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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 10, 2014 21:44:04 GMT -6
Another consideration there is that the bluster is aimed at shoring up support at home. Remember, Putin won re-election with less than the expected margin of victory and that was followed by protests. Setting up a major confrontation with the West (which, either as a propaganda tactic or out of genuine suspicion, gets blamed for supporting protests) is a time-honored means of whipping up patriotic fervor and making it easier to label dissenters as traitors. Back on the topic, as stated we may be able to apply the information in those articles to the current splashiest menace in the "carriers are dead" argument, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. Leaving aside the fact that this is (as far as we know) a completely untested weapons system, it seems to be heavily reliant on satellites to find and engage targets. How likely is it that in actual use the DF-21D would be forced to rely on more "hands-on" targeting methods such as surveillance aircraft, submarines, and surface ships given the Soviet experiences with trying to find CVBGs using surveillance satellites? This weapon is a sea denial/anti-access weapon but not a sea control. It won't stop us from killing Chinese ships, we will just have to do it another way. We have credible second strike weapons, which the Chinese don't. The Chinese cannot risk escalating any conflict with the US by hitting one of our carriers. If they sink one of our carriers, it will probably start a decision process that will lead to a full retaliatory nuclear strike. They will lose everything.
That said, we should and are developing and deploying shipboard Anti-ballistic missile systems for our cruiser force. The Chinese will have to develop an extensive maritime surveillance and recon capability to provide the targeting required for the ASBM's.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 12, 2014 18:03:12 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 13, 2014 22:09:37 GMT -6
Interesting article but highly theoretical, bordering on fantasy. Sub-munitions are good on soft targets, not runway aprons, piers, etc. These targets they are alluding to, are area targets requiring many weapons, not sub-munitions. A sub-munition hitting a runway will do very little damage, and same goes for aprons. Fuel farms are hard and difficult targets to destroy even with heavy weapons like 2000 lb. JDAMS. All this aside, do you really believe that the Chinese would throw away all their economic gains, to start a war with their best customer. Sounds like bad business practice to me. This is not 1940 and the Chinese are not the Nazis or the Imperial Naval General Staff. They will use the threats along with economic pressures to gain economic ascendancy in the Far East.
Interesting series of articles, but I cannot go along with the basic premises. However this is an interesting subject about Backfires and DF-21's to discuss.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 15, 2014 19:47:37 GMT -6
I'm not 100% sure the PRC has a clear-eyed view of the potential risks of pointing weapons in their corner of the world. The current spat with Japan over the Senkakus is fairly stupid; unlike the Spratlys they do have a capable opposing military force with a direct interest in keeping those rocks. Best to assume just in case that the other guy might not know when to fold 'em. That goes both ways; they might not be intending to start a fight with us or the Japanese, but they'd be stupid not to procure at least some capability to strike at those bases. Overall though I think the point of that piece is to demonstrate that the PRC does not currently have the numbers of DF-21C and D missiles to effectively attack US assets in the area. This may be due to issues with the weapons themselves (as stated, we have yet to see any demonstration of the DF-21D being tested on a target at sea), issues with production or deployment, waiting to see what the US counter to a limited deployment of these weapons will be, or a decision not to provoke the US and other regional powers by deploying a crap-ton of MRBMs.
