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Post by RNRobert on Mar 26, 2016 14:05:28 GMT -6
I would posit that the Guadalcanal campaign was the "decisive battle" of the Pacific War, although the Japanese didn't realize it. The IJN, despite losing four flattops Midway, still was a formidable force. The USN was still recouping from Pearl Harbor. We only had four operational carriers in the Pacific at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign, and of these, Wasp and Hornet would be sunk, Saratoga would be damaged and take no further part in the campaign, leaving only Enterprise available by the end of the year, and herself in a damaged state. On the other hand, the Japanese frittered away what was left of their carrier aviators, a loss from which they never recovered. Both sides suffered heavy losses in cruisers and destroyers as a result of the night actions in the waters of the Solomons (and the Japanese lost two of their older battleships to boot). However, the US was able to make good their losses, and the Japanese were not, which meant that the tide swung inexorably in favor of the US.
Update: After consideration, I wonder how we answer the question: "When did commanders realize the carrier was more important than the battleships". The standard answer is Pearl Harbor. That's silly, because Taranto should have been the convincing operation. The Fleet Problems conducted by the US and Japan along with other nations, the table top exercises; all of these games finally showed us how vulnerable surface ships actually were to a concentrated air attack. The real issue is that those were games, not necessarily accurate in their depiction of actual combat. It wasn't until Taranto, Pearl Harbor actually showed navies, what 21 inch torpedoes and 1000, 2000 lbs. AP bombs could do, that it was finally realized how dangerous carriers and their air wings actually were.
I have a book, "Our Navy: A Fighting Team, by VADM Joseph Taussig and Captain Harley Cope (Taussig commanded the first destroyer squadron sent to England after we entered WW1, and when the British Admiral asked when his squadron would be ready for action, he replied, "as soon as we are done refueling"). The book was written in 1943, at which time the aircraft carrier was proving to be the dominant warship type in the Pacific (Coral Sea, Midway, etc), yet the authors believe in the need to continue to continue to build more and bigger battleships, and calls the cancellation of 58,000 ton battleships (referring presumably to the Montana class) "regrettable," and in the last chapter depicts the USN fighting the IJN in some Jutland-style battle, with at least twenty battleships slugging it out with the Japanese. In contrast, Admiral Yamamoto in the '30s called for the abolition of the battleships, comparing them to "elaborate religious scrolls which old people hung up in their homes. They are of no proved worth. They are purely a matter of faith not reality."
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 26, 2016 19:48:23 GMT -6
One of the misconceptions about Admiral Yamamoto and the attack on Pearl Harbor is that because he specified that at least four battleships had to be sunk, that he felt they were of prime importance. He didn't feel they were, but he felt that the US people did and if he could sink their priced battleships, they would be demoralized and offer terms. He had spent time in the US and from that short period, misread the US nation as a whole. Yamamoto never sanctioned nor approved of spending money and time to build the Yamato's.
