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Post by aeson on Jul 9, 2017 1:45:16 GMT -6
I agree that the Austro-Hungarian navy will not need carriers if it's content to leave at least its surface elements bottled up in the Adriatic for lack of air cover elsewhere. If they want to be a Mediterranean naval power rather than just an Adriatic naval power, though, they need to be able to send the fleet beyond the Adriatic, and if they want the fleet to be able to leave the Adriatic after air power becomes a credible threat to major warships, they need to be able to give it air cover while it's away from home, which means that they either need aircraft carriers or they need to have airbases outside of historical Austro-Hungarian territory. I also agree that aircraft carriers are a bad idea when your home ports are in confined waters and a really bad idea when they're all in waters as confined as the Adriatic, but for an Austria-Hungary that wants to play at being a Mediterranean naval power they are also the only option that does not involve war or alliances with or concessions from at least one other state with Mediterranean holdings, aside from being foolishly overconfident in the ability of WWII-era shipborne AAA and armor to protect against attacks made by WWII-era aircraft. As I recall, Austria-Hungary's relations with the other states with Mediterranean holdings were not particularly good, so alliances with or concessions from the other Mediterranean powers to get better air cover in the region might not be particularly practical, and I suspect we all know how the last Balkan war that Austria-Hungary got itself into turned out (granted, that one rapidly became something rather larger than just a Balkan war).
Time and aircraft availability could very easily say otherwise. In order to be able to scramble fighters quickly enough to meet the attackers over the fleet, you need to be able to detect an inbound attack early enough that the time it takes to identify the likely target(s), get the necessary information and orders out to the airfields where the fighters are, get the pilots to the fighters, get the fighters off the ground, and get the fighters to the fleet at an acceptable altitude to engage the attackers in at most the same amount of time that it takes the attackers to reach their target(s) from the point where you detected them (I'm assuming you're scrambling ready fighters rather than having to arm and fuel the fighters before launching them). Since the targets in this scenario are - at least in theory - reasonably mobile, you might be able to buy a little extra time for the fighters to get to the fleet if the proper maneuvers are undertaken, but even most early military aircraft move three to five times faster than contemporary ships, and by the middle of WWII that would have grown to something closer to ten to fifteen times faster, at least with top-of-the-line aircraft, so the fleet's movement is probably not going to help much. If you can't do that, though, then in order to provide a decent level of air cover to the fleet you need to have enough available aircraft and aircrews to maintain a standing patrol over the fleet, at least during periods when attacks are reasonably likely, and that kind of thing is hard on men and materiel and greatly increases the force commitment required to obtain a given degree of protection.
If the fleet is about 150 miles off Sardinia's coast, then even at a C.202's maximum speed roughly 25 minutes will pass between fighters passing over Sardinia's coast and fighters arriving over the fleet; call it half an hour to allow some small amount of time to get the fighters manned, started, into the air, and over the coastline (I'm assuming that these fighters were already armed and fueled; if not, less than five minutes between getting the mission orders and getting off the ground starts looking rather short). Assuming attacking aircraft approach the fleet at an average of 300 miles per hour between being detected and hitting the target, the attacking force would need to be detected at least 150 miles out from the target (i.e. the fleet) in order for fighters scrambled from Sardinia to reach the fleet in time to provide air cover during the attack. If the attacking force cannot reliably be detected that far out, then fighter aircraft based in Sardinia cannot reliably provide air cover to a fleet operating 150 or more miles away unless they're maintaining a standing patrol over the fleet more or less continuously.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 9, 2017 8:11:28 GMT -6
I agree that the Austro-Hungarian navy will not need carriers if it's content to leave at least its surface elements bottled up in the Adriatic for lack of air cover elsewhere. If they want to be a Mediterranean naval power rather than just an Adriatic naval power, though, they need to be able to send the fleet beyond the Adriatic, and if they want the fleet to be able to leave the Adriatic after air power becomes a credible threat to major warships, they need to be able to give it air cover while it's away from home, which means that they either need aircraft carriers or they need to have airbases outside of historical Austro-Hungarian territory. I also agree that aircraft carriers are a bad idea when your home ports are in confined waters and a really bad idea when they're all in waters as confined as the Adriatic, but for an Austria-Hungary that wants to play at being a Mediterranean naval power they are also the only option that does not involve war or alliances with or concessions from at least one other state with Mediterranean holdings, aside from being foolishly overconfident in the ability of WWII-era shipborne AAA and armor to protect against attacks made by WWII-era aircraft. As I recall, Austria-Hungary's relations with the other states with Mediterranean holdings were not particularly good, so alliances with or concessions from the other Mediterranean powers to get better air cover in the region might not be particularly practical, and I suspect we all know how the last Balkan war that Austria-Hungary got itself into turned out (granted, that