I think the PRC gets the default bad-guy role among naval wargamers simply because it has the technology and resources to be dangerous now and even more dangerous in the future. Russia as stated earlier talks a big game but their capability to turn out and maintain new equipment - especially with the current drop in energy prices and the ongoing sanctions - is suspect. If Russia says it intends to field six aircraft carriers by 2030, I might give them a 5% or less chance of actually doing it. They can't even make good on overhauling the one carrier they have. If the PRC says it intends to field six aircraft carriers by 2030, I'd give them 50-50 odds of doing it and much better odds of getting at least 3 or 4 operational. They actually have the economy to play that game, even if they only intend to use it as a fleet in being.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 16, 2014 12:59:17 GMT -6
I'm not 100% sure the PRC has a clear-eyed view of the potential risks of pointing weapons in their corner of the world. The current spat with Japan over the Senkakus is fairly stupid; unlike the Spratlys they do have a capable opposing military force with a direct interest in keeping those rocks. Best to assume just in case that the other guy might not know when to fold 'em. That goes both ways; they might not be intending to start a fight with us or the Japanese, but they'd be stupid not to procure at least some capability to strike at those bases. Overall though I think the point of that piece is to demonstrate that the PRC does not currently have the numbers of DF-21C and D missiles to effectively attack US assets in the area. This may be due to issues with the weapons themselves (as stated, we have yet to see any demonstration of the DF-21D being tested on a target at sea), issues with production or deployment, waiting to see what the US counter to a limited deployment of these weapons will be, or a decision not to provoke the US and other regional powers by deploying a crap-ton of MRBMs. I think the PRC gets the default bad-guy role among naval wargamers simply because it has the technology and resources to be dangerous now and even more dangerous in the future. Russia as stated earlier talks a big game but their capability to turn out and maintain new equipment - especially with the current drop in energy prices and the ongoing sanctions - is suspect. If Russia says it intends to field six aircraft carriers by 2030, I might give them a 5% or less chance of actually doing it. They can't even make good on overhauling the one carrier they have. If the PRC says it intends to field six aircraft carriers by 2030, I'd give them 50-50 odds of doing it and much better odds of getting at least 3 or 4 operational. They actually have the economy to play that game, even if they only intend to use it as a fleet in being. All naval history is a war near the shores of continents and islands. The principal mission of navies has been either to provide protection for transport and commerce or to protect seaborne invasion fleets. History records that all naval warfare occurred near focal points of maritime trade which means straits or approaches to major ports . The Shenkaku's and the Spratley's are no different and this historical fact is not lost on the Chinese, who are students of history. Here are two articles from the BBC that explain the significance of the two island groups better than I can.
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349
Do the Chinese realize the danger of pointing weapons at friendly nations? Well, we can never really know what a nation is really thinking, even intelligence agencies have to make a calculated guess based on real time intelligence and documents to make a judgment. Brinksmanship has been a normal business characteristic of geostrategy since the end of WWII. We and the Russians have done it continuously, and the Chinese have been secondary players. So I am certain they have a reasonably good idea of just how far to go.
As to the threat of the carriers, we only have two carrier battle groups deployed in the Pacific as of the 14th of November; the GW and Nimiz. We have two amphibious assault ships deployed in the Pacific; the Peleliu and Makin Island. This gives us a total of 85 times 2, for attack aircraft. That's about 170 aircraft. I think if I were the Chinese I would be more worried about B-2 Stealth bombers and missile submarines, than those 170 aircraft.
We currently have 14 Ohio class Trident missile submarines with 24 tubes per sub. That's about 336 missiles not counting the total number of warheads. If we deploy the older, Tomahawk missile boats, each of those can carry about 154 missiles. thirty of the LA class SSN's have 12 VLST's for firing Tomahawks. We also have the Seawolf class which can fire the missiles from their eight torpedo tubes. The 18 Virginia class subs carry twelve VLS tubes, and who knows how many Tomahawks they can shoot. The Tomahawks, depending on the block, have a range of between 1350 and 900 nautical miles. They can be equipped with submunitions, nuclear warhead or a conventional unitary 1000 lb. HE. They have three different guidance systems, which interact or can guide the missile independently. Realistically, if only a third of those boats are in the area, and the other third are available within days, that's far more firepower, that is harder to detect, and destroy than two carrier groups. Missiles don't need to be refueled. If we add in the surface ships and USAF bombers with standoff weapons, the carriers are not that important, in my opinion.
As I said, the Chinese have far more to worry about than a few carrier groups and bases.
