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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 13, 2017 14:26:57 GMT -6
I'm a bit muddle-headed to write this terrribly well, but I've started reading Friedman's 'Network-Centric Warfare', and was struck at the level of use of radio/rdf/intelligence in the first world war (and it reinforces the importance of this in the second), as well as the way intelligence lead to fleet coordination at the 'whole of fleet' level (so in WW2, signals intelligence playing a large role in BdU vectoring U-boats to convoys, the RN vectoring all sorts of things all over the place). Things like Japan having 'dummy' radio signals for its carriers prior to Pearl Harbor, so that US signals intelligence people wouldn't think they were up to something (Friedman argues that US confidence in signals intelligence meant they didn't do things like station subs outside of Japanese harbours to monitor traffic, one of the reasons they were caught out - I've only read this here, so don't know the veracity of the argument). I'm afraid I don't have a concrete suggestion, but something to help represent the importance of signals intelligence (perhaps 'intelligence' tracks on the operational map?) could help - and having missions generated with signals intelligence in mind would also be cool. In the background, perhaps have a signals intelligence 'mini-game' players are weighing the costs of changing their codes vs the benefits (for example, the Germans didn't change their codes even after they'd been cracked for some time, which caused them all sorts of trouble, the British as well, but code changes could lead to a substantial reduction in signals intelligence for months (if not years), as it had to fall back on RDF/HF-DF and other 'signal analysis' techniques (Friedman mentions range estimation, Serpentina and radio finger-printing). Suspect oldpop2000 would know a whole lot more. As always, ignore if not of interest or useful . The subject of signal intelligence which includes cryptography etc. is very complex and I am not certain which direction anyone wants to go. I would leave the concept of signal intelligence and its implementation to the team but I am willing to help them if they need it. Serpentina was a way of recording Morse-code on inked paper. Radio intercept teams use the individual keying of a particular person to identify where he is located and what ship. If the Serpentina inked paper system is used, that disguises that ability to detect the individual. Another name for it is radio finger-printing. We used this consistently in the Pacific to identify the enemy ships. The whole issue of why we didn't detect the First Striking Fleet before Pearl Harbor is complex. In the first place, the key pads on the ships were removed and stored in a locker to prevent accidental signals being sent out. So, when the First Striking Fleet left Hitokappu Bay and was on radio silence, without that port being watched by our subs there was no way to track the Japanese. Would stationing submarines at all the available ports have helped, well that is 20/20 hindsight. We were at peace, and that might have been considered an act of war. It's easy with the benefit of hindsight to come to that conclusion. The question is whether we actually had enough subs to perform such a vast surveillance system. We might never have figured that the carriers and the First Striking fleet were at Hitokappu Bay. The boats that were the closest were the S-boats at Manila Bay. It's 2920 miles from Manila to Hitokappu Bay in one direction. The S boats only had a range of 5500 miles. In other words, our boats did not have the range to make that trip and stay off the bay. The distance from Pearl Harbor is 3222 miles, one way. The possibility would be to sail from Pearl to Guam, refuel with a sub tender and then sail to that bay. That trip would be 1721.48, so it is possible. But the point is how much time could that sub waste sitting monitoring and how many subs would be needed to keep a 24 hour watch. See, it isn't easy, especially when you are at peace.
