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Post by steel selachian on Feb 16, 2015 17:45:28 GMT -6
Found this interesting - cimsec.org/lcs-ssc-survivability-dilemma/14310Frankly, I agree with the fact that you can't expect a smaller vessel to meet the same survivability standards as a larger one. I get the sense that if some of the LCS critics were around in the 1940s they would have tried to hold up the CVEs and DEs by arguing they weren't sufficiently hardened enough against battleship-caliber gunfire and Long Lances.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 16, 2015 18:25:44 GMT -6
Found this interesting - cimsec.org/lcs-ssc-survivability-dilemma/14310Frankly, I agree with the fact that you can't expect a smaller vessel to meet the same survivability standards as a larger one. I get the sense that if some of the LCS critics were around in the 1940s they would have tried to hold up the CVEs and DEs by arguing they weren't sufficiently hardened enough against battleship-caliber gunfire and Long Lances. The author of that article hasn't done his homework. Many of those destroyers and destroyer escorts were lost at Okinawa in the picket positions stationed away from the fleet(14 to be exact). They were the first line of defense against the Kamikaze and were heavily hit by them. I don't really see a correlation except that the Kamikaze were the forerunners of the modern ASM in a sense.
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Post by kyle on Feb 16, 2015 19:25:41 GMT -6
Found this interesting - cimsec.org/lcs-ssc-survivability-dilemma/14310Frankly, I agree with the fact that you can't expect a smaller vessel to meet the same survivability standards as a larger one. I get the sense that if some of the LCS critics were around in the 1940s they would have tried to hold up the CVEs and DEs by arguing they weren't sufficiently hardened enough against battleship-caliber gunfire and Long Lances. The author of that article hasn't done his homework. Many of those destroyers and destroyer escorts were lost at Okinawa in the picket positions stationed away from the fleet(14 to be exact). They were the first line of defense against the Kamikaze and were heavily hit by them. I don't really see a correlation except that the Kamikaze were the forerunners of the modern ASM in a sense. Yeah, the Kamikaze's had squishier guidance systems.
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 16, 2015 19:35:12 GMT -6
You may have better numbers than me, but from what I've looked up the US lost 14 destroyers sunk by kamikaze attacks, out of the claimed total losses of 82 DDs and DEs. The USN lost half that many destroyers - 7 - in two night actions off Guadalcanal in November 1942. I don't think the losses on kamikaze picket duty especially skewed the loss ratio (especially given the number of hits on carriers during the Okinawa campaign). Ships are a compromise; vessels like CVEs, DEs, and the LCS are designed to perform a function within certain weight, performance, manning, and production constraints. In that calculus, survivability doesn't get the same ranking it would on a "quality over quantity" combatant.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 16, 2015 20:31:08 GMT -6
There were 100 destroyers in commission on December 7th, 1941. A further 175 Fletchers were produced, another 112 with later modifications, 67 Allen B. Sumner and 45 Gearings. Total destroyers fielded by the US was 499 destroyers. The loss rate then, using the 73 destroyers lost, was 14 percent. I haven't researched the DE's. I suspect that their figures will be the same.
Let's look at the carriers. There were 7 carriers in the water at the beginning of the war. Wasp was added, and then 24 Essex class carriers along with 9 Independence class. I have left out the jeep carriers. That gives us a total of 40 carriers. We lost five of those types. The loss ratio was 12.5 percent. For battleships, we had 27 and four were sunk. That's a 14.8% loss ratio.
So, we had a loss ratio of 14 percent for destroyers, 12.5 percent for carriers and 14.8% for battleships. I don't see a problem with destroyers and lighter ships, there were more of them and they were fighting in areas that carriers and battleships were not designed to fight. Yet their loss ratio was about the same. Sorry, the criticism of smaller and lighter ships doesn't hold up under scrutiny. My point is simply; don't use a 70 year old war, to prove a point for modern weapons especially when you apparently haven't done your math. Is the LCS vulnerable especially in the areas that it will be operating? That is entirely possible but I haven't seen any real data to prove or disprove that case as yet. I will continue looking.
