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Post by oldpop2000 on May 20, 2016 10:55:19 GMT -6
The subject of this thread is strategic bombing in Europe and the Pacific during WWII with a brief excursion into the Vietnam Bombing campaigns. I believe that the plan should be to explore the theory and origin of strategic bombing, pre-war and wartime plans and the actual results. This could lead us into the Vietnam bombing and possibly how it was affected.
We should start with a definition of strategic bombing as opposed to tactical bombing, its origins during the post-WW1 era and its implications for WWII, Korea and Vietnam. Most experts both practitioners and historians have had problems with the definition of strategic bombing in relation to other kinds of aerial bombardment. Most analysts have espoused three versions of strategic bombing: Destruction of population and industrial centers; Destruction of land forces or naval: Destruction of selected targets vital to the enemy’s war making capability. The most ardent of all the men who advocated strategic bombing was BG Giulio Douhet. He saw a long range air force consisting entirely of bombers and that the air superiority gained would lead to victory. Others like Hugh Trenchard and Billy Mitchell had a much wider view and understood that it was only one component of a victory.
The pre-1939 theory and doctrine was based on the concept that bombardment was a strategic activity all on its own. It was theorized that it would be different than tactical bombing since its goals were to attack the economic and psychological vulnerabilities of the enemy not his surface forces. Tactical bombing was always based on the support of land forces. In fact, I believe that it is still viewed in that manner but the lines between strategic bombing and tactical bombing have blurred. Most pre-war ideas believed that the advent bombing had fundamentally changed the nature of warfare.
Anyway, there is a lot material available on line about this subject and we can delve into other areas of bombing including tactical bombing which, in many circles is more important than strategic bombing. It probably doesn't have to be stated, but a discussion of the tools of strategic bombing is a part of this, a very necessary part. There are volumes of statistics, aircraft details, manuals etc. on this subject including the US Strategic Bombing Survey which is available. One very good source is the USAF Historical Division.
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Post by Deleted on May 20, 2016 14:51:07 GMT -6
The destruction of an enemy state's industrial and economical infrastructure.
I think it is extremely effective in WW2 against germany and japan.
Not only was the bombing itself but the long range detached escorts are equivalent of offensive counter air sweeps that greatly degrade enemy's air force strength.
But Korea and vietnam the effects seemed somewhat... questionable. After (or later stages of) vietnam since advent of PGMs and increased ability of tactical fighter bombers i think it's safe to call 'em all "strikes" or "deep strikes"....
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 20, 2016 20:10:01 GMT -6
The destruction of an enemy state's industrial and economical infrastructure. I think it is extremely effective in WW2 against germany and japan. Not only was the bombing itself but the long range detached escorts are equivalent of offensive counter air sweeps that greatly degrade enemy's air force strength. But Korea and vietnam the effects seemed somewhat... questionable. After (or later stages of) vietnam since advent of PGMs and increased ability of tactical fighter bombers i think it's safe to call 'em all "strikes" or "deep strikes".... I believe that despite the statistical data about sorties flown, types of bombs dropped and how many, etc. like Spaatz said, "the war against Germany was fundamentally an infantry war supported by air power. It is my believe that the decline in the German war economy was due more to territorial losses, and less to strategic bombing. The loss of the Rumanian and Hungarian oil fields severely limited the oil production. The loss of Western Europe's iron ore hit the steel industry very hard. Tactical air power furthered the ground offensives, and that ended the war. However it must be said that the use of the strategic bombers did take German fighters away from ground support for the Army and that was decisive but I think it would still have been defeated by a more concentrated tactical bombing campaign. |
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Post by Deleted on May 20, 2016 22:40:12 GMT -6
mwahahah... vietnam prolly is a pivotal point where air power could play a decisive role excluding the nukes... but whether "go army" or "go air force" or "go navy"? each could go a very long way i reckon!!
