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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 1, 2015 7:30:48 GMT -6
Here is a simplified flight path for the Russian SU-24 shot down by Turkey. Note the short amount of time that the Russian plane would have been in Turkish air space... about 1.5 minutes depending on speed. So, the Turks must have been tracking this aircraft in Syrian airspace and realized they were going to cross their territory. My question is why didn't the Russian pilots plot a course to avoid that finger of Turkish airspace thus avoiding such an encounter. They must have been aware of the fact that they were being tracked by ground radar. Again, two wrongs don't make a right... both sides goofed.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 1, 2015 19:48:00 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 2, 2015 8:40:31 GMT -6
The first article shows the difference between a bunch of amateurs and an experienced air force, that's why the Russians and Israeli's can fly in the same air space. In the second, you carry what you've got, and they ain't got much to work with, IMO. This whole operation may backfire on the Russians since it might show their forces and equipment up to the world for what it is, old junk.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 2, 2015 22:04:17 GMT -6
I did come across some interesting allegations that about half the R-77-AE missiles originally sold to the Indian Air Force were found to be defective, and that in general it's not deployed with the Russian Air Force (either due to continued technical issues or the improved versions being too expensive).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 3, 2015 8:38:06 GMT -6
I did come across some interesting allegations that about half the R-77-AE missiles originally sold to the Indian Air Force were found to be defective, and that in general it's not deployed with the Russian Air Force (either due to continued technical issues or the improved versions being too expensive). Russian quality control has never been up to Western standards, and I am reasonably certain it hasn't improved. I have read that the Indian's are not pleased with Russian support, which doesn't surprise me one bit. I will research today about R-77-AE missile problems. Update: Here is the information you are are referring to: India's national auditor, in a report released yesterday, has said the Indian Navy chose to buy the Vympel R-77 BVR missile for the MiG-29K weapons package despite adverse observations about the missile's serviceability by the air force at least six years previously. Here's what the auditor has observed:
"A critical armament for the MiG 29K aircraft is a BVR missile, which augments the ‘Beyond Visual Range’ capability of the aircraft. The [R-77], one such BVR missile was acquired by the Indian Air Force between 1999 and 2002. However, the serviceability status of the missile, in evidence prior to the Navy contract of March 2006, has been poor as brought out in paragraph No. 3.2 of the Report of the C&AG of India, No. CA 18 of 2008-09. High rate of unserviceability was noticed by IAF since 1999 from the first lot of missiles received. By November 2005, IAF decided against refurbishing the missiles “X” after life expiry and started considering a suitable replacement for future procurements. Nonetheless, Indian Navy concluded the contract in March 2006 for supply of armaments for MiG-29K aircraft which, inter alia, catered for supply of 40 Air to Air missiles [R-77] at a cost of USD 21.88 million. Audit noted that there was a delay of 51 months in finalizing the weapon package for MiG 29K aircraft, Indian Navy failed to adopt an integrated approach to utilise the data/knowledge base of IAF and consequently ended up by procuring 40 missiles worth USD 21.88 million (Rs 97.67 crore) whose serviceability has been found unreliable by the IAF. Thus, the Ministry modified the decision of CFA by decreasing the quantity of approved armament and procured additional items worth Rs 93.68 crore which were not envisaged at the time of seeking approval of CFA to sustain within the financial ceiling. Further, Indian Navy procured Air to Air missiles [R-77] costing USD 21.88 million which had a track record of poor serviceability for which the IAF is seeking replacement since November 2005. The matter was referred to the Ministry in November 2010; their reply was awaited as of July 2011."