UPDATE: Update: There were 12 DE's lost in World War II by the USN. The USN received 563 DE's of which 78 went to GB, 6 to France, with 8 being transferred to Brazil. This gives us a rough total of 471 DE's. This is a loss rate of 2.5 percent. These were 1350 ton ships, 306 feet long and 36 feet 8 inches wide with a speed of 24 knots. They only had 2 x 5 in. guns, 4 x 40 mm AA, 10 x-20mm for protection, yet they had the lowest loss rate.
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 16, 2015 23:06:08 GMT -6
There were 100 destroyers in commission on December 7th, 1941. A further 175 Fletchers were produced, another 112 with later modifications, 67 Allen B. Sumner and 45 Gearings. Total destroyers fielded by the US was 499 destroyers. The loss rate then, using the 73 destroyers lost, was 14 percent. I haven't researched the DE's. I suspect that their figures will be the same.
Let's look at the carriers. There were 7 carriers in the water at the beginning of the war. Wasp was added, and then 24 Essex class carriers along with 9 Independence class. I have left out the jeep carriers. That gives us a total of 40 carriers. We lost five of those types. The loss ratio was 12.5 percent. For battleships, we had 27 and four were sunk. That's a 14.8% loss ratio.
So, we had a loss ratio of 14 percent for destroyers, 12.5 percent for carriers and 14.8% for battleships. I don't see a problem with destroyers and lighter ships, there were more of them and they were fighting in areas that carriers and battleships were not designed to fight. Yet their loss ratio was about the same. Sorry, the criticism of smaller and lighter ships doesn't hold up under scrutiny. My point is simply; don't use a 70 year old war, to prove a point for modern weapons especially when you apparently haven't done your math. Is the LCS vulnerable especially in the areas that it will be operating? That is entirely possible but I haven't seen any real data to prove or disprove that case as yet. I will continue looking.
UPDATE: Update: There were 12 DE's lost in World War II by the USN. The USN received 563 DE's of which 78 went to GB, 6 to France, with 8 being transferred to Brazil. This gives us a rough total of 471 DE's. This is a loss rate of 2.5 percent. These were 1350 ton ships, 306 feet long and 36 feet 8 inches wide with a speed of 24 knots. They only had 2 x 5 in. guns, 4 x 40 mm AA, 10 x-20mm for protection, yet they had the lowest loss rate.
I think the metric we'd need to use in this discussion is the ratio of ships damaged to ships lost for each type, rather than proportional losses. I'm betting many DDs and DEs finished WWII without firing or taking a shot in anger, whereas just about every CV and CVL probably saw combat (and were priority targets, to boot). Preferably this would include types of hits taken (say, torpedo versus bomb or gunfire damage, and size of weapons involved) but that would get pretty messy. The ultimate question perhaps is what is survivability and how do we apply it to different types of vessels. A 4,000 ton LCS or even an FFG-7 is simply going to be more fragile than a 10,000-ton CG or DDG versus the same example of enemy ordnance - tonnage does matter. It's also going to carry fewer weapons, which means it will either have to specialize its loadout or have reduced combat endurance. Both options reduce its capacity to operate unsupported in hostile areas; if it skimps on self-defense weapons it can only withstand a limited attack and if it skimps on offensive weaponry there's little point in sending it forward in the first place. How are we going to adjust our expectations of "survivability" for a small combatant, and what level of threat/damage should it be expected to handle? We expect an Aegis vessel to handle a saturation missile attack featuring supersonic AShMs and possibly survive a hit from one; what is the expected standard for an LCS or FF/FFG? If you want a more modern comparison of survivability, we can compare the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) and the USS Princeton (CG-59). Both were modern warships mined in the Persian Gulf. The fact that Samuel B. Roberts was not sunk by the mine she hit was a testament to heroic damage control efforts and calm sea conditions; by all rights she should have ended up on the bottom. Princeton was crippled but not in danger of sinking after two mine detonations, although these detonated in proximity rather than in direct contact with the hull.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 16, 2015 23:52:31 GMT -6
There were 100 destroyers in commission on December 7th, 1941. A further 175 Fletchers were produced, another 112 with later modifications, 67 Allen B. Sumner and 45 Gearings. Total destroyers fielded by the US was 499 destroyers. The loss rate then, using the 73 destroyers lost, was 14 percent. I haven't researched the DE's. I suspect that their figures will be the same.
