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Post by marcorossolini on Apr 11, 2016 9:12:53 GMT -6
I'm putting together an anniversary miniature wargame for the Battle of Jutland.
A somewhat significant part of any wargaming scenario is the ability to know comprehensively that one side has won and the other lost.
This... isn't really apparent with Jutland. The best (and even this is contentious) outcome I can make of the literature I have is that it was a German tactical victory (they did a lot of damage and survived to fight another day) and it was a British strategic victory in that the Hochseeflotte remained bottled up in port and command of the sea remained.
These aren't very satisfying outcomes for a wargame aimed at recreating Jutland. If I had a campaign to run it'd be fine, but as its just Jutland for the anniversary I have to find historical and satisfying outcomes for both sides.
This is where you lot come in. I've been trawling through my books and whilst they are specific on how poorly everything was handled, not on how the battle could've turned out differently. With a lot of the uncertainty of the battle removed from the equation, by virtue of it being on a tabletop, it's likely that we'd see far more decisive results, but that's likely to play into the Grand Fleet's favour. I'm working on cards and other elements to add some uncertainty and confusion to the fighting, but it remains that asking the Germans to shave off enough of the Grand Fleet to be at parity is a rather tall order.
With all this in mind, I'm curious what you lot would be able to come up with for an achievable, realistic decision.
Marco
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 11, 2016 12:19:45 GMT -6
I'm putting together an anniversary miniature wargame for the Battle of Jutland. A somewhat significant part of any wargaming scenario is the ability to know comprehensively that one side has won and the other lost. This... isn't really apparent with Jutland. The best (and even this is contentious) outcome I can make of the literature I have is that it was a German tactical victory (they did a lot of damage and survived to fight another day) and it was a British strategic victory in that the Hochseeflotte remained bottled up in port and command of the sea remained. These aren't very satisfying outcomes for a wargame aimed at recreating Jutland. If I had a campaign to run it'd be fine, but as its just Jutland for the anniversary I have to find historical and satisfying outcomes for both sides. This is where you lot come in. I've been trawling through my books and whilst they are specific on how poorly everything was handled, not on how the battle could've turned out differently. With a lot of the uncertainty of the battle removed from the equation, by virtue of it being on a tabletop, it's likely that we'd see far more decisive results, but that's likely to play into the Grand Fleet's favour. I'm working on cards and other elements to add some uncertainty and confusion to the fighting, but it remains that asking the Germans to shave off enough of the Grand Fleet to be at parity is a rather tall order. With all this in mind, I'm curious what you lot would be able to come up with for an achievable, realistic decision. Marco This sounds interesting, so here are my comments. First, it is my opinion that all nations are in the hands of their geographic fate. Germany was a land based power and built the wrong ships for their needs. That having been said, no decision at Jutland is the best one. If they could have just turned around, and returned to Wilhelmshaven, that would have been the best decision. After that, continue to go out and attack the British coast, and build more submarines to conduct a good guerre de course, which was where the British were vulnerable. It might have been helpful to attach submarines to the High Seas Fleet to pickoff damaged or slow moving British vessels to increase losses but as we all know, increased losses probably wouldn't have made any difference. Probably not what you wanted to hear, but there it is.
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Post by vonfriedman on Jun 27, 2016 8:50:02 GMT -6
Someone (not me) thinks that Scheer could have achieved an even greater success. Cutting the T on Jellicoe tail he could have sunk some of the less protected british BBs (Class Bellerophon and St Vincent), the some way as the british BCs. This seems rather unlikely to me, since he would have met there the Queen Elizabeth BBs, and also Revenge and Marlborough. Perhaps Scheer did not made good use of the encounter with the units of Beatty and Evan Thomas, at the end of their race to the south.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 27, 2016 9:58:42 GMT -6
Someone (not me) thinks that Scheer could have achieved an even greater success. Cutting the T on Jellicoe tail he could have sunk some of the less protected british BBs (Class Bellerophon and St Vincent), the some way as the british BCs. This seems rather unlikely to me, since he would have met there the Queen Elizabeth BBs, and also Revenge and Marlborough. Perhaps Scheer did not made good use of the encounter with the units of Beatty and Evan Thomas, at the end of their race to the south. Here is what Scheer said in his memoirs" I believe he answers his critics.
