond the Luftwaffe's grasp, with or without Me-262's. Aside from RAF Fighter Command, throw in fighter units that could have easily augmented from not only RAF 2nd TAF but also US 8th and 9th AF's. Any major Luftwaffe raid (day or night) that might've assembled to affect the invasion timetable would have been very warmly received.
From February 1944, the Allied air offensive kicked off in unrelenting fashion that eventually passed the situation not to just "air superiority," but to "air supremacy" as far as the Channel and northern France was concerned. The very few German sorties of D-Day could trace to the bulk of German air strength being pulled to bases further back south and east for self-preservation as June rolled in.
Not that aerial mining wasn't possible. In fact, it was used exceedingly effectively in the war's last months---by B-29's mining the straits between the Japan home islands. But even with the greater payload capabilities of B-29's, each mining run still needed hundreds of sorties to build up mine zones into a major hazard to shipping.
By the time of D-Day, allied resources, manpower, airpower and shipping were all too daunting for the Luftwaffe to sufficiently counter. The V-weapon raids did pose some concern, but even those couldn't achieve a crisis-level impact given their imprecise targeting.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 11, 2014 20:36:10 GMT -6
The ME-262 could use grass fields if needed but who knows how that worked. Most of the concrete runways in NW France were already built when the German's invaded in 1940. They upgraded many of the asphalt runways to concrete, added new runways, underground storage, new hangers etc. But the major Luftwaffe problem was fuel. The Allies had been focusing on aircraft production facilities, fuel storage and fuel generation plants in the previous months, and I have read messages sent out in March 1944 to all commands to reduce gasoline usage by eliminating unnecessary trips. The best defense for the Luftwaffe would have been in January of 1944, to have used the bombers sent to England to cause moral issues, to simply drop naval mines in the channel and along the coast. That might not have stopped the invasion, but it would have slowed its progress.
The Germans were already attempting "interdiction" per se with mines, E-boats, and whatnot. HMS Warspite struck a mine while enroute for a refit at Rosyth after the Normandy landings. And it was an E-boat raid that was the catalyst for the tragic Slapton Sands invasion exercise months before D-Day. The destroyer USS Meredith also struck a mine, and was ultimately doomed by a bombing raid later on.
But my recollection is that the invasion fleet was fitted out to include minesweeper ships. Therefore, with that counter, and the channel currents, I'm exceedingly doubtful that it was anywhere in the Luftwaffe's means to effectively and consistently mine the cross-channel invasion routes as would've mattered to overall invasion progress. For that matter, to effectively interdict/bomb the invasion support ports in the UK was also beyond the Luftwaffe's grasp, with or without Me-262's. Aside from RAF Fighter Command, throw in fighter units that could have easily augmented from not only RAF 2nd TAF but also US 8th and 9th AF's. Any major Luftwaffe raid (day or night) that might've assembled to affect the invasion timetable would have been very warmly received.
From February 1944, the Allied air offensive kicked off in unrelenting fashion that eventually passed the situation not to just "air superiority," but to "air supremacy" as far as the Channel and northern France was concerned. The very few German sorties of D-Day could trace to the bulk of German air strength being pulled to bases further back south and east for self-preservation as June rolled in.
Not that aerial mining wasn't possible. In fact, it was used exceedingly effectively in the war's last months---by B-29's mining the straits between the Japan home islands. But even with the greater payload capabilities of B-29's, each mining run still needed hundreds of sorties to build up mine zones into a major hazard to shipping.
By the time of D-Day, allied resources, manpower, airpower and shipping were all too daunting for the Luftwaffe to sufficiently counter. The V-weapon raids did pose some concern, but even those couldn't achieve a crisis-level impact given their imprecise targeting.
While I agree that they were attempting an interdiction with mines and E-boats, the use of the bombers lost in the early months of January through March over England could have done more with mines. 
I've inserted a map of known German minefields at the time of the invasion. Now, double or triple that with more bombers laying mines. If you can slow down the build up, you can move more Panzer divisions but more importantly the infantry divisions from Pas de Calais down across the Seine or use them to build a defensive line along the Seine and retreat your armor and other units across that line. This is your only hope, this might be possible even with the Allies air superiority. I don't know the answer, possibly Von Rundstedts comment of " make peace, you idiot" was the only real answer. The German's only solution had to be a well organized retreat to the Seine, then back to the Meuse River trading distance for time. They had well over 250,000 men and 2200 tanks to accomplish this. However, poor leadership and strategy from Hitler to the CinC West probably eliminated any real hope of that.
