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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 9, 2013 14:36:09 GMT -6
I thought that I would start a "Virtual and Counterfactual History" thread. The thread is open to any what-if scenario in military history. In other words, if you want to explore the possibility that the Greeks lose Marathon, let's do it. My only requirement is that we stick to the absolute facts of the historical situation, and only explore possible outcomes. No fantasy.
We all do what-ifs everyday in our lives. Economist use the tool, businessmen, meteorologists do it when running different variables of heat, wind, etc. to determine possible paths of tropical storms, called the spaghetti patterns. Your mind does it, sometimes subconsciously. Many historians frown on this type of historical analysis, but I believe that it is useful. That's how almost all war plans are developed and tested, by using what-if testing. Anyway, it's open to any scenario you would like to pursue. If you want to pursue a steam and Iron alternative, let's do it then you test it and provide the results. This is how the Naval War College proceeded in the '20's and '30's, develop a what-if plan and then game it.
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Post by fredsanford on Oct 14, 2013 11:05:55 GMT -6
Here's one with a SAI tie-in: What if Italy had decided to honor its treaty commitments (at least from the POV of the Germans & Austro-Hungarians) and entered the war in August 1914 on the side of the Central Powers?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 14, 2013 12:58:13 GMT -6
Here's one with a SAI tie-in: What if Italy had decided to honor its treaty commitments (at least from the POV of the Germans & Austro-Hungarians) and entered the war in August 1914 on the side of the Central Powers? I like it! That puts Austria-Hungary, Italy and Turkey in direct conflict with France and England. The English are fully involved with the North Sea and the Atlantic so they are going to have to move ships from the Far East and the Home Fleet. We need to examine the geopolitical landscape first, then determine force ratios. Nice. When we are done, someone or all can setup a scenario. Cool. First problem is that France will have to deploy troops to its Italian border, possibly a lot of troops. It also means that German, and Austrian troops could move through the Italian plain to the French border and start an offensive before the French could reinforce. Nasty!
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Post by fredsanford on Oct 14, 2013 14:50:53 GMT -6
Doing a little Wikipedia-level research, a couple of issues worth considering: Italy apparently took pains to try and reassure Britain that the Triple Alliance, in their mind, wasn't directed against Britain. Later, they also sought to reassure France in a similar manner, though I'm not sure they really meant that. Which to me, begs the question, "So who was this alliance meant to protect against?"
Also, there was little love lost between the Austrians and the Italians, as evidenced by the actual turn of events as well as recent contemporary history. So even if Italy did side with the Austrians, as a practical matter, what would that mean operationally? i.e., how well would they play together? Would you see combined fleets with units of both countries? I'm a bit skeptical. In fact, I'm not sure Italy would be keen on the Austrian army crossing northern Italy to strike at the French, unless the French were themselves advancing into Italy. They would most likely be "co-belligerents", more than formal allies in any operational sense, IMO.
Final thought of this post: Would the Ottomans end up a belligerent in this alternate 'reality'? Would the Goeben have been homeless? Presumably not, and so it's voyage to Turkey wouldn't have happened. Absent this gift to the O.E., would they have joined the war? Given that the Ottomans and Italy just concluded a war against each other, my gut feeling is that Italy and the Ottomans would be incompatible as allies.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 14, 2013 19:42:13 GMT -6
Doing a little Wikipedia-level research, a couple of issues worth considering: Italy apparently took pains to try and reassure Britain that the Triple Alliance, in their mind, wasn't directed against Britain. Later, they also sought to reassure France in a similar manner, though I'm not sure they really meant that. Which to me, begs the question, "So who was this alliance meant to protect against?" Also, there was little love lost between the Austrians and the Italians, as evidenced by the actual turn of events as well as recent contemporary history. So even if Italy did side with the Austrians, as a practical matter, what would that mean operationally? i.e., how well would they play together? Would you see combined fleets with units of both countries? I'm a bit skeptical. In fact, I'm not sure Italy would be keen on the Austrian army crossing northern Italy to strike at the French, unless the French were themselves advancing into Italy. They would most likely be "co-belligerents", more than formal allies in any operational sense, IMO. Final thought of this post: Would the Ottomans end up a belligerent in this alternate 'reality'? Would the Goeben have