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Post by steel selachian on Feb 25, 2014 20:56:50 GMT -6
Shifted from the LCS tangent in the F-35 thread: LCS is a hard one to judge; it really comes down to whether or not one plans to put it unsupported on the front lines of an all-out fight against a top-tier adversary. If you expect it to have the fighting power of an FFG-7, then it's a lousy idea. If you expect it to be a 40-knot minesweeper/subchaser/mini-LPD to either serve as a USN presence in low-risk areas (alongside say Maritime Sealift Command's force of Joint High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing Platforms - medium.com/war-is-boring/dfad249c4dfc) or as second-line support for CSGs and ESGs, then it may work out. Unlike the F-35, it was never meant to serve as a first-rate puncher capable of handling the toughest adversaries. medium.com/war-is-boring/ebf51ce106feI'm a bit concerned at the DoD's idea to develop a new FFG class to replace the last 20 LCS hulls. Assuming they decide to go with a militarized variant of the Huntington Ingalls National Security Cutter, you're looking at a vessel that currently - without VLS, Harpoon launchers, a 76mm gun, combat systems, or the other bells and whistles - costs the USCG $700 million per copy. It may not be farfetched to assume an FFG version might hit or exceed the $1 billion mark. For 20 of those FFGs, you could buy 30-40 LCS hulls or 10 additional DDGs. For that matter, you could buy another 20 LCS hulls and sink the rest of the money into developing some better SUW modules for them. I'm not entirely convinced about the whole "survivability" argument. If a 3,000-4,500 ton surface combatant takes a hit from a modern AShM, torpedo, or mine, it is going to be hurt no matter what material the hull is made out of. If it can't escape and the enemy attack continues, it will probably be sunk unless it has backup.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 25, 2014 23:06:55 GMT -6
Shifted from the LCS tangent in the F-35 thread: LCS is a hard one to judge; it really comes down to whether or not one plans to put it unsupported on the front lines of an all-out fight against a top-tier adversary. If you expect it to have the fighting power of an FFG-7, then it's a lousy idea. If you expect it to be a 40-knot minesweeper/subchaser/mini-LPD to either serve as a USN presence in low-risk areas (alongside say Maritime Sealift Command's force of Joint High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing Platforms - medium.com/war-is-boring/dfad249c4dfc) or as second-line support for CSGs and ESGs, then it may work out. Unlike the F-35, it was never meant to serve as a first-rate puncher capable of handling the toughest adversaries. medium.com/war-is-boring/ebf51ce106feI'm a bit concerned at the DoD's idea to develop a new FFG class to replace the last 20 LCS hulls. Assuming they decide to go with a militarized variant of the Huntington Ingalls National Security Cutter, you're looking at a vessel that currently - without VLS, Harpoon launchers, a 76mm gun, combat systems, or the other bells and whistles - costs the USCG $700 million per copy. It may not be farfetched to assume an FFG version might hit or exceed the $1 billion mark. For 20 of those FFGs, you could buy 30-40 LCS hulls or 10 additional DDGs. For that matter, you could buy another 20 LCS hulls and sink the rest of the money into developing some better SUW modules for them. I'm not entirely convinced about the whole "survivability" argument. If a 3,000-4,500 ton surface combatant takes a hit from a modern AShM, torpedo, or mine, it is going to be hurt no matter what material the hull is made out of. If it can't escape and the enemy attack continues, it will probably be sunk unless it has backup. I decided that rather than bore you, I thought I would let Dr. Milan Vego's article in the U.S. Naval Institute for September 2009 say it for me. The opening paragraph says it all for me.
www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-09/no-need-high-speed
Another, more recent article - www.armedforcesjournal.com/go-smaller-time-for-the-navy-to-get-serious-about-the-littorals/
BTW: Dr. Vego has written a very good book titled "Naval Strategy and Combat Operations in Narrow Seas". I have it in front of me, wish it was in Ereader format.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 1, 2014 23:45:11 GMT -6
Regarding the latter article, the "smaller is better" argument falls flat to me. One of the facets of US Navy operations for the past 100+ years has been range. Unlike many of our adversaries, we have the luxury of being a long ways across the water from potential enemies and our strategy is not formulated around home-court engagements. The downside to that is we have to travel a long ways to get to the fight. That means a long unrefueled range and good seakeeping characteristics are historical must-haves for a USN combatant. A small, fast, shallow-draft vessel with significant combat capability displacing no more than 500-2000 tons is not likely to have those characteristics when transiting blue water. It will need refueling support to get across the pond and then it's dependent on a friendly base close to the operational area, which is vulnerable to attack.