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Post by Deleted on Jun 2, 2016 21:04:41 GMT -6
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Post by bcoopactual on Jul 29, 2016 20:03:58 GMT -6
The destruction of an enemy state's industrial and economical infrastructure. I think it is extremely effective in WW2 against germany and japan. Not only was the bombing itself but the long range detached escorts are equivalent of offensive counter air sweeps that greatly degrade enemy's air force strength. But Korea and vietnam the effects seemed somewhat... questionable. After (or later stages of) vietnam since advent of PGMs and increased ability of tactical fighter bombers i think it's safe to call 'em all "strikes" or "deep strikes".... I believe that despite the statistical data about sorties flown, types of bombs dropped and how many, etc. like Spaatz said, "the war against Germany was fundamentally an infantry war supported by air power. It is my believe that the decline in the German war economy was due more to territorial losses, and less to strategic bombing. The loss of the Rumanian and Hungarian oil fields severely limited the oil production. The loss of Western Europe's iron ore hit the steel industry very hard. Tactical air power furthered the ground offensives, and that ended the war. However it must be said that the use of the strategic bombers did take German fighters away from ground support for the Army and that was decisive but I think it would still have been defeated by a more concentrated tactical bombing campaign. Wasn't one of the lessons learned by the Strategic Bombing Survey in Europe was that they spread their efforts out in too many directions? They attempted all three ideas you mentioned in your OP. Bombing civilian and industrial centers, Destroying land and naval forces and destroying key war making targets. That strategic bombing would have had a far greater impact if from the start they had concentrated their efforts on one or two key components of war making economy like oil production or electrical production and crippled it to the maximum extent possible and continued to suppress it over time. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 30, 2016 9:17:39 GMT -6
The strategic bombing campaign was a new kind of warfare and always controversial. The doctrine was formed in the years between the wars and only the experiences in the First World War were available for use. By definition, the campaign was a direct attack on the enemy's means and will to continue a war. Basically psychological and economical attacks by air on the nation itself. However, realizing that only land armies can occupy ground, air power was always an auxiliary.
Did they spread their effort over too many directions? That is very possible, but they were groping. It must be remembered that the German war economy was not in full swing until the defeat at Moscow in 1942, that's three years approximately after the war started. It was at this time that the factories in France, low countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia were added to the production of weapons in Germany. Its amazing but the German industry was on a one shift basis for most of the war. All these factors made the German industry resilient to air attacks. Plants and machinery were not used completely so it was easy to substitute unused equipment for destroyed or damaged.
We learned from the strategic bombing campaign that even a very tough nation like Germany can't live very long on constant air attacks over its territory. It was learned by all this, that a nation must maintain air superiority over its homeland, if it does not, it will get reduced to helplessness. Germany was always concerned about its basic industries and services. This would be the oil, chemical, steel and transportation networks. Their armament industries were never as important. Those important industries were the ones that were given the most air defenses like AA guns, radar, aircraft, camouflage, smoke screens, shadow plants etc.
The Allies learned that no single or combination of attacks could render an industry out of service, it took a sustained effort. Should they have focused on those key industries? Most certainly and I am certain that with 20/20 hindsight, it was realized.
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Post by director on Jul 30, 2016 13:20:50 GMT -6
The strategic bombing campaign in Europe suffered early-on from a number of factors:
1) The equipment (bombers, bombsights) wasn't up to the demand
2) The theory was ahead of the practical results (predictions of the collapse of civilian morale were unfounded)
3) The intelligence was non-existent or faulty (did we hurt the enemy? Was it worth our cost? Could we have done more harm against another target?)
4) Theories on the effectiveness of fighter protection and cover were faulty - fighters could provide protection to targets, all the bombers would not always get through, fighters could operate at night, and a long-range fighter to cover the bombers was essential
Of these, the third is (I think) the most important. A lack of intelligence and a faulty appreciation of what they did have led directly to the failure of the German air campaign over Britain and led to a lot of 'bombing for the sake of bombing' on the Allied side.
Once they worked out what targets to hit for maximum effect and got long-range fighters to cover the bombers, Allied bomber offensives became much more effective. In particular, the targeting of transportation infrastructure before D-Day was very effective in preventing German reinforcements from moving to the beach-heads. I haven't made a study of the bomber campaigns but if I recall correctly, wrecking transportation proved more effective in shutting down German industry than targeting key industries (oil, ball-bearings) or carpet-bombing. Any air-power enthusiasts have better knowledge than mine?
