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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 7, 2016 12:13:28 GMT -6
The events prior to the attack have presented an interesting case for everyone looking the wrong way. Reports from the US and British ambassadors in China and Japan consistently sent reports that the Japanese were headed north and west; that would be towards Siberia and China. However, that was the Imperial Japanese Army, not the Navy. The IJA always focused on China and Manchuria, but the Navy looked south for good reason. The raw materials they need, since the closing of the Trans-Siberian RR were south. Short and Kimmel would have gotten these reports from the CNO and his assessments. However, we come back to the same issue. Once the fleet was in Pearl Harbor, it was their responsibility to maintain security.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 8, 2016 19:27:57 GMT -6
Whatever the failings in Washington were in regards to assessing the threat from Japanese forces towards Hawaii, to my thinking it is hard to absolve Kimmel and Short of responsibility for the defensive failures at Pearl. As CINCPAC, Kimmel had responsibility for keeping his forces ready to fight an aggressive peer-state competitor. He had his own Naval Intelligence staff and scouting assets; the instant he was told that four of the six Japanese fleet carriers had dropped off the grid figuring out where they were should have been Priority Number One for his command. Short had one primary job - defend Hawaii. He should have been ready to do so.
With the discussions regarding possible alternate scenarios for Pearl Harbor, I'd be interested to shift the discussion to another - Wake Island. After the first Japanese invasion attempt was repulsed on December 11, a relief convoy was dispatched to Wake that included the Saratoga, three heavy cruisers, and 10 destroyers. Lexington, in the company of three heavy cruisers and eight destroyers, was to raid the Marshalls as a diversion. The Japanese dispatched Hiryu and Soryu to cover their second invasion attempt against Wake; on December 20 acting CINCPAC Vice Admiral Pye cancelled the Marshalls raid and sent Lexington to cover Saratoga's force. On the night of December 22 the Wake Island relief mission was recalled, with Saratoga's force slated to arrive at Wake on December 24. The Japanese invaded on December 23 and took the Wake within the day.
Hypothetical - the Wake Island relief operation is not recalled and Saratoga and possibly Lexington are committed to battle on December 24, resulting in the war's first carrier battle. Any thoughts on how it might have unfolded? Probably even odds on carriers; however the US pilots did not have the months of raiding practice they had before Coral Sea and most of the US fighters were Brewster F2As, some of which would be shredded by Zeroes at Midway six months later. Japanese submarine activity in the Pacific was also considerable at that point.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 9, 2016 7:55:18 GMT -6
....... Hypothetical - the Wake Island relief operation is not recalled and Saratoga and possibly Lexington are committed to battle on December 24, resulting in the war's first carrier battle. Any thoughts on how it might have unfolded? Probably even odds on carriers; however the US pilots did not have the months of raiding practice they had before Coral Sea and most of the US fighters were Brewster F2As, some of which would be shredded by Zeroes at Midway six months later. Japanese submarine activity in the Pacific was also considerable at that point. I think we both agree, that despite poor signal intelligence, a country who really was isolationist, and a State Department that was on the horns of dilemma, the ultimate responsibility for what occurred at Pearl Harbor was the two commanding officers- Short and kimmel. No question in my mind, but we can assign blame for their attitude to many others. As to the Wake Island relief, it was absurd to say the least. Why risk three of your only carriers in the Pacific for an indefensible position. Pre-war planners knew that Guam, Wake, and even Samoa were not defensible by the fleet. They knew that they could not relieve the Philippines. The carriers had to stay near the Hawaiian Islands and that includes Midway. By December 18th, Signal Intel had four Japanese carriers plus a land based air group of bombers from the Marshall's tied to the invasion of Wake Island. Enterprise was slowed by the Oiler Neches to 12 knots. On the morning of the 21st of December, the Japanese hit wake with 49 strike aircraft. By the 23 of December, with our forces still attempting to get close and coordinate, it was apparent that it was over on Wake. The second landings had taken place and by the 0800 it was all over on Wake Island. If Admiral Pye and his staff had not recalled our carriers, we might have lost at least two of those carriers, to Japanese Naval air forces and/ or Japanese submarines accompanying the fleet. As Admiral Stark, CNO, stated "Wake is now and will continue to be a liability". Any attempt at a quick raid might have proven to be our version of the Battle of Midway so I don't see anything of value or good coming out of continuing an operation that pre-war planners knew was totally out of the question. I think that if Japan had realized that they had the three carriers that they had missed at Pearl Harbor close, they would have ordered Nagumo and the rest of the First Striking Fleet to head down to Wake and along with land based aircraft from the Marshall's finished what they had started at Pearl Harbor.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 17, 2016 10:17:29 GMT -6
While it may have been a doomed plan, there was still a feeling in some quarters of the USN that it should not have been called off. Pye was Nimitz's preferred choice for the South Pacific theater command prior to Guadalcanal; reportedly however CNO Ernest King still had a grudge against Pye for recalling the Wake Island relief operation and he was kept stateside for the remainder of the war.