The other facet is that typically, if the other guy is trying to get you to play by his rules on his home court, don't oblige him. In this case, our adversaries would like nothing better than to get US warships in shallow, confined waters where they can be swarmed by multiple threats. The argument behind small combatants is to enter that game on an even field (probably outnumbered and outgunned), on the basis that losing a few PCFGs and their crews hurts less than losing a larger combatant. I would much rather not play that game and use ISR assets, aircraft, and standoff weapons to turn the littorals into the proverbial barrel full of fish from a comfortable distance.
Also, note that the piece specifies that this force will need carrier air cover to survive. Sooo ... in order for this short-legged outboard navy not to get blown out of the water while doing a Leeroy Jenkins right into the heart of their well-prepared killzone, I have to put the crown jewel of my fleet within striking range anyway. Why don't I just skip the part where I send in boats and let the flyboys handle the task of sweeping the seas?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 2, 2014 9:09:22 GMT -6
First, with your background, you and I both know that trying to describe littoral combat zones as having a set of common characteristics is futile and developing platforms to operate in them, is a daunting task. They are all different and they are areas, where frankly, the US Navy would really like to stay out of. The US Navy has nightmares dating back to Guadalcanal and the Solomon's campaign of 1942-1943. His statement in the last article, "If the littorals are truly the theater of future naval conflict" speaks volumes about the US Navy and its attitude. It is my true belief, that the US Navy is hoping that this problem goes away and that it will get to focus on the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, places where US Navy doctrine is much more adaptable. The LCS appears to me, to be a mix between destroyers and small boats with the hope that it can be used with the battle groups as a scout or mine warfare ship, nothing else. I do not believe that the US Navy has fully embraced the idea of fighting in the Littoral zones.
We need to look at naval history in the past. In the Solomon's, the Navy reluctantly embraced the patrol torpedo boat, because it realized that it really could conduct antishipping operations and scouting in those waters with it current class of ships. However, as soon as that campaign ended, the Navy put those ships aside. In Vietnam, it realized the need for the Patrol Boat River or PBR, it didn't like them or want them, but they were necessary to conduct similar types of operations as in the Solomon's. However, as soon as the war ended, PBR's went away. Remember the PHM Pegasus class of hydrofoil boats? Built to operate in coastal waters and equipped to fulfill the missions of destroyers and frigates in littoral zones. The last boat was decommissioned in the 1993, If I remember. Pegasus lasted from 1977, to that year, less than 16 years.
The point is that the LCS is nothing new to the US Navy and the US Navy doesn't do patrol boats, coastal boats or Littoral Combat Ships. However, the Navy will not leave this one alone, which they should. They will build a few and then Congress will step in and eliminate funding. The few built will sail around the ports of the US and possible operate on disasters, then they will quietly go away. The Navy will be back to its bread and butter, blue water Mahanian style decisive battles.
I believe that SECDEF Hagel and the Congress have already started this process of examining the requirements and possibly modifying the current ships. The Navy will have to reexamine it NWP-1 and determine if there are alternatives to sending the fleet into some of the waters that the LCS was designed to operate in.
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf - I haven't had the opportunity to read this, I am babysitting this morning so I will be busy. I will try to get to it later in the day when my wife is here.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 2, 2014 10:36:08 GMT -6
Have some things on my plate today, but I did manage to skim over a portion of it. This quote here from Page 21 sums up much of my attitude towards LCS:
"Although there may be alternative potential ways to perform the LCSs’ three primary missions of countering mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines, particularly in littoral waters, the LCS program was devised specifically to address these three capability gaps and remains the most economical way of addressing them. Critics of the LCS program cannot point to a rigorous study that shows a more cost effective way for performing these three primary missions. Extending the lives of existing mine warfare ships and mine warfare helicopters for more than a few years may not be feasible, and the LCS can perform the mission more effectively. Other types of ships, such as cruisers and destroyers, are already fully occupied performing their own missions; assigning LCS missions to these ships would reduce their capacity for performing their core missions."
