Post by spook053 on Aug 15, 2014 16:37:26 GMT -6
Disclaimer: This started as a Wiki search on another topic, and the following discussion is drawn from the confines of one Wiki article, so this is by no means pretending to be an exhaustive review or set of original findings. Far from it. Nonetheless, even within that article, the nuggets found still compelled to me, and reminded me on what all still pulls me into historical study.
When one starts into British naval history, it seems likely for the train of thought to turn to the more glorious achievements of the Royal Navy and its predecessors. Repulse of the Spanish Armada. Quiberon Bay. The Saintes. Cape St Vincent (more than once). The First of June. Camperdown. Akoubir Bay. Trafalgar. With exception to the first example of the Spanish Armada, these battles happened in the last hundred years of the “Fighting Sail” era, straddling the 1700’s and 1800’s. One might therefore assume that in this period, the British naval forces never suffered a defeat on an operational or strategic scale to set against those inflicted on Britain’s various opponents.
This assumption would be wrong.
Happenstance, I came across the following entry concerning a certain “Battle of Cartagena de Indias.”
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cartagena_de_Indias
I suppose it’s understandable to see little mention of this event. After all, it was part of a little-noted “War of Jenkins Ear” that would soon be subsumed into the War of the Austrian Succession. The battle’s end result did not fundamentally undercut the global strategic position of Britain, rather than cost Britain a strategic opportunity over Spain. Further, the British defeat wasn’t the result of dramatic fleet maneuvers and seaborne clashes that highlighted the better known victories of the RN.
And yet – operationally – the Battle of Cartagena de Indias was still a debacle for British arms. The great killer was disease, but the defending Spanish commander, Blas de Lezo, anticipated for this in his defense planning.
To rewind a bit, the intent of the operation (March-May 1741) was to capture the coastal city of Cartagena and its nearby fortress in present-day Columbia. Cartagena’s location was such that its capture would’ve help build a “jugular” hold over the Spanish Main trade routes. Over 50 ship-of-line and frigates were gathered to escort 130 transports and merchant ships carrying an invasion force of about 12,000. Adding the naval personnel brought total force numbers to over 27,000. (Included were 3,600 American colonists.) This was by no means a minor force as far as 18th century operations went, and bore comparison to the Spanish Armada in overall size. Against all this was a Spanish garrison of 3,000-4,000.
Given the size of the invading force, the Spanish commander, Admiral Blas de Lezo, did not expect that he could keep the landing force from getting ashore. But by building up fortifications and applying a fighting withdrawal, he intended to hold up the invaders against the main fort (Ft San Lazaro) and let the “rainy season” of April-May take hold before the “sickly season” following afterwards. By then, diseases such as yellow fever would then run rampant.
This was along the lines of Sun Tzu’s “Heaven” and “Earth” factors, and Sun Tzu would’ve approved, because the British force was indeed incapacitated by de Lezo’s defense, the rains, and finally the yellow fever. Among the British forces, estimates vary on the loss of life, but were somewhere between 9,000 and 12,000. Add in those sick needing time to recover, total “casualties” were about 18,000. The loss in life to the naval crews was enough that six warships had to be abandoned and burned, with another 50 ships lost from the transports & merchants. Losses to yellow fever were heavy to the Spanish too, but much smaller in total to British losses given the initial garrison numbers. Ironically, Admiral de Lezo himself also soon died afterwards from the fever outbreak.
For all intents, this was Britain’s own “Spanish Armada” moment in personnel losses. The warships lost were not lost from direct action, but operationally, a loss was a loss. In these terms, the ship losses compared with what the RN inflicted in battles like Quiberon Bay, the Saintes, Cape St Vincent, and so forth.
The British naval commander, Admiral Edward Vernon, was inevitably recalled back to Britain along the ground forces leader (Wentworth), due not only for this operation but also for the mutual acrimony in following Caribbean operations. “Grog” Vernon (he concocted the rum-water mix of that name) would hold later operational commands, before relief and his final dismissal in 1746. Whatever others thought of Vernon at the time, he seemed to be regarded well enough by one of the surviving American participants---George Washington’s elder half-brother Lawrence. On his return, Lawrence would rename his plantation estate Mount Vernon.
Upon learning the news, the British government forbade further discussion or publication concerning the failed operation; but firstmost, the prematurely stamped “victory medals” had to be scooped up and taken out of circulation. One comment of the time was: “We have already lost seven millions of money and thirty thousand men in the Spanish war and all the fruit of all this blood and treasure is the glory of having Admiral Vernon's head on alehouse signs.”
Yes, history can still fascinate……