Theoretically, how far could Japan have gotten before American industrial production knocked them out? 1942 seems to have been an even-odds slugfest in terms of ships lost, with the Japanese losing four fleet carriers and two light carriers while the US lost four fleet carriers. In terms of damaged ships, Shokaku and Zuiho were out of action for long periods due to battle damage, while Saratoga required repairs from two torpedo attacks and Enterprise was pretty much being held together with duct tape after Santa Cruz. If it wasn't for the completely inadequate Japanese aircrew training program which had even their undamaged carriers sidelined at several points, 1942 might have ended with with the Japanese having a 3-1 superiority in active carriers. The US wouldn't start getting the Essex-class CVs and Independence-class CVLs into the lineup until the summer of 1943. It would seem that Japan's inability to scale up its naval aviation training program and poor damage-control (I doubt they would have tried to keep a damaged carrier in action as the US did with Yorktown and Enterprise) gave the US a good six-month window to hold the line with just one or two operational carriers until new construction started reaching the Pacific.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 17, 2016 16:34:15 GMT -6
I go back to the original planning before the war that Wake, Guam and the Philippines were not defensible and that is how Pye viewed it. He could not risk his few carriers for islands he knew he could not defend nor support and support is the key to this whole issue. CNO King had a thing for men whom he viewed as not being aggressive, he did it against Fletcher but Nimitz protected until after Santa Cruz it was over for him and the officer in charge of the Southwest Pacific. However, if Pye had tried to defend Wake and lost as most figure he would, then King would have had him cashiered for not using good commonsense. He was hard to work with as Nimitz would attest to.
As to how far the Japanese could have gone, 1942 was the make or break year. By the end of 1942, we had built 18 CV/CVL/CVE's, 4 BB's, 8 CA/CL's, 82 DD" and 34 subs. For the Japanese, 4, 1, 4, 10, 61. There are some more striking figures. At PH, we lost about 169 aircraft. In terms of 1941 production, that was fifteen days. In other words, we replaced those aircraft in fifteen days with absolutely brand new aircraft. In 1943 production figures, it was fifteen minutes. In 1942, we produced 26,277 aircraft, the Japanese produced 5,088.
Theoretically, even if we had not destroyed four aircraft carriers at Midway, we probably would have had two carriers and 164 aircraft and the Japanese would have had 6 carriers and 561. By the beginning of 1943, we would have had 3 fleet carriers and 2 light carriers with about 321 aircraft while the Japanese would have had their same numbers. This assumes no losses at Guadalcanal if it had taken place after Midway. At the end of 1943, the figures are 7 fleet carriers and 7 light carriers with a total of 850 aircraft. The Japanese numbers on increased in light carriers up to 621. Already, without the losses at Midway, they are behind the curve in two years at best.