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Post by vonfriedman on Jun 27, 2016 13:21:49 GMT -6
If I am not mistaken, at the end of the race to the south the ships under the command of Beatty met the Hochseeflotte deployed in line ahead. I wonder if in his memoirs Scheer gives a justification for that, which seems to me a tactical mistake. Playing at SAI and knowing in advance that the enemy is coming straight toward us, one would try to "cut the T" with as many ships as possible.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 27, 2016 14:04:09 GMT -6
If I am not mistaken, at the end of the race to the south the ships under the command of Beatty met the Hochseeflotte deployed in line ahead. I wonder if in his memoirs Scheer gives a justification for that, which seems to me a tactical mistake. Playing at SAI and knowing in advance that the enemy is coming straight toward us, one would try to "cut the T" with as many ships as possible. The "run to the south" occurred between 3:45 pm and 4:40 Pm. So, here is what Scheer states In answer to your question for justification Scheer states I've included a map to clarify our discussion. Attachment Deleted
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 27, 2016 14:50:38 GMT -6
Based on available records and Scheer's own words, the objective of the operation was to attack shipping and hope to draw out parts of the British fleet in order to destroy them. Basically an attrition operation. When he encountered Beatty, he had his prey except, Beatty turned and headed north at 25 knots. Scheer probably realized that Beatty was leading him into a trap because at the other two engagements he did not do that, so the main portion of the British Fleet must have been deploy north waiting for Scheer. I think what Scheer states, confirms this so there would have been no time to cross the T, Beatty was moving faster than Scheer and Scheer's forces were losing the chase. If the initial report of Beatty's force didn't arrive until 5:45 when the first contact by the destroyers was at 4:30, then Beatty might have had at least a 20 mile head start on the trip north. Beatty's accelerated to 25 knots but Scheer did not. He was moving at 21 knots, IIRC, so almost from the beginning Beatty was outdistancing him.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 27, 2016 18:18:34 GMT -6
Let me pose a question for you. Admiral Scheer sailed with the HSF in the early morning of May 31st. Shortly after sailing, at 5:30 AM on May 31st, he received a report from U-32 70 miles east of Rosyth that 2 BB's, 2 Cruisers, and destroyers were taking a SE course. At 6:30 AM same day, she also reported English messages to the effect that 2 BB's and groups of destroyers had left Scapa flow. At 6:48 AM, same day, 60 miles east of Kinnaird Head, U-66 reported 8 BB's, light cruisers and numerous destroyers had been sighted on northeasterly course.