Update 2: www.ausairpower.net/APA-Rus-BVR-AAM.html - Analysis of Russian BVR technology and R-77 - Caveat: This author tends to play down Russian equipment deficiencies and use the idea that he is just providing information as a balance against Western technology provided to Australia. This site isn't updated anymore but he does have good pictures and data that can be cross referenced.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 4, 2015 22:40:19 GMT -6
Yeah, APA is a suspect source - lots of nice technical diagrams, but it really puffs up the Russian capabilities (and includes vaporware that never made it past the mockup phase) and on the Western side shafts anything that's not the F-111 or F-22. An example being where it contrasts the Flanker's missile load with that of the Super Hornet and JSF by listing the Flanker's capability to carry up to 12 AAMs versus 6 for the Super Hornet and 2 for JSF ... except other pages on APA show the Super Hornet as capable of carrying 12 AAMs. The footnotes here acknowledge this, but attempt to wave it away by having the Super Hornet carry external tanks. Apparently this isn't a requirement for the Flanker. The JSF can carry 4 internal (possibly 6 internal eventually) and up to 6 external AAMs. For all the hoopla about carrying different seeker models of the R-27 to maximize the Pk, this doesn't give me much confidence: "R-27T and ET variants can be used out of cloudiness, at least 15 degrees away from the bearing of sun, and 4 degrees away from the bearing of moon and ground based head-contrasting conditions. In cases of maximum head-on range launches where lock-command cannot be utilised, missile can be fired in PPS: In this mode, missile will fly straight until achieves target lock. As missile lacks capability of maneuvering before lock, aircraft itself must maneuver so that missile will be pointed to no more than 15 degrees bearing of the target for confident capture by the IR seeker after launch. Equalising altitude is recommended but not required." en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-27_(air-to-air_missile)
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 6, 2015 8:51:43 GMT -6
Yeah, APA is a suspect source - lots of nice technical diagrams, but it really puffs up the Russian capabilities (and includes vaporware that never made it past the mockup phase) and on the Western side shafts anything that's not the F-111 or F-22. An example being where it contrasts the Flanker's missile load with that of the Super Hornet and JSF by listing the Flanker's capability to carry up to 12 AAMs versus 6 for the Super Hornet and 2 for JSF ... except other pages on APA show the Super Hornet as capable of carrying 12 AAMs. The footnotes here acknowledge this, but attempt to wave it away by having the Super Hornet carry external tanks. Apparently this isn't a requirement for the Flanker. The JSF can carry 4 internal (possibly 6 internal eventually) and up to 6 external AAMs. For all the hoopla about carrying different seeker models of the R-27 to maximize the Pk, this doesn't give me much confidence: "R-27T and ET variants can be used out of cloudiness, at least 15 degrees away from the bearing of sun, and 4 degrees away from the bearing of moon and ground based head-contrasting conditions. In cases of maximum head-on range launches where lock-command cannot be utilised, missile can be fired in PPS: In this mode, missile will fly straight until achieves target lock. As missile lacks capability of maneuvering before lock, aircraft itself must maneuver so that missile will be pointed to no more than 15 degrees bearing of the target for confident capture by the IR seeker after launch. Equalising altitude is recommended but not required." en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-27_(air-to-air_missile)We've always known that Russian equipment had technical difficulties. They go for quantity over quality. But the real key to air dominance is situational awareness; not just from the pilots view, but over the whole battlefield using AWACS and satellite intel. This is what has given the Western allies the advantage over their enemies. Our air to air victories have moved from visual range to BVR because of this increased situational awareness and I personally don't see the Russian's getting to that point any time soon. It is a tactical air force like it was in WWII.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 6, 2015 10:18:10 GMT -6
Yeah, APA is a suspect source - lots of nice technical diagrams, but it really puffs up the Russian capabilities (and includes vaporware that never made it past the mockup phase) and on the Western side shafts anything that's not the F-111 or F-22. An example being where it contrasts the Flanker's missile load with that of the Super Hornet and JSF by listing the Flanker's capability to carry up to 12 AAMs versus 6 for the Super Hornet and 2 for JSF ... except other pages on APA show the Super Hornet as capable of carrying 12 AAMs. The footnotes here acknowledge this, but attempt to wave it away by having the Super Hornet carry external tanks. Apparently this isn't a requirement for the Flanker. The JSF can carry 4 internal (possibly 6 internal eventually) and up to 6 external AAMs. For all the hoopla about carrying different seeker models of the R-27 to maximize the Pk, this doesn't give me much confidence: "R-27T and ET variants can be used out of cloudiness, at least 15 degrees away from the bearing of sun, and 4 degrees away from the bearing of moon and ground based head-contrasting conditions. In cases of maximum head-on range launches where lock-command cannot be utilised, missile can be fired in PPS: In this mode, missile will fly straight until achieves target lock. As missile lacks capability of maneuvering before lock, aircraft itself must maneuver so that missile will be pointed to no more than 15 degrees bearing of the target for confident capture by the IR seeker after launch. Equalising altitude is recommended but not required." en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-27_(air-to-air_missile)We've always known that Russian equipment had technical difficulties. They go for quantity over quality. But the real key to air dominance is situational awareness; not just from the pilots view, but over the whole battlefield using AWACS and satellite intel. This is what has given the Western allies the advantage over their enemies. Our air to air victories have moved from visual range to BVR because of this increased situational awareness and I personally don't see the Russian's getting to that point any time soon. It is a tactical air force like it was in WWII. I do wonder how much time they spend testing their weapons systems before putting them into service, or whether that program is on the same level as ours was prior to Vietnam. As far as situational awareness, at least into the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet model was still derived from Ground-Controlled Interception, so I wouldn't quite say the Russians are entirely off the mark. The trouble probably is that they put too much responsibility for situational awareness on the ground controllers and not enough on the pilots; when Germany re-unified and the Luftwaffe got its hands on MiG-29s and their pilots we learned that the Soviets viewed the pilot as more or less a Weapons Systems Officer. GCI told him where the target was, he used his radar to get a weapon lock, and pulled the trigger.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 6, 2015 13:19:33 GMT -6
We actually did a lot of testing at Pax River for the Navy and the test facility at Nellis for the USAF. The problem in Vietnam was that we were testing in desert and a humid subtropical environment. These were not wet, monsoonal climates like Vietnam. Our testing presumed BVR but our technology in combat proved unable to provide that edge. Airborne intercept radar was single target track systems, which meant that after you engaged the half action switch on the control column, the radar stopped scanning and changed to a pencil beam to track the target. Any other targets were not registered. This is not a good situation although we did have AEW equipment in the EC-121's but they were very crude. We also had Red Crown on board a cruiser off the coast which could notify pilots when Migs were launched from Hanoi. Finally, our own rules of engagement required the pilots to confirm visually their targets, not good for aircraft that were not designed for dogfighting and without a gun. Technology was developed and Top Gun along with Red Flag helped to changed the game for us by 1972.