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Post by RNRobert on Mar 26, 2016 20:29:01 GMT -6
I believe Yamamoto was also disappointed that none of our carriers were in Pearl the morning of the attack.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 26, 2016 21:35:15 GMT -6
I believe Yamamoto was also disappointed that none of our carriers were in Pearl the morning of the attack. I don't believe that is true. The mission objectives were, in fact, achieved; to delay the US fleet from moving across the Pacific for about six months and to sink four battleships. The carriers were not HIS priority, they were secondary to him. They were pushed to the front by Genda, the operation developer, who was a pilot. If there was disappointment, it was over the lack of aggressiveness of Nagumo, the First Striking Fleet commander. Yamamoto believed he should have stayed in the area, launched a second attack or alternately, searched for the US carriers and destroyed them in a sea battle. He had supremacy in the operational area. Nagumo was not Yamamoto's choice for the commander of First Striking Fleet, it was the IJ Naval High Commands, he had to be satisfied with him. He was not.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 30, 2016 18:51:52 GMT -6
I believe Yamamoto was also disappointed that none of our carriers were in Pearl the morning of the attack. I don't believe that is true. The mission objectives were, in fact, achieved; to delay the US fleet from moving across the Pacific for about six months and to sink four battleships. The carriers were not HIS priority, they were secondary to him. They were pushed to the front by Genda, the operation developer, who was a pilot. If there was disappointment, it was over the lack of aggressiveness of Nagumo, the First Striking Fleet commander. Yamamoto believed he should have stayed in the area, launched a second attack or alternately, searched for the US carriers and destroyed them in a sea battle. He had supremacy in the operational area. Nagumo was not Yamamoto's choice for the commander of First Striking Fleet, it was the IJ Naval High Commands, he had to be satisfied with him. He was not. Just to ask, how might that have worked out if Nagumo had hung around? From what I've read, Nagumo had some practical concerns about launching a third attack wave. His planes would have been returning at dusk and his pilots were not trained for night carrier landings, the Pearl Harbor defenses were alerted, he had no intel on the whereabouts of USN carriers or whether land-based bombers from Hawaii were available, and he was getting low on fuel. I believe Yamamoto's second-guessing came some time later; the morning after the attack he supported Nagumo's decision to call it a day. Hindsight is 20/20 and the shellacking the Japanese took starting in mid-1942 may have changed his mind. Later on the US side there was much criticism of Spruance for not being aggressive enough at Midway and the Philippine Sea, but in those cases it was arguably far smarter to take the win and back off rather than bet the farm on a clean sweep. We've also discussed in the past that while it seems like a poor decision for the Japanese to not take out some logistical targets like the tank farms and repair facilities, the Kido Butai just didn't have the capability to take out large area targets like that. Later experience showed you really needed carpet bombing to do the job, which is hard to pull off with single-engine carrier birds (especially when they had to split their attention between docked ships and the airfields). Nagumo might have been able to do a few things differently, but overall he probably did about as much damage as he realistically could and went home having lost only 29 aircraft and 55 aircrew in exchange for putting PACFLT's battle line out of commission and annihilating the Army and Marine aviation component on Oahu. Even if he had done something else, like take out some of the docked subs or even catch Enterprise, it wouldn't have tipped the scales in the long run.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 31, 2016 7:50:07 GMT -6
Well, the first issue is the second attack which had never been contemplated let alone planned. When the first attack aircraft landed, the first item of business is to push over the side the ones beyond repair. We believe that was an additional 20 aircraft. You then have to effect repairs on the ones that you have, if you can. You have to check on the air crews, some were injured and would have to be replaced. Replacing aircrews can affect aircraft operations as they are a team, the longer they fly together, the better they get. While this is going on, you have to interview the flight leaders, get tactical information about the results and get information, if possible on the secondary targets like the Navy Yard and the above ground fuel tanks. Once that information is compiled, you have to develop an attack plan, issue it to the air crews, go over the timing and now, use the information about available aircrews and aircraft to assign targets and inform the ordnance teams what to load on what aircraft. Keep in mind, the Japanese had loaded extra torpedoes, not high explosive ordnance. They would have to ensure that the HE ordnance was available in sufficient quantities to perform the second attack. All this presupposes that sufficient time was available to actually launch the attack which there wasn't. This was December, the shortest month of the year. The sunset would be approximately 5:00 PM. The flight from the carriers was 1.5 hours, that's 3 hours of flight time just getting to and from the target. Now, even if you are quick, just flying over the target and dropping your bombs without maneuvering, that's at least .5 hours. That's a total of 3.5 hours if everything goes according to plan... which it never does. So, you have to launch by 1300 hours. Do you have the time? Well, you have to wait for the second wave to return, the last aircraft landing at 11:30, that was Fuchida's. All total, there would have been about 265 aircraft available for the second attack, and with six carriers. However, the fly in the ointment is that now the US Navy is alerted. You have no idea where the US carriers are located and you have to ensure that they don't surprise you. So you have to look for them, that is going to require 35 aircraft for a 360 degree search pattern. You have to prepare for the worst, which means you can't use all your available aircraft for the second attack, you have keep an adequate number for anti-shipping, or use against the carriers, when found. As you can see, the second attack was an impossible dream. Genda, Kusaka, Nagumo and Fuchida knew it. Fuchida in his 1946 post war interview never broached the subject when asked, it was only after being a forgotten soybean farmer, longing for the better times, that he suddenly developed the idea that he wanted a second attack.
