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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 6, 2013 18:02:42 GMT -6
Navy Sixth Generation FighterWell, we haven't even got the F-35 flying in the service and now an RFI for a sixth gen fighter replace the F/A-18.
www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/darpa-working-on-sixth-generation-fighter-study-385112/
I like the idea of tailless and manned or unmanned, that sounds neat. But fuel efficient engines? I have a hard time putting turbofan engine and fuel efficient together, sounds like an anachronism to me. Anyway, more fodder for our discussions.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 7, 2013 17:37:07 GMT -6
It would be nice if they bundled that bird as a replacement for the F/A-18E/F, F-15E, and F-22. Granted we've been burned on the F-35 with trying to please multiple customers, but if the thing doesn't have to be wrapped around a STOVL version for the Marines that will help matters. I can see that aircraft and a strike UCAV replacement for the F-35 making up the backbone of an air wing circa 2050 or so.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 7, 2013 18:02:11 GMT -6
It would be nice if they bundled that bird as a replacement for the F/A-18E/F, F-15E, and F-22. Granted we've been burned on the F-35 with trying to please multiple customers, but if the thing doesn't have to be wrapped around a STOVL version for the Marines that will help matters. I can see that aircraft and a strike UCAV replacement for the F-35 making up the backbone of an air wing circa 2050 or so. I think this aircraft should be an air superiority fighter, not a bomb truck because by the time this is flying, missiles and UCAVs probably will have taken over the close air support and interdiction missions. I am working on my ideas for sixth generation fighter now, and I will post here. Here are preliminary thoughts you can consider.
Most of the cost of these latest aircraft is the sensor and avionics packages, somehow we need to get that cost down. We need to determine how much stealth is worth in both initial cost and maintenance, compared to its value in combat. We need to decide the thrust to weight ratio. This will make the decision as to how many engines we will need. If we go with the F-35 engines or later versions, we are probably going to be looking at 50,000 lb. thrust engines. With an empty weight of around 35,000 lbs., fuel load of around 25,000 lbs. , we've already exceeded the weight necessary for a modest 1.2 thrust to weight ratio. It appears that the plane will have to have two engines with a dry thrust of around 100,000 lbs. The LPI radar must be able to track while scan, have look-down, shoot-down capability and have dogfight capability with associated helmet targeting system for close in fights; knife fights as we call them. The engines will need thrust vectoring to gain the super maneuverability we need, but weight for a Naval aircraft is critical. How critical is unknown, I will have to examine the figures for the Ford class carriers.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 7, 2013 18:30:13 GMT -6
Should that discussion be shunted over to the fifth-gen fighters thread? By the way, I agree with you there. Air superiority is probably going to be one of the last bastions of manned combat aircraft. UCAVs are ideally suited to the bomb truck role, provided you can make the sensor feeds and remote control datalinks work properly. However, I believe the Navy at least would want some strike capability on the F/A-XX.
Moving back to the carriers and airwing composition, let's switch gears - what does the PLAN have in mind? Right now they have the Liaoning apparently testing the J-15 (Su-33 knockoff) in the pure air superiority role and possibly the Ka-31 and Z-8 AEW helos. Par for the course given those kinds of aircraft are what she's designed for. Now, the question is what they do with the carriers they are supposedly getting started on at the Jiangnan yard. Are they going to make them repeats or enlargements of the Liaoning, or will they go all in for a large (60,000 ton plus) CV with catapults and a multirole airwing? Furthermore, will their planning be focused on a sea control/sea denial strategy, using carriers as air cover for surface action groups, or are they actually projecting a carrier-centric fleet focused on power projection far from home? If the latter, would this be based on their actual strategic needs or a "because the Americans have them" mentality?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 7, 2013 18:43:34 GMT -6
Should that discussion be shunted over to the fifth-gen fighters thread? By the way, I agree with you there. Air superiority is probably going to be one of the last bastions of manned combat aircraft. UCAVs are ideally suited to the bomb truck role, provided you can make the sensor feeds and remote control datalinks work properly. However, I believe the Navy at least would want some strike capability on the F/A-XX. Moving back to the carriers and airwing composition, let's switch gears - what does the PLAN have in mind? Right now they have the Liaoning apparently testing the J-15 (Su-33 knockoff) in the pure air superiority role and possibly the Ka-31 and Z-8 AEW helos. Par for the course given those kinds of aircraft are what she's designed for. Now, the question is what they do with the carriers they are supposedly getting started on at the Jiangnan yard. Are they going to make them repeats or enlargements of the Liaoning, or will they go all in for a large (60,000 ton plus) CV with catapults and a multirole airwing? Furthermore, will their planning be focused on a sea control/sea denial strategy, using carriers as air cover for surface action groups, or are they actually projecting a carrier-centric fleet focused on power projection far from home? If the latter, would this be based on their actual strategic needs or a "because the Americans have them" mentality? Check the my previous post, I added some items about sixth gen fighters.