FYI: The combat radius unrefueled for an F-18E/F is 420 nm. For the F-35C, internal fuel only, it's 1200 nm. Remember that's 210 miles or 600 miles out, and same back, and the carrier had better be close or you swim.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 16, 2014 19:23:30 GMT -6
Is that 1200 nm figure the unloaded range for the F-35C or with ~5,000 lbs of internal weapons? I have seen 1,200 nm listed as the maximum range on internal fuel and then 600 nm as the combat radius. Not sure if the latter figure is when operating with internal weapons only or when carrying external stores. I suspect 600 nm is the combat radius with a pair of 2,000-lb weapons and a pair of AIM-120s in the internal bays.
The inclusion of nuclear assets in your rundown there raises a really good point - for all the talk of targeting systems and using a maneuverable re-entry vehicle, the simplest and probably cheapest solution to the "how to kill a carrier with a ballistic missile" question is probably to use a nuke. We expected the Soviets would use nuclear-tipped AShMs and I would be surprised if the PRC has not explored the option of using a nuclear RV and just needing to get one warhead close enough. When a ballistic missile goes up, nukes are the first thought on everyone's mind. Whether or not there are nuclear-armed variants of the DF-21D, a launch is going to be perceived as a potential nuclear weapon release and may provoke a nuclear response. I'm thinking that short of all-out war, the PRC would be EXTREMELY hesitant to launch those missiles and the order to do so would come from fairly high up in the chain of command.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 16, 2014 20:01:22 GMT -6
Is that 1200 nm figure the unloaded range for the F-35C or with ~5,000 lbs of internal weapons? I have seen 1,200 nm listed as the maximum range on internal fuel and then 600 nm as the combat radius. Not sure if the latter figure is when operating with internal weapons only or when carrying external stores. I suspect 600 nm is the combat radius with a pair of 2,000-lb weapons and a pair of AIM-120s in the internal bays. The inclusion of nuclear assets in your rundown there raises a really good point - for all the talk of targeting systems and using a maneuverable re-entry vehicle, the simplest and probably cheapest solution to the "how to kill a carrier with a ballistic missile" question is probably to use a nuke. We expected the Soviets would use nuclear-tipped AShMs and I would be surprised if the PRC has not explored the option of using a nuclear RV and just needing to get one warhead close enough. When a ballistic missile goes up, nukes are the first thought on everyone's mind. Whether or not there are nuclear-armed variants of the DF-21D, a launch is going to be perceived as a potential nuclear weapon release and may provoke a nuclear response. I'm thinking that short of all-out war, the PRC would be EXTREMELY hesitant to launch those missiles and the order to do so would come from fairly high up in the chain of command. One of the problems with all these figures is that they don't define the mission profile and that has a big effect on combat radius. USN F-35C's use a H-H-H mission profile, but they have larger wings which means more drag and they are heavier than the A model. With that mission profile, you will get a good 610 miles +. Normal weapons load is two AIM-120's and 2 x 2000 lbs. JDAMs. The A model mission profiles can be H-L-L-H, H-M-M-H or any combination. These mission profiles will use more fuel due to the need for frequent climbs, that will consume more fuel. Fuel consumption at higher altitudes is less, as you might expect.
The real point is that the range of carrier based aircraft is limited, this puts aircraft at risk. A submarine can sneak into a good range, fire its missiles and sneak out, even if the opponent finally gets a fix on them.
As to the issue of missile launches, I agree that the PRC had better be in a position to provide tight controls over ballistic missiles, or all hell will break out.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 28, 2014 13:01:46 GMT -6
Figured I would post this here for discussion: www.defensenews.com/article/20141117/DEFSECT03/311170019/Surface-Ships-Need-More-Offensive-Punch-OutlookPersonally, I'm not crazy about the idea and think it smacks somewhat of career surface officers "wanting in on the kill." If you're going to get into a missile fight with other surface targets that have capable weapons, you want to be shooting from a platform that is hard to counterdetect and engage. A $1.8 billion-plus Tico or Burke is not that platform. An aircraft, sub, or small stealthy surface craft is. And the fool who would base his defenses on the premise of being able to stop incoming missile salvos at a range of 30 nm or less (or assumes that his "offensive" strategy means he won't get shot at in the first place) has no business running a fleet. Also as we have discussed, said surface platforms will have difficulty engaging targets at long (~250+ mile) range without accurate targeting support from air or satellite assets.