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Post by axe99 on Nov 13, 2017 18:36:07 GMT -6
The subject of signal intelligence which includes cryptography etc. is very complex and I am not certain which direction anyone wants to go. I would leave the concept of signal intelligence and its implementation to the team but I am willing to help them if they need it. Serpentina was a way of recording Morse-code on inked paper. Radio intercept teams use the individual keying of a particular person to identify where he is located and what ship. If the Serpentina inked paper system is used, that disguises that ability to detect the individual. Another name for it is radio finger-printing. We used this consistently in the Pacific to identify the enemy ships. The whole issue of why we didn't detect the First Striking Fleet before Pearl Harbor is complex. In the first place, the key pads on the ships were removed and stored in a locker to prevent accidental signals being sent out. So, when the First Striking Fleet left Hitokappu Bay and was on radio silence, without that port being watched by our subs there was no way to track the Japanese. Would stationing submarines at all the available ports have helped, well that is 20/20 hindsight. We were at peace, and that might have been considered an act of war. It's easy with the benefit of hindsight to come to that conclusion. The question is whether we actually had enough subs to perform such a vast surveillance system. We might never have figured that the carriers and the First Striking fleet were at Hitokappu Bay. The boats that were the closest were the S-boats at Manila Bay. It's 2920 miles from Manila to Hitokappu Bay in one direction. The S boats only had a range of 5500 miles. In other words, our boats did not have the range to make that trip and stay off the bay. The distance from Pearl Harbor is 3222 miles, one way. The possibility would be to sail from Pearl to Guam, refuel with a sub tender and then sail to that bay. That trip would be 1721.48, so it is possible. But the point is how much time could that sub waste sitting monitoring and how many subs would be needed to keep a 24 hour watch. See, it isn't easy, especially when you are at peace. Aye, definitely agree it's complex (and that's just from the snippets I've read, you've got far more insight into this kind of thing ). My argument was just that perhaps it deserves a gameplay element or two, given its importance more broadly.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 13, 2017 19:06:05 GMT -6
The subject of signal intelligence which includes cryptography etc. is very complex and I am not certain which direction anyone wants to go. I would leave the concept of signal intelligence and its implementation to the team but I am willing to help them if they need it. Serpentina was a way of recording Morse-code on inked paper. Radio intercept teams use the individual keying of a particular person to identify where he is located and what ship. If the Serpentina inked paper system is used, that disguises that ability to detect the individual. Another name for it is radio finger-printing. We used this consistently in the Pacific to identify the enemy ships. The whole issue of why we didn't detect the First Striking Fleet before Pearl Harbor is complex. In the first place, the key pads on the ships were removed and stored in a locker to prevent accidental signals being sent out. So, when the First Striking Fleet left Hitokappu Bay and was on radio silence, without that port being watched by our subs there was no way to track the Japanese. Would stationing submarines at all the available ports have helped, well that is 20/20 hindsight. We were at peace, and that might have been considered an act of war. It's easy with the benefit of hindsight to come to that conclusion. The question is whether we actually had enough subs to perform such a vast surveillance system. We might never have figured that the carriers and the First Striking fleet were at Hitokappu Bay. The boats that were the closest were the S-boats at Manila Bay. It's 2920 miles from Manila to Hitokappu Bay in one direction. The S boats only had a range of 5500 miles. In other words, our boats did not have the range to make that trip and stay off the bay. The distance from Pearl Harbor is 3222 miles, one way. The possibility would be to sail from Pearl to Guam, refuel with a sub tender and then sail to that bay. That trip would be 1721.48, so it is possible. But the point is how much time could that sub waste sitting monitoring and how many subs would be needed to keep a 24 hour watch. See, it isn't easy, especially when you are at peace. Aye, definitely agree it's complex (and that's just from the snippets I've read, you've got far more insight into this kind of thing ). My argument was just that perhaps it deserves a gameplay element or two, given its importance more broadly. We already have a modest amount of peacetime intel available, so I guess you are requesting some more wartime intel. I suppose that could be added but to what advantage, I don't know. The game is more at the operational level and strategic level, than the tactical level. In RTW2, maybe we should have a research item for intelligence to improve code breaking efforts with computers, high frequency direction finders etc. We could also develop on board intelligence gathering with code breakers and signal gathering. Just a thought.
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Post by Fredrik W on Nov 14, 2017 12:53:03 GMT -6
I'm afraid I don't have a concrete suggestion, but something to help represent the importance of signals intelligence (perhaps 'intelligence' tracks on the operational map?) could help - and having missions generated with signals intelligence in mind would also be cool. In the background, perhaps have a signals intelligence 'mini-game' players are weighing the costs of changing their codes vs the benefits. Not a bad idea, but it must be fitted in and gameplay improvement must be weighed against added complexity and coding, as usual.
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Post by garrisonchisholm on Nov 14, 2017 14:03:44 GMT -6
Well right now pre-battle intelligence accuracy is governed by the Fleet Tactics tech, perhaps a new tech called "Sig Int", which would allow you enhanced understanding of emplacements at enemy ports, the passage of major fleet units ("Bismarck enroute to Singapore via Suez, expected ETA xyz"), etc., could add something without becoming overly complex.