been homeless? Presumably not, and so it's voyage to Turkey wouldn't have happened. Absent this gift to the O.E., would they have joined the war? Given that the Ottomans and Italy just concluded a war against each other, my gut feeling is that Italy and the Ottomans would be incompatible as allies. It's hard to imagine with her distrust of Austria-Hungary as to its stance in the Balkans, which for the AH was offensive and the Italian participation in the alliance was for defensive purposes, any cooperation with AH's. With the secret alliance with France, I am not certain that neutrality shouldn't have been the norm for them. They declared neutrality on 2 August 1914 . For our virtual history, I believe that the Italian ambassador would inform both AH and Germany, that they would not take any offensive action for the Alliance, but guard the border against the French. This would leave AH troops to move to the borders with Russia and Serbia, a definite advantage for them and the Alliance. As to the naval war, they will declare a barrier across the Sicilian straits to any and all traffic. They will deploy submarines, MAS boats and a cruiser/destroyer force to the opening of the Suez to block supplies moving north and south. This may bring her into conflict with the British, but with the HSF keeping the bulk of their fleet busy in the North Sea, I am not sure what they can do about it. It could affect their operations against the Turks in Palestine. EDIT: Something or someone else to consider: the Greeks. What will they do, if the Italians join the Alliance. They offered up to six divisions for any action at Gallipoli aimed at the Turks, but might they, in turn, send those divisions against the Italians? But they still have a another foe in the Bulgarians, so how does that play out? Virtual geostrategic considerations can get very complicated. Your ideas?
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Post by fredsanford on Oct 15, 2013 11:08:35 GMT -6
I'm thinking that Italy would abrogate any secret arrangement with France under this alternative. The inducement Germany and AH would use to garner active Italian participation is the promise of French North Africa. Italy was historically unhappy that the French beat them into Tunisia, so this is the presumed motivation for active Italian involvement. This would make the naval war more active, as the Italian fleet would be available to support the Goeben in attempting to interdict French troop convoys, or perhaps even undertake offensive operations aimed at French North Africa.
Meanwhile, the AH fleet would attempt, independently, to interfere with British support to Serbia and Greece via the Salonika front. Since the Goeben & Breslau don't need to flee Italian waters in this alternative, their subsequent transfer to the Ottoman navy and operations against the Russians doesn't take place, so the Ottomans remain neutral- so no Middle Eastern Theater or Gallipoli. However, the stopper is off the Adriatic bottle and the AH fleet has more freedom of movement to interfere with Britain in the eastern Med.
On land in the east, the net result is that AH can concentrate on Serbia and the Eastern front, but Russia doesn't have the Caucasus front to worry about, either. So that's more or less a wash. In the west, the French may want to bring the colonial army over to the mainland for helping out on the Western front or for a drive into northern Italy. However, that may leave French North Africa vulnerable, and getting those troop convoys across is by no means assured. What to do, what to do?
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Post by julianbarker on Oct 15, 2013 14:49:50 GMT -6
I am not so sure. German influence and the opportunity to gang up with Germany an AH against the Slav menace would still have made the Central Powers a good bet for Turkey. Italy Bering part of that alliance would make Britain and Egypt less of a threat, and may make Egypt a more viable target. Agincourt and Erin still get appropriated by the RN.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 15, 2013 15:04:06 GMT -6
It is my belief that a waning imperial power like the Turkish empire would cling to all of its Balkan and Middle Eastern possessions and will go with whomever guarantees that possession. AH and Germany, to get the Bosporus closed both to Allied and Russian shipping, will guarantee anything to Turkey. Frankly, Germany and AH are not interested at all, in North Africa or the Middle East, just the Balkans and Northern Europe. So, I don't see any changes in our virtual scenario except Italy staying with the Triple Alliance passively except the Sicilian Straits and area between Libya, Egypt and Crete.
Keep in mind, that the Italians, before Mussolini and the Fascist were attempting to rebuild their Roman Empire but only North Africa and the Balkans with possibly Greece were left to grab. I believe that this might be the only motivation for staying in the Alliance but only as a silent partner. Blocking the straits will provide assistance without a direct confrontation. The French are not in a good position, naval wise to really contest the straits without losing valuable ships, that they cannot afford to lose and possibly Tunisia and other African possessions. They have the same desires; empire building.
