Post by dickturpin on Jan 29, 2015 15:36:57 GMT -6
I am not sure if this post should go in the history section or the gaming section so apologies in advance if I have put it in the wrong place.
I have a few thoughts on the implications of the technological/financial model for Rule the Waves that may or may not be of interest.
The “orthodox” paradigm for games is that the nation (player/AI) allocates “resources” to “research” technologies along a technology “tree”. This model is not really reflective of what happened in history and produces un-historic results and usually acts to the detriment of tactical/operational games from both the realism and game play perspective in my view.
If we take for example the classical roman world, a legionary from around 250 BC may be equipped with essentially the same “technology” as one 400 years later. In the gaming model, it is often possible to up tech such a unit to the extent that you can crush a less “advanced” opponent with little need to resort to any tactical finesse; the paper/scissors/stone aspect of wargaming becomes subordinate to the super army that can pretty much win in any circumstance. I struggle to find any historical example to offer up in support of this model (prior to 1946).
In reality, the individual inventor of a technological advance will be loyal to themselves rather than a state and will likely as not sell to the highest bidder or bidders. A manufacturer will likewise sell their products to whoever is likely to pay for them. A manufacturer’s competitors both nationally and internationally are likely to copy or produce alternatives to an innovative design and sell to whoever is prepared to buy from them. In the period in question, Krupp and Vickers had an arrangement to share innovations for a time.
For example, the American company Christie developed an innovative wheel and track tank. This was offered to the US Government who instead adopted a rival design. The Christie tank was then sold to the Soviet Union (as an agricultural tractor) and became prototype of the BT series which was developed and mass produced in Russia. Vickers produced a design closely influenced by the successful BT for the British Army. The distinctive Christie suspension then formed the basis for a succession of Russian, British, American and German designs. It was not so much the availability of technology through research as the choices made during procurement that influenced the adoption of the technology in the designs.
Warship design in the period in question appears to have been heavily influenced by political factors due to desire to control cost; both in total and often per unit. Germany for instance budgeted for a given number of ships as well as for cost. The Kaiser was keen to adopt an (expensive) fast battleship as alternative to a mix of cruisers and battleships but this was rejected due to the reluctance to exceed the allocated budget or reduce the allocated number of units.
Protectionist political influences were also significant factors as for example Germany and the United States were reluctant to procure technology abroad. Thus Germany procured its guns from Krupp. Krupp heavy guns were unique in offering quick fire technology and were successful in high velocity versions. The converse is that they were expensive and frequently not available in the higher calibres used by foreign navies. Thus the question: do the German designs appear to be reflecting a desire for the doctrine of close range combat or were they driven by what was available from their preferred gun supplier? The United States were similarly constrained by the political decision to build their warships entirely at home. Lack of an available rapid fire medium gun (pre Kearsarge Class) resulted in the substitution of a smaller battery of heavier 8” guns (which were not considered to have been a success at the time of introduction but would potentially have been more useful as battle ranges increased over time).
Superfiring guns are attracting some interest but are these really a technological issue? British superfiring guns could not actually fire end on due to the sighting hoods; however, the importance is questionable as a fleet action is unlikely to be influenced greatly by end on fire when decision will be reached when ships are firing broadsides. The Americans realised this and pressed on with adoption of superfiring guns definitively discovering that the superfiring gun could actually superfire and that it was successful on commission of the ship.
The American superfiring gun is one with a happy ending but this was not always the case. The double deck turret in Kearsarge was generally positively received due to its innovative approach (although not copied in foreign designs). This was however an unmitigated disaster when repeated in Virginia as improvements in rate of fire by the time of commissioning meant that when used, the 8” guns could not be fired without disrupting the firing cycle of the 12” guns. A similar situation existed when the British “improved” their wing turret arrangements to accommodate cross deck firing only to find that this practice stressed the decks in action.
Seeking an advantage from technological advancement is theoretically possible as the Royal Navy had a secret exclusivity deal with Pollen’s Argo company for the development of an advanced fire control system which they hoped would give a technological advantage over their rivals. Whilst the merits of the decision to terminate the contract and adopt the cheaper Dreyer system is debated, the arrangement had cost a great deal of money for no discernable advantage as Pollen then tried to sell his system abroad and the technology became available to Britain’s rivals.