In the Pacific, the incendiary campaigns against Japanese cities were effective (though frightful and brutal) at wrecking the economy and making the population hungry, homeless and apathetic. It was not the A-bomb alone but the combination of incendiary bombing and the A-bombs that brought the Emperor to understand that he either had to surrender or watch his people literally die out. One proposal for avoiding an invasion of the Japanese home islands was a naval blockade coupled with an air campaign, intended to literally starve the Japanese out. Given how little food could be raised in Japan (and how little could be moved if the transportation network was smashed), starvation and disease could have raised their casualties into the tens of millions. The death-toll on all sides from an Allied invasion could have been as bad... so here, the horrific strategic bombing campaign might have been the most humane alternative.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 31, 2016 11:22:23 GMT -6
The strategic bombing campaign in Europe suffered early-on from a number of factors: 1) The equipment (bombers, bombsights) wasn't up to the demand 2) The theory was ahead of the practical results (predictions of the collapse of civilian morale were unfounded) 3) The intelligence was non-existent or faulty (did we hurt the enemy? Was it worth our cost? Could we have done more harm against another target?) 4) Theories on the effectiveness of fighter protection and cover were faulty - fighters could provide protection to targets, all the bombers would not always get through, fighters could operate at night, and a long-range fighter to cover the bombers was essential Of these, the third is (I think) the most important. A lack of intelligence and a faulty appreciation of what they did have led directly to the failure of the German air campaign over Britain and led to a lot of 'bombing for the sake of bombing' on the Allied side. Once they worked out what targets to hit for maximum effect and got long-range fighters to cover the bombers, Allied bomber offensives became much more effective. In particular, the targeting of transportation infrastructure before D-Day was very effective in preventing German reinforcements from moving to the beach-heads. I haven't made a study of the bomber campaigns but if I recall correctly, wrecking transportation proved more effective in shutting down German industry than targeting key industries (oil, ball-bearings) or carpet-bombing. Any air-power enthusiasts have better knowledge than mine? In the Pacific, the incendiary campaigns against Japanese cities were effective (though frightful and brutal) at wrecking the economy and making the population hungry, homeless and apathetic. It was not the A-bomb alone but the combination of incendiary bombing and the A-bombs that brought the Emperor to understand that he either had to surrender or watch his people literally die out. One proposal for avoiding an invasion of the Japanese home islands was a naval blockade coupled with an air campaign, intended to literally starve the Japanese out. Given how little food could be raised in Japan (and how little could be moved if the transportation network was smashed), starvation and disease could have raised their casualties into the tens of millions. The death-toll on all sides from an Allied invasion could have been as bad... so here, the horrific strategic bombing campaign might have been the most humane alternative. I agree that theory obviously as usual, was way ahead of actual practice and implementation. As to the intelligence, one of prewar issues was what is a civilian target and what is military target. A tank on the road is a military target, but what about in the factory where civilians are working, are they military targets then also. So, the moral argument did have to play out during the war. There are three operational requirements for a strategic bombing force: First, the force must be able to reach the designated targets which is a question of range, penetration and navigation. All had to evolve quickly during the war. Secondly, it must be able to hit those targets effectively which means bombs have to be effective as does the quantity and accuracy of the bombing systems. Thirdly, the aircraft must be able to return to base without excessive casualties and what is considered excess casualties. The answers to those questions evolved over time. The choice of targets, was generally based on pre-war industrial information and the efficiency of the attacking forces along with defenses. Due to limitations, not all targets could be attacked, whether they were the best to reduce the wartime production of weapons or not. Intelligence was gathered from neutrals who were able to gain information and from prisoners. Area targets had to be attacked numerous times, due to their square acreage. One of the reasons that the Japanese did not attack the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor was its size; it was 420 square acres which for a bomber carrying one single 500 or 1000 lbs. bomb is a lot of acreage. In other words, it was essentially too large for the attacking force and this happened to the IJA and IJN many times. Lack of adequate aerial resources to really attack targets of large acreage. All these factors come together in the Strategic Bombing campaign. I've known and talked to a few pilots and air crewmen from the period about this and they agree. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 31, 2016 12:07:49 GMT -6
Just some interesting facts about bombing. The mean point of impact or MPI for US heavy bombers was about 2000 feet. For Japanese bombers, it was 150 feet. German Stuka's had a circular error of probability on the order of 90 feet.