Let's look at the carriers. There were 7 carriers in the water at the beginning of the war. Wasp was added, and then 24 Essex class carriers along with 9 Independence class. I have left out the jeep carriers. That gives us a total of 40 carriers. We lost five of those types. The loss ratio was 12.5 percent. For battleships, we had 27 and four were sunk. That's a 14.8% loss ratio.
So, we had a loss ratio of 14 percent for destroyers, 12.5 percent for carriers and 14.8% for battleships. I don't see a problem with destroyers and lighter ships, there were more of them and they were fighting in areas that carriers and battleships were not designed to fight. Yet their loss ratio was about the same. Sorry, the criticism of smaller and lighter ships doesn't hold up under scrutiny. My point is simply; don't use a 70 year old war, to prove a point for modern weapons especially when you apparently haven't done your math. Is the LCS vulnerable especially in the areas that it will be operating? That is entirely possible but I haven't seen any real data to prove or disprove that case as yet. I will continue looking.
UPDATE: Update: There were 12 DE's lost in World War II by the USN. The USN received 563 DE's of which 78 went to GB, 6 to France, with 8 being transferred to Brazil. This gives us a rough total of 471 DE's. This is a loss rate of 2.5 percent. These were 1350 ton ships, 306 feet long and 36 feet 8 inches wide with a speed of 24 knots. They only had 2 x 5 in. guns, 4 x 40 mm AA, 10 x-20mm for protection, yet they had the lowest loss rate.
I think the metric we'd need to use in this discussion is the ratio of ships damaged to ships lost for each type, rather than proportional losses. I'm betting many DDs and DEs finished WWII without firing or taking a shot in anger, whereas just about every CV and CVL probably saw combat (and were priority targets, to boot). Preferably this would include types of hits taken (say, torpedo versus bomb or gunfire damage, and size of weapons involved) but that would get pretty messy. The ultimate question perhaps is what is survivability and how do we apply it to different types of vessels. A 4,000 ton LCS or even an FFG-7 is simply going to be more fragile than a 10,000-ton CG or DDG versus the same example of enemy ordnance - tonnage does matter. It's also going to carry fewer weapons, which means it will either have to specialize its loadout or have reduced combat endurance. Both options reduce its capacity to operate unsupported in hostile areas; if it skimps on self-defense weapons it can only withstand a limited attack and if it skimps on offensive weaponry there's little point in sending it forward in the first place. How are we going to adjust our expectations of "survivability" for a small combatant, and what level of threat/damage should it be expected to handle? We expect an Aegis vessel to handle a saturation missile attack featuring supersonic AShMs and possibly survive a hit from one; what is the expected standard for an LCS or FF/FFG? If you want a more modern comparison of survivability, we can compare the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) and the USS Princeton (CG-59). Both were modern warships mined in the Persian Gulf. The fact that Samuel B. Roberts was not sunk by the mine she hit was a testament to heroic damage control efforts and calm sea conditions; by all rights she should have ended up on the bottom. Princeton was crippled but not in danger of sinking after two mine detonations, although these detonated in proximity rather than in direct contact with the hull. Well, ok, we can use that metric. Here is some data from the Official Summary of War Damage, there are three documents in this series. From October 1941 to 7 December 1944, 134 destroyers were either sunk or damaged. We know that 73 destroyers were sunk so damaged must be 61. For DE's, 16 were either damaged or sunk, we know that 12 were sunk. For carriers, 26 were either sunk or damaged, we know that 5 were lost.