So, the second attack idea was a myth developed by a man forgotten by time, trying to regain the importance he once had. Now, the second issue. Could they have stayed around and searched for the US carriers. If Nagumo had never considered a second wave, then he could have launched a 360 degree search out to 150 miles in 10 degree segments, to search for the US carriers. For an effective two plane search, that would have required about 70 aircraft, however that type of two plane search was only implemented after Midway. He would have had about 265 minus the 35 for search, plus combat air patrols over the carriers which will require about 20 to 30. This leaves him with 210 aircraft available for a naval surface attack. This would have been sufficient to attack one carrier, but not two together. He is facing Lexington and Enterprise, which amounts about 160 US aircraft, fully armed and ready. It also means that every submarine in the area knows where you came from, the northeast, plus aircraft already on Midway which is about 1100 mile to the NW. There are also a flight of B-17's arriving and did so during the attack. They can quickly be reequipped for naval surface attack and while they were never effective in that role, they are one more group of attackers to deal with. Now, the important issue is fuel, because the tankers are 600 miles to the north awaiting your return. So, you are either going to have to unrep the destroyers yourself, or bring those tankers down so they can do it all while searching for the US carriers and hopefully not get caught during the unrep which has to be done during the day hours.
All of this considered, I would say that Nagumo probably made the correct decision as the Pearl Harbor operation was always a raid. After a raid, its time to hightail it for home. It's easy for Yamamoto to criticize after the attack, since he wasn't there. He also knew that missing those carriers was just fate. In point of fact, no contingency had ever been put into the plan for their absence. The IJN knew 24 hrs. before the attack, the carriers were missing, so they could have delayed the attack until Enterprise arrived. I agree that the attack tactically was successful considering the state of the art for carrier attacks on stationary targets in port. Most historians who claim that Nagumo should have stayed around probably don't understand that this force was the only mobile attack force the Japanese would have for the war and that they could not really replace it anytime soon. We learned that after Midway six months later. How much more could he have done in the attack would rest upon how much better the plan would have to be, and again, we are in a new area for naval planners. What happened was the best the IJN or any mobile attack force could do at this stage of the war.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 31, 2016 11:39:04 GMT -6
One of the most interesting issue about the Pearl Harbor attack is the finger pointing that occurred in the US after the event. We witnessed it after 9/11. The military pointing fingers at the President and Congress for not passing larger navy bills earlier, the President pointing fingers at the Congress, the Congress absolving their responsibility by saying " we gave you the money and it is your job to assess the enemy and his possible alternative actions". The press pointing fingers at everyone including the American people. The responsibility actually was everyone's fault, for not assessing the Japanese correctly and stop sending scrap iron to them, knowing they weren't making frying pans and such out of it. There was enough blame for all. Here is my partial list:
1. President Roosevelt - for making the US Navy leave the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor after Admiral Richardson had informed him, personally, that the base defenses were not ready.
2. General Short - For putting the Army Command whose responsibility it was to protect the fleet in the harbor, on sabotage alert instead of full alert. He had no information, to warrant that decision.
3. Admiral Kimmel - For not putting torpedo nets around the battleships, a precaution that should have always been done.
4. Press - For believing that the Japanese, who already had an illegal operation in China, were no threat to the US, even though we knew they had a predilection for attacking without warning. This failure rests on the Congress as well. People like Charles Lindberg who most later believed was a Nazi sympathizer.
5. Congress - For not stopping economic assistance in the form of scrap iron and banking to the Japanese, along with stopping industries from selling military parts to the Japanese. One perfect example was the engines used on their aircraft especially the Zero were copies of Wright engines and propellers that had Hamilton Standard stamped on them. Congress should have been warned when Japanese gold funds were being removed from the New York Federal Reserve bank just before the attack.