The adoption of safer propellant is an example of an advantage of technological advancement as the German RPC6 was possibly safer than British Cordite MD due to the incorporation of a stabiliser and the adoption of the solventless RPC12 was significantly earlier than Cordite SC; so you can justifiably research technology to stop your battleships blowing up at anchor. Is this however a product of the investment in research by national government or an accident of progress in the nation’s applicable industry?
“Superior” AP shells that penetrate behind armour are another possibility as there was a succession in adoption German>British>American. However, there is a significant argument in favour of using HE shells or “AP” shells that burst on impact when firing at ranges beyond those at which the “superior” shells penetrate armour reliably (in which circumstance they are not really “superior” anymore). This would really require some modelling in the base game to allow for a rather more sophisticated gunnery model and allowing choices to be made on the gunnery doctrine and direction of procurement and research.
Britain is an interesting conundrum for a sandbox type game. The reason for the British advantage in resources is probably a result of the financial model that was adopted. Whilst the gap between Britain and emerging nations such as America and Germany had narrowed by the time in question, Britain still had significant advantages. If this is not fully reflected in the game, then Britain would not really be Britain and thus the actual political geography of the world in 1900 would not be appropriate. Conversely, Britain has a lot of far flung dependencies to protect and is potentially vulnerable to an alliance of the larger foreign powers.
In conclusion, there may be a more rewarding gameplay experience and greater historical realism obtained by kicking the traditional gaming model for technological development into the long grass. The game may be better served with model that gives the player an annual budget and constraints with some form of penalty for exceeding this. In addition to the decisions as to the combinations of guns, armour and speed type issues, there could be the option to incorporate some form new technology or radical design solution (possibly reflective of national precedent) but no guarantee as to how successful this will be and potentially involving some form of potential penalty in the final design if it does not work very well. Possibly the opportunity to prioritise the availability of some new advancement or argue for the escalation of maximum tonnage (e.g. ask your armament supplier to develop larger guns or your politician to sanction a super Dreadnought) but with no guarantee that this will be available.[/font]
I have a few thoughts on the implications of the technological/financial model for Rule the Waves that may or may not be of interest.
The “orthodox” paradigm for games is that the nation (player/AI) allocates “resources” to “research” technologies along a technology “tree”. This model is not really reflective of what happened in history and produces un-historic results and usually acts to the detriment of tactical/operational games from both the realism and game play perspective in my view.
If we take for example the classical roman world, a legionary from around 250 BC may be equipped with essentially the same “technology” as one 400 years later. In the gaming model, it is often possible to up tech such a unit to the extent that you can crush a less “advanced” opponent with little need to resort to any tactical finesse; the paper/scissors/stone aspect of wargaming becomes subordinate to the super army that can pretty much win in any circumstance. I struggle to find any historical example to offer up in support of this model (prior to 1946).
In reality, the individual inventor of a technological advance will be loyal to themselves rather than a state and will likely as not sell to the highest bidder or bidders. A manufacturer will likewise sell their products to whoever is likely to pay for them. A manufacturer’s competitors both nationally and internationally are likely to copy or produce alternatives to an innovative design and sell to whoever is prepared to buy from them. In the period in question, Krupp and Vickers had an arrangement to share innovations for a time.
For example, the American company Christie developed an innovative wheel and track tank. This was offered to the US Government who instead adopted a rival design. The Christie tank was then sold to the Soviet Union (as an agricultural tractor) and became prototype of the BT series which was developed and mass produced in Russia. Vickers produced a design closely influenced by the successful BT for the British Army. The distinctive Christie suspension then formed the basis for a succession of Russian, British, American and German designs. It was not so much the availability of technology through research as the choices made during procurement that influenced the adoption of the technology in the designs.
Warship design in the period in question appears to have been heavily influenced by political factors due to desire to control cost; both in total and often per unit. Germany for instance budgeted for a given number of ships as well as for cost. The Kaiser was keen to adopt an (expensive) fast battleship as alternative to a mix of cruisers and battleships but this was rejected due to the reluctance to exceed the allocated budget or reduce the allocated number of units.