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Post by fredsanford on Oct 15, 2013 17:38:01 GMT -6
I'm not saying Germany and AH are interested in North Africa. Italy was interested in North Africa however, along with the Balkans as mentioned. They also had irredentist claims on Corsica. If Italy was going to add to its nascent empire, they'd have to take an active role against the French, as well as being a truly useful alliance partner. I'm not sure I understand how a silent partner/defensive stance for Italy would get them anywhere- in that case they might as well have stayed on the course they ended up taking. In order to give Italy a reason to vary from that historical course, there would have to be a potential upside for them. The hypothetical inducement would be Germany and AH saying to Italy, "make common cause with us against the French and British. When we are victorious, you will be rewarded with as much of French North Africa as you can take, along with Corsica, Malta, and Egypt if you can get it." This would help Germany in Northern Europe by diverting French and English strength away from the German main effort. Having both the Italian and AH fleets loose in the Med would also hinder Entente efforts to supply Russia, even if Turkey remains neutral. I just don't see Turkey joining the same alliance as Italy given that they had just fought a war against each other 2 years prior, and Turkey's losses to Italy were still fresh. Perhaps if AH, Italy, and Turkey made an arrangement to partition Greece...maybe then.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 15, 2013 19:29:55 GMT -6
We cannot overlook a major difficulty for the Italians and that is the real instability of the government. Both sides in the government wanted territory. On one side they wanted to maintain relations with the Alliance to gain colonial territories from the French but on the side, they wanted to maintain an alliance with the entente to gain Italian-populated areas from AH. The Nationalist eventually won and Italy went to the Allies.
In our virtual historical path, we are making Italy take the path, her people did not actually want to take and for that reason, then, the winning side must adopt a more defensive posture or there could be a revolution. Remember who was leading the Nationalists; Benito Mussolini and about six years later, he did just that. So, if we adopt this path, there will be a revolution and he will take control but only six years earlier. He will sue for peace and we are back to the original path that they took. As I said at the beginning, we must use the actual facts, no fantasy. These are the facts, had they gone to the Alliance and took an active part, Mussolini and the Nationalist would have revolted. Pure and simple.
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Post by fredsanford on Oct 16, 2013 3:03:58 GMT -6
The Nationalists wanted to "redeem" Dalmatia, certainly. However, they also held irredentist claims on France (I neglected to mention Savoy and Nice above). This would force a choice over which claims/colonial territory would take priority, and which set of claims would require patience. A defensive posture would have still been an act of war (or otherwise be meaningless posturing), but IMO would be a futile attempt to split the difference and have no possibility of accomplishing either goal. It thus becomes a prerequisite of this alternative that the Dalmatian territorial ambitions be put on hold, until Italy could fulfill it's goals against the French (and Malta wrt the British). The Nationalists would have to understand that liberation of Dalmatia would have to wait until the next war.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 16, 2013 17:11:51 GMT -6
The Nationalists wanted to "redeem" Dalmatia, certainly. However, they also held irredentist claims on France (I neglected to mention Savoy and Nice above). This would force a choice over which claims/colonial territory would take priority, and which set of claims would require patience. A defensive posture would have still been an act of war (or otherwise be meaningless posturing), but IMO would be a futile attempt to split the difference and have no possibility of accomplishing either goal. It thus becomes a prerequisite of this alternative that the Dalmatian territorial ambitions be put on hold, until Italy could fulfill it's goals against the French (and Malta wrt the British). The Nationalists would have to understand that liberation of Dalmatia would have to wait until the next war. You are correct, a declaration of war is just that; an act of war and just sitting would be meaningless. However, that does not preclude them from doing something like that. They might convince themselves that not taking offensive action would give them the best of both worlds; the French would have to respect the potential offensive action and man their border with Italy which would assist the Alliance. The Alliance might feel that this is better than nothing and AH would certainly appreciate not having to fight in those mountains against the Italians, so they might just go along with it. This might just give them the best of both situations and it would easier for the Alliance not to have them on the other side especially if their navy could close the straits and keep supplies from reaching the Sevastopol and Russia. It might just be tempting to the Alliance.
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Post by fredsanford on Oct 17, 2013 6:36:45 GMT -6
I guess I'm coming at the issue of Italy's stance from the POV of someone trying to convince Mussolini (using him as a stand-in for all triple alliance intervention skeptics) that declaring war on the Entente had a potential payoff for Italy. From that POV, what good does simply closing the eastern Med do? Garner AH's "appreciation"? I don't see that as a very convincing argument. In fact, if I were Mussolini I'd say "why don't we just stay out of it?", since I'd see the cost and risk of war with the Entente, but no upside.