The defense of NW France required a layered approach to defense; extensive naval minefields, a fortified coast, not a series of fortified nodes with thin wires connecting them, then mobile force behind the front to attack any landing immediately. Then the backup plan had to be a withdrawal to the Seine, all under the Allied air superiority. A tall order in my book.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 11, 2014 22:00:56 GMT -6
I've read and reread the article which is the subject of this thread and its been gnawing at me, what this article misses or at least never explicitly states as to what might have defeated the Allies or possibly given the German's fighting chance at slowing down the Normandy invasion.
The simple answer is a coordinated defense with the CinC West in command, making the decisions and executing his strategic plan without interference from Hitler and the OKW. In practice, CinC West had no authority over the Luftwaffe units in the West or naval units. The navy commanded the coastal artillery and the air force the bulk of the AAA and parachute units. Some of the SS Panzer division came under the SS command. This arrangement was byzantine, in my opinion. Even Rommel, equal in rank to CinC West, went around him and went directly to Hitler. The article fails to remind us, that it was Hitler who thought the invasion would come at Normandy, but in this case, failed to force his decision upon CinC West and ensure that the divisions required were moved quickly to prepare for the attack. Lack of coordination between Luftwaffe reconnaissance assets and the defense of Germany prevented reconnaissance flights over the English Channel ports which might have given the German's some vital information. Spy's in fact did provide Germany with the code name Overlord.
What the article gives us is counterfactual fantasy, not concrete ideas that might have given the German's a better chance of defending NW France. Without naval forces and inadequate air support, the German forces in France were definitely had a severe disadvantage, but the situation was not hopeless. They had fought hard in Sicily and Italy, slowing down the Allies at every turn. They were experienced and had good equipment but it was the command structure that failed. No amount of fantasy could or would have changed that.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 11, 2014 23:53:01 GMT -6
Yes, the Germans, and to some limited degree the Italians, fought hard at Sicily and Italy.. but those were far smaller invasions and neither had airbases just a stones throw away with thousands of allied aircraft at the ready. Much of the most daunting effect on the Allies movements in Italy was the rugged and often mountainous terrain and limited area of strategic maneuvering IMHO.. but that is for another thread.
The Me262 would have been almost useless for "interdiction" raids.. 6 seconds of firepower (60 rounds per gun) with a max effective range of around 600m, hopelessly inaccurate for bombing, limited view from the cockpit, if it slowed down to find ground targets at low altitude it would have been far more vulnerable to prop fighters and AAA (a hot piece of flak in an engine could have caused it to cartwheel right into the ground), and again.. you go back to the problem of limited range so their airbases would be prime targets if they started showing up over the battlefield - just as happened when they attacked bombers, but worse. It was an *interceptor*.. nothing more, and much worse at anything else. It was bad enough it took a crack shot, steady nerves, and a damn good pilot to hit a big fat easy to see slow flying bomber with an Me-262 (which is why they often prefered the R4M rockets) so hitting a vehicle sized target on the ground would have been insane.
The author claimed they could "sweep" the skies of enemy bombers, complete BS. That was not going to happen, EVER. On AVERAGE the Luftwaffe had around 3,900 serviceable aircraft at any given time during the war for ALL fronts.. that was it, with maybe ~40-50% of those being fighter type aircraft. The 8th Air Force ALONE had could launch up to around ~3,000 aircraft in a SINGLE DAY on raids over Europe when at peak strength. A measly 1,400 Me-262s (which most never saw combat, only 200 were available for combat at any given time) was going to stop that?? Even double that number and they could not have hoped for a snowballs chance in hell to do much better - especially with the lack of pilots and serious logistical challenges involved. If they got to be a real nuisance the allies would have hunted them down like rabid dogs and hammered their airbases - and/or - pushed the P-80s and Meteors out to combat them more rapidly. As it were, those 1,400 built Me-262s only waxed 100 bombers, hell the USAF lost more then that a day on average due to flight accidents! I would also note that more bombers were lost to FLAK then ANY OTHER threat - IIRC.