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Post by sirchaos on Nov 29, 2014 9:56:35 GMT -6
Not to mention the economics are flawed, too - shooting two 4 million dollar SAMs at a 2.5 million dollar SSM may seem like a poor trade, but expending two 4 million dollars SAMs to protect a 1 billion dollar surface ship (or 10 billion dollar aircraft carrier) is a very sound decision.
It is of course always better to engage the launch platform before it can launch, so that a single of your missiles can potentially knock out several enemy missiles, but with increasing range of ASM and SSM, it seems obvious that the ability of surfaces ships to do so on their own is reaching its limits - if it hasn´t done so already long ago (against the Tu-22M/AS-4 combo).
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 29, 2014 10:49:23 GMT -6
I think the logic there is that the other guy can build and launch double the number of $2.5 million AShMs than you have $4 million SAMs - but relying on a large number of cheaper, shorter-range weapons to stop them at a range where you only have seconds to engage is not the answer. As with an antiship ballistic missile, shooting it down is the hard way; ideally you want to prevent the launch platform from obtaining a firing solution and give yourself time to kill it first. This is why surface ships are a poor SUW option if your opponent has good sensors and weapons; unless you have an AShM that significantly outranges your opponent's weapons you put your own ship in position to be fired upon.
Even if you do have a long-range 250 nm missile, I can probably take the same missile and put it on an aircraft that has a combat radius of 400 to 600 nm. The aircraft will have a longer striking range since it's dropping the missile from altitude and giving it a 400+ knot starting push. The aircraft will be harder to detect, harder to engage, can scoot out of trouble more quickly, and if worst comes to worst I'm out a pilot and $50-$100 million in hardware rather than 100+ sailors and close to $2 billion. Or I can shoot it from a submarine that will be nigh-impossible to find and shoot back at.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 29, 2014 15:18:37 GMT -6
The real problem for the USN is trying to determine what their mission is; sea control/sea denial which is traditional, anti-piracy, BMD or any number of missions that can be presented. The main document states this up front in the executive summary. It seems to me, the Navy hasn’t really settled on the answer or answers, hence the difficulty determining whether air or surface forces will get the lion’s share of the funding. Do surface ships need more punch? Well, it depends on the missions assigned. If it is the traditional landing operations, then I would say that the USAF has much better capability of attacking ground targets in support of landing operations than the USN. If it is sea control/sea denial then submarines can be of great assistance and may have the edge. They can strike from afar, hit airbases and missile launch facilities stealth fully, retire quickly to reload and reassess the situation.
All in all, what I continually see is the idea that we can eliminate losses. You can’t, this is war and losses will occur, the object is to reduce the losses to an acceptable level. Now that is the issue; what is acceptable. From what I can see, for the US nation, none is the acceptable level. What do we need to achieve that level; perfect weapons and tactics? The problem with that is we are dealing with human controls that mean mistakes. Do we need more surface weapons to protect the carrier battle groups? Sure we do. We also need more airborne weapons to protect the carriers. But all this sounds defensive to me, isn’t the job of the carrier battle groups; to take and hold control of areas, to defeat enemy surface and subsurface naval weapons? You need more offensive weapons not more defensive weapons for that. The pot is not bottomless in this. If you increase funding for surface ships and their defensive armament, then offensive weapons like drones, F-35's, missiles all suffer. Another area that suffers is O&M,N, or operations and maintenance Navy. It does no good to spend all this money on these fancy ships and weapons if the O&M,N fund is so meager that regular maintenance and depot repairs go right out the door. Aircraft in combat put over ten times the flight hours on their structures that peacetime aircraft do. This happens to all weapons systems, in combat. I saw nothing in these reports about how maintenance was going to be accomplished if we spend more money on fancy weapons. We don't have the money to fix the systems we have now, let alone add to them.