I think certain heads in the Navy are realizing that they have a lot of jobs to do around the world, and not all of them require the touch of an Aegis ship, large amphib, or carrier. In fact, as stated earlier the Navy seems to be making a serious investment in outfitting Maritime Sealift Command with what amounts to a second amphibious force; the second two MLPs will essentially be mini-LPH vessels. Using platforms like LCS, JHSV, and MLP to backfill a lot of the routine jobs means the Navy can consolidate the CGs and DDGs; for instance there are plans afoot to enlarge the escort force for CSGs and ESGs. I think they realize that unless they have those vessels covering the little stuff, their blue-water Mahanian ops will be confounded by the frontline ships being spread too thin around the world monitoring brushfires. That is a lesson from WWII; the ungodly amount of striking power available to the US Pacific Fleet was greatly helped by the escort carriers and destroyer escorts taking up the backfield jobs. The USN may also be looking at the heat the USAF has taken over the years by spending much of their budget on programs like the F-22 and F-35, where the very expensive hardware sits around waiting for a major conflict and being too valuable to risk in a brush war.
LCS and the whole idea of "fighting in the littorals" can probably be viewed through the prism of the 1990s and early 2000s. At that point, we had no major blue-water threats and the Navy's future looked to be striking weakly-defended targets ashore and supporting Marines. If you can't play a part in today's fights, you're at a disadvantage in the budget battles. After that, Afghanistan and Iraq soured us on the idea of putting people and equipment in places where even an unsophisticated enemy could inflict damage, and the PRC significantly increased its naval capabilities and regional ambitions.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 3, 2014 14:45:31 GMT -6
Have some things on my plate today, but I did manage to skim over a portion of it. This quote here from Page 21 sums up much of my attitude towards LCS: "Although there may be alternative potential ways to perform the LCSs’ three primary missions of countering mines, small boats, and diesel-electric submarines, particularly in littoral waters, the LCS program was devised specifically to address these three capability gaps and remains the most economical way of addressing them. Critics of the LCS program cannot point to a rigorous study that shows a more cost effective way for performing these three primary missions. Extending the lives of existing mine warfare ships and mine warfare helicopters for more than a few years may not be feasible, and the LCS can perform the mission more effectively. Other types of ships, such as cruisers and destroyers, are already fully occupied performing their own missions; assigning LCS missions to these ships would reduce their capacity for performing their core missions." I think certain heads in the Navy are realizing that they have a lot of jobs to do around the world, and not all of them require the touch of an Aegis ship, large amphib, or carrier. In fact, as stated earlier the Navy seems to be making a serious investment in outfitting Maritime Sealift Command with what amounts to a second amphibious force; the second two MLPs will essentially be mini-LPH vessels. Using platforms like LCS, JHSV, and MLP to backfill a lot of the routine jobs means the Navy can consolidate the CGs and DDGs; for instance there are plans afoot to enlarge the escort force for CSGs and ESGs. I think they realize that unless they have those vessels covering the little stuff, their blue-water Mahanian ops will be confounded by the frontline ships being spread too thin around the world monitoring brushfires. That is a lesson from WWII; the ungodly amount of striking power available to the US Pacific Fleet was greatly helped by the escort carriers and destroyer escorts taking up the backfield jobs. The USN may also be looking at the heat the USAF has taken over the years by spending much of their budget on programs like the F-22 and F-35, where the very expensive hardware sits around waiting for a major conflict and being too valuable to risk in a brush war. LCS and the whole idea of "fighting in the littorals" can probably be viewed through the prism of the 1990s and early 2000s. At that point, we had no major blue-water threats and the Navy's future looked to be striking weakly-defended targets ashore and supporting Marines. If you can't play a part in today's fights, you're at a disadvantage in the budget battles. After that, Afghanistan and Iraq soured us on the idea of putting people and equipment in places where even an unsophisticated enemy could inflict damage, and the PRC significantly increased its naval capabilities and regional ambitions. One of the issues that I have with the LCS, is that it is not well equipped for a slugging match. If you head into the areas it is designed to operate, you have to bring along an array of weaponry and relying on the bigger ships to protect you could lead to disaster. The Navy's whole plan is that this ship will have protection on the water, under the water and above, so it can do its job. The issue is timing, how fast can we get help to these ships before they get sunk. Don't tell me we will have constant LCS CAP's over them because it isn't going to happen. We will not risk nuclear submarines so the only thing we can do is send in some frigates and destroyers. Those are very expensive and valuable ships. The fleet commander is not going to strip himself of escorts to protect that overgrown underarmed speedboat. Speed alone will not save this boat. It can't outrun missiles. Another concern is logistics. These ships are small with small crews. They do not have large hulls for the storage of spares and crew support. I need to research the length of time that these ships can stay in action and can they be UNREP'd, I am certain that they can and maybe with helicopters.