6. The US people - For burying their heads in the sand about Europe and Japan, hoping that peace would come because of good will and nice talk. It doesn't. If you want peace, you have to arm for war. Its been a norm for 2000 years. The US people were still in a bad economic depression and were just coming out of it. They really didn't want to think about another war, like the previous that they thought we should never have been involved with. You can't bury your head in the sand, hoping things will go away.
The list goes on and on, but overall, the military didn't do its job, the press and US people failed, and the President failed because of his stupid idea that he could bluff the Japanese. None were without blame.
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Post by RNRobert on Mar 31, 2016 17:21:05 GMT -6
One of the most interesting issue about the Pearl Harbor attack is the finger pointing that occurred in the US after the event. We witnessed it after 9/11. The military pointing fingers at the President and Congress for not passing larger navy bills earlier, the President pointing fingers at the Congress, the Congress absolving their responsibility by saying " we gave you the money and it is your job to assess the enemy and his possible alternative actions". The press pointing fingers at everyone including the American people. The responsibility actually was everyone's fault, for not assessing the Japanese correctly and stop sending scrap iron to them, knowing they weren't making frying pans and such out of it. There was enough blame for all. Here is my partial list: 1. President Roosevelt - for making the US Navy leave the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor after Admiral Richardson had informed him, personally, that the base defenses were not ready. 2. General Short - For putting the Army Command whose responsibility it was to protect the fleet in the harbor, on sabotage alert instead of full alert. He had no information, to warrant that decision. 3. Admiral Kimmel - For not putting torpedo nets around the battleships, a precaution that should have always been done. 4. Press - For believing that the Japanese, who already had an illegal operation in China, were no threat to the US, even though we knew they had a predilection for attacking without warning. This failure rests on the Congress as well. People like Charles Lindberg who most later believed was a Nazi sympathizer. 5. Congress - For not stopping economic assistance in the form of scrap iron and banking to the Japanese, along with stopping industries from selling military parts to the Japanese. One perfect example was the engines used on their aircraft especially the Zero were copies of Wright engines and propellers that had Hamilton Standard stamped on them. Congress should have been warned when Japanese gold funds were being removed from the New York Federal Reserve bank just before the attack. 6. The US people - For burying their heads in the sand about Europe and Japan, hoping that peace would come because of good will and nice talk. It doesn't. If you want peace, you have to arm for war. Its been a norm for 2000 years. The US people were still in a bad economic depression and were just coming out of it. They really didn't want to think about another war, like the previous that they thought we should never have been involved with. You can't bury your head in the sand, hoping things will go away. The list goes on and on, but overall, the military didn't do its job, the press and US people failed, and the President failed because of his stupid idea that he could bluff the Japanese. None were without blame. Several years ago, I read Gordon Prange's "At Dawn We Slept." In reading it, I felt General Short was particularly clueless. The war games in Hawaii that summer focused on repelling a Japanese invasion. In the scenario, US airpower had been wiped out, and so the exercise had aviation personnel serving as ground troops. Short even wanted the airmen to have two months infantry training, and when aviation officers complained this would take away from flight training, asked what he was supposed to do with "surplus" personnel. I also think Kimmel could have done more to protect the fleet. Up until the attack, the fleet followed a predictable routine of leaving Pearl on Monday for training, returning on Friday and spending the weekend in port. He could have alternated deployments, or dispersed to other anchorages, so that you didn't have the entire fleet in port at any one time. Also, about a week before Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel was informed by his intelligence officer, LCDR Edwin Layton, that Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 (consisting of four of the six carriers involved in the Pearl Harbor raid) were no longer appearing in Japanese radio traffic, and thus he did not know where they were. Kimmel asked, "Do you mean to tell me they could be rounding Diamond Head, and you wouldn't know it?" Layton replied he hoped they would have been spotted by then. What struck me most from reading the book was the cognitive dissonance displayed by our civilian and military leaders. Many of them, not just in Washington, but even in Hawaii, predicted that the Japanese would likely commence hostilities against the United States with a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor (and US Navy wargames in the '30s showed a surprise carrier raid on Pearl Harbor was doable). However, at the same time, these same people had this attitude of disbelief that the Japanese would actually go through with it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 1, 2016 12:28:07 GMT -6