The Russian's have not had any air combat encounters to speak of to test their technology or their doctrine since WWII. We know that they had pilots in Mig-15's in Korea, but no combat experience since then. You can't gain knowledge about your air doctrine from other nations flying your aircraft, it simply doesn't work. The Russian's have to glean information about air combat from foreign sources and hopefully apply them to their doctrine to keep it modern. Whether that is effective waits to be seen.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 6, 2015 14:14:39 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 6, 2015 16:22:12 GMT -6
You don't learn anything from one engagement on someone else's turf, you know that. The secrecy surrounding that operation probably hindered any possible lessons learned.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 6, 2015 17:08:57 GMT -6
You don't learn anything from one engagement on someone else's turf, you know that. The secrecy surrounding that operation probably hindered any possible lessons learned. It seems the Soviets were concerned enough to launch an official investigation. The real question is whether after that serving of humble pie they started paying more attention to what the Egyptians (and at the time, the North Vietnamese) were telling them. From Wikipedia: "The Egyptians themselves reacted with ill-concealed delight at the outcome of the engagement. They had previously suffered intense criticism of their own performance and boasts of superior Soviet skills, when in fact the Soviets had fallen for tactics the Egyptians were already familiar with." "By this time I’d realized the Russian pilot was inexperienced; he didn’t know how to handle his aircraft in a combat situation. At 15,000ft he proved this fact by trying to escape in a steep dive to 700ft." The latter quote being from an F-4E Phantom pilot; I gather that for a MiG-21 trying to fight an F-4 in the vertical is not a smart move.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 6, 2015 18:01:12 GMT -6
You don't learn anything from one engagement on someone else's turf, you know that. The secrecy surrounding that operation probably hindered any possible lessons learned. It seems the Soviets were concerned enough to launch an official investigation. The real question is whether after that serving of humble pie they started paying more attention to what the Egyptians (and at the time, the North Vietnamese) were telling them. From Wikipedia: "The Egyptians themselves reacted with ill-concealed delight at the outcome of the engagement. They had previously suffered intense criticism of their own performance and boasts of superior Soviet skills, when in fact the Soviets had fallen for tactics the Egyptians were already familiar with." "By this time I’d realized the Russian pilot was inexperienced; he didn’t know how to handle his aircraft in a combat situation. At 15,000ft he proved this fact by trying to escape in a steep dive to 700ft." The latter quote being from an F-4E Phantom pilot; I gather that for a MiG-21 trying to fight an F-4 in the vertical is not a smart move. Here is a comparison of climb rates that will illustrate the problem of attempting to fight in the vertical with an F-4. The F-4 had a climb rate of about 49,000 FT. per minute, the Mig-21 of that era had a climb rate of 21,000 FT. per minute. As one can see, the F-4 has a 2:1 advantage and US and Israeli pilots had learned to fight in the vertical. As you can see by the results of the Soviet action with the Israeli's, they had not learned the lessons their comrades had learned. But the US pilots had learned the lesson the hard way also, it took some experienced WWII and Korean war pilots like Robin Olds, to teach the US pilots to fight in the vertical, to use the strengths of the F-4 to your advantage. Top Gun and Red Flag were created to solve the problem. The F-15 and F-16 were both products of that learned lesson. I don't doubt that the Soviets did some real soul searching about this action realizing that their air doctrine might be about twenty years or more, behind the times. The NVAF pilot flying against Randy Cunningham, supposedly an experienced pilot, committed the same error.... twice. The last time realizing he was in serious trouble and tried to escape by running, and Cunningham killed him with a Sidewinder. Just a note, BTW. When you are in an air defense zone with SAM's, a steep climb which would require full military power might not be the best idea. Again, you must conduct an extensive air campaign against a worthy opponent to develop and hone your air doctrine. The Soviet and now the Russians, have not done that. They are amateurs, as I said.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 7, 2015 21:39:27 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 7, 2015 22:54:12 GMT -6
Friendly fire incidents are still possible today even with the sophisticated technology that we have . ....War is Hell as William Tecumseh Sherman said on 19 June 1879. A bomb, laser or no laser, is no ones friend once dropped.
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