The CRS piece has one section that I totally agree with and here it is:
This is how I feel. Has the Navy done its homework?
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 3, 2014 20:27:52 GMT -6
Again, I think the issue I see is that folks are expecting LCS to perform in an environment where it will need heavily-armed escorts - racing into North Korean waters to duke it out with missile-armed FACs or getting in scraps with Chinese frigates. Not every naval deployment features sophisticated armed opposition; in fact a lot of them don't. We recently had an FFG-7 deploy to the Black Sea as a security/evac measure for the Sochi Olympics, where it ran aground and had to limp to Turkey for repairs - gee, maybe a shallower-draft vessel would have been better? We have a standing maritime security deployment off the Horn of Africa facing pirates in speedboats. FFG-7s are used in the Caribbean to interdict drug smugglers. Even the prospect of a conflict with Iran in the Persian Gulf features more threats from mines, armed speedboats, and primitive submersibles that sophisticated AShMs. We could - as we do now - fill these assignments with capable frontline combatants, which is gross overkill and reduces the amount of firepower we can bring to bear in other, more dangerous areas. While I'm sure the Navy would like to have another 50 DDG-51s for those jobs, that's not going to happen. Where LCS does appear in more contested areas, I don't see it being escorted by other ships so much as it escorting them in the minesweeper/ASW role. I do not see a reason for LCS to go into a contested littoral area unless there is a requirement for higher-value surface combatants or amphibs to go there anyway.
Long story short, maybe it was a mistake to have embarked on this program without a full analysis of mission needs, although quite frankly mines, diesel-electric subs, and small boats have been obvious and common threats since the 1980s. However, we're getting at least 32 of these vessels (and I'm betting that while the Navy will look at the frigate suggestions, given the investment in LCS and the current budget climate they will opt for another two dozen LCS hulls, possibly with improvements). Like it or not, we'll have to find ways to employ them effectively, and I think we will.
As a further note, how much more bite will a proposed frigate have? Let's say we go with the proposed stats for the militarized National Security Cutter - 12 VLS cells, 8 Harpoon canisters, and a 76mm Oto Melara gun. If you expect it to enter a "high-intensity" combat zone without serious backup, I'm betting most if not all of the VLS cells will be quad-packed with ESSMs, which gives it a credible self-defense capability at the expense of carrying any SUW, ASW, or strike weapons. Even if you loaded half the cells with AShMs or Tomahawks, it won't carry any more punch than a flight of F/A-18s, although it will have a longer reach. It will also probably not be particularly effective at covering other ships from a determined attack. Harpoon has all but been retired from the surface fleet. The 76mm gun has more reach and punch than the 57mm on the LCS, but I still wouldn't advise slugging it out with a surface combatant that can actually shoot back. On top of that, while it will probably have decent ASW capabilities, it may not be effective as a minesweeper. So to sum up, it will be able to defend itself better, not have much better offensive capabilities (which is the whole reason for putting a warship in harm's way), and may not be able to fulfill some of the functions of LCS, all for about twice the price per hull.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 3, 2014 21:05:08 GMT -6
Again, I think the issue I see is that folks are expecting LCS to perform in an environment where it will need heavily-armed escorts - racing into North Korean waters to duke it out with missile-armed FACs or getting in scraps with Chinese frigates. Not every naval deployment features sophisticated armed opposition; in fact a lot of them don't. We recently had an FFG-7 deploy to the Black Sea as a security/evac measure for the Sochi Olympics, where it ran aground and had to limp to Turkey for repairs - gee, maybe a shallower-draft vessel would have been better? We have a standing maritime security deployment off the Horn of Africa facing pirates in speedboats. FFG-7s are used in the Caribbean to interdict drug smugglers. Even the prospect of a conflict with Iran in the Persian Gulf features more threats from mines, armed speedboats, and primitive submersibles that sophisticated AShMs. We could - as we do now - fill these assignments with capable frontline combatants, which is gross overkill and reduces the amount of firepower we can bring to bear in other, more dangerous areas. While I'm sure the Navy would like to have another 50 DDG-51s for those jobs, that's not going to happen. Where LCS does appear in more contested areas, I don't see it being escorted by other ships so much as it escorting them in the minesweeper/ASW role. I do not see a reason for LCS to go into a contested