|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 23, 2014 10:25:50 GMT -6
On April 18th, 1942, a TF moved carefully toward the Japanese home islands. It consisted of Enterprise and Hornet under the command of William Halsey. On board Hornet was twenty-five specially configured B-25's under the command the LTC James Doolittle. The plan was to move to a point about 400 miles from the coast of Japan, launch and strike Tokyo and four other cities. Due to Japanese picket boats, the TF was spotted and Doolittle decided to launch at 700 miles. After the bombings, the aircraft would proceed to China and be picked up by the Chinese; the increase range caused problems with this portion of the plan. The damage caused was slight but the psychological effects on the Japanese and their planning was important. For Americans, the boost in morale was vital after Pearl Harbor. This is all the important details of the operation, now the discussion about risk versus reward. We should center the discussion on what we risked in men and equipment versus what the operation was designed to accomplish and whether those operational objectives were worth that risk. We risk two valuable carriers and experienced air crews. We only had four operational fleet carriers in the Pacific with fifth still in the yards after its torpedoing in January. The rewards were twenty-five bombers dropping four bombs each on selected targets and a diversion of Japanese forces. Intelligence placed all the Japanese carriers in the southern region of the Pacific.
Keep in mind, that during the operation, the Japanese started Operation MO; the invasion of Port Moresby. We only had two carriers available now, to thwart that effort. What could have been done, if four carriers had been present. Beware of the tendency to use 20/20 hindsight to cloud your assessment of the risk. Most of the history was written AFTER the operation and there was no way to judge how this operation would affect the Japanese attitude or operations. Did it really make up the minds of the Japanese high command as to the Midway Operation?
Now for the discussion
Update: www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/rep/Doolittle/Summary_20.html - Intelligence Information Summary
|
|
|
Post by kyle on Dec 23, 2014 13:24:05 GMT -6
My first question is what did the US KNOW (not suspect) of where the Japanese fleet was at? Obviously the carriers were of prime concern as they were the biggest threat to the US task force (TF). Having the TF blunder into a group of Japanese warships of any size above a picket could be bad though. What did the US know (or suspect) of what the Japanese had in place as far as early warning? What did the US know about air defenses? From a military stand point the answers to these questions or good guesses at least would be prime for deciding on the risks involved to the US TF.
What the US knew and when is sketchy, but from some research it appears that there was good confidence in the location of the Japanese carrier fleet as well as the battleships. Cruisers were not tracked (or evidence is lacking) to any great extent and in any case the odds are against accidentally encountering them (Ocean is BIG, fleet of ships is small by comparison). OK then - from what I can glean the US TF had a reasonably good chance of not meeting enemy ships on the way in. Did the US know about Japanese pickets?
The US I believe was quite aware that the Japanese had some good, long ranged patrol aircraft (Kawanishi H6K and H8K). Were I the USN, I would expect patrols coming out from Japan doing basic search patterns at least 500 miles if not more (range of these two planes is excess of 4000 miles). There is a LOT of ocean to cover though, but at the very least I - as the US planner - would base my guesses on what my patrol is like out of Hawaii (post P. Harbor). Were the tables turned, would the US TF be able to sneak in and attack PH in April 1941 with B-25's? Not counting radar here - just what are the odds of surprise. Of course PH was a forward base as was Hawaii.
President Roosevelt ordered the strike mainly to bolster morale. The damage would be negligible. It was a slap in the Japanese face. Risk 2 precious carriers and their escorts for this???
Morale and perception in war is important. France fell largely due to poor morale in 1940, for example. Was public perception (let alone military) of how the war is progressing of vital interest?
More questions than answers. I would NOT have risked my carriers to slap Japan in the face (so to speak). The potential gain vs the risks just don't weigh out. Of course since it worked it was celebrated as a fantastic raid. No one said "you idiots, what were you thinking?!"