In the area of logistics, which for island hopping and supplying forward bases was vital, we had produced by the end of 1942, 5,479,766 tons of merchant shipping to the Japanese 260,059. Remember we had instituted unrestricted submarine warfare and the Japanese Navy did not institute convoying until late 1943. The Pacific War was a war of merchant shipping because almost everything you need to defend or assault the various island outposts had to be transported. The Japanese southern offensive's specific purpose was to capture regions with natural resources for their industrial base. Unfortunately, with low merchant shipping, those raw materials like oil, chromium, rubber, copper etc. could not be moved to their factories in Japan. One of the reasons for much of the IJN being stationed at Singapore was because of its location near oil.
For more data, by the end of December 1943, the Japanese had lost to all causes, about 73 naval ships. For the Essex class carriers, Essex was commissioned and added to the fleet on December 1942. By April 1943 Yorktown had been added, with Intrepid in August of the same year and Hornet in November. It doesn't take much thought to figure that the IJN was finished essentially by the end of 1942. By this time, its losses in carriers, cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, transports was far too high to be reversed. 1942 was the make or break year, and they were aware of it.
As to aircrews, it was even worse. Although she managed to produce pilots, they were not well trained nor well lead since most of the best leaders were dead. Also, aircraft quality had deteriorated. The Zero was, 1943 just a good target with the F4U and F6F Hellcat. The rest of their dive bombers and torpedo bombers were targets also.
All in all, I set the date at 9 February 1943, when Guadalcanal fell. After that date, Rabaul was heavily bombed by bombers and fighters from Australia and Port Moresby, and supplies of parts and new pilots were dwindling. Bougainville and the other islands in the chain were just a few obstacles but nothing much. It all went downhill after that very quickly.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 17, 2016 18:33:03 GMT -6
I found some figures for you about Japanese pilot strengths. According to Captain Genda, the pilot who designed the Pearl Harbor attack, the JNAF had about 3-4000 pilots trained at the beginning of the war with 1500 for carriers. Each pilot had about 800-1000 hrs of experience average. The minimum was 200-300 hrs. Japanese pilots originally prior to the war, had about 100 hrs of primary training and that was shortened to 30. As time passed, the total hrs including primary reached 100 hrs. According to US intel, the experienced Japanese pilot hours dropped from 600 plus at the beginning to 500 by August 1942. By July 1943 is was down to 400 and by the beginning of 1933 it was 300. Figures show that after Guadalcanal, the number of pilots with over 600 hrs. dwindled steadily until 1944.
As the documents state, simply put the pilot training and experienced dwindle until by 1944, they were just cannon fodder for better US aircraft and pilots. Hope that provides some good information for the discussion. I have much more.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 17, 2016 18:38:42 GMT -6
Saying Admiral King was a hard man to work with is an understatement. Reportedly one of his daughters was quoted as saying "He is the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage."
The question behind the gains in US fleet production also have to be viewed in light of logistics; remember that all our major fleet units were built on the East Coast. They had to work up and then get to the Pacific; Essex may have been commissioned in December 1942 but even after an accelerated trials/shakedown period she didn't get into action until May 1943. Yorktown didn't make it to Pearl until the end of July and Intrepid didn't reach Pearl until January 1944. The Independence-class ships didn't start arriving in the Pacific until July 1943.
At the end of 1942 we had one battered fleet carrier on station in the South Pacific and one fresh out of drydock repairs - we actually requested to "borrow" HMS Victorious from the RN at the end of 1942; she arrived for service in May 1943 and went back to Scapa Flow in September. Against that the Japanese had an undamaged Zuikaku, Hiyo, and Junyo plus the recently repaired light aircraft carrier Zuiho and the recently converted light carrier Ryuho. Shokaku returned to action in May 1943. Together with their surface forces, they still had a pretty strong fleet. The fly in the ointment though was that they were already starting to feel the fuel crunch and they had lost more than half of their veteran naval aviators. In addition to the statistics you posted, after Santa Cruz the Japanese had lost 409 out of the 765 aircrew who had flown in the Pearl Harbor raid. As 1943 rolled on we also had an increasing number of bases in the South Pacific that helped patch the carrier shortage and made life hell for anything Japanese that floated or flew in the area.