Protectionist political influences were also significant factors as for example Germany and the United States were reluctant to procure technology abroad. Thus Germany procured its guns from Krupp. Krupp heavy guns were unique in offering quick fire technology and were successful in high velocity versions. The converse is that they were expensive and frequently not available in the higher calibres used by foreign navies. Thus the question: do the German designs appear to be reflecting a desire for the doctrine of close range combat or were they driven by what was available from their preferred gun supplier? The United States were similarly constrained by the political decision to build their warships entirely at home. Lack of an available rapid fire medium gun (pre Kearsarge Class) resulted in the substitution of a smaller battery of heavier 8” guns (which were not considered to have been a success at the time of introduction but would potentially have been more useful as battle ranges increased over time).
Superfiring guns are attracting some interest but are these really a technological issue? British superfiring guns could not actually fire end on due to the sighting hoods; however, the importance is questionable as a fleet action is unlikely to be influenced greatly by end on fire when decision will be reached when ships are firing broadsides. The Americans realised this and pressed on with adoption of superfiring guns definitively discovering that the superfiring gun could actually superfire and that it was successful on commission of the ship.
The American superfiring gun is one with a happy ending but this was not always the case. The double deck turret in Kearsarge was generally positively received due to its innovative approach (although not copied in foreign designs). This was however an unmitigated disaster when repeated in Virginia as improvements in rate of fire by the time of commissioning meant that when used, the 8” guns could not be fired without disrupting the firing cycle of the 12” guns. A similar situation existed when the British “improved” their wing turret arrangements to accommodate cross deck firing only to find that this practice stressed the decks in action.
Seeking an advantage from technological advancement is theoretically possible as the Royal Navy had a secret exclusivity deal with Pollen’s Argo company for the development of an advanced fire control system which they hoped would give a technological advantage over their rivals. Whilst the merits of the decision to terminate the contract and adopt the cheaper Dreyer system is debated, the arrangement had cost a great deal of money for no discernable advantage as Pollen then tried to sell his system abroad and the technology became available to Britain’s rivals.
The adoption of safer propellant is an example of an advantage of technological advancement as the German RPC6 was possibly safer than British Cordite MD due to the incorporation of a stabiliser and the adoption of the solventless RPC12 was significantly earlier than Cordite SC; so you can justifiably research technology to stop your battleships blowing up at anchor. Is this however a product of the investment in research by national government or an accident of progress in the nation’s applicable industry?
“Superior” AP shells that penetrate behind armour are another possibility as there was a succession in adoption German>British>American. However, there is a significant argument in favour of using HE shells or “AP” shells that burst on impact when firing at ranges beyond those at which the “superior” shells penetrate armour reliably (in which circumstance they are not really “superior” anymore). This would really require some modelling in the base game to allow for a rather more sophisticated gunnery model and allowing choices to be made on the gunnery doctrine and direction of procurement and research.
Britain is an interesting conundrum for a sandbox type game. The reason for the British advantage in resources is probably a result of the financial model that was adopted. Whilst the gap between Britain and emerging nations such as America and Germany had narrowed by the time in question, Britain still had significant advantages. If this is not fully reflected in the game, then Britain would not really be Britain and thus the actual political geography of the world in 1900 would not be appropriate. Conversely, Britain has a lot of far flung dependencies to protect and is potentially vulnerable to an alliance of the larger foreign powers.
In conclusion, there may be a more rewarding gameplay experience and greater historical realism obtained by kicking the traditional gaming model for technological development into the long grass. The game may be better served with model that gives the player an annual budget and constraints with some form of penalty for exceeding this. In addition to the decisions as to the combinations of guns, armour and speed type issues, there could be the option to incorporate some form new technology or radical design solution (possibly reflective of national precedent) but no guarantee as to how successful this will be and potentially involving some form of potential penalty in the final design if it does not work very well. Possibly the opportunity to prioritise the availability of some new advancement or argue for the escalation of maximum tonnage (e.g. ask your armament supplier to develop larger guns or your politician to sanction a super Dreadnought) but with no guarantee that this will be available.[/font]