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 23, 2014 16:04:34 GMT -6
My first question is what did the US KNOW (not suspect) of where the Japanese fleet was at? Obviously the carriers were of prime concern as they were the biggest threat to the US task force (TF). Having the TF blunder into a group of Japanese warships of any size above a picket could be bad though. What did the US know (or suspect) of what the Japanese had in place as far as early warning? What did the US know about air defenses? From a military stand point the answers to these questions or good guesses at least would be prime for deciding on the risks involved to the US TF. What the US knew and when is sketchy, but from some research it appears that there was good confidence in the location of the Japanese carrier fleet as well as the battleships. Cruisers were not tracked (or evidence is lacking) to any great extent and in any case the odds are against accidentally encountering them (Ocean is BIG, fleet of ships is small by comparison). OK then - from what I can glean the US TF had a reasonably good chance of not meeting enemy ships on the way in. Did the US know about Japanese pickets? The US I believe was quite aware that the Japanese had some good, long ranged patrol aircraft (Kawanishi H6K and H8K). Were I the USN, I would expect patrols coming out from Japan doing basic search patterns at least 500 miles if not more (range of these two planes is excess of 4000 miles). There is a LOT of ocean to cover though, but at the very least I - as the US planner - would base my guesses on what my patrol is like out of Hawaii (post P. Harbor). Were the tables turned, would the US TF be able to sneak in and attack PH in April 1941 with B-25's? Not counting radar here - just what are the odds of surprise. Of course PH was a forward base as was Hawaii. President Roosevelt ordered the strike mainly to bolster morale. The damage would be negligible. It was a slap in the Japanese face. Risk 2 precious carriers and their escorts for this??? Morale and perception in war is important. France fell largely due to poor morale in 1940, for example. Was public perception (let alone military) of how the war is progressing of vital interest? More questions than answers. I would NOT have risked my carriers to slap Japan in the face (so to speak). The potential gain vs the risks just don't weigh out. Of course since it worked it was celebrated as a fantastic raid. No one said "you idiots, what were you thinking?!" I suspect that the strategic success at the Battle of the Coral Sea might have overshadowed any post Doolittle thoughts of risk versus reward. We gambled and we won, although had the other two carriers been in the SW Pacific, that strategic victory could have been a tactical victory like Midway. With four carriers against two, we could have sunk both and its possible that Midway would never have happened. All speculation of course, but possible.
We knew from the British that the First Striking fleet was leaving the Indian Ocean on the 15th of April 1942. We also knew that the shokaku and Zuikaku were detached and sent to Truk. The problem for Nimitz is getting a firm answer as to when Operation MO would begin. Australian intelligence said 21 April, which meant there was no way Lexington could be in the SW Pacific with Yorktown, however, we did not believe that figure. We estimated it would take until May. So, which one do you believe? We were correct as the Tulagi invasion began on the morning of the 3 of May, 1942.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 23, 2014 16:04:48 GMT -6
My first question is what did the US KNOW (not suspect) of where the Japanese fleet was at? Obviously the carriers were of prime concern as they were the biggest threat to the US task force (TF). Having the TF blunder into a group of Japanese warships of any size above a picket could be bad though. What did the US know (or suspect) of what the Japanese had in place as far as early warning? What did the US know about air defenses? From a military stand point the answers to these questions or good guesses at least would be prime for deciding on the risks involved to the US TF. What the US knew and when is sketchy, but from some research it appears that there was good confidence in the location of the Japanese carrier fleet as well as the battleships. Cruisers were not tracked (or evidence is lacking) to any great extent and in any case the odds are against accidentally encountering them (Ocean is BIG, fleet of ships is small by comparison). OK then - from what I can glean the US TF had a reasonably good chance of not meeting enemy ships on the way in. Did the US know about Japanese pickets? The US I believe was quite aware that the Japanese had some good, long ranged patrol aircraft (Kawanishi H6K and H8K). Were I the USN, I would expect patrols coming out from Japan doing basic search patterns at least 500 miles if not more (range of these two planes is excess of 4000 miles). There is a LOT of ocean to cover though, but at the very least I - as the US planner - would base my guesses on what my patrol is like out of Hawaii (post P. Harbor). Were the tables turned, would the US TF be able to sneak in and attack PH in April 1941 with B-25's? Not counting radar here - just what are the odds of surprise. Of course PH was a forward base as was Hawaii. President Roosevelt ordered the strike mainly to bolster morale. The damage would be negligible. It was a slap in the Japanese face. Risk 2 precious carriers and their escorts for this??? Morale and perception in war is important. France fell largely due to poor morale in 1940, for example. Was public perception (let alone military) of how the war is progressing of vital interest? More questions than answers. I would NOT have risked my carriers to slap Japan in the face (so to speak). The potential gain vs the risks just don't weigh out. Of course since it worked it was celebrated as a fantastic raid. No one said "you idiots, what were you thinking?!" I suspect that the strategic success at the Battle of the Coral Sea might have overshadowed any post Doolittle thoughts of risk versus reward. We gambled and we won, although had the other two carriers been in the SW Pacific, that strategic victory could have been a tactical victory like Midway. With four carriers against two, we could have sunk both and its possible that Midway would never have happened. All speculation of course, but possible.