What strikes me about the Japanese actions in 1943 is that they were perhaps too conservative. They sent much of their remaining carrier aircraft to land bases in the South Pacific (where they were further decimated) and more or less sat their major fleet units out until mid-1944. By that time we had amassed the most devastating naval force on the planet and had the ability to take whatever they could dish out and throw it back with compound interest. In the meantime, even with a shorthanded carrier force we were rolling up the Solomons and keeping up the pressure on Rabaul and other outposts. Perhaps part of the problem was that they seemingly continued to underestimate the US capacity for attacking with the resources at hand rather than waiting for a full order of battle, despite having been proven wrong on that at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 17, 2016 20:43:29 GMT -6
Saying Admiral King was a hard man to work with is an understatement. Reportedly one of his daughters was quoted as saying "He is the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage." The question behind the gains in US fleet production also have to be viewed in light of logistics; remember that all our major fleet units were built on the East Coast. They had to work up and then get to the Pacific; Essex may have been commissioned in December 1942 but even after an accelerated trials/shakedown period she didn't get into action until May 1943. Yorktown didn't make it to Pearl until the end of July and Intrepid didn't reach Pearl until January 1944. The Independence-class ships didn't start arriving in the Pacific until July 1943. At the end of 1942 we had one battered fleet carrier on station in the South Pacific and one fresh out of drydock repairs - we actually requested to "borrow" HMS Victorious from the RN at the end of 1942; she arrived for service in May 1943 and went back to Scapa Flow in September. Against that the Japanese had an undamaged Zuikaku, Hiyo, and Junyo plus the recently repaired light aircraft carrier Zuiho and the recently converted light carrier Ryuho. Shokaku returned to action in May 1943. Together with their surface forces, they still had a pretty strong fleet. The fly in the ointment though was that they were already starting to feel the fuel crunch and they had lost more than half of their veteran naval aviators. In addition to the statistics you posted, after Santa Cruz the Japanese had lost 409 out of the 765 aircrew who had flown in the Pearl Harbor raid. As 1943 rolled on we also had an increasing number of bases in the South Pacific that helped patch the carrier shortage and made life hell for anything Japanese that floated or flew in the area. What strikes me about the Japanese actions in 1943 is that they were perhaps too conservative. They sent much of their remaining carrier aircraft to land bases in the South Pacific (where they were further decimated) and more or less sat their major fleet units out until mid-1944. By that time we had amassed the most devastating naval force on the planet and had the ability to take whatever they could dish out and throw it back with compound interest. In the meantime, even with a shorthanded carrier force we were rolling up the Solomons and keeping up the pressure on Rabaul and other outposts. Perhaps part of the problem was that they seemingly continued to underestimate the US capacity for attacking with the resources at hand rather than waiting for a full order of battle, despite having been proven wrong on that at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. I assumed you realized that working up time added about two to three months. Most of the time the air wing was already on board having flown from Oceana, Norfolk or any of the other old bases on the coast. As the ship moved from the east to the west coast through the canal, she could perform her working up exercises. Once on the West Coast she would them finish either off of the coast of San Diego, Long Beach or San Francisco. Each of those cities were equipped to provide major services to the air wings and ship. We did have a battered fleet at the end of the Guadalcanal operation. The Japanese problem was the types of carriers still available and air crews. The Solomon's campaign however, allowed her to use her land bases on New Guinea- Lae and Salamaua along with the two bases at Rabaul. She also had bases on the other islands like Bougainville and New Ireland. These land bases were nice and unsinkable.... however they made excellent targets for B-24's, B-17's, B-25's, B-26's and fighter bombers like the P-38's. The JNAF and IJAAF never had enough pilots or spare parts to maintain a good fighter defense plus no advanced warning system. One issue was