I'll let you massage the numbers.
As to defining survivability, why not use OPNAV Instruction 9070.1A, Survivability Policy and standards for Surface Ships and Craft of the U.S. Navy DTD 13 September 2012. doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/09000%20General%20Ship%20Design%20and%20Support/09-00%20General%20Ship%20Design%20Support/9070.1A.pdf
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 17, 2015 8:47:00 GMT -6
There are other factors that are the basis for the survivability of naval vessels; detectability, susceptibility , vulnerability and recoverability. These factors will lay the foundation for the survivability rating of any ship. How detectable is the vessel not only electromagnetically, but aurally and visually. This usually means stealth enters the picture. A smaller, faster vessel usually will have the best rating in this area. How susceptible is the vessel to being hit, in other words, what is its ability to avoid being hit. I would say that a smaller vessel with a lower electromagnetic signature would have a distinct advantage. Vulnerability is the ability to withstand a hit and smaller vessels do suffer in this area. The last is recoverability, or the ability to sustain the hits, and maintain mission capability using damage control etc. In most cases, the fourth factor is included in vulnerability so I would say there are three factors that have to be consider in calculating survivability and they must be balanced.
Just so you know, the director of operational test and evaluation, whose office is responsible for conducting the "total ship survivability Test" has said that the LCS "is still not expected to be survivable in combat". Nice. Essentially the ships were sent on their first mission which was maritime policing and counter-piracy around Singapore without passing the exam that his office conducts. His office stated that " LCS is not expected to be survivable,” it finds, “in that it is not expected to maintain mission capability after taking a significant hit in a hostile combat environment.” Additionally, Gilmore discloses that the Navy has “knowledge gaps related to the vulnerability of an aluminum ship structure to weapon-induced blast and fire damage".
The USN is aware of some glaring survivability problems with the vessel, but like all weapons systems, you design it, build it, test it and then deploy it. Afterwards, you find all the problems and fix them. Almost all services conduct business this way, if they didn't, new technology would never get to the battlefield. Sometimes you identify a problem, categorize it as either non-life threatening or non-mission threatening and you put it on a list for the next overhaul.
So what is the final answer on survivability of the LCS: simple. Deploy it. Send it on the missions it was specifically designed for, then gradually upgrade its capability to achieve the desired survivability rating that you seek. If you are looking for perfection, you are on the wrong planet. War is a dangerous business... and boring, as my father said to me many long years ago.
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Post by kyle on Feb 17, 2015 11:12:52 GMT -6
The problem is today as it was through history - you don't really know the survivability of a ship until/unless it gets into combat. In my naval service some time ago we really didn't know how good the enemy missiles really were and were not certain how good our defenses against them would be. Of course guns were fired against drones simulating missiles and radar detection of enemy ships, subs, aircraft and missiles was practived in blue vs red games. Upgrades on my ship were pretty constant and we did 2 yard visits for major upgrades. Everything was geared toward improving survivability (better sonar, better ESM (arguably, can you tell I was an EW?), better defenses, better damage control, etc.
WW2 is an example - look at the start of the war and how many AA guns were on ships. It was quickly determined that virtually all needed more, and their number progressed constantly as the war continued.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 17, 2015 14:11:36 GMT -6
Let me give you a real life situation that occurred with the AIM-7. It was thoroughly tested at Pax River and Nellis. Problem is neither of those locations are jungles near the equator and this was the primary problem in Vietnam, with this missile from 1964 to 1968. Even after this was identified it took a while to develop and retro fit all the missiles. You test till the cows come home, and its good training and development but nothing can substitute for combat. BTW, a document: Report of the Air to Air Missile System Capability Review DTD July-November 1968 related the problem after four years of combat by the USAF and the Navy. It was never identified at Nellis...... a desert over 800 miles from the ocean. Gee, I wonder why?