Both Kimmel and Short got warnings on 27 November from the Army and Navy chiefs in Washington that war was imminent. The first draft of the Hawaiian message had also included a specific warning about subversion; but after argument this warning went out as a separate and almost simultaneous G-2 message, in these terms: "Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only." One day later, the Hawaiian department received two more messages, the Hawaiian Department received two more messages from Washington, one addressed to General Short and the other through him to his air commander, both of them emphasizing the need for the most careful precautions against sabotage and other subversive activities. The general assumed these messages were follow-up replies to his terse report of the 27th. He answered the first of the new messages promptly and in detail, and this reply reached General Marshall's office on 1 December. Since Washington made no comment on either of his reports, and gave him no further guidance about the impending crisis before the great blow fell, the general assumed also that the War Department approved his course of action
This information is from Army Historical documents. Here is their description of what Short did and why: Why General Short did not alert his command more fully was to become the subject of long questioning after the Japanese attacked. The new Standard Operating Procedure had prescribed two higher alerts: under No. 2, against a threat of air and surface bombardment, all coastal and air defenses, including antiaircraft guns, were to be ready for action; under No. 3, against a threat of invasion as well, all Army defenders were to occupy battle positions. When first questioned, General Short said he ordered Alert No. 1 for three reasons: first, he thought there was a "strong possibility" of sabotage, and he feared sabotage more than anything else; second, he had no information about any danger of external attack; and third, either No. 2 or No. 3 would interfere very seriously with training-"it was impossible to do any orderly training with them on."
I hope that you can see, that General Short was a scapegoat for the Army and the Navy's failure to take into account that the Japanese might attack from the air, Pearl Harbor. This was, IMO, a military failure at the top of the organizational chain. This is not the failure of the administration or the American people. Neither the Navy nor the Army made any attempt to develop a unified command. This was a singular failure as one side did not know what the other side was doing. For Navy, whose ships were supposed to be protected by Army aircraft and AA guns, the AA guns were stowed and ammunition placed in one of the craters for protection. The aircraft were lined up like ducks on a pond and the supposed SCR-270 surface radar net closed at 0700 in the morning. How unprepared could you be.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 3, 2016 21:59:55 GMT -6
Following from that discussion, what if President Roosevelt had heeded Admiral Richardson's advice and kept the Pacific Fleet at San Diego? how would that have affected the Japanese plans and the opening stages of the war in the Pacific?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 3, 2016 22:58:09 GMT -6
Following from that discussion, what if President Roosevelt had heeded Admiral Richardson's advice and kept the Pacific Fleet at San Diego? how would that have affected the Japanese plans and the opening stages of the war in the Pacific? The question as to what the IJN would have done, had the battleships not been at Pearl Harbor has been asked a million times. I am not certain anyone has yet come up with a satisfactory answer. Here is what I believe. First, the Last fleet problem held before WWII occurred around the Hawaiian islands from Late April to early May 1940. It was during this time, that Roosevelt offered up to his cabinet, the idea of keeping the Fleet in Hawaii for the defense of the islands. Marshall was against the idea feeling that the islands defenses would be able to keep the Japanese off of them. The problem with all of this was, the Japanese had no plans to invade and occupy Oahu, they just wanted to have a crack at our fleet to put it out of commission for six months. Now, Admiral Richardson, CinCUS, did not object to retaining the fleet in Hawaii because he feared of an attack. His reasons were logistical. He felt he could prepare his ships better for war, on a normal basis better on the West Coast. In point of fact, Admiral Richardson had no concern over the Fleet's safety while in Oahu. Now the answer to the $64,000 question. With no battleships in Pearl Harbor, there probably would have been no attack on Oahu. Part of Kido Butai would have been used to support the Southern Operation against Malaya, Dutch East Indies, Wake, Guam and the Philippines. Shokaku and Zuikaku, the two newest carriers with the least amount of training, would have been used for that purpose. The other four experienced carriers probably