(I know that's more-or-less what you just suggested Pops, my apologies)
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Post by atlanticghost on Nov 14, 2017 14:22:05 GMT -6
I'm afraid I don't have a concrete suggestion, but something to help represent the importance of signals intelligence (perhaps 'intelligence' tracks on the operational map?) could help - and having missions generated with signals intelligence in mind would also be cool. In the background, perhaps have a signals intelligence 'mini-game' players are weighing the costs of changing their codes vs the benefits. Not a bad idea, but it must be fitted in and gameplay improvement must be weighed against added complexity and coding, as usual. Perhaps instead of, or in addition to, the usual battle opportunities, we could have messages pop up along the lines of: "Intelligence reports Japanese CV and escorts have sailed, on course for Philippines. Sources: human intel and sigint. Aerial recce and submarine picket line cannot confirm. Do you wish to intercept? Y/N" If you choose to intercept and the intel is good, then a battle ensues. Choosing interception when the intel is wrong leads to a message like: "No enemy force located. CV Wasp has developed boiler trouble. CL Atlanta damaged by mine." Or maybe nothing untoward happens, or maybe your CV gets sunk by a sub. Should you choose not to believe the partial intel and be wrong, then the enemy may launch an attack you are forced to counter with limited forces, or you can only try to intercept after they've done their damage. If you don't choose to intercept and there wasn't anything to intercept anyway, then no harm is done. No doubt there's a better way to do this, but I'd really love to see some element of those tough operational choices admirals are often faced with. Also, thanks for mentioning that book, axe99 . Now it's on my shopping list.
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Post by axe99 on Nov 14, 2017 14:35:05 GMT -6
@fredrik W - oh aye, I'm just throwing ideas around, you should only do anything along these lines if it's consistent with your vision and something you'd like to do. I've been aware of the importance of intelligence in the background, but this is the first time I'd read something on it specifically, hence why I'm posting on page 85 of the thread! Best of luck with continued development, hope it's treating you well . Aye, definitely agree it's complex (and that's just from the snippets I've read, you've got far more insight into this kind of thing ). My argument was just that perhaps it deserves a gameplay element or two, given its importance more broadly. We already have a modest amount of peacetime intel available, so I guess you are requesting some more wartime intel. I suppose that could be added but to what advantage, I don't know. The game is more at the operational level and strategic level, than the tactical level. In RTW2, maybe we should have a research item for intelligence to improve code breaking efforts with computers, high frequency direction finders etc. We could also develop on board intelligence gathering with code breakers and signal gathering. Just a thought. Friedman's argument (which he makes very well) is that this is very much strategic and operational - so along the line's of atlanticghost 's suggestion, or better info on force dispositions (which is already in RtW1 via techs, but there could be a 'SIGINT' tech tree maybe to give it a bit more to-and-fro, as there as a bit of 'move and counter-move' went on with procedures and technology. That's not to say that tactical intel/SIGINT isn't important either, but I was more talking shore-based RDF and code intercept stations gathering info, relaying to Admiralty/CINCPAC/etc;, who then made fleet disposition and orders based on it, rather than ship-based HF/DF finding u-boats near convoys or similar. So along the lines of the Lutjens not realising his 30-minute long radio message allowed the British a good idea of his latitude, making it easier to find Bismarck, or the US knowing the where, when and roughly who would turn up from the IJN for the Battle of Midway.
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Post by axe99 on Nov 14, 2017 14:37:38 GMT -6
Also, thanks for mentioning that book, axe99 . Now it's on my shopping list.
Sorry for the double-post - no worries, I've only read the first three chapters so far (the book goes up to this century, so a decent amount isn't relevant to RtW/RtW2) - would highly recommend reading the notes as well - Chapter 3 has more text in the notes than it does in the actual chapter (all of which is interesting) - classic Friedman!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 14, 2017 14:47:55 GMT -6
Also, thanks for mentioning that book, axe99 . Now it's on my shopping list.
Sorry for the double-post - no worries, I've only read the first three chapters so far (the book goes up to this century, so a decent amount isn't relevant to RtW/RtW2) - would highly recommend reading the notes as well - Chapter 3 has more text in the notes than it does in the actual chapter (all of which is interesting) - classic Friedman! Pardon me, but which Norman Friedman book are we referring to? I probably missed the name but have a some of his books.