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Post by RNRobert on Feb 17, 2015 20:39:19 GMT -6
Let me give you a real life situation that occurred with the AIM-7. It was thoroughly tested at Pax River and Nellis. Problem is neither of those locations are jungles near the equator and this was the primary problem in Vietnam, with this missile from 1964 to 1968. Even after this was identified it took a while to develop and retro fit all the missiles. You test till the cows come home, and its good training and development but nothing can substitute for combat. BTW, a document: Report of the Air to Air Missile System Capability Review DTD July-November 1968 related the problem after four years of combat by the USAF and the Navy. It was never identified at Nellis...... a desert over 800 miles from the ocean. Gee, I wonder why? Sounds like the Norden bombsight.What it could do in the clear skies of the southwest was one thing, and what it could do in the cloudy skies of Europe was another.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 18, 2015 14:10:35 GMT -6
Here is the US Navy's rebuttal to survivability issues with the LCS.
news.usni.org/2013/01/17/navy-responds-pentagon-lcs-survivability-claims
The US Navy is a blue water navy by geography. For the US Navy to operate in enclosed seas, narrow seas and brown water requires our ships to sail well over 5500 miles, give or take a few thousand to get there. It's easy for the Swedes to build a corvette size stealth ship, with a range of only 2500 miles at 15 knots, because their navy operates on the Baltic; that is an enclosed sea. This fact is lost in many articles. They fail to point out where the navy in question operates.
Survivability is important, but habitability and serviceability are also. The LCS might have to stay at sea for 10-12 days, just to get to her assigned area of operation. How far does a Swedish Visby have to go? Measure some of the distances in the Baltic and Skagerrak areas. The geostrategic situation for Sweden is entirely different. Look at almost any small corvette, frigate etc. built in Europe, the Med or Asia and you will see the same situation. So, the LCS does have survivability issues, but it also has to ensure habitability, and sea worthiness because the Pacific Ocean is a nasty place to sail. Our sailors have to ensure the ship is maintained at sea due to the lack of available port areas. Yes, she will be accompanied by support ships, but its hard, I'll bet, to service a ship in rough seas, I don't care how big it is.
Another point about modern(late 20th century and early 21st century) ships. The most important area of the ship is the Combat Information Center and computers all housed in the superstructure. If it were placed in the hull, then an enlarged area would be needed to house it. This would require a larger beam and hence a longer length to maintain a good length to beam ratio for speed. This also would require more power which means more space and more fuel. Missile magazines need to be a little above the water line. Survivability for a small ship is really placed in the hands of countermeasures. However, ECM works best up high to reach an effective range. But, if we increase the height of the superstructure to accommodate this, we now increase topweight and hence we have to widen the beam and we are back to the same problem; wider beam means a longer ship, which means increased hull and machinery weight and more power is required to maintain the same speed and that means more fuel which means more fuel tanks and around and around we go. You do not get something for nothing in naval architecture.
The USN never liked the PT boats, but realized its need especially in the Solomon's chain. It also didn't like PBR's in Vietnam, but understood the need at the time. Neither of those two boats were really survivable, but did manage to accomplish their missions and make a good name for themselves.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 5, 2015 19:48:54 GMT -6
Another argument that's been made against LCS is comparing it to certain foreign-built frigate-type ships. Well, to quote from John D. MacDonald, the really clever people are the accountants: cimsec.org/lcs-versus-danish-strawman/14974
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 6, 2015 8:29:34 GMT -6
Another argument that's been made against LCS is comparing it to certain foreign-built frigate-type ships. Well, to quote from John D. MacDonald, the really clever people are the accountants: cimsec.org/lcs-versus-danish-strawman/14974That article just proves my point that you cannot just compare the LCS and foreign vessels of similar operational requirements. Liars figure and figures lie, as I have always heard.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 8, 2015 16:32:21 GMT -6
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