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Post by William Miller on Jun 16, 2014 19:31:50 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 17, 2014 9:54:34 GMT -6
The problem for the Russians was the Russian tank radio factory's lack of production. Of the first 112 T-34s, only 12 had radios. After the June 1941 invasion, the factory had to be evacuated and moved. It wasn't until 1943 that full production was realized and tanks began to be equipped with transceivers. The real problem for the Russians was their lack of combined arms operations. The German's speak of times when they were struck by Russian tanks and if the Russian infantry had been accompanying the tanks, they would have lost the battle. However, examining Russian TOE's, the Russian tank brigades had integrated infantry but no armored personnel carriers. In other words, there is a series of nodes connected together, that could cause the Russian performance until later in the war. There are many reasons for Russian operational inefficiency including lack of training and upper level officers after the purges, but that is not part of this discussion. Suffice it to say, due to poor factory production and many other problems, Russian tanks did not, on the whole have radios, they had two man turrets which is inefficient and other issues. The lack of radios means that one person in each tank, has to be watching the lead tank for orders which reduces the number eyes watching the enemy.
The lack of initiative on the part of Russian officers who were trained to follow orders, contributed always to the lack of flexibility and failure to adjust to a fluid situation, which mobile warfare certainly was and is. Lack of radios might have slowed down the reaction time, but the real issue was training and doctrine. Keep in mind, that until late 1942 and early 1943, the Russians were really in a defensive operational mode, which means that does have an effect on your flexibility. It doesn't require constant updates via radio about enemy resistance, location, direction of movement etc. Land lines can serve that purpose. It wasn't until they turned the War in the East into a Russian offensive operational mode, that combat flexibility with radios would have seem to be needed. We now realize, that that was not necessarily true.
My final assessment is that the T-34 was an advanced tank, carrying all the qualities that we now believe are needed in a good to excellent tank but was fielded in a bad system. Technology cannot make up for a poor system. On the other hand, a good to excellent system like the Germans can make up for weak technology. But frankly, war is attritional, and numbers count.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 17, 2014 14:57:47 GMT -6
How do we rate the "best tank or tanks"? Is it speed over ground, armor protection, main weapon lethality, survivability, range, turret speed, fire control accuracy etc.? What are the main factors or qualities that the best tanks must have? Could reliability be one factor, ease of maintenance? which version of the tank? For the T-34, was it the T-34-85 or 76; for the Panther, was it the D model or G model; for the Sherman, was it the M4, M4A3E8 or what? Most of the polls on this subject are not very scientific or have a wide base of participation. Most of the participants are game players, who may or may not know much about tanks and armored warfare. This is the one reason I don't necessarily subscribe to the idea of the "best" of something. All of you might be interesting in this website - english.battlefield.ru/ The author of this page has written an interesting book titled T-34 in Action and it is only $4.96 in the Kindle edition which is very cheap. It is an excellent book of the internal workings of the Soviet Armored forces and the T-34
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 19, 2014 11:09:30 GMT -6
One of the most useful tools on a T-34 was the tarpaulin. According to my sources, it was used as a blanket, table and it covered the tank during rail transportation because the tank leaked so bad. There were no rubber inserts in the upper hatch due to the war. Some problems with the T-34 included a noisy engine and clanging pillars in its catepillars. Rubber tired road wheels were not reintroduced until after the 1943 rubber shortage was over. So all T-34-76 had this problem, the -85s did not.
The intercom was unreliable so the tank commander/gunner had to use his feet on the driver to tell him the direction. The 71-TK-3 radios were very poor quality. It had a range of about 6 kilometers or 3.7 miles. During the evacuation of Soviet radio manufacturing plants in August of 1941 all tank wireless sets stopped being produced. After this a new better radio, the 9R based on the RSI-4 aircraft radio. Early radios could not transmit Morse code.
Research by the NIIBT(The Scientific Research Institute of Armored Machines at Kubinka, Moscow, found that most damaged T-34's were hit from the side due to poor visibility. Crews were unable to spot a gun emplacement and turn the turn to the least dangerous position. The periscopes were replaced with armored glass slits and a commanders cupola was installed to eliminate the visibility problem.
The majority of the ordnance for the main gun was high explosive, 75 anti-personnel/high explosive, 25 AP for a total of 100. The T-34 was primarily an infantry support tank, most of the tank kill were by SUs and AT guns or infantry not the T-34.
The turret did have electric gun laying but manual was usually used in combat.
All in all, the T-34-76 was the first version, it wasn't perfect as with most weapons systems when they are new, but over time during the war, the deficiencies were modified or corrected and the T-34-85 was a much better tank. As late as the Yom Kippur War in 1972, it was still in use and in most cases, was effective.
As I read through this book, I will post interesting information. I also now have a book on the Tiger and the Panther, so I can provide some interesting information.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 20, 2014 7:12:00 GMT -6
Sorry.. got busy over here.