Bombing is a complex procedure. Where the bomb lands is a function of direction and speed of the aircraft at the moment of release, the aerodynamics of the bomb itself and the atmospheric conditions while the bomb is in flight. At 20,000 feet you are close to the 500 Millibar level and winds do pickup. Quote: Historian Stephen L. McFarland has explained the geometry of it, using the example of a B-17 flying at 160 mph at 23,000 feet and dropping a 600-pound bomb. The bomb was released at a distance, measured on the ground, of 8,875 feet from the target. It was in flight for 38 seconds. If the speed calculated for the airplane was off by two mph and the altitude wrong by 25 feet, that made a difference of 115 feet in where the bomb would land. Blast effects of the individual weapon now become a factor. I have two documents from 1944 which explain this function for each type of bomb used during the war with polar diagrams of the blast effect's.
Just a reminder that strategic bombing was very important and in fact, critical for the invasion of Europe. The Allies had to have air supremacy over that operation for it to be successful. The key to that was to draw the Luftwaffe from France to Germany to defend against the bomber raids. In fact, it was more successful than anyone could have imagined. Only two fighters strafed the landings on the first day.
Another reminder is that air superiority or supremacy is ephemeral. It only lasts while you are over the target, once you leave and go back to base, the opponent regains control. It is a fight for supremacy every day with every attack.
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Post by director on Jul 31, 2016 19:41:55 GMT -6
The US thought the Norden bombsight would give their heavy bombers the accuracy needed; sadly, this did not happen. (The difference between theory and practice is that in theory there is no difference but in practice there is... In sports, they call this the 'Why we play the game' concept).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 31, 2016 20:05:57 GMT -6
The US thought the Norden bombsight would give their heavy bombers the accuracy needed; sadly, this did not happen. (The difference between theory and practice is that in theory there is no difference but in practice there is... In sports, they call this the 'Why we play the game' concept). It's interesting that the procedure for bombing was that the lead bombardier of the group would sight on the target and release his bombs. At the same time, when he released, so did everyone in the group. So much for the Norden Bomb sight. Those groups were about 2-4 miles across and who knows how deep. |
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Post by bcoopactual on Aug 3, 2016 11:51:29 GMT -6
The strategic bombing campaign was a new kind of warfare and always controversial. The doctrine was formed in the years between the wars and only the experiences in the First World War were available for use. By definition, the campaign was a direct attack on the enemy's means and will to continue a war. Basically psychological and economical attacks by air on the nation itself. However, realizing that only land armies can occupy ground, air power was always an auxiliary. Did they spread their effort over too many directions? That is very possible, but they were groping. It must be remembered that the German war economy was not in full swing until the defeat at Moscow in 1942, that's three years approximately after the war started. It was at this time that the factories in France, low countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia were added to the production of weapons in Germany. Its amazing but the German industry was on a one shift basis for most of the war. All these factors made the German industry resilient to air attacks. Plants and machinery were not used completely so it was easy to substitute unused equipment for destroyed or damaged. We learned from the strategic bombing campaign that even a very tough nation like Germany can't live very long on constant air attacks over its territory. It was learned by all this, that a nation must maintain air superiority over its homeland, if it does not, it will get reduced to helplessness. Germany was always concerned about its basic industries and services. This would be the oil, chemical, steel and transportation networks. Their armament industries were never as important. Those important industries were the ones that were given the most air defenses like AA guns, radar, aircraft, camouflage, smoke screens, shadow plants etc. The Allies learned that no single or combination of attacks could render an industry out of service, it took a sustained effort. Should they have focused on those key industries? Most certainly and I am certain that with 20/20 hindsight, it was realized. My comments weren't intended as a criticism because I realize that in many ways they were putting into practice strategic bombing for the first time, beginning efforts in WW1 not withstanding. Just pointing out what I thought was one of the major lessons learned from the European campaign. Also, if your not familiar with it, I would recommend Professor Tooze's book Wages of Destruction. Not an easy read for me (not the least of which because I read on my lunch breaks on the night shift to pass the time) but it discusses the economy of Nazi Germany from the early 20's through the end of the conflict and he has several conclusions that go against conventional wisdom such as the German economy not being at a war footing for the first several years of the war. The US thought the Norden bombsight would give their heavy bombers the accuracy needed; sadly, this did not happen. (The difference between theory and practice is that in theory there is no difference but in practice there is... In sports, they call this the 'Why we play the game' concept). I thought from what I've read that the bombsight was almost as accurate as advertised but that it was designed and tested and the bombing crews practiced, prior to deployment, in the clear, calm air of the southwest American desert and conditions over Europe and Japan were of course, very different. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 3, 2016 15:17:27 GMT -6