I am going to have to do some research on the PLAN carriers. I can't see them using that carrier too far from the mainland under an air umbrella.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 8, 2013 8:54:25 GMT -6
Recently, the US Navy sent out an RFI or request for information. This is just what the name implies, a document designed to provide information for future planning by the Navy. Here is the official definition: " Request for Information (RFI) is for informational and planning purposes only and shall not be construed as a Request for Proposal (RFP), Request for Quote (RFQ) or as an obligation on the part of the Government. The Government does not intend to award a contract on the basis of this request or otherwise pay for the requested information. No reimbursement will be made for any costs associated with providing information in response to this announcement or any follow-up information requests. "Here is the actual document, not much is it.
Well, there it is, in all its government splendor. This is not an air superiority fighter, it is a standard multi-mission fighter like the current F-18E/F. A contractor might not develop a "clean sheet" aircraft, but most likely will. Someone could just overhaul the F-35 design. This is where we start. Some design considerations:
1. two engines - should be compatible with F-35 for ease of maintenance. Probably around the 50,000 lbs. thrust range, with vectored thrust for agility. Possibly supercruise additional.
2. Moderate stealth including an LPI radar with look-down, shoot-down capability with track-while-scan and electronically scanned antenna. Modular, integrated link 11 and link 7 data link capability.
3. All glass cockpit, reprogrammable mission computer and GPS enhanced INS.
4. Must be able to switch from air superiority to interdiction within one hour. (this will be a killer)
5. Thrust to weight must be greater than 1.0, Ceiling 50,000 feet, internal fuel storage about 25,000 lbs. Empty weight cannot exceed 35,000 lbs.
6. For the F135 engine, Max thrust with AB is 40,000 lbs, Max Military power is 30,000 lbs. thrust to weight is 10.5:1, SFC is .70 lb/lbt/hr, 2.0 lb/lbt/hr with AB. This engine is most efficient at 80% of Max. Military Thrust, its fuel usage increases when you throttle back to 40 to 50%.
Go for it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 9, 2013 10:41:07 GMT -6
The internal fuel load on an F-35C is 20,060 lbs. If optimum fuel consumption is at 80% of military power, then that is 24,000 lbs. of thrust. If we use .7 pounds of fuel per pound of thrust per hour, if my math holds up, that's 16,800 lbs. of fuel. If my math is correct, at 80% military power, we have about one hour of fuel. Keep in mind, that at takeoff, we will be filled with max fuel and ordnance which means we will need AB, so that will reduce you load quickly. This bird will, IMO, need air to air refueling to reach the target and external fuel tanks. The F-35C can carry 8,160 lbs. of fuel externally. Total fuel capacity is 28,160 lbs. The B version carries only 22,000 lbs. of fuel. You do the math.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 9, 2013 15:28:37 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 11, 2013 20:17:47 GMT -6
Just to help with the understanding of the fuel systems, let's take the F-18. It has four tanks in the fuselage and one in each wing. Fuel tank 1 is directly behind the pilot, fuel tank 2 is next and feeds the left engine, fuel tank 3 is next and feeds the right engine, and fuel tank 4 is next on the starboard side in the middle of the fuselage. Tanks 1 & 4 are feed tanks, 2 & 3 are engine feed tanks and the wing tanks are feed tanks. Four external 480 gallon fuel tanks on centerline and inboard and midboard pylons can be carried.