littoral area unless there is a requirement for higher-value surface combatants or amphibs to go there anyway. Long story short, maybe it was a mistake to have embarked on this program without a full analysis of mission needs, although quite frankly mines, diesel-electric subs, and small boats have been obvious and common threats since the 1980s. However, we're getting at least 32 of these vessels (and I'm betting that while the Navy will look at the frigate suggestions, given the investment in LCS and the current budget climate they will opt for another two dozen LCS hulls, possibly with improvements). Like it or not, we'll have to find ways to employ them effectively, and I think we will. As a further note, how much more bite will a proposed frigate have? Let's say we go with the proposed stats for the militarized National Security Cutter - 12 VLS cells, 8 Harpoon canisters, and a 76mm Oto Melara gun. If you expect it to enter a "high-intensity" combat zone without serious backup, I'm betting most if not all of the VLS cells will be quad-packed with ESSMs, which gives it a credible self-defense capability at the expense of carrying any SUW, ASW, or strike weapons. Even if you loaded half the cells with AShMs or Tomahawks, it won't carry any more punch than a flight of F/A-18s, although it will have a longer reach. It will also probably not be particularly effective at covering other ships from a determined attack. Harpoon has all but been retired from the surface fleet. The 76mm gun has more reach and punch than the 57mm on the LCS, but I still wouldn't advise slugging it out with a surface combatant that can actually shoot back. On top of that, while it will probably have decent ASW capabilities, it may not be effective as a minesweeper. So to sum up, it will be able to defend itself better, not have much better offensive capabilities (which is the whole reason for putting a warship in harm's way), and may not be able to fulfill some of the functions of LCS, all for about twice the price per hull. You can't pick your battlefields and fights, Steel. You may not have good intel on what is facing you. You think your sending this boat into quiet waters and suddenly your facing heavily armed missile boats, diesel submarines and a sea full of mines, it happens and then this boat has to be covered with air support, and ships. We don't always have perfect intelligence, in fact we usually don't even have good intelligence. Even FFG-7s can get in over their heads, this is why we have super carriers with large air wings, LHDs and the USAF to cover the area and gain air supremacy. The first action that will be taken is to hit any port that has military weaponry floating in it. However, some of that will be at sea, so now we have to go hunting for them. I agree we have 32 of these ships, so let's use them. How about turning them over to the Coasties, and let them go after drug runners and such; station some of them near Somalia and chase the pirates. Let's quit worrying about Iranian speedboats. The Russians, Swedes and other nations have managed to build similar boats, with more firepower and a little less speed. Why can't we do that? The days of the 600 ship fleet are long over, the ships you deploy had better be well armed because "you won with what you brung", as we used to say. Remember that you can't do 45 knots in every kind of sea state and the strain on engines and hulls is enormous. These boats are already experiencing those problems especially with hull cracking and engines problems. This will impact maintenance and if they find that they can't do 45 knots, then the ship is now under-gunned and the speed everyone counted on has now evaporated.
I don't mean to sound harsh, but we are sending kids out there in these overgrown, unarmed and under protected speed boats with a pop gun with a range of about 18 miles if they are lucky against boats and aircraft that have missiles with a range of over 100 miles.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 4, 2014 21:39:49 GMT -6
Just some more observations. Here is something from a Pentagon document: This quote is from the Pentagon's director of Operational Test and Evaluation(DOT&E).
From other documents, the Navy engineered the two ships for "Level 1 survivability" Which means that they are expected to operate in the "least severe combat environment and not expected to fight hurt" A level 1 ship, if damaged, will sink but will last long enough for the crew to get off. Wonderful, and then what do they do, if they survive the impact of the weapons. BTW, all other navy ships are engineered for Level 3 or the ability to take severe damage, not sink, put out the fires and keep shooting and steaming. (the last are not my words, but believe I indicated this in earlier posts)". Remember the HMS Sheffield, one Exocet and poof, it was a flaming torch. On the other hand, the Stark, a Perry class frigate took two and survived. I say this again, how can we send our kids out on these flimsy craft? The Freedom's have, reportedly no reserve buoyancy. The Indy's have some, but not much.
