|
Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 25, 2019 9:22:18 GMT -6
I had the impression that Japan put floatplanes on its cruisers because they could be retrofitted. Flattops were at a premium but by putting their scouts on the cruisers they could free up flattop space. And the conversion was fast enough to be done after they saw the problem and still make a difference. The Japanese used several models of floatplanes; Aichi E13A, E16A, M6A( submarine based), F1M(Pete), A6M2(Rufe), E8N(Dave), E14Y(Submarine-borne). The E13A was available in 1941, as was the F1M and the E8N. There were a few reasons for their development of floatplanes. We had many different models that we used mostly for air/sea rescue and ASW and some minor scouting for task forces not equipped with air cover. This was alleviated by the introduction of light aircraft carrers and escort carriers. There were disagreements after the war about the value of the Japanese reconnaissance effort. Genda claimed that it was the primary defect in the IJN air arm. Genda always exaggerated things, but he was right in that there were severe limitations such as the unwillingness to sacrifice offense aircraft to embark reconnaissance aircraft on board the carriers. Their blue water operations were severely hampered by the lack of training for the crews of the floatplanes and their unreliability. The other deficiencies were their lack of defensive armament and poor radio communications which hampered all Japanese aircraft but was especially vital to scouting operations. We can see numerous mistakes made by recce crews like mistaking the Neosho for an aircraft carrier which caused the Japanese to launch a whole strike against this ship. Many historians claim that had the Japanese fielded more floatplanes and seaplane tenders in the Solomon's area, their surprise on August 7th, 1942 of the invasion of Guadalcanal might not have occurred. I will say that our fleet reconnaissance was never perfect and failed us on numerous occasions. However, reconnaissance is absolutely critical in carrier battles and our SBD scout squadrons were well trained as were the PBY crews. They were very effective in the first four carrier battles and the seaplanes were effective flying out of Guadalcanal. The two most important ingredients in carrier battles are scouting effectiveness and net striking power. The results from WWII show that the side that attacks first has the crucial advantage and that is supported by the first four carrier battles.
|
|
|
Post by ulzgoroth on Aug 25, 2019 12:16:37 GMT -6
The point of floatplanes is mostly to provide air recon to forces that don't have proper carrier support, I think...
Though like rimbecano you could also use them to take the load off limited carrier aviation assets.
|
|
|
Post by rimbecano on Aug 25, 2019 20:55:59 GMT -6
I had the impression that Japan put floatplanes on its cruisers because they could be retrofitted. Flattops were at a premium but by putting their scouts on the cruisers they could free up flattop space. And the conversion was fast enough to be done after they saw the problem and still make a difference. The Japanese used several models of floatplanes; Aichi E13A, E16A, M6A( submarine based), F1M(Pete), A6M2(Rufe), E8N(Dave), E14Y(Submarine-borne). The E13A was available in 1941, as was the F1M and the E8N. There were a few reasons for their development of floatplanes. We had many different models that we used mostly for air/sea rescue and ASW and some minor scouting for task forces not equipped with air cover. This was alleviated by the introduction of light aircraft carrers and escort carriers. There were disagreements after the war about the value of the Japanese reconnaissance effort. Genda claimed that it was the primary defect in the IJN air arm. Genda always exaggerated things, but he was right in that there were severe limitations such as the unwillingness to sacrifice offense aircraft to embark reconnaissance aircraft on board the carriers. Their blue water operations were severely hampered by the lack of training for the crews of the floatplanes and their unreliability. The other deficiencies were their lack of defensive armament and poor radio communications which hampered all Japanese aircraft but was especially vital to scouting operations. We can see numerous mistakes made by recce crews like mistaking the Neosho for an aircraft carrier which caused the Japanese to launch a whole strike against this ship. Many historians claim that had the Japanese fielded more floatplanes and seaplane tenders in the Solomon's area, their surprise on August 7th, 1942 of the invasion of Guadalcanal might not have occurred. I will say that our fleet reconnaissance was never perfect and failed us on numerous occasions. However, reconnaissance is absolutely critical in carrier battles and our SBD scout squadrons were well trained as were the PBY crews. They were very effective in the first four carrier battles and the seaplanes were effective flying out of Guadalcanal. The two most important ingredients in carrier battles are scouting effectiveness and net striking power. The results from WWII show that the side that attacks first has the crucial advantage and that is supported by the first four carrier battles. I think part of the issue the Japanese had is that if you're going to use cruiser seaplanes for recon, you need to have your cruisers rotating regularly through both the carrier and surface fleets and training with both, so that they can fulfill the reconnaissance requirements of either force, and I don't get the impression that the Japanese has really developed such a doctrine.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 25, 2019 21:27:33 GMT -6