So I think it's a case of "go big or go (stay) home". I would say to Mussolini, "Look, intervening on the side of our alliance partners will give us the closest thing to a favorable balance of naval power that we're going to see in the foreseeable future. If the French reinforce metropolitan France with the colonial army, we can subsequently attack and sieze their undefended colonies and Corsica. If they don't move the colonial army, we can take Nice and Savoy and hold the southern alpine passes in our undisputed control. Heck, if we get lucky and intercept the troop convoys and destroy them at sea, we may be able to do both. So far as the British go, they have only 3 BC's and a few cruisers in the Mediterranean, and with the situation in the North Sea, reinforcing them would be problematical for them. So we may have the opportunity to sieze Malta, blockade Suez and assist AH and Turkey in subduing the Balkans. And by "assist", I mean beat them both to Greece and the rest of the Aegean islands. An offensive strategy would also have the virtue of accomplishing all of the support goals of the defensive strategy by default, since a successful offensive strategy would mean gaining naval supremacy in the Med. Furthermore, as a price for participation, Italy should require the industrial assistance of our alliance partners, specifically in the form of coal, steel, and armaments to allow us to undertake such a bold and important mission on behalf of all alliance partners."
So basically, I'd appeal to his lust for territorial gain. Also, remember the saying "possession is 9/10ths of the law". A defensive strategy doesn't give Italy possession of anything when peace negotiations come around. Does Italy really want to count on the generosity of AH and Germany for some crumbs that fall from their table? Italy must create its own "facts on the ground", to borrow a phrase from another place and time. Early, forceful, and successful operations would also have the benefit of rallying the people to our Great and Noble Cause.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 17, 2013 9:26:03 GMT -6
I guess I'm coming at the issue of Italy's stance from the POV of someone trying to convince Mussolini (using him as a stand-in for all triple alliance intervention skeptics) that declaring war on the Entente had a potential payoff for Italy. From that POV, what good does simply closing the eastern Med do? Garner AH's "appreciation"? I don't see that as a very convincing argument. In fact, if I were Mussolini I'd say "why don't we just stay out of it?", since I'd see the cost and risk of war with the Entente, but no upside. So I think it's a case of "go big or go (stay) home". I would say to Mussolini, "Look, intervening on the side of our alliance partners will give us the closest thing to a favorable balance of naval power that we're going to see in the foreseeable future. If the French reinforce metropolitan France with the colonial army, we can subsequently attack and sieze their undefended colonies and Corsica. If they don't move the colonial army, we can take Nice and Savoy and hold the southern alpine passes in our undisputed control. Heck, if we get lucky and intercept the troop convoys and destroy them at sea, we may be able to do both. So far as the British go, they have only 3 BC's and a few cruisers in the Mediterranean, and with the situation in the North Sea, reinforcing them would be problematical for them. So we may have the opportunity to sieze Malta, blockade Suez and assist AH and Turkey in subduing the Balkans. And by "assist", I mean beat them both to Greece and the rest of the Aegean islands. An offensive strategy would also have the virtue of accomplishing all of the support goals of the defensive strategy by default, since a successful offensive strategy would mean gaining naval supremacy in the Med. Furthermore, as a price for participation, Italy should require the industrial assistance of our alliance partners, specifically in the form of coal, steel, and armaments to allow us to undertake such a bold and important mission on behalf of all alliance partners." So basically, I'd appeal to his lust for territorial gain. Also, remember the saying "possession is 9/10ths of the law". A defensive strategy doesn't give Italy possession of anything when peace negotiations come around. Does Italy really want to count on the generosity of AH and Germany for some crumbs that fall from their table? Italy must create its own "facts on the ground", to borrow a phrase from another place and time. Early, forceful, and successful operations would also have the benefit of rallying the people to our Great and Noble Cause. I agree with your approach, but we must concentrate on the government, not entirely on Mussolini who perhaps does not represent the whole of the Nationalist at this time. We are going to have to convince the Italian people of the value of another war. Keep in mind, that the unification of Italy was not completed until the beginning of the Twentieth Century. These were not a people who really considered themselves Italian, more like Venetians, Neapolitans, Romans, Sicilians etc. This was a polyglot nation, and that's how they thought. These people had already fought a war against the Turks from 1911-1912, they had participated in the Boxer Rebellion and fought the first war in Ethiopia in 1895-1896 and another in Eritrea in 1885-1895. That's four wars since the capture of Rome in 1870. Don't