Here is another issue. If these are patrol boats, then how can we justify 3500 miles at 18 knots, on her diesels. If she goes to 40 knots or better, she can steam for half a day then she's a raft. One more comment. If these ships are going to be MCM's, doesn't mine hunting and destruction usually take place at slow speeds near coastlines and shallow waters and aren't those some of the most dangerous waters in the world? And we are sending a ship with a level 1 survivability into them. I will let the armament issue go, even Perry's were not armed well so the LCS's aren't any different..
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Post by sirchaos on Mar 5, 2014 9:11:48 GMT -6
Maybe it´s just me, but I am beginning to doubt the qualifications of whoever drew up the specifications for these LCS.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 5, 2014 10:33:03 GMT -6
Maybe it´s just me, but I am beginning to doubt the qualifications of whoever drew up the specifications for these LCS. Naval weapons design and development is based on a proper and complete assessment of naval strategy and its tactical requirements. Without a complete assessment, the LCS is what you get. The Navy did not "do diligence" as we say. It might have overreacted to the move from blue water navy to littoral zone which is where most traditional naval warfare has occurred. The whole process is at fault, not just one person or team.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 6, 2014 15:55:17 GMT -6
Just some more observations. Here is something from a Pentagon document: This quote is from the Pentagon's director of Operational Test and Evaluation(DOT&E).
From other documents, the Navy engineered the two ships for "Level 1 survivability" Which means that they are expected to operate in the "least severe combat environment and not expected to fight hurt" A level 1 ship, if damaged, will sink but will last long enough for the crew to get off. Wonderful, and then what do they do, if they survive the impact of the weapons. BTW, all other navy ships are engineered for Level 3 or the ability to take severe damage, not sink, put out the fires and keep shooting and steaming. (the last are not my words, but believe I indicated this in earlier posts)". Remember the HMS Sheffield, one Exocet and poof, it was a flaming torch. On the other hand, the Stark, a Perry class frigate took two and survived. I say this again, how can we send our kids out on these flimsy craft? The Freedom's have, reportedly no reserve buoyancy. The Indy's have some, but not much.
Here is another issue. If these are patrol boats, then how can we justify 3500 miles at 18 knots, on her diesels. If she goes to 40 knots or better, she can steam for half a day then she's a raft. One more comment. If these ships are going to be MCM's, doesn't mine hunting and destruction usually take place at slow speeds near coastlines and shallow waters and aren't those some of the most dangerous waters in the world? And we are sending a ship with a level 1 survivability into them. I will let the armament issue go, even Perry's were not armed well so the LCS's aren't any different..
The FFG-7s are actually rated at Level 2 survivability. Stark and Samuel B. Roberts did survive some bad hits, but I doubt they were combat capable afterwards. Stark was fighting onboard fires for 24 hours (one of the missiles was a dud, although it did spew rocket fuel and start a fire) and Samuel B. Roberts was lucky not to have been sunk as her keel was snapped. In either case, had they been under a continued attack both ships would likely have been lost. LCS I believe is rated as a Level 1+; between a Level 1 minesweeper or other auxiliary and an FFG-7. I think with LCS we have a lot of valid critiques about what it can't do and what went wrong with the process. The interesting thing will be to find out what it can do.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 6, 2014 16:56:40 GMT -6
Just some more observations. Here is something from a Pentagon document: This quote is from the Pentagon's director of Operational Test and Evaluation(DOT&E).
From other documents, the Navy engineered the two ships for "Level 1 survivability" Which means that they are expected to operate in the "least severe combat environment and not expected to fight hurt" A level 1 ship, if damaged, will sink but will last long enough for the crew to get off. Wonderful, and then what do they do, if they survive the impact of the weapons. BTW, all other navy ships are engineered for Level 3 or the ability to take severe damage, not sink, put out the fires and keep shooting and steaming. (the last are not my words, but believe I indicated this in earlier posts)". Remember the HMS Sheffield, one Exocet and poof, it was a flaming torch. On the other hand, the Stark, a Perry class frigate took two and survived. I say this again, how can we send our kids out on these flimsy craft? The Freedom's have, reportedly no reserve buoyancy. The Indy's have some, but not much.
Here is another issue. If these are patrol boats, then how can we justify 3500 miles at 18 knots, on her diesels. If she goes to 40 knots or better, she can steam for half a day then she's a raft. One more comment. If these ships are going to be MCM's, doesn't mine hunting and destruction usually take place at slow speeds near coastlines and shallow waters and aren't those some of the most dangerous waters in the world? And we are sending a ship with a level 1 survivability into them. I will let the armament issue go, even Perry's were not armed well so the LCS's aren't any different..