would have either kept at Hashirajima, in Southern Japan awaiting the US Fleet's march across the Pacific or based at Truk awaiting the same march. Unfortunately, the IJN did not realize the this march across the Pacific was about 1 to 2 years away. I am certain that Yamamoto would have kept submarines in the area of Oahu to monitor the US Pacific Fleet. He probably would have even sent the Emily flying boats in recon flight over the island. Any further speculation on actions is fantasy. However, one issue that is rarely examined is whether the US nation would have been so ready to go to war over the Philippines, which we had already guaranteed their independence soon. It might have taken Roosevelt time to get the Congress to vote for war and get the US nation to back him. This would have given Japanese much time to finish the Southern operation including taking Rabaul and possibly New Guinea and Port Moresby. They might have even explored options in the Indian Ocean against India and Ceylon. This would have made Australia's situation almost untenable. Anyway, those are my thoughts.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 4, 2016 18:18:59 GMT -6
I think it's hard to say what exactly might have happened if PACFLT was still in San Diego, but then again I haven't researched the issue very thoroughly. Whether or not the fleet was at Pearl, it still was a well-developed, strategically important base that provided the US a major staging and resupply point for operations into the Western Pacific. If the Japanese felt the fleet would come out and attempt to relieve the Philippines, a smart move might have been to hit Pearl hard enough to cripple it as a forward base and maybe take Midway, which was lightly defended at the time. PACFLT would then be coming to the fight from a much longer distance; the Japanese would have had more time to pick away at them before the "decisive battle."
As to the Philippines, while the war plans had the US holding back reinforcements for the Philippines I'm not certain they would have been abandoned according to plan if PACFLT had not been reduced in the Pearl Harbor attacks. The Asiatic Fleet and the US Army's Philippine Department were both based there well prior to the 1941 buildup of forces, with tens of thousands of American servicemen present. Antiwar attitudes aside, I imagine there would have been public pressure to launch a counterattack if Pearl Harbor had not happened and the Japanese had attacked the Philippines in force. If word had gotten out about events such as the Bataan Death March, I don't think the public would have accepted hanging thousands of American troops and sailors out to dry while we still had an intact battle fleet in the Pacific.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 4, 2016 20:51:41 GMT -6
Yamamoto was reportedly a gambler but he was not stupid. The Pearl Harbor operation was a calculated risk, but not a gamble. If the Philippines had been bombed and invaded, we would have gone to war, and there would have been no surprise at Pearl Harbor. Any attempt to attack would have been detected long before his First Striking Fleet could have arrived. In reality, the implementation of Rainbow 5 and disestablishment of War Plan Orange meant that there would be no thrust across the Pacific to relieve MacArthur in the Philippines. So, the slow 21 knot battleships would have gone no where. Now, if Yamamoto had decided to attack Oahu, to eliminate it as a base, he would have had a formidable task. He could have hit the airfields; Hickam, Kaneohe, Ewa, Bellows, Ford Island and Wheeler. However, if he attacked after the Philippines, those planes would not have been lined up like ducks on a pond. So all he gets is a chance to destroy some hangars which are hard to destroy and tear up some runways. Runways are easy to fix, and they were after Pearl Harbor. Now what other targets does he have? Well the shipyard facilities, above ground fuel tanks, the power plant and the channel. The Naval shipyard was 498 acres or 21,692,800 square feet. One 250KG GP bomb like the ones dropped by the Japanese could destroy about 4,400 Square feet of industrial facilities as per the US Strategic Bombing Survey. So, to effectively render the Naval Shipyard unusable for any period of time would have required 4930 aircraft. The Japanese did not even that many planes in the IJA air force or the Naval Air force. This assumes that all the planes drop their bombs on the target and reach the target, despite our defenses being on full readiness as they would have been if the Philippines had been attacked. It also assumes no duds, and many of the Japanese bombs were duds. West Virginia got hit by two 1980 lb. AP bombs that never went off. Also, there were 3 repair ships, 2 destroyer tenders and 2 seaplanes tenders in port and available to accomplish some minor work. Two other targets were the power plant and fuel tanks, both very difficult targets to locate and bomb with light 250 kg or 500 lbs. bombs. The USSBS found that a generator hall could be rebuilt very quickly and the above ground fuel tanks had berms around them so even if the tanks were hit, the fuel would have been kept in the berms and it was estimated that it would have take about 3 month to replace every tank, even if the Japanese had managed to hit them dead center, which most experts doubt.