We knew from the British that the First Striking fleet was leaving the Indian Ocean on the 15th of April 1942. We also knew that the shokaku and Zuikaku were detached and sent to Truk. The problem for Nimitz is getting a firm answer as to when Operation MO would begin. Australian intelligence said 21 April, which meant there was no way Lexington could be in the SW Pacific with Yorktown, however, we did not believe that figure. We estimated it would take until May. So, which one do you believe? We were correct as the Tulagi invasion began on the morning of the 3 of May, 1942.
As to the air defenses and scouting for the Japanese, the TF met bad weather from the time it left San Francisco until arriving at the coast of Japan and bad weather all the way back to Pearl Harbor. This was perfect weather for this type of operation. The bombers reported seeing seaplanes and when they reached their targets, it was sunny but met no real opposition except a few stray fighters. Apparently the picket boat information had not been forwarded or their defense was not well coordinated. I suspect the latter. This operation changed everything and four fighter groups were returned to Japan for homeland defense.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 24, 2014 10:10:54 GMT -6
Here is an interesting article with some facts not in evidence possibly. Maybe a good article to center discussion on -http://fly.historicwings.com/2013/04/reconsidering-the-doolittle-raid/
I am going to use Ugaki Diary and see if the facts are possibly true.
|
|
|
Post by kyle on Dec 24, 2014 12:33:16 GMT -6
Very interesting article. There is no doubt that the raid had some repercussions!
I found this on the Imperial Japanese Navy page (John Parshall's page). By the way, anyone that has not looked at it and has an interest in the IJN should take a look. Fantastic source of lots of interesting information.
19 April 1942: Akagi In response to the raid on Japan, when west of Bashi Channel while steaming north for Formosa Straits, Vice Admiral Nagumo changes course eastward and his three carriers pass through Luzon Strait at high speed in an attempted pursuit of the "Doolittle Raiders" - carriers USS HORNET (CV-8) and ENTERPRISE (CV-6). No contact is made and the chase has to be called off. 22 April 1942: Return to Hashirajima.
18 April 1942: Soryu Less CarDiv 5, which detaches with screen to head for New Guinea for "Operation MO" (Battleof the Coral Sea) operations, the Striking Force changed course while west of Bashi Strait in high speed attempted pursuit of the "Doolittle Raiders" - carriers USS HORNET and ENTERPRISE, which have just struck the Tokyo Bay area with aircraft on the 18th. 22 April 1942: Return to Hashirajima.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 24, 2014 14:08:32 GMT -6
Here is some information from Ugaki diary.
Dtd 18 April, 1942 - Ugaki states that a telephone message from the Naval General Staff received a report from No. 23 Nitto Maru, sighting three enemy carriers at 720 miles east of Tokyo at 0630. Ugaki states that Tactical Order No. 3 was activated against the US Fleet. Ugaki reports that no further word has been received from her. Other patrol boats report sightings in the afternoon and the Kisarazu Air Group fails to find the enemy. At 1300 news of the raid is received. No further word is received.
Sunday, 19 April 1942. No word from Nitto Maru and Nagato Maru and three other boats damaged by air attacks.
Search planes from Kisarazu find no enemy ships.
20 April 1942 No word on enemy ships and no more bombings. Fifth Fleet, 26th Air Flotilla and Third Submarine Squadron continues vigilance.