...... I think with LCS we have a lot of valid critiques about what it can't do and what went wrong with the process. The interesting thing will be to find out what it can do. The only problem with that idea is that we are not the ones that will have to go out into dangerous waters and find out what it will do or will not do. Our current lack of ships puts us into a position of not having the luxury of a failed system. A fleet commander is not going to risk his high value ships to protect this oversized canoe.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 8, 2014 13:55:30 GMT -6
...... I think with LCS we have a lot of valid critiques about what it can't do and what went wrong with the process. The interesting thing will be to find out what it can do. The only problem with that idea is that we are not the ones that will have to go out into dangerous waters and find out what it will do or will not do. Our current lack of ships puts us into a position of not having the luxury of a failed system. A fleet commander is not going to risk his high value ships to protect this oversized canoe. Our current lack of ships is a big driver behind LCS. Unless we're going to boost funding for shipbuilding to design and produce a new class of FFGs, we are going to have to either put the LCS hulls out there or cut back surface ship deployments around the world. What we can do is put the LCS hulls out of the really hot zones and concentrate the CGs and DDGs in places where we can expect trouble. The intel consideration is noted, but there are plenty of fleet deployments where the threat level is suited to LCS. We do not need every ship in the fleet armed for WWIII. Even in a conflict with a major power like China, there are secondary roles they could fill. For instance, let's say we would use the strategy of cutting the PRC's shipping routes from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. Do you really want to tie up DDG-51s interdicting oil tankers and freighters in the Straits of Malacca, when the Aegis ships will be badly needed to escort carriers and amphibs? Now, as far as seeing what they can do - why wait for a combat test? Put them through fleet exercises. Let the commanders run wild and put them through their paces. That's how we learn the capabilities of new weapons systems. In the case of LCS, which is designed to incorporate modular mission packages and network with other ships, there are a lot of potential tricks in the bag. Some of those might require design changes or new mission modules, but the potential is there. As far as risking high-value ships to protect LCS, explain to me why a commander is going to send those ships into a high-risk littoral area alone in the first place. You clear out minefields, diesel subs, and PT boats if you're planning on conducting operations in that area; i.e. you need to control it, deny its use to the enemy, or hit something in there. You don't do it just to rack up score points. Either the LCS hulls are going in because we're already sending high-value ships in there (in which case the LCS hulls are the escorts, covering the high-value platforms from mine and submarine threats), or we can just leave it the heck alone. Again, I think the big perception problem with LCS is that it was originally conceived as a littoral "streetfighter." It's still being viewed through that prism, even though the Navy is now pushing it as essentially an auxiliary warship for secondary duties.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 8, 2014 15:56:45 GMT -6
Our current lack of ships is do to the issue of funding and that isn't going to change in the future. The Navy is aware of this. It may have to give up one or two Gerald Fords, and use that funding for a new class of Guided missile cruisers and FFG's, only time will tell. Now, do I want FFG's or DDG's interdicting tankers and freighters in the Straits of Malacca? Sure, why not. If those ships are at a good level 2 survivability and have far more fire power, then yes if it keeps the kids safe.
As far as fleet exercises, first they are not completely representative and second, they cost a heck of a lot of money to conduct, money the Navy just doesn't have. For the 2012 fleet exercise, for five ships it cost in biofuel, almost $12 million dollars. Every ship and aircraft in the exercise gets more time on their hulls and airframes, time you can get back. The Fleet Commander will send these ships into the areas that require their expertise. For small boats, the SUW equipped boat will be engaged, for ASW the appropriately equipped LCS will be used and for MCM, likewise. It will probably be used mostly by MEU's to support landings and irregular warfare operations. This ship will spend most of its time in Africa, South America and quiet areas of the Far East. As evidenced by its first contingent operating out of Singapore. As the CNO said "These are not large surface combatants that are going to sail into the South China Sea and challenge the Chinese military, that's not what they're made for. " So, someone appears to have come to their senses and realized that this overgrown speedboat cannot be the "streetfighter" we all dreamed of. But a FC will use whatever he has available, and the Navy is fully aware of this.
For the Navy, the survivability of this ship depends on A. Speed B. Stealth in both physical and electronic areas. If the fleet commanders and theatre commanders can resist the urge to deploy this ship into dangerous waters, it can serve to " show the flag" and release other, more survivable ships for fleet duty and combat operations. However, my experience is, that they will not.. or can't.
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