The last issue was the possible blocking of the channel by sinking a ship in it. The channel was 400 yards wide or 1200 feet. Even if a battleship or carrier had been dumb enough to try to get out, there would have been about 500 feet of clearance and any Captain worth his salt, could have easily maneuvered around it.
I hope I have detailed why an attack, with no battleships after the attack on the Philippines would have been a disaster for the Japanese. I don't believe that Yamamoto, despite his reputation would have made the attempt.
I have strong doubts that the Philippines would have lasted any longer than they did, especially if the IJN had two fleet carriers and one light carrier available to launch air strikes from along with any bombers from Formosa.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 4, 2016 21:22:18 GMT -6
I was thinking more that the surprise strike at Pearl still precedes the assault on the Philippines; the only difference being the US fleet is not there and the entire Japanese attack is focused on the airfields and infrastructure. US forces at Hawaii are just as unprepared as they were on Dec. 7th (and note that even with hours of warning, US forces in the Philippines were caught flat-footed and did little better than Pearl's defenders). I agree that hitting Pearl after the Philippines attack commenced would have been a very stupid idea. From the numbers you're posting, they could not have caused much in the way of permanent or lasting damage had they concentrated on the base facilities. Given the striking power of the six available fleet carriers in Nagumo's force, what would have crippled Pearl for the longest period of time (assuming two attack waves, the same as they actually used on Dec. 7th)?
Of course, another thought might be the potential of mining Pearl, either as part of an airstrike (I do not know if the IJN had naval mines that could be air-dropped from carrier aircraft) or via submarines. If the latter, it might have been a nasty and surprising shock; even if little damage was done, sweeping the damn things out would have taken time and there'd be no guarantees they were all found.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 4, 2016 22:39:58 GMT -6
I was thinking more that the surprise strike at Pearl still precedes the assault on the Philippines; the only difference being the US fleet is not there and the entire Japanese attack is focused on the airfields and infrastructure. US forces at Hawaii are just as unprepared as they were on Dec. 7th (and note that even with hours of warning, US forces in the Philippines were caught flat-footed and did little better than Pearl's defenders). I agree that hitting Pearl after the Philippines attack commenced would have been a very stupid idea. From the numbers you're posting, they could not have caused much in the way of permanent or lasting damage had they concentrated on the base facilities. Given the striking power of the six available fleet carriers in Nagumo's force, what would have crippled Pearl for the longest period of time (assuming two attack waves, the same as they actually used on Dec. 7th)? Of course, another thought might be the potential of mining Pearl, either as part of an airstrike (I do not know if the IJN had naval mines that could be air-dropped from carrier aircraft) or via submarines. If the latter, it might have been a nasty and surprising shock; even if little damage was done, sweeping the damn things out would have taken time and there'd be no guarantees they were all found. In point of fact, nothing would have crippled us for longer than about 3 months. The Japanese were not real good at logistics, and the slowness of their building the runway on Guadalcanal proves that. However, we were not slow. We would have had everything in working order very quickly, our record during the war proves it. We took Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 with a partially build runway and it was finished in 15 days. On 22 August, Marine aircraft began to land and fly missions from it. Actually all the Japanese had completed was the clearing of the area and laying down of coral pieces before laying down the runway. It wasn't much. The most important logistical facilities were the fuel tanks, Naval Yard. At the time, one of the Red Hill underground fuel tanks had been completed and it was completely filled. As I explained earlier all those facilities could have been repaired easily but most importantly, the IJN just did not have enough ordnance and aircraft to do the job. It really boils down to the same issue: no battleships, no attack. It's just that simple. As to the mines, the Japanese had a type 3 Mark 1, aircraft mine that was dropped from a land based attack plane which could only carry one. I believe that it was too heavy for any naval carrier based aircraft to carry.
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