maintenance. The USN lives on cannibalizing. The IJN did not. When Rabaul was finally taken, many Japanese aircraft were sitting on the hardstands with one part missing. The USN would have taken one bird and gotten 90% of those planes in the air. The IJN never did fully accepted the problems they had with their naval aviation. An example was air base construction: They took on average well over 6 months to build an effective air strip and base. We did it in two weeks. On Guadalcanal, Henderson field was started by the Japanese but all they had accomplished was the clearing and placement of coral bits down before actually putting down the hard stuff to complete it. We invaded on 7 August and 15 days later, the first Marine fighters and bombers were landing. After the nightly bombardments, we had the runways operational within a few hours, drove the Japanese crazy. We had radar on the tower they left and coast watchers, so when they arrived during the day, we had fighters up at altitude to jump them. That's when losses began to mount plus the new Zero with the better guns and new engine used more fuel so the fighters couldn't stay around and bomber losses soared rapidly. On the whole, despite their initial performance in the Southern Operation, Pearl Harbor, Guam, and Wake island, the Japanese performed poorly. They should have taken the experienced torpedo bomber pilots, dive bomber pilots and fighter pilots, and used them to train. They never got that point. One last comment is that they had a much smaller population and so men had to be shoehorned into flying. Not everyone is qualified to fly aircraft, and many pilots they produced were, to put it mildly, simply dumb and uncoordinated. I agree that the Japanese did not estimate our capability to rebound and come after them. The invasion of Guadalcanal was a very big surprise to them.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 20, 2016 9:11:05 GMT -6
One issue about the Japanese move south and the US intelligence assessment that is tragic, in my estimation is the fact that we were looking in the wrong direction. I don't mean just toward Europe, which in fact is true, but we expected after the German invasion of Russia, the Japanese to move their army into Manchuria and Southern Siberia due to the closure of the Transsiberian Railroad. This was a primary source of raw materials for the Japanese.
The issue for the Japanese was one of pledged neutrality to Russa and being part of the Axis powers. Which direction do you go? Japanese intelligence did not want the German's to move all the way to vladivostock after winning in the West. Many in the State department felt that the IJA would move against the Maritime provinces and other areas of Siberia to eliminate the German's getting too close. The Allies were focused on the IJA not the IJN. They did not realize that the IJN had developed the Southern Operation to capture the areas containing the raw materials they required. London estimated that " Japan will not advance southward except into Thailand because of the danger of becoming embroiled with the United States and Britain..." These ideas developed by the men who were closest to the area, swayed the Roosevelt advisors to expect the Japanese to strike north and west, instead of south and east. All these assessments were, again, based on what the IJA would do, not the IJN because we did not realize that the two entities were separate in the Japanese government and were not bound by what the government heads wanted. In reality, the key to the Japanese dream of absolute power in the east with burgeoning industry, was in the south where all the resources including oil, existed and those were parts of the British, French and Dutch empires. Any movement south, had to include the Philippines to cover the flank of the Southern Operation, everyone who could read a map understood that.
So, we can observe that the invasion of Russia by the German's unleashed the tiger of Japanese sea power. From the minute the Germans struck, thus isolating Japan from her tenuous overland connection with her Tripartite partners, the US should have directed all possible efforts to determining the plans and preparations of the Japanese Navy. This was the words by Gordon Prange examining comments made by Nomura to Sumner Welles. We did not examine the IJN for their plans and what to expect, so the surprise at Pearl Harbor occurred.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 20, 2016 10:17:25 GMT -6
The US wasn't completely blind to the possibility of a southern advance by the IJN. We understood that the Japanese had their eyes on the southern region of Asia by the fact that they caused their embargo from the US by invading and occupying the rest of Indochina.