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Post by atlanticghost on Nov 14, 2017 14:56:07 GMT -6
Sorry for the double-post - no worries, I've only read the first three chapters so far (the book goes up to this century, so a decent amount isn't relevant to RtW/RtW2) - would highly recommend reading the notes as well - Chapter 3 has more text in the notes than it does in the actual chapter (all of which is interesting) - classic Friedman! Pardon me, but which Norman Friedman book are we referring to? I probably missed the name but have a some of his books. axe99 can correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe this is the one. For some strange but welcome reason, it's much cheaper on .ca than .com.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 14, 2017 15:17:17 GMT -6
Pardon me, but which Norman Friedman book are we referring to? I probably missed the name but have a some of his books. axe99 can correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe this is the one. For some strange but welcome reason, it's much cheaper on .ca than .com. Interesting, I have a few books and documents from the government on sigint and network centric warfare. Thanks.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 14, 2017 15:19:18 GMT -6
The US Navy early in WWII thought in terms of conservatism and cautiousness with regards to submarine doctrine. They thought in terms of decisive fleet actions. Our Navy never acknowledged the nearly successful U-boat strategy of WW1. Our submarines were considered auxiliaries to the main fleet. One author calls this "a failure of imagination on the highest levels of command which failed to set up a broad, unified strategy for the Pacific submarine." It was not until 1943 that new objectives were considered and implemented.
One of these new objectives was scouting duty in the target area and off enemy bases to report enemy movements and intercept and attack enemy forces which sortied to oppose the attacking US forces. The pre-war doctrine was to attack high-speed, well-screened combat ships in support of the fleet. We actually no plans for unrestricted submarine warfare, which we railed against in the pre-war era after WW1. This should account for the poor performance of our submarine force in the early months of the war.
With this brief bit of information, it should be apparent that no one did or would have sent our limited submarine force out to scout enemy bases. We only had fifty-one submarines in Pearl Harbor, on the West coast and at Manila Bay in the Philippines on December 7th. Most of those were obsolete boats. One of the reasons that the IJN used Hitokkapu Bay was the fact that it wasn't a regular fleet base. My conclusion is that sending out our submarines, designed to assist the fleet, to Japanese bases would not have occurred under any circumstance. They did not have enough range to stay long and no training to perform intelligence operations. I think any suggestion of this is based on 20/20 hindsight. If someone wants answers to why we didn't know the Japanese were coming to attack Pearl Harbor, don't use submarines as one of the solution, there are many other easier ways. 'nough said.
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Post by JagdFlanker on Nov 14, 2017 19:33:08 GMT -6
possible ways of implementing intel, perhaps as it's own tech tree:
if enemy ships are passing through one of your seazones, greater chance and/or choice of intercept
when you choose your battles the enemy force disposition has a better chance of being more precise for that specific battle, perhaps with a % of certainty
start the game choosing 1 battle at a time as per RtW currently, but as the intel tech tree progresses you may choose 1 of 2 battles simultaneously, then 1 of 3 battles, etc
possibly having the random choice of being able to fight a 2nd battle in a month due to knowing in advance where the enemy is and your fleet being prepared
better chance at finding raiders/convoys/enemy merchants so they can be engaged/avoided
better chance at surprising the enemy in battle - maybe you can setup your TF composition before battle if you have surprise, or the enemy can if they surprise you
when you hover your mouse on the map seazones right now you can see where all the enemy ships are - maybe the accuracy would vary according to your intel and/or maybe you can't get any intel unless you commit intel gathering pickets/spies/etc to a seazone
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Post by jwsmith26 on Nov 15, 2017 11:22:57 GMT -6
I like the idea of expanding how intel works in the game but you're not always going to be playing America and intel doesn't always go one way. If something like this is implemented then there should be a relatively strong chance that the nation you are playing ends up on the losing side of the equation. In that case the following might be some of the effects. (Thanks for the original list, JagdFlanker.)
BTW, I don't think any of the stuff below would be bad for the game. Having more unforeseen battles and facing a tougher enemy that seems more wiley because he knows your movements might be frustrating but would also make the game more interesting and lively.
If your ships are passing through one of the enemy sea zones, there might be greater chance of enemy interception.
When you choose your battles, the enemy force disposition may have a worse chance of being more precise for that specific battle, perhaps with a % of certainty. In fact the enemy may show up with the exact mix of force to counter and totally destroy your force.
You might be forced to fight many more unexpected battles that have enemy forces superior to your own.
Possibly being forced to fight a 2nd battle in a month due to not knowing in advance where the enemy is and your fleet being less prepared than the enemy.
Much less chance of finding enemy raider/convoys and merchantmen which are able to raid and move with impunity because they know your own fleet's movements.
Better chance of being surprised by the enemy in battle. Maybe you can setup your TF composition before battle if you have surprise, or the enemy can if they surprise you.
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Post by Airy W on Nov 15, 2017 21:19:24 GMT -6
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