Here is the 2015 Navy Budget with O&M, Navy, R&D, MILPERS, Procurement and infrastructure. navylive.dodlive.mil/2014/03/04/navy-fy15-budget-preserving-presence-and-warfighting-capability/
BTW, my estimate, based on at least six articles is that the Aegis carries about 60 surface to air missiles for each MK41 launcher. Another piece of information that isn't usually mentioned is that there is no established configuration for a carrier strike group. In other words, it might have one Aegis cruiser or more, depending on the mission. The same goes for all other ships in the force. In San Diego, we have about seven Aegis cruisers. Pearl has three, Japan has two. Let's see, that's twelve in all. There are five Nimitz class carriers in San Diego. We have over fourteen Arleigh Burkes. See the point here, carrier strike groups might leave San Diego with one Aegis and accumulate a few more on the way to their mission area, who knows?
See
Take a good look. Where do we get the money to build all those extra ships and missile systems? MILPERS, R & D, infrastructure. If you don't do R & D, you don't get new systems in a timely manner. If you neglect infrastructure and MILPERS, retention of experienced people declines. The author doesn't seem to address any of these, or did I miss something.
BTW, if you are concerned about using up your missiles, then reduce the number of missiles that might be launched and/or reduce the number that can find you. This means destroy or disable launchers, weapons storage and targeting systems. This might be the cheapest method; use sub launched missiles, drones, or ECM.
This is the way I see it.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 29, 2014 21:16:37 GMT -6
The CG-47s and DDG-51s were designed to fight saturation air attacks. Yes, they have ASW and ASUW capabilities, but nothing that an FFG-7 or for that matter tricked-out LCS can't equal or better. Those big radars aren't going to make them more effective at shooting surface targets over the horizon. They can carry more offensive weapons than a smaller platform, but at the expense of the role they were born to fill - guarding a carrier, amphib, or other asset that you absolutely cannot afford to take a hit on. They will also be bigger targets and having one take a hit will be a greater loss.
I agree that "zero losses" is an unattainable goal. That's why war is something to be avoided unless you have no other option; **** happens when ordnance starts flying. The best you can do is have multiple redundant ways of preventing the other guy from getting a lucky shot in, and try not to unduly risk mission-critical units.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 29, 2014 22:16:11 GMT -6
The CG-47s and DDG-51s were designed to fight saturation air attacks. Yes, they have ASW and ASUW capabilities, but nothing that an FFG-7 or for that matter tricked-out LCS can't equal or better. Those big radars aren't going to make them more effective at shooting surface targets over the horizon. They can carry more offensive weapons than a smaller platform, but at the expense of the role they were born to fill - guarding a carrier, amphib, or other asset that you absolutely cannot afford to take a hit on. They will also be bigger targets and having one take a hit will be a greater loss. I agree that "zero losses" is an unattainable goal. That's why war is something to be avoided unless you have no other option; **** happens when ordnance starts flying. The best you can do is have multiple redundant ways of preventing the other guy from getting a lucky shot in, and try not to unduly risk mission-critical units. The problem with your scenario is that the FFG-7 has half the beam and two thirds the length of an Aegis destroyer. They are a 4,600 ton ship against a 10,500 ton ship and this translates into carrying capacity. The FFG's have only two LM2500's whereas the Aegis destroyers have four, giving them far more power, nearly 100,000 SHP. They are so limited that they cannot be upgraded with any new weapons and simply add more targets in an already target rich environment. Funding will not allow single purpose ships, they must be multi-mission, which is why I don't particularly believe that the LCS is a viable platform. The Aegis platforms allows us the space to add weaponry and sensors to improve their capability. My guess, although I don't have any supportable facts, is that the radar signature of an FFG is not that much smaller than an Aegis destroyer, its all in how you build the superstructure. I don't seriously believe that they are bigger targets, maybe in physical size, but radar size is what is important.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 30, 2014 2:49:47 GMT -6
I was using the FFG-7 as an example - until we get a standoff AShM for the Mk-41 VLS, the Aegis ships are not a significant improvement over the FFG-7s in terms of Harpoon loadout. Up to 8 Harpoons in Mk-141 quad launchers versus whatever Harpoons the FFG-7s could carry in the magazine for the Mk-13. Currently a moot point, since the Harpoon launchers have been pulled from most if not all of the Aegis ships and the few remaining FFG-7s have had their Mk-13 launchers removed. The Aegis ships do currently have dual-capable Standard missiles, but that's not trading off AAW capability for standoff SUW.