On July 26th of 1941, Roosevelt incorporated the armed forces of the Philippines into those of United States. This event also prompted the movement of the B-17's from Pearl Harbor to the Philippines. On 12 September 1941, nine B-17's arrived at the Philippines. Somehow, even the aviation specialist thought this aircraft could stop the IJN from invading the Philippines. Unfortunately, after Midway we realized that a B-17 flying even at 5,000 feet, couldn't hit a moving ship. One of important issues for the movement of the B-17's was the lack of aviation fuel for them. There weren't enough tankers to transport the fuel to the Philippines and many of the bombers were sitting in the US awaiting the fuel to reach the waypoints in the Pacific for the flight to the islands. General Short in Hawaii paid the price as did the US fleet for this short sighted policy. He originally had 21 of these long ranged aircraft to use to scout in the 360 degrees needed to keep an eye on the waters around Oahu, but with the movement of those nine planes, he ended up with only twelve of which six were cannibalized to keep the aircraft flowing from the US to the Philippines. This robbed Short of the best long range scout aircraft he had, requiring Kimmel to pickup the slack with the PBY's and they did not have the same range. This doesn't excuse Short's failures, but it does provide one explanation for some of his actions. The end result of this change in defensive policy meant that the movement of some of fleet back to the coast should have been considered since the defensive capability was now deficient. As one author points out, with so little heavy airpower remaining in Oahu, careful consideration of the fleet's presence in the Oahu should have been considered and more intelligence and information provided to Kimmel and Short. Again, this doesn't excuse either officer for their failures but it does mean that the blame goes farther than Hawaii.
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Post by RNRobert on Apr 21, 2016 5:54:00 GMT -6
One issue about the Japanese move south and the US intelligence assessment that is tragic, in my estimation is the fact that we were looking in the wrong direction. I don't mean just toward Europe, which in fact is true, but we expected after the German invasion of Russia, the Japanese to move their army into Manchuria and Southern Siberia due to the closure of the Transsiberian Railroad. This was a primary source of raw materials for the Japanese. The issue for the Japanese was one of pledged neutrality to Russa and being part of the Axis powers. Which direction do you go? Japanese intelligence did not want the German's to move all the way to vladivostock after winning in the West. Many in the State department felt that the IJA would move against the Maritime provinces and other areas of Siberia to eliminate the German's getting too close. <snip> From what I've read, the IJA was involved in a couple of skirmishes with the Russians between 1938 and 1940, and both times, they got clobbered. So, I don't see the Japanese (who had their hands full with China) being overly enthusiastic in taking on the Russians.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 21, 2016 7:06:28 GMT -6
One issue about the Japanese move south and the US intelligence assessment that is tragic, in my estimation is the fact that we were looking in the wrong direction. I don't mean just toward Europe, which in fact is true, but we expected after the German invasion of Russia, the Japanese to move their army into Manchuria and Southern Siberia due to the closure of the Transsiberian Railroad. This was a primary source of raw materials for the Japanese. The issue for the Japanese was one of pledged neutrality to Russa and being part of the Axis powers. Which direction do you go? Japanese intelligence did not want the German's to move all the way to vladivostock after winning in the West. Many in the State department felt that the IJA would move against the Maritime provinces and other areas of Siberia to eliminate the German's getting too close. <snip> From what I've read, the IJA was involved in a couple of skirmishes with the Russians between 1938 and 1940, and both times, they got clobbered. So, I don't see the Japanese (who had their hands full with China) being overly enthusiastic in taking on the Russians. I did some research to confirm that Russians moved Siberian units. From June 6th, 1941 to December 31, 1941 the Russians move in this order: June: 11 Divisions July: 3 Divisions August: None September: 3 Divisions October: 6 Divisions November: 5 divisions December: 0 Divisions Only eight divisions participated in the Battle for Moscow. The rest were assigned to the Western and Kalinin Fronts. BTW, they not Asiatics but Ukrainians, and other Russians. But in fact, on the day of the German invasion, there 703,714 Russians facing the Japanese but December, 1, 1941 there were 1.343307 Russians facing them, so although many were moved, they actually increased the numbers in the Far East. Probably, like you say, it was better that they did not try to test the Russians. The quality of those Russians is questionable, the Japanese were experienced so its hard to guess the outcome. Possibly they would have done well at the beginning but the Russians would have used the same fire and fall back tactics to wear out the Japanese. I believe that in this deep winter environment, the well equipped Russians would have done much better.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 26, 2016 19:39:19 GMT -6