Overall I would give the T-34 (early models) a C rating, but definitely not "superior" as most mainstream historians cling to. The PzIII 50mm tank I would give a B rating, overall a decent tank and it was a threat to the T-34, the PzIV 75mm (long) I given an A rating. Very good gun and decent tank that was a reasonable threat until the end of the war. The Stugs (75mm long) I also give a B rating - excellent TDs with very low profiles, good guns, with the only detraction of lacking a turret. Each of these vehicles were moderate to very serious threats to the T-34 so the concept of "early superiority" of the design IMHO was bogus. The above German vehicles had good outside visibility, good FCs, maneuverable, reasonably fast and reliable, good communications, and well armed.
Note I stop at the PzIV as the PzIIIs to PzIVs were the primary available threat (in numbers) to the T-34 at the time it was deployed. Yes, doctrines mattered, and doctrines often dictated *how* the vehicle was supposed to function on the battlefield which in turn gave parameters for the design... but... doctrines *after* a tank is deployed can only compensate to a certain degree for any deficiencies with the vehicle. You can have a great doctrine, like the Germans, and have a tank with poor reliability, as happened with the PzV when it first deployed - no doctrine, before or after the tank is designed/built, will fix that problem. Now when the Russians improved the T-34 and ALSO improved their doctrines then the T-34 (especially the 85) started to be reasonable threat to the Germans. Then the Russians had a BETTER tank then they started with and a doctrine that was not crippled by any serious tank design problems.
Those are my few thoughts.. anyone else? Thanks Dennis for the input.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 20, 2014 10:06:10 GMT -6
I am getting the signal to back off and let others discuss, and I agree. I will throw out one concept..... training. Russian tank schools were good at training technically, but had almost nothing about tactics. Their gunnery was also poor especially in firing on the move and selecting targets. The German's on the other hand, spent far more time training in tactics and their gunnery training was more realistic because it used moving targets plus they simulated moving tanks. This had a dramatic effect on the results at the front as most former Russian tankers will attest to. This may explain the poor performance for the first three years until 1944, things then changed with more experienced tank and unit commanders in the Russian army. Just some more thoughts, think about this and discuss how this gave the German's an advantage even with inferior tanks like the MK III and MK IV. Consider some of the advantages the two German tanks had in terms of sighting, fire control, command and control using radios, that might have enhanced their training advantage. Now I promise I will shut up.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 23, 2014 1:07:51 GMT -6
Ok.. back again, I do agree that Russian training was poor - much less combined arms tactics. However, I still think doctrine/training can only go so far to cover for any faults of a weapon system. PzII tankers were very good but with a poor AT weapon all their experience, training, etc.. mattered little against a T-34 which the 2cm gun stood no chance against (and was not even that great vs the BT series of tanks), and the PzIII needed to upgrade from the 37mm gun, and the PzIV was upgraded from the 75mm L24 gun. As a note about "guns", this flips around to another point that history has proven repeatedly that it is usually easier to make a better gun (or weapon) then it was to add more of a defense to a system, or build a new system. The ONLY, superiority, of any kind, the T-34 held over PzIII/IV at the start of Barbarossa, as a combat tank, was a better gun and armor protection that was not easily defeated by early German AT weapons. However, the faults of the design, combined with poor doctrine/training, caused it to suffer horrible loss ratios even with those features. However, IMHO, even if the Russians had *somewhat* equal training to the German crews I still think the faults of the design, *especially* in terms of combat efficiency, would not have made a serious difference in the initial battles. This is circumstantially proven true when the Germans attacked France which also had so-called "superior" tanks and that were not ALWAYS used with inferior tactics. In some cases the British/French gave as good as they received - but - French tanks still suffered similar combat efficiency problems to the Russian designs. Where the Germans *failed* at the start of Barbarossa was thinking they would only be facing the BT series of tanks (or other more antiquated designs) and did not fully realize the Russians had tougher AFVs already deployed - even if they were only a fraction of the tank forces (around 4%). However, within months the PzIII/IV series were given better guns and could defeat the T-34 at anywhere from 500-1500m in combat. All of the sudden the only marked "superior" features of the T-34 were seriously countered until the T-34/85 came along later, which in turn was an attempted counter to the PV/VI series of tanks - which yes, it was more of a threat to those designs then the T-34/76, but it was still not on par with them as an overall combat vehicle. In any event.. the PzIV upgrade caused it to be a serious threat to any allied tank of the war, for the possible exception of the IS-2s and Pershings, and the T-34/76 was never on equal terms with it even with later model upgrades IMHO. T-34 losses even after the "initial shock", some improvements, and moderately better training/doctrines was still often very horribly lopsided. The Stugs (long 75mm), as another example, took a horrible toll on T-34s all throughout the war using the same gun as the upgraded PzIVs. Bottom line.. the Germans might have first underestimated the possible threat of the KV-1/T-34s but they quickly upgraded already deployed vehicles to deal with them.. and dealt with them all through the war even long after the Russians tried to make up for their own failures in tank warfare. That is my basic summation anyways.. Interesting topic. Any thoughts? Go ahead Dennis.. seems we left everyone else behind.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 24, 2014 13:32:34 GMT -6
In any event.. the PzIV upgrade caused it to be a serious threat to any allied tank of the war, for the possible exception of the IS-2s and Pershings, and the T-34/76 was never on equal terms with it even with later model upgrades IMHO. T-34 losses even after the "initial shock", some improvements, and moderately better training/doctrines was still often very horribly lopsided. The Stugs (long 75mm), as another example, took a horrible toll on T-34s all throughout the war using the same gun as the upgraded PzIVs. Bottom line.. the Germans might have first underestimated the possible threat of the KV-1/T-34s but they quickly upgraded already deployed vehicles to deal with them.. and dealt with them all through the war even long after the Russians tried to make up for their own failures in tank warfare. ... Whether the German's knew of the T-34 and KV series is almost irrelevant as their operational plan dictated avoiding any tank versus tank encounters, preferring to surround them with infantry and destroy them with air support. Most Russian tanks were captured or destroyed when attempting to breakout of pockets or through mechanical problems.