you think they are just a little tired. These wars and internal instability caused the Italians to be split down the middle about the war in Europe. The Socialists did not want the war and supported pacifism, appealing to the Italian people who are tiring of wars. The relatives of Giuseppe Garibaldi died in France in 1914, which was used by the Nationalists as a reason to join the conflict. But they did not declare war until April of 1915 when it was clear that the AH were on the downward spiral and the empire would not last. This was also months after the failure of the Schlieffen plan and the development of attrition warfare in the form of trenches. There was no reason to suspect that a war with France and possibly England would not turnout to be another attrition based trench war. If it did, it meant heavy casualties and even the Nationalists could see that. So, how do I ameliorate the situation? Well, convince the Nationalist and the people that while we will join the Alliance we are not taking offensive action in the north, just establishing a defensive position, to draw forces against us, to give the Alliance some help but our Naval forces will be our biggest hammer. If France begins to falter, we can always concentrate our forces and move into Southern France, but only if we see French Forces moving. We can then move the bulk of our forces to Libya and get the rest of North Africa before the French can react. They are moving forces to France from that area, making it easier to fight in that area and with our fleet in control of the straits, it will be easier to cut off the French forces and supply our own. The NA operation should be easy, and not cause many casualties. The area between France and Italy is good defensive country. we can mine the valley paths and mountain passages, man them with medium artillery sighted well, machine guns and use a minimum of forces to prevent movement. You can use second rate reservist for this mission. Same with the other mountainous region although it borders AH, our Alliance partner. The first rate forces, mobile troops with armored cars and trucks can be use in North Africa, which is better suited to them. He who defends everything, defends nothing. You can't be on the offensive everywhere, so why not use the good defensive ground to hold the passes and attack once the NA business is concluded. As to the British, they are fighting in Palestine against the Turks and now, the Italian forces are behind them, knocking out the French. They are now caught between a rock and a hard place. Most of their forces are in France. This is not 1940, but 1914. They will have to do something to protect Egypt from an eastern advance by Italian forces once French forces are overwhelmed. Those Italian forces will be supported by the Italian fleet closing the straits so the British have to move around the horn of Africa which is longer, and far more dangerous with German U-boats in the area. As to the AH, by the time of Italian entrance into the war, the handwriting is on the wall; this empire will not last. It's emperor is old and the replacement is a person who believes in some freedom for the Serbs. The best plan for the Italians, is to leave the AH alone, let the Balkan operations and Russians to drain the empire, let it collapse and the AH problem is gone. The Greeks will be easy to handle, when the AH empire is gone. The Italian strategy should be to collect as much of NA as possible, ensure that the Austro-Hungarian Empire fragments and that the Ottoman Turks fall. With an Arab Spring in the area of the Middle East when the Turkish rule is eliminated and the Balkan's in a nationalist mess, the Greeks should be easy to handle. If the war goes badly, then the Italians could simply enter into secret negotiations with the Entente and since they haven't really attacked them in Europe, switch sides as they did. Best of all worlds. Anyway, that is the best battle plan. defensive stance in mountains bordering France and AH, take offensive action in NA and use the fleet offensively to close the Eastern Med to Entente traffic. This plan will cause minimum casualties but should maximize benefits to Italy and possibly strengthen the liberal government.
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Post by fredsanford on Oct 20, 2013 9:43:07 GMT -6
Sorry to not respond for a few days... Reading your last post, I don't think we're that far apart. I agree that an offensive drive into France in the southern Alps is really a non-starter. Greece, like you say, isn't going anywhere and once the decay and fall of Italy's erstwhile allies AH & OE come to fruition, the Balkans and eastern Med will be ripe for future exploitation. If the early part of the war in the Med is focused on naval activity, it will help assuage the Italian people's aversion to casualties. Once naval superiority is established, Italy can focus it's limited resources on attainable, low cost objectives.
Next question: Assuming Italian intervention on the side of the central powers takes place, and the straits of Otranto aren't the choke point they became historically, what does AH do with its fleet? I don't think either one of us believe a high level of operational cooperation would take place between AH and Italy, more like co-belligerents with their own independent strategic objectives. If you were CinC of the AH navy, what kind of campaign would you wage?
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