Thanks
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 12, 2014 10:02:42 GMT -6
Yes, the Germans, and to some limited degree the Italians, fought hard at Sicily and Italy.. but those were far smaller invasions and neither had airbases just a stones throw away with thousands of allied aircraft at the ready. Much of the most daunting effect on the Allies movements in Italy was the rugged and often mountainous terrain and limited area of strategic maneuvering IMHO.. but that is for another thread. The Me262 would have been almost useless for "interdiction" raids.. 6 seconds of firepower (60 rounds per gun) with a max effective range of around 600m, hopelessly inaccurate for bombing, limited view from the cockpit, if it slowed down to find ground targets at low altitude it would have been far more vulnerable to prop fighters and AAA (a hot piece of flak in an engine could have caused it to cartwheel right into the ground), and again.. you go back to the problem of limited range so their airbases would be prime targets if they started showing up over the battlefield - just as happened when they attacked bombers, but worse. It was an *interceptor*.. nothing more, and much worse at anything else. It was bad enough it took a crack shot, steady nerves, and a damn good pilot to hit a big fat easy to see slow flying bomber with an Me-262 (which is why they often prefered the R4M rockets) so hitting a vehicle sized target on the ground would have been insane. The author claimed they could "sweep" the skies of enemy bombers, complete BS. That was not going to happen, EVER. On AVERAGE the Luftwaffe had around 3,900 serviceable aircraft at any given time during the war for ALL fronts.. that was it, with maybe ~40-50% of those being fighter type aircraft. The 8th Air Force ALONE had could launch up to around ~3,000 aircraft in a SINGLE DAY on raids over Europe when at peak strength. A measly 1,400 Me-262s (which most never saw combat, only 200 were available for combat at any given time) was going to stop that?? Even double that number and they could not have hoped for a snowballs chance in hell to do much better - especially with the lack of pilots and serious logistical challenges involved. If they got to be a real nuisance the allies would have hunted them down like rabid dogs and hammered their airbases - and/or - pushed the P-80s and Meteors out to combat them more rapidly. As it were, those 1,400 built Me-262s only waxed 100 bombers, hell the USAF lost more then that a day on average due to flight accidents! I would also note that more bombers were lost to FLAK then ANY OTHER threat - IIRC. Thanks Terrain did play a role in the Italian campaign but it is passive and not a solution to poor command and control. There were terrain features in Normandy and NW France that could have aided the Wehrmacht, but poor command and control along with strategic direction prevented them from being effective.
As to the articles comments about the ME-262, it was never going to perform well in the scenario in which it found itself. It had too many technical limitations as we have discussed. Apparently this author did not do his homework, or he wouldn't have made those comments.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 13, 2014 0:51:01 GMT -6
I agree about the command and control at Normandy, but Monte Cassino was much more costly then the hedgerows of France - as one small example. You could not just simply slap a weedwacker on a Sherman and plow through it!  But that comparison would be good for a different thread. Articles.. yeah, well, since most "article" writers simply forgo the time to do real research and just copy the "mainstream" BS that has been repeated 1000 times over the last 70 years your definitely not going to get a real education on history. Much like the history channel shows - basically the same gibberish over and over again, just a change in format. (Especially the "top ten" series..geezz, even some of the comments in the somewhat better "dogfight" series were bogus) Most historians know squat about tactics, weapon applications, command and control, logistics, etc..etc.. much less WHY things happened the way they did. Its much easier for article writers to play the safe ground of riding the often very opinionated historians context then to ever question their research and analysis abilities, much less challenge their "sources" or findings. I guess they just assume that if a "historian" wrote a book, or books, about history .. well hell, he MUST be right! Whatever. Thanks. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 13, 2014 9:46:30 GMT -6
I agree about the command and control at Normandy, but Monte Cassino was much more costly then the hedgerows of France - as one small example. You could not just simply slap a weedwacker on a Sherman and plow through it! But that comparison would be good for a different thread. Articles.. yeah, well, since most "article" writers simply forgo the time to do real research and just copy the "mainstream" BS that has been repeated 1000 times over the last 70 years your definitely not going to get a real education on history. Much like the history channel shows - basically the same gibberish over and over again, just a change in format. (Especially the "top ten" series..geezz, even some of the comments in the somewhat better "dogfight" series were bogus) Most historians know squat about tactics, weapon applications, command and control, logistics, etc..etc.. much less WHY things happened the way they did. Its much easier for article writers to play the safe ground of riding the often very opinionated historians context then to ever question their research and analysis abilities, much less challenge their "sources" or findings. I guess they just assume that if a "historian" wrote a book, or books, about history .. well hell, he MUST be right! Whatever. Thanks. Here is a quote that I feel defines the problem in the west at the time of the Normandy Invasion perfectly. It was written by Rommel's Chief of Staff Dr. Hans Spiedel. He was a co-conspirator and survived to become in the early 1950's the first NATO commander. The book is titled "Invasion 1944". My copy has a cost of $.60, that should tell you how long I have had it.