Tank 1 has 1430 lbs. Tank 2 has 2660 lbs. Tank 3 has 2680 lbs. Tank 4 has 3860 lbs. Total internal wing tank is 3340 lbs. Total internal fuel is 13,790 lbs.
The 480 gallon tanks hold equivalent 3260 Lbs. on wings, and 3220 Lbs. on centerline.
Hope that helps
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 30, 2014 17:14:41 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 31, 2014 10:03:21 GMT -6
Steel: I concur that we don't need to start a new thread each time, its basically only you and I. Good links, I am currently reading the article from the Naval War College Review that was referenced then I am going to read all the articles. Good subject, love it. BTW, in his final thoughts, he talks about how the Soviet and US Navies actually used EW and tactical deception against each other to gain edges in their struggle for maritime scouting superiority. Be advised, this isn't anything new to analyst's nor those who have been around this subject for a while. Tokarev's revealing information is interesting, but most people knew the stories. As always, I will be circumspect about how I answer any questions or knowledge provided due to restrictions imposed by the government. www.informationdissemination.net/
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 2, 2014 18:49:44 GMT -6
I figured much of it was nothing new; however it was an interesting discussion of how the Backfire-vs-CVBG game (and nowadays the A2/AD problem) isn't just a simple matter of launching a missile massacre at a bunch of blips on the screen. Worth noting as in the past we have had some posters on here claiming that the USN was "unprepared and complacent" regarding that particular challenge.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 3, 2014 14:02:39 GMT -6
I figured much of it was nothing new; however it was an interesting discussion of how the Backfire-vs-CVBG game (and nowadays the A2/AD problem) isn't just a simple matter of launching a missile massacre at a bunch of blips on the screen. Worth noting as in the past we have had some posters on here claiming that the USN was "unprepared and complacent" regarding that particular challenge. The US Navy was not "unprepared and complacent", it gathered intelligence, analyzed it, and developed technology and tactics to counter the threats. Now, over the years, there were other priorities like close air support and interdiction during Vietnam, Desert Storm etc. but the Soviet Maritime bomber threat was always taken seriously. I can't speak for others, I don't know what they think, but I saw and worked on the technology and it was as good as was necessary to do the job. Losses in war are to be expected, everyone knew that, the idea was to minimize them. And they would have, I can assure you. Maybe Scott could enlighten both of us, if he reads this and has time.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 3, 2014 21:09:51 GMT -6
I figured much of it was nothing new; however it was an interesting discussion of how the Backfire-vs-CVBG game (and nowadays the A2/AD problem) isn't just a simple matter of launching a missile massacre at a bunch of blips on the screen. Worth noting as in the past we have had some posters on here claiming that the USN was "unprepared and complacent" regarding that particular challenge. The US Navy was not "unprepared and complacent", it gathered intelligence, analyzed it, and developed technology and tactics to counter the threats. Now, over the years, there were other priorities like close air support and interdiction during Vietnam, Desert Storm etc. but the Soviet Maritime bomber threat was always taken seriously. I can't speak for others, I don't know what they think, but I saw and worked on the technology and it was as good as was necessary to do the job. Losses in war are to be expected, everyone knew that, the idea was to minimize them. And they would have, I can assure you. Maybe Scott could enlighten both of us, if he reads this and has time. And depending on how much of it you two can talk about in public, of course. The two takeaways that stuck for me were Soviet Naval Aviation's distrust of satellite tracking and their acknowledgement that they would likely take 50% losses if attacking a CVBG with a large force of Backfires (~100 aircraft, or about three regiments presumably). That was before every tin can had Aegis, Cooperative Engagement Capability, and a few other tricks. I'm trying to look into what they have left nowadays; reportedly in the past few years the 50-60 Naval Aviation Backfires were divested from Navy control and sent back to the Russian Air Force. I'd be interested to know if those airframes and aircrews still have an antishipping focus; even if the whole Backfire force (100-150 aircraft) is trained and armed for carrier-busting they might have a hard time taking on one carrier group without losing a big chunk of their strategic bomber force (assuming they were not being overly pessimistic about their odds of getting planes back).
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 3, 2014 21:28:26 GMT -6
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