The strategic bombing campaign was a new kind of warfare and always controversial. The doctrine was formed in the years between the wars and only the experiences in the First World War were available for use. By definition, the campaign was a direct attack on the enemy's means and will to continue a war. Basically psychological and economical attacks by air on the nation itself. However, realizing that only land armies can occupy ground, air power was always an auxiliary. Did they spread their effort over too many directions? That is very possible, but they were groping. It must be remembered that the German war economy was not in full swing until the defeat at Moscow in 1942, that's three years approximately after the war started. It was at this time that the factories in France, low countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia were added to the production of weapons in Germany. Its amazing but the German industry was on a one shift basis for most of the war. All these factors made the German industry resilient to air attacks. Plants and machinery were not used completely so it was easy to substitute unused equipment for destroyed or damaged. We learned from the strategic bombing campaign that even a very tough nation like Germany can't live very long on constant air attacks over its territory. It was learned by all this, that a nation must maintain air superiority over its homeland, if it does not, it will get reduced to helplessness. Germany was always concerned about its basic industries and services. This would be the oil, chemical, steel and transportation networks. Their armament industries were never as important. Those important industries were the ones that were given the most air defenses like AA guns, radar, aircraft, camouflage, smoke screens, shadow plants etc. The Allies learned that no single or combination of attacks could render an industry out of service, it took a sustained effort. Should they have focused on those key industries? Most certainly and I am certain that with 20/20 hindsight, it was realized. My comments weren't intended as a criticism because I realize that in many ways they were putting into practice strategic bombing for the first time, beginning efforts in WW1 not withstanding. Just pointing out what I thought was one of the major lessons learned from the European campaign. Also, if your not familiar with it, I would recommend Professor Tooze's book Wages of Destruction. Not an easy read for me (not the least of which because I read on my lunch breaks on the night shift to pass the time) but it discusses the economy of Nazi Germany from the early 20's through the end of the conflict and he has several conclusions that go against conventional wisdom such as the German economy not being at a war footing for the first several years of the war. The US thought the Norden bombsight would give their heavy bombers the accuracy needed; sadly, this did not happen. (The difference between theory and practice is that in theory there is no difference but in practice there is... In sports, they call this the 'Why we play the game' concept). I thought from what I've read that the bombsight was almost as accurate as advertised but that it was designed and tested and the bombing crews practiced, prior to deployment, in the clear, calm air of the southwest American desert and conditions over Europe and Japan were of course, very different. This is a good discussion, criticism isn't a concern for me, don't worry. Present your ideas, for all of us to learn. I have Adam Tooze's book on my Kindle and have had the book in paper version for many years, excellent but tiring. Try reading "Inside the Third Reich" by Albert Speer, most enlightening. Most economists and historians don't agree as to whether the German economy was on a war footing, the problem is to define a war footing. I don't believe Hitler could afford to go for broke on the economy for political reasons initially, but eventually realized that it was a necessity. As to the Norden, it was accurate... up to a point but testing in the desert is nothing like flying over Germany during the winter. The same problem occurred in the Vietnam war. The testing for the AIM-7 Sparrow was conducted in the desert near Las Vegas at Nellis AFB. That is not the jungles of Vietnam, trust me. We had nothing but problems with the lack of moisture coating on the missile launchers and the missiles themselves until someone figured the problem out. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 3, 2016 18:44:42 GMT -6
Just some facts about the Norden Bombsight. Fewer than 5 percent of the 8th AF bombs fell within 1000 feet of the target and the average error for the 500 lbs. bombs was 1673 feet. A 500 lbs. bomb created a crater of 20 feet in diameter but the bombsights accuracy was always much larger. You had to have a direct hit or saturation bombing to usually accomplish the missions. The accuracy of the sight was about 75 feet for 50% of the bombs at 20000 feet. Due to weather conditions and FLAK, this was never achieved. The bombers generally flew at altitudes above 28000 feet to avoid FLAK.
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