The Mark IV did have a better system of communication both internally and externally allowing for better command and control. It's engine was quieter and more reliable, its sighting system was initially superior and its caterpillar system was also quieter. Gasoline engines were easier to start in cold weather plus the tanks were much more water proof than Russian tanks. However, now we come to the question of armor plate and protection. Simple logic tells us that a thicker, sloped armor plate is more effective. It is, unless its brinell hardness to so high that when hit with an armor piercing round, although not penetrated, pieces fly off of the plate and become lethal shrapnel. Its called spalling and the Soviet tanks were noted for it. Soviet tank crews had the highest death rate of any nation, even though they had some of the thickest armor. In tests conducted in 1953 by the ordnance test station on normally hard and Soviet armor, results showed that Soviet armor was definitely inferior and was easily penetrated by even rounds equal to the thickness. The poor quality of the welds also created problems when struck because the blast compression was transmitted through the welds, causing damage to other areas, even though the plate had not been penetrated. In other words, you did not need an 88 mm gun to destroy most Russian tanks, a simple high velocity 75 mm was perfectly capable of doing the job. The problem in historical narratives is they tend to leave out these details, which you only find through examination of actual testing. The Russian advantage was simple: quantity not quality. The Russians realized very quickly as did the Western Allies that numbers count and having a greater supply of weapons such as tanks, readily available was the key to victory. This simply means that doctrine and tactics might not have been as important as industrial base and logistics.
I know you are busy, but these are short - www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt07/increased-panzer-protection.html www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt08/vulnerability-of-german-tank-armor.html
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Post by William Miller on Jun 26, 2014 3:49:03 GMT -6
Actually what you just posted was also noted in that article I linked to - especially armor quality.
However, numbers was not the game either - again relating to that article, as the T-34s only amounted to around 0.4% of the total armored AFVs in the Russian arsenal at any given time and yet still lost 78% of their total production numbers in combat. The tank loss ratio overall - throughout all of Operation Barbarossa - was about 3.5 to 1 in favor of the Germans even with a Russian AFV production rate of 2 to 1 compared to the Germans. As the article write well stated, "superior indeed".
I think mainstream historians got fixated on that tank due to their total incompetence to do real fact checking and then that information was copycatted at ridiculous levels for over 70 years. The "shock" was very short lived - a few months at most, and even that shock was of little use with Panzers wiping out everything in their path until Stalingrad and Kursk.
End result.. the T-34 was a mediocre tank at best that caused some problems at first but was quickly countered within a few months with simple German AFV gun upgrades (which they were planning on anyways to counter the improving British tanks). The fact they built a lot of them was not due to any reason except pushing massive amounts of factory efforts into the vehicle. They were going to build a lot of them no matter what as it was easier to build then the KV-1 (which had mechanical issues) and was better armed and protected then their paper thin armored BT series of tanks. In terms of combat efficiency, they were no better then their predecessors and worse then even comparable Allied tank designs. I think any historian calling it "arguably" the "best" medium tank of WW2 is full of crap and knows squat about combat vehicles.
I think the T-34 caught some fame because it was at the right place at the right time in terms of an AFV that was harder to defeat then the BT series by early German AT weapons, but once those weapons were upgraded just a few months later they were destroyed in large numbers. At the start they lost large numbers due to pathetic tactics, afterwards due to better German guns. Their was no real proven, and measurably consistent, T-34 superiority at anytime that I could find.
That is my base summary based on what I have read over the past couple of weeks.
Thanks for the chat Dennis and the additional readin.
Take care, I am off to play some military sims and more work.
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