Post-WW2 warship design

[oaktree]

Just finished Friedman's _The British Battleship 1906-1946" and am about to start Friedman's "U.S. Battleships".

What struck me is that the 1930s-1940's UK design studies paid a lot of attention to deck armor, bomb and torpedo resistance, and also immune zones with the intent of preferring a 15,000 yard battle range.  (The last I think is a relatively realistic assumption given the desire for accuracy and scoring hits as compared to standing off at 20,000+ yards and lobbing shells at each other hoping for deck hits.

And as the aircraft attack capabilities of WW2 aircraft increased the expected size of bombs increased from 500 to 1000 to 2000lb - along with heavier stuff in the German guided bombs.  There was also an 11" rocket coming into use and the torpedoes were getting larger and using better explosives.  So you start seeing the design studies (post-war "Lion" in particular" where larger and larger displacements are needed in order to get speed (keep up with carriers), range (carry more oil), and carry heavy deck armor and internal splinter bulkheads since the designers essentially admitted that they could not keep bombs out of the citadel.  And these designs were down to 6x16" guns since the other demands on the displacement were so high.

I think from this you start seeing the "modern" design philosophy where nothing more than minimal armor is used since the offensive power of weapons has completely outscaled the passive defense value of armor.  Instead the concentration goes to damage control and taking steps in detection, tactics, and active defenses in the attempt to not get hit in the first place if possible.

[AiryW]

It's interesting to me that they would pick 6x16 inch guns instead of something like 8x14 inch guns. The smaller guns would still pack a heck of a wallop and any potential enemy would face the same cost struggle in making armor resistant to 14 inch guns. And most targets probably wouldn't even be battleships so 12 inch or even 10 inch guns would be plenty big enough. Also the current experience was for ships that would serve for several decades with modernization. Since it is easier to upgrade to a newer gun then to improve the quality of the armor on an existing ship a main armament which would be only barely sufficient at the time it was built might be extremely capable a decade letter with a new model of gun or ammunition.

[oldpop2000]

Just some thoughts about post-WW2 naval warfare. The 1946 Bikini Atoll bomb tests changed the naval situation radically. A simple A-bomb of 20,000 tons TNT, when exploded underwater, essentially sank two battleships, a carrier and host of other smaller ships. That fleet was wrecked. By 1955, H-bombs had been tested and were ready. The nature of naval warfare had been changed. Large warships, with heavy guns were very vulnerable. Deck armor and belt armor was useless against the nuclear bombs. Unlike standard bombs, an A-bomb did not have to hit a ship, just explode underwater nearby and it was over.

It was also realized after the Pacific War, that mission-killing was more costly to the enemy and easier to accomplish than merely sinking a ship. So, it was decided to just use weapons to take a ship out of action and force it home for repairs, then to waste gunfire and aircraft to try to sink the ship.

The third factor would be the development of the air to surface missile during the war, which signaled the change from bombs to missiles. With missile equipped with small nuclear weapons, the missile came of age. The jet aircraft were now being designed to carry such missiles and naval warfare changed before the 1960's

[oaktree]

A very very big factor with the Royal Navy after World War 2 was having sufficient manpower to man the fleet. And with the development of nuclear weapons and their proliferation the battleships kept on reserve were rapidly seen as not useful at all. Wars were expected to be low-intensity and regional where the carriers and cruisers were deemed sufficient, or was going to be a large-scale nuclear exchange and there the battleships were probably going to be nailed in port - or if surviving there not really being resources or time to activate and use them. Thus all the RN battleships that had survived the post-war cutbacks were gone by 1961.

[oldpop2000]

After any war, especially a world war, it is really difficult to find reasons to have a large navy. This happened after WW2 for almost all navies. It happened to the US Navy. It had a real battle keeping its aircraft. The USAF wanted them. The other issue is to find an opponent. The only opponent was the Soviet Union which sits in the middle of Eurasian continent. This means it is simply impossible for the US Navy to reach it and just as hard for the USAF without foreign bases. We also have the lack of island bases to conquer which was the driving force behind the large navy with many large carriers and battleships. All this contributed along with nuclear weapons and missiles to cause the US Navy and other navies to reconsider their naval strategy. Luckily the Korean War showed how handy it was to have a carrier force to project power onto an enemy. However, now we had to revise the ship designs to be able to handle the larger, more powerful jet aircraft. These new carriers were much more expensive and the nation wanted cut military spending and begin to grow after the war.

The actions in the Middle East with Israel and the Arabs, renewed the idea that carriers could go where they wanted and did not need permission to sail the open seas, from foreign nations. All these minor actions and wars, renewed the concept of power projection using a carrier task force. What we are seeing after WW2, is a policy that President Truman had advocated and that was  containment... to help free peoples everywhere "against aggressive movements" by totalitarian regimes and supporting people who resisted. This was the Truman Doctrine, never mentioned was its focus on the Soviet Union.

One of key ideas the Navy developed was that of a strong reserve fleet of ships and personnel. Many ships were decommissioned and scrapped because maintenance was more costly than their replacement value. Another addition was the helicopter which served as a scout, ASW platform and for movement of men and supplies between ships. In 1951, the US tested in Eniwetok Atoll, a prototype thermonuclear bomb and this changed almost everything.

[Blothorn]

Late to the thread, but:

I think the argument for 16" guns is that in the radar era, ballistics are really the limiting factor in effective range. A 14" shell might have adequate penetration at all ranges, but a 16" shell will be (minutely) more accurate. It reminds me of a paper study that helped the USN decision to go all-big-gun--at expected battle ranges, a 12" gun was expected to have several times the hit rate of a 6" shell due to its flatter trajectory and shorter flight time. Between 14" and 16" the proportional difference is going to be far smaller, but the effect still exists. (At least assuming comparable guns; the German 11" and French 13", with their high muzzle velocities, made superb long-range guns against poorly armored targets, notwithstanding their low caliber).