His final statement in his section seems to say it all "This concept of "divide and rule" broke the unity of Western Command and delivered it to the forces of confusion. "
This concept should have been the center point of the article. This was the primary failure for the Germans in the West. The author does not even bring up the issue of training for the men in the infantry and Panzer divisions, which was lacking.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 14, 2014 4:33:56 GMT -6
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Post by William Miller on Jun 14, 2014 5:20:30 GMT -6
As a quick final note regarding the Me-262 fighter/bomber concept; speed - the ONLY true asset of the Me-262, was NEVER a critical factor for an "attack" aircraft as has been proven countless times over. Too FAST means missing the target entirely and slowing down for accuracy for such a jet would have meant making it MUCH more vulnerable to enemy AAA/fighters.
Some examples.. A-1 Skyraider - slow prop job in the age of jets, A-10.. slow.. but used to flying low enough to make any supersonic pilot fear for his life, attack helos - like speed matters at NOE?, and so on.
Point being -- CAS/Interdiction work is the work of slow aircraft that fly very low but with reasonably good range and/or can be committed close to the front effectively. The Me-262 was none of this so bottom line, as a CAS/bomber/interdiction aircraft it would suffered bad losses, hit almost nothing, and been a total waste of an "interceptor". Not much different then comparing the F-104 vs the A-10 with the Me-262 vs the FW-190F-8.
Thanks
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Post by sirchaos on Jun 14, 2014 6:04:32 GMT -6
Even without Hitler´s meddling - once you´re in 1944, there is very little Germany could have done that would have an effect beyond delaying the Allied advance, and resulting in the Soviets snatching up more of Europe in ´45. Over at alternatehistory.com, the second-quickest way of outing yourself as a clueless newbie is to start a "Nazi Germany wins WW2" timeline. (the absolutely quickest way, of course, is to start a "successful Operation Sealion" timeline) One poster famously had the Germanic gods return to Earth to aid the Nazis, because that was the most realistic scenario he could see for the Nazis to win the war. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 14, 2014 8:54:52 GMT -6
..... Some examples.. A-1 Skyraider - slow prop job in the age of jets, A-10.. slow.. but used to flying low enough to make any supersonic pilot fear for his life, attack helos - like speed matters at NOE?, and so on. Point being -- CAS/Interdiction work is the work of slow aircraft that fly very low but with reasonably good range and/or can be committed close to the front effectively. The Me-262 was none of this so bottom line, as a CAS/bomber/interdiction aircraft it would suffered bad losses, hit almost nothing, and been a total waste of an "interceptor". Not much different then comparing the F-104 vs the A-10 with the Me-262 vs the FW-190F-8. Thanks Speed of the aircraft wasn't the problem for a good CAS or interdiction platform, it was directional stability. One of the fastest planes in WWII, the P-47D with paddle bladed props was also one of the best ground attack aircraft due to its directional stability as a gun platform. Many aircraft when in a high speed shallow 30 degree dive begin to porpoise due to problems with tail design, namely the horizontal stabilizer. Air exiting the trailing edge of the wing hits the horizontal stabilizer at acute angles disrupting the flow over that control surface causing the nose to gyrate up and down - I.E. porpoising. This action makes the aircraft unstable and requires the aircraft to slow down to maintain tracking of the target, this then causes the aircraft to be a better target for ground fire. The best CAS aircraft were usually directionally neutral, in that when an asymmetric force was applied, it would return to neutral very quickly. This provides for a stable gun platform. However, it can also hinder maneuverability. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 14, 2014 10:08:36 GMT -6
Well.. most of us already know that the greatest enemy of Germany was Hitler himself, heck even many Germans at the time knew that. ... One simple comment about this contentious subject. The seeds for the rise of Nazism, and Adolf Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini were laid in WWI and afterwards. All nations contributed to this, including the Allies. Hitler and his cronies might have been the boogiemen, but the nations of the world let them in. Hope this post survives, but if not, understandable.
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But that comparison would be good for a different thread.