The Japanese used several models of floatplanes; Aichi E13A, E16A, M6A( submarine based), F1M(Pete), A6M2(Rufe), E8N(Dave), E14Y(Submarine-borne). The E13A was available in 1941, as was the F1M and the E8N. There were a few reasons for their development of floatplanes. We had many different models that we used mostly for air/sea rescue and ASW and some minor scouting for task forces not equipped with air cover. This was alleviated by the introduction of light aircraft carrers and escort carriers. There were disagreements after the war about the value of the Japanese reconnaissance effort. Genda claimed that it was the primary defect in the IJN air arm. Genda always exaggerated things, but he was right in that there were severe limitations such as the unwillingness to sacrifice offense aircraft to embark reconnaissance aircraft on board the carriers. Their blue water operations were severely hampered by the lack of training for the crews of the floatplanes and their unreliability. The other deficiencies were their lack of defensive armament and poor radio communications which hampered all Japanese aircraft but was especially vital to scouting operations. We can see numerous mistakes made by recce crews like mistaking the Neosho for an aircraft carrier which caused the Japanese to launch a whole strike against this ship. Many historians claim that had the Japanese fielded more floatplanes and seaplane tenders in the Solomon's area, their surprise on August 7th, 1942 of the invasion of Guadalcanal might not have occurred. I will say that our fleet reconnaissance was never perfect and failed us on numerous occasions. However, reconnaissance is absolutely critical in carrier battles and our SBD scout squadrons were well trained as were the PBY crews. They were very effective in the first four carrier battles and the seaplanes were effective flying out of Guadalcanal. The two most important ingredients in carrier battles are scouting effectiveness and net striking power. The results from WWII show that the side that attacks first has the crucial advantage and that is supported by the first four carrier battles. I think part of the issue the Japanese had is that if you're going to use cruiser seaplanes for recon, you need to have your cruisers rotating regularly through both the carrier and surface fleets and training with both, so that they can fulfill the reconnaissance requirements of either force, and I don't get the impression that the Japanese has really developed such a doctrine. The IJN placed a priority on offensive operations and hence scouting and reconnaissance suffered. They did not understand how important those two missions were to the success of fleet operations. The crews assigned to reconnaissance were ill-trained, inexperienced and very careless. The Japanese did not prepare for a long war and hence did not develop idea of mass training for its pilots. Simply put, it was quality over quantity. Many of their mistakes in this area were due to the idea of a short war, and when that did not become a realization, they were in serious trouble.
|
|
|
Post by jishmael on Aug 26, 2019 1:26:26 GMT -6
I don't understand the tactical or strategical role of floatplanes in this game <snip> all big engagements contain cv or cvl I use floatplanes so that my entire carrier air group is available for strikes on enemy warships once they're found. I personally do not think that the earlier availability of a single torpedo bomber squadron is worth the investment elsewhere. But on the other hand I usually start my battles by turning airplane search off and either make contact with my surface fleet first or just launch strikes to where I expect the enemy fleet to spawn. Whenever I have air recon (I'm looking at you land based airforce) it often ends up more annoying and confusing then helpful after the first two spottings. It's nice to know the rough area of the enemy fleet, number, type, course and precise location fluctuate so wildly between reports that I just ignore any further reports
|
|
euchrejack
Full Member
Don't feed the Trolls. They just get bigger and more numerous.
Posts: 139
|
Post by euchrejack on Aug 30, 2019 22:37:07 GMT -6
On the original question of CVL before AV, I've seen it happen, and have been always delighted when it did. I usually convert my AVs into CVLs when I get the CVL tech, so it is hardly a problem for me.
To the best of my knowledge, Seaplane carrier tech is only needed for AVs, dedicated seaplane carriers. Other ships equipped with seaplanes are unlocked by Seaplane scouts. Now, getting seaplane carriers without the seaplanes...really sucks.
|
|