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_GolThe IJA and the Russians (along with their respective puppet states, Manchukuo and Mongolia) scrapped a number of times between 1935 and 1939, but Khalkin Gol was when it erupted into a large-scale conflict. Casualties seem relatively even; the issue is that the IJA was heavily outnumbered and getting into a meat-grinder contest with the Russians rarely goes well. The IJA had the equivalent of two light infantry divisions facing a force of five infantry divisions( two of which were Motor Rifle divisions), two cavalry divisions, and two tank divisions. Very lousy odds even if in some early engagements the casualty ratio heavily favored the Japanese. One reason that scrap gave the IJN favor in aiming south was that the Kwantung Army had kicked off and escalated the fight without authorization from Tokyo (something they had done frequently up to that point), which didn't help the IJA's case for driving the bus.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 27, 2016 13:10:30 GMT -6
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_GolThe IJA and the Russians (along with their respective puppet states, Manchukuo and Mongolia) scrapped a number of times between 1935 and 1939, but Khalkin Gol was when it erupted into a large-scale conflict. Casualties seem relatively even; the issue is that the IJA was heavily outnumbered and getting into a meat-grinder contest with the Russians rarely goes well. The IJA had the equivalent of two light infantry divisions facing a force of five infantry divisions( two of which were Motor Rifle divisions), two cavalry divisions, and two tank divisions. Very lousy odds even if in some early engagements the casualty ratio heavily favored the Japanese. One reason that scrap gave the IJN favor in aiming south was that the Kwantung Army had kicked off and escalated the fight without authorization from Tokyo (something they had done frequently up to that point), which didn't help the IJA's case for driving the bus. The Khalkhin-Gol series of engagement were started by an air attack on a Soviet Base at Tamsak-Bulak in Mongolia. The IJA high command knew nothing about it and forbid any further air attacks. This was a key decision later in the ground battle because they had no air support against the Russians under Georgi Zhukov. Needless to say, the IJA was soundly thrashed and realized that they were no match for the Russians especially with their involvement in China. As we have already stated, with this defeat and the problems with operations in China, the IJN plan for movement south was the only option for expanding the empire, gaining the necessary natural resources to expand their limited industries. I believe they took the strategic lesson but failed to understand the tactical lessons dealt to them by the Soviets. They were reminded by the British and US forces after Pearl Harbor; to their dismay.
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Post by director on Apr 28, 2016 8:37:01 GMT -6
Responding to some points from earlier in the discussion:
American fire control was almost entirely mechanical with inputs fed in directly from rangefinders etc or by a small number of personnel, and transmitted directly to the turrets. Japanese fire control had several 'talkers' in the loop so (for example) the rangefinder data would be read out to the man who entered it, solution run and the result passed by voice to the guns. This is a significant loss of speed and accuracy but might not have mattered against any other navy because everyone but the Americans used basically the same system.
The performance of the Japanese fleet off Samar can be explained by systemic and personal fatigue. Their navy was bled white, with trained men moved out to combat units (and killed more and more often as the war went on). The ships not directly in combat, like the battleships, received more and more green men who needed training. Once the fleet left Borneo it was subjected to almost continuous submarine and aircraft attacks. Heavy losses (Atago and Musashi for two) plus the lack of Japanese aircraft and the few destroyers escorting the force must have made it clear that this was not a 'do-or-die mission' but a desperate and almost hopeless one. No human can go for days under continual attack without experiencing exhaustion, so it is reasonable to assume the Japanese crewmen were not at peak efficiency.
If Roosevelt had left the Navy at San Diego, it is possible it would have been attacked anyway, though surprise would certainly have been lost. Pushing the carrier fleet to Pearl Harbor strained Japanese logistics, so reaching the West Coast is unlikely but theoretically possible, and a strike on the US mainland would have been at least as terrifying as one at Pearl. On the other hand, the Japanese could have tried to fight Britain and the Netherlands without declaring war on the US - that would complicate Roosevelt's political position, but the US would have come in anyway I think. Or they could have declared war without a surprise attack, overrun the Far East and then raided the fleet once it got to Pearl Harbor. None of these are as purely effective as a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor strike but we can see that was not Japan's only option.
What they could NOT do was keep fighting in China and not go to war with the US; Japan could not buy oil from anyone but the US, Netherlands or Britain and the embargo was literally going to bring the nation to a halt unless they could get oil.
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