The question is how much carrying capacity do you need to execute the SUW mission. Is it going to be similar to how we've loaded out Harpoons - 4-8 missiles per ship, for use in destroying lone targets or adding some additional wallop to a CVW strike? Or are we going on the old Soviet model of saturation attacks, with large surface combatants carrying 12-20 AShMs and swarming heavily defended targets? Do we expect those platforms to "shoot and scoot," or will they be loitering in the combat area to engage targets as they come up? Can we split the weapon load over a couple of smaller platforms? I think you should be able to get at least 4 AShMs on an LCS - if not the LRASM, perhaps the Naval Strike Missile, which has been test-fired from an LCS. Four missile-armed LCS hulls equals up to 16 AShMs. Sensors aren't a big issue; even a DDG-51 will need off-board help to find a target over the horizon.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 30, 2014 8:36:13 GMT -6
I was using the FFG-7 as an example - until we get a standoff AShM for the Mk-41 VLS, the Aegis ships are not a significant improvement over the FFG-7s in terms of Harpoon loadout. Up to 8 Harpoons in Mk-141 quad launchers versus whatever Harpoons the FFG-7s could carry in the magazine for the Mk-13. Currently a moot point, since the Harpoon launchers have been pulled from most if not all of the Aegis ships and the few remaining FFG-7s have had their Mk-13 launchers removed. The Aegis ships do currently have dual-capable Standard missiles, but that's not trading off AAW capability for standoff SUW. The question is how much carrying capacity do you need to execute the SUW mission. Is it going to be similar to how we've loaded out Harpoons - 4-8 missiles per ship, for use in destroying lone targets or adding some additional wallop to a CVW strike? Or are we going on the old Soviet model of saturation attacks, with large surface combatants carrying 12-20 AShMs and swarming heavily defended targets? Do we expect those platforms to "shoot and scoot," or will they be loitering in the combat area to engage targets as they come up? Can we split the weapon load over a couple of smaller platforms? I think you should be able to get at least 4 AShMs on an LCS - if not the LRASM, perhaps the Naval Strike Missile, which has been test-fired from an LCS. Four missile-armed LCS hulls equals up to 16 AShMs. Sensors aren't a big issue; even a DDG-51 will need off-board help to find a target over the horizon. Here is an article that details the Ticonderoga class ships, from this it appears they have adequate capability. Now if we include air launched harpoons and other surface units, I believe that we have enough capability with the carrier strike groups.
www.naval-technology.com/projects/ticonderoga/
Here is an article on the Arleigh Burke class - www.naval-technology.com/projects/burke/
In answer to your question; how much carrying capacity, we need to define some parameters.
1. What is the target? Major warships, coastal craft, missile boats?
2. Who are we fighting? Chinese, North Korean, Iranians, Russians, Syrians. Each has their own capability and problems
3. Where are we fighting? Enclosed sea, littoral zone of a continent, open ocean, narrow passages like Hormuz, Malacca.
4. Why are we engaging these forces? Sea communications, land support, etc.
Each of these scenarios will have different mission requirements. Do we have friendly forces to assist?
All these and more will establish how we equip our forces.
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