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Post by director on Jan 26, 2016 10:18:46 GMT -6
I do agree - some of Mahan's thinking was more applicable to his own time and it's too much to think that anyone gets it all right. His thoughts on the importance of a battlefleet built around capital ships are still valid, he was just wrong to think that was the only thing that mattered. And certainly the definition of capital ship has changed.
But I do think his thoughts on the importance of geography are valid. As you say, any nation with a coastline can develop seapower, but if it takes two hundred years of building ports for one nation while another has abundant fine harbors, then it is more likely the national energies of the first will be turned away by other crises. Even a persistent effort (Kaiser Wilhelm II, Soviet Union from WW2 to 1980s) will eventually give way unless the returns are clearly visible.
We are seeing now that China's economy is having to transition from explosive growth to less, and from an export economy to an internal market. I think the political stresses are going to be huge; no well-educated citizenry above poverty level likes having its decisions made for it, and the model of 'economic growth without political freedom' is going to get tested.
One thing political repression was good for was population control. India is now set to overtake China in population, and that's going to put greater strain on a country whose infrastructure doesn't have that much slack.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 26, 2016 11:51:56 GMT -6
I do agree - some of Mahan's thinking was more applicable to his own time and it's too much to think that anyone gets it all right. His thoughts on the importance of a battlefleet built around capital ships are still valid, he was just wrong to think that was the only thing that mattered. And certainly the definition of capital ship has changed. But I do think his thoughts on the importance of geography are valid. As you say, any nation with a coastline can develop seapower, but if it takes two hundred years of building ports for one nation while another has abundant fine harbors, then it is more likely the national energies of the first will be turned away by other crises. Even a persistent effort (Kaiser Wilhelm II, Soviet Union from WW2 to 1980s) will eventually give way unless the returns are clearly visible. We are seeing now that China's economy is having to transition from explosive growth to less, and from an export economy to an internal market. I think the political stresses are going to be huge; no well-educated citizenry above poverty level likes having its decisions made for it, and the model of 'economic growth without political freedom' is going to get tested. One thing political repression was good for was population control. India is now set to overtake China in population, and that's going to put greater strain on a country whose infrastructure doesn't have that much slack. The terminology issue is really "What's in a name". By the Mahan definition, we don't have battlefleet's anymore. We have Surface Action Groups, Small Surface Action Groups and Littoral Surface Groups along with combat Logistics Groups, and most importantly Carrier Strike Groups. Together all these make up a fleet but they all have their own missions. To equate Mahan's battlefleet to this collection of groups is a bit of stretch. In 21st century terminology, the capital ship is the nuclear powered aircraft carrier. You could stretch the point to the Aegis Class cruisers, and that is a stretch. As we have all agreed, a nation-state cannot simply overcome, completely, geography. The Russian's have needed a warm water port forever. The reason that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan was to move closer to Pakistan and gain a warm water port on the Indian Ocean, the Chinese are doing the same thing. Although Sevastopol is a warm water port, it is confined by the Dardanelles and Turkey's control. Germany has always had a problem with ports. Wilhelmshaven and Bremen are limited and there was no method of getting to the Baltic before the Kiel Canal. But that doesn't help her. She invaded Norway in WWII to gain a port like Narvik and be able to get the iron ore from Sweden through that port and transport it down the coast of Norway. Even China has a real problem with Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines essentially acting as barriers to a clear access to the Pacific Ocean. They have to move through the Straits of Malacca which is covered by Singapore and Indonesia with Thailand and Vietnam possible areas of conflict. They have a similar problem. It is historically evident that nations like the US, Britain and even France with unfettered access to the oceans, have gained prominence in the world. I don't think Mahan identified anything new. As to geography and its lasting effects, Sir Halford Mackinder assessed the geographic situation in the world the best.
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Post by director on Jan 26, 2016 23:27:36 GMT -6
Um... no. "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World."
That is not true and has not been true in historical times; neither Poland, Lithuania, Russia or the Soviet Union could make it work, and applying it to Austria-Hungary or Bohemia would be risible. In no way can we hold that, for example, Soviet control of Eastern Europe gave them control of Europe, much less Eur-Asia or the world. It is possible that a Germany enlarged by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty or triumphant in the East in WW2 could have given some validity to it... but they didn't; the Eastern European heartland is inherently indefensible from outside invasion and simply has never been united under a strong power for any really long period. Not even the Mongols could pull that off...
What has been true is that the sea-faring commercial nations have possessed wealth above their share, and that usually (but not always) translates to military power. For most of the 19th and 20th centuries the great maritime powers (Britain, occasionally France, later the US) have exerted much more control over continental affairs than the continent has exerted over them (France might be an exception... but they did prosper when they competed in maritime trade, colonies and commerce).
I'd certainly count a carrier group with air assets as an expression of Mahanian capital-ship theory; if you have them you can go places and project power in ways you cannot without them. And submarines (not just the ballistic missile boats) also probably qualify. They don't have the integral sensor capability of the carrier group but stealth has a value all its own. If Mahanian theory was entirely outdated I think nations like Britain, France, India, the Soviet Union and China would not have expended so much resources, time and effort in constructing capital ships.
I do entirely agree with you that Mahan's terms need to be re-named and re-applied, but to be fair he was a naval officer in Civil War times and couldn't possibly have seen where steam, steel, gasoline engines and the rest would go.
And I agree whole-heartedly that many nations have struggled against their geography; the repeated rise and fall of ancient Middle-Eastern states who tried to hold the fertile Tigris-Euphrates basin is, if you will pardon the pun, a 'classic' case.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 27, 2016 11:04:35 GMT -6
Here is a my list of books on the subject of nation-states, geography and geopolitics.
1. Prisoners of Geography by Tim Marshall
2. The Revenge of Geography by Robert D. Kaplan
3. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations by David S. Landes
4. Strategic Vision by Zbigniew Brzeinski
5. The Grand Chessboard by Zbigniew Brzezinski
6. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers - Paul Kennedy
7. Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism by John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart
I hope that you find them interesting.
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