Scheer in his book, states that "These reports gave no enlightenment as to the enemy's purpose". This was, however very important information for Scheer, information that should have had a very large influence upon all his decisions and tactics. Keep in mind, that Scheer had no desire to engage the bigger Grand Fleet in a fleet engagement, their primary mission during this operation was to intercept and defeat a detachment of the Grand Fleet by attacking British shipping in the Skagerrak. For the British, their desire throughout the war was to bring about a decisive battle to destroy the High Seas Fleet. So, why didn't Scheer turn around and head back to Wilhelmshaven to avoid a major engagement? He had clear evidence that a large force was already sailing toward him, with an idea to destroy his fleet. He didn't
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Post by vonfriedman on Jun 28, 2016 6:28:04 GMT -6
Let me pose a question for you. Admiral Scheer sailed with the HSF in the early morning of May 31st. Shortly after sailing, at 5:30 AM on May 31st, he received a report from U-32 70 miles east of Rosyth that 2 BB's, 2 Cruisers, and destroyers were taking a SE course. At 6:30 AM same day, she also reported English messages to the effect that 2 BB's and groups of destroyers had left Scapa flow. At 6:48 AM, same day, 60 miles east of Kinnaird Head, U-66 reported 8 BB's, light cruisers and numerous destroyers had been sighted on northeasterly course. Scheer in his book, states that "These reports gave no enlightenment as to the enemy's purpose". This was, however very important information for Scheer, information that should have had a very large influence upon all his decisions and tactics. Keep in mind, that Scheer had no desire to engage the bigger Grand Fleet in a fleet engagement, their primary mission during this operation was to intercept and defeat a detachment of the Grand Fleet by attacking British shipping in the Skagerrak. For the British, their desire throughout the war was to bring about a decisive battle to destroy the High Seas Fleet. So, why didn't Scheer turn around and head back to Wilhelmshaven to avoid a major engagement? He had clear evidence that a large force was already sailing toward him, with an idea to destroy his fleet. He didn't Even more so, he would have to return to port after the exceptionally successful outcome of the battle between Hipper and Beatty. I think, however, that Scheer could have made better use of the much-sought opportunity to deal with the bulk of his forces a portion of the English fleet. Although this would have been difficult, given that the British BCs and also the Queen Elizabeth class BBs were faster of the German BBs.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 28, 2016 10:03:31 GMT -6
When you begin to do an historical analysis of Jutland and make a judgement about what mistakes were made, its important to review what the strategic plan was, for both sides and how their combat operations fitted into that plan.
For Jellicoe and Scheer, the strategic objective was similar. Entice the other sides detachments to sea, cut them off and destroy them. For the British with their numerical superiority and higher building capacity, losses were not going to affect them that much. We see that at Jutland with the loss of three battlecruisers, plus some armored cruisers etc. For Scheer with a numerical inferiority and limited building capacity, losses could not be afforded. His losses, though minor at Jutland did affect future combat operations. For Jellicoe, he had another advantage.... Room 40 was reading Scheer's mail. We can't diminish the advantage this gave Jellicoe and how it affected Scheer's operations. His original plan during the Jutland operation, plan 1, was to bombard Sunderland near Rosyth, where Beatty was based. There were to be 16 submarines stationed off of coast. The plan was to use the Zeppelins for scouting to prevent Beatty from leaving without Scheer's knowledge. However, in case of bad weather, the alternative was to send a detachment north to the Skagerrak to attack British merchantmen. This was the plan that was eventually adopted and this was where the Room 40 intelligence was absolutely critical because when Scheer sailed, so did Beatty headed due east. By 5:00 PM May 30, the Admiralty knew the U boats were out and that Hipper had sailed.
When Scheer sailed on the 31st of May, he had absolutely no knowledge of any movement of the British Forces. However, right after sailing on the same day, the first submarine report comes in about 2 battleships and escorts headed on a southeasterly course. What is he to make of this?
At 6:30 he gets the second sighting of 2 more battleships and escorts leaving Scapa Flow, the main fleet base for the Grand Fleet. What is he to make of this?
At 6:48, he gets the third sighting of 8 battleships and escorts headed on a northeasterly course. What is he to make of this?
It is my personnel opinion that this information should have been very significant and definite in the mind of Scheer and the staff. Scheer and the staff now know that 12 battleships with escorts are headed towards the Skagerrak. It should have had a decisive influence upon all his decisions and tactics. Tactics employed in battles are directly affected by the information in possession of the commanders on the scene plus the strategic situation existing at the time.
This is what should be considered, not the specific maneuvers that occurred during the running battle between Hipper's scouting force and Beatty.