The following is from JM-17 Homeland Operations Record
The assigned responsibility for the homeland defense was the General Defense Command created on 12 July 1941. There were four military districts.
"Although the United States may not be in a position to make a major air raid on Japanese homeland, it is possible that small scale attacks will be attempted: either for political reasons or to divert the attention of the Japanese air force from its offensive operations. The targets of their aerial assaults will probably be the northern and eastern portions of the Homeland which can be reached by planes based in the Aleutians or Midway or the Central District and western part of Japan which can be reached by carrier based planes or large type land planes operating from bases in Chekiang Province in China" . Defensive air and AA units were: Defense Area Air AAA* Tokyo-Yokohama 50 planes .150 guns Nagoya 10 planes 20 guns Osaka-Kobe 20 planes 70 guns Kokura-Yawata 20 planes 70 guns
From the same document above, on 17 April 1942 the Navy warned the GDC of the approach of the US Fleet and predicted an air raid. It says that Navy patrol planes detected the US Task Force at 600 miles on the 18th of April. The GDC determined that the carriers could only carry small planes and estimated they would have to move to point 300 miles from off shore. They estimated 19 April as the date of launch. At noon on the 18th, incoming planes were observed by an observation post near Mito, 70 miles NE of Tokyo but raid was on Tokyo within minutes. The Japanese discovered that their type 97 fighter was useless against B-25's and that their AA guns were useless against low flying aircraft.
It would seem that the standard view(mine included) is not correct. They had a warning system, they knew we would try something and they did detect the carriers but did not realize that they had twin engine bombers with greater range so their AD system was not prepared. It was also expecting high altitude bombing, not low altitude.
My new assessment is that the IGHQ had established an adequate defense for the perceived threat but that did not include medium bombers flying from carriers. Without long range radar, they needed more standing patrols and more long range patrols from flying boats and seaplanes. Possibly more picket ships with radar might have been possible, but I don't think so.
|
|
|
Post by kyle on Dec 26, 2014 17:38:52 GMT -6
What kind of nut would put medium bombers on and aircraft carrier and make a relatively meaningless strike on Japan? There are a few surprise 'crazy' things that worked in the war. This was one of them (the Channel dash comes to immediate mind as another).
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 26, 2014 17:46:08 GMT -6
What kind of nut would put medium bombers on and aircraft carrier and make a relatively meaningless strike on Japan? There are a few surprise 'crazy' things that worked in the war. This was one of them (the Channel dash comes to immediate mind as another). The nut was Admiral King, he is the one who came up with the idea in January of 1942. Who would have ever thought of dropping bombs from 50 ft. and bouncing them into the side of ships. We did and the Japanese lost a whole convoy of transports. In war, you have to think outside the box. Darn clever, these Yankees.
|
|
|
Post by kyle on Dec 27, 2014 15:28:30 GMT -6
Or rolling a bomb into a dam for that matter (clever Brit's too!) - or wooden fins on torpedoes (clever Japanese). Not sure what the Italians did that was clever - the 'pigs' did manage to do some damage though. Soviets? Operationally they did much better after 1941 but I can't think of anything they 'pulled off' that was very out of the box as far as thinking.
The skip bombing idea was a game changer making land based bombers much better ship killers than they would have been attacking conventionally. Wonder how it would have worked vs a DD that had better AA (40mm instead of those 20mm less than ideal Japanese AA guns).
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 27, 2014 15:38:56 GMT -6
Or rolling a bomb into a dam for that matter (clever Brit's too!) - or wooden fins on torpedoes (clever Japanese). Not sure what the Italians did that was clever - the 'pigs' did manage to do some damage though. Soviets? Operationally they did much better after 1941 but I can't think of anything they 'pulled off' that was very out of the box as far as thinking. The skip bombing idea was a game changer making land based bombers much better ship killers than they would have been attacking conventionally. Wonder how it would have worked vs a DD that had better AA (40mm instead of those 20mm less than ideal Japanese AA guns). For the Italians, it was the Maiale or manned torpedoes. They sank the Queen Elisabeth and the Valiant in Alexandria Harbor and the tanker Sargona. They also attacked British shipping at Gibraltar launching from the hull of an old transport moored in a Spanish Harbor.
|
|