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Post by vonfriedman on Jun 29, 2016 6:11:04 GMT -6
I am not taking into account the specific maneuvers of the running battle beween Hipper and Beatty forces. I am only considering what Scheer could have done at the time of the meeting with the british BCs led by Beatty, as for the map above indicated. The deployment of the HSF seems to me not suitable to exploit that fleeting opportunity. I agree with your thoughts about the English and German overall strategic options. On this basis the decision of Scheer to chase Beatty to the North, perhaps hoping for some lucky hits, was unnecessarily risky.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 29, 2016 8:13:58 GMT -6
I am not taking into account the specific maneuvers of the running battle beween Hipper and Beatty forces. I am only considering what Scheer could have done at the time of the meeting with the british BCs led by Beatty, as for the map above indicated. The deployment of the HSF seems to me not suitable to exploit that fleeting opportunity. I agree with your thoughts about the English and German overall strategic options. On this basis the decision of Scheer to chase Beatty to the North, perhaps hoping for some lucky hits, was unnecessarily risky. If you examine the records and maps, you can see that Beatty was fortunate that he saw the German Battle Fleet on his port bow and not his starboard. This was Hipper's fault. Had Hipper led Beatty to the east, then Scheer could have headed west and caught Beatty between the two forces. This scenario is in accordance with Scheer's overall operational objective: to catch a detachment of the Grand Fleet by itself and destroy it. This is were the principle of security enters. Beatty should not have been 73 miles ahead of Jellicoe and once his offensive strategy to scout for the High Seas Fleet had ended with its location, then he should have changed to defensive, turned immediately and headed north to lure Scheer into Jellicoe's trap. He should also have kept Jellicoe informed constantly. At this point, radio security is out the door, your opponent knows where you are now. He only sent one message and that was never enough for Jellicoe to get a feel of the current situation. This might be an interesting variance in the game to try.
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Post by vonfriedman on Jun 30, 2016 3:24:35 GMT -6
Very interesting indeed and worth to try in the game. About to change from an offensive to a defensive approach, this is an issue that I also raised in a discussion on a Steam and Iron thread (see Steam and Iron AAR).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 30, 2016 9:19:54 GMT -6
Very interesting indeed and worth to try in the game. About to change from an offensive to a defensive approach, this is an issue that I also raised in a discussion on a Steam and Iron thread (see Steam and Iron AAR). Let me know where your AAR for this change is located, I am interested in the results. It might be a good idea to change the attitude of each commander for realism. While Beatty was offensive during the Run to the South, it had to change to defensive to accomplish the mission. I believe that better communications with Jellicoe and a good series of messages from Jellicoe to Beatty providing guidance on what he wanted Beatty to do might have assisted. However, Beatty after the fleet exercises with the Grand Fleet should have been aware of these ideas. He really should not had to be reminded of them. That's why you practice on tables and at sea during exercises. There is a fine line between aggressiveness and clarity of purpose, I call it. Lee found this out during the Gettysburg Operation when his cavalry commander due to aggressiveness failed to follow the purpose of his orders to guard the flanks and report on the Union Army. Many battles have been disaster simply due to a failure to conduct proper scouting and follow proper well defined procedures. Another example is Midway. Good luck.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 30, 2016 10:25:05 GMT -6
Here is another idea for scouting for the Grand Fleet and possibly the High Seas Fleet. A screen is supposed provide security, by information on the opposing fleet, denying that same information to the opposing fleet and for the ability to deploy quickly. Should Beatty's battlecruiser force have been so far away and in front, doing the scouting. I believe and many US admirals support this idea, that the destroyer flotillas should have been the eyes of the fleet, not expensive battlecruiser. The light cruisers should have been the second line of screening and scouting behind them, then the battlecruisers.
I thought this might be a good line of thought to pursue in the game. One caveat: check the speed of your light cruisers because the lack of speed I suspect was a possible reason that Beatty was leading. According to Jellicoe, the lack of speed of light cruisers compared to dreadnought battleships made these ships inefficient for scouting. Destroyers might not have had that issue. This might be a good reason to improve speed in RTW was light cruisers.
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