one rapidly became something rather larger than just a Balkan war). Time and aircraft availability could very easily say otherwise. In order to be able to scramble fighters quickly enough to meet the attackers over the fleet, you need to be able to detect an inbound attack early enough that the time it takes to identify the likely target(s), get the necessary information and orders out to the airfields where the fighters are, get the pilots to the fighters, get the fighters off the ground, and get the fighters to the fleet at an acceptable altitude to engage the attackers in at most the same amount of time that it takes the attackers to reach their target(s) from the point where you detected them (I'm assuming you're scrambling ready fighters rather than having to arm and fuel the fighters before launching them). Since the targets in this scenario are - at least in theory - reasonably mobile, you might be able to buy a little extra time for the fighters to get to the fleet if the proper maneuvers are undertaken, but even most early military aircraft move three to five times faster than contemporary ships, and by the middle of WWII that would have grown to something closer to ten to fifteen times faster, at least with top-of-the-line aircraft, so the fleet's movement is probably not going to help much. If you can't do that, though, then in order to provide a decent level of air cover to the fleet you need to have enough available aircraft and aircrews to maintain a standing patrol over the fleet, at least during periods when attacks are reasonably likely, and that kind of thing is hard on men and materiel and greatly increases the force commitment required to obtain a given degree of protection. If the fleet is about 150 miles off Sardinia's coast, then even at a C.202's maximum speed roughly 25 minutes will pass between fighters passing over Sardinia's coast and fighters arriving over the fleet; call it half an hour to allow some small amount of time to get the fighters manned, started, into the air, and over the coastline (I'm assuming that these fighters were already armed and fueled; if not, less than five minutes between getting the mission orders and getting off the ground starts looking rather short). Assuming attacking aircraft approach the fleet at an average of 300 miles per hour between being detected and hitting the target, the attacking force would need to be detected at least 150 miles out from the target (i.e. the fleet) in order for fighters scrambled from Sardinia to reach the fleet in time to provide air cover during the attack. If the attacking force cannot reliably be detected that far out, then fighter aircraft based in Sardinia cannot reliably provide air cover to a fleet operating 150 or more miles away unless they're maintaining a standing patrol over the fleet more or less continuously. If the Austro-Hungarians wish to develop their geostrategic position into the Eastern Med, then they will have to have land and naval bases on the Ionian Sea on Greece and on the western side on the Aegean. The distance across the Ionian Sea is easy to handle with fighters and drop tanks. The Macchi C202 Folgore used an Italian built DB 601 engine, same as the ME-109. It's fuel consumption was 66 gal/hr at 16,404 and the most economical was 55 gal/hr. With a wooden drop tank, of 100 gallons capacity with the throttle setting at minimal, propeller on fine, that gives you about 1.5 to 2 hours of extra flight time. With that information you have three ways of solving the Sardinia problem. 1. Develop surface search radar such as the Chain Home High and Low, possibly buy it from the British, install three sets on the western coast with a direction center. Use the one hour warning time to scramble fighters to cover operations or incoming aircraft. 2. Build and deploy twin engine seaplanes for long range scouting patrols that can give you an adequate warning. 3. Deploy standing patrols of fighters with drop tanks to protect fleet deployments when known to be in progress. Not the best method of solution, requires more fighters, fuel and pilots. Use Sardinia as an unsinkable aircraft carrier like Sicily and other island bases.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 9, 2017 9:15:49 GMT -6
I want to point out some factors that should be considered before building carriers. Carriers are expensive to develop, build, maintain and deploy. If your country in the game is not an industrial power and had medium to low naval budgets, then carriers might not be a good solution. Training for carriers is expensive and time consuming. This conclusion is based on history, not the game. A carrier is a vulnerable weapon and requires surface and air search radar, or it is nothing but a nice fat target. Examine the first four battles of the Pacific from the Japanese side, and you will see the results. Even with air search radar, we lost carriers.
If you are considering just converting merchants to carriers beware that you will need catapults to launch them. These types of light carriers are also slow and very vulnerable to submarines and air attacks. Even based on light or heavy cruiser hulls, these carriers will not have the long flight decks and will require catapults.
If you are a middle sea country, consider alternatives. For the Northern seas like the Baltic and North Sea, you will have the same issues but not as severe except your problem will be weather. You can't launch in gales and heavy seas. You will have similar problems and will have to use similar reasoning to provide adequate protection to convoys and coastal regions.
One more factor is prestige. If your opponent develops carriers whether they are useful or not, isn't a question. For prestige purposes and to counter his capability, you might have to develop carriers. Many times, we are not masters of our own fate.
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Post by firefox178 on Jul 14, 2017 9:36:01 GMT -6
That was an interesting discussion. My next quick question is what were the tactics and technology that were required to allow aircraft to sink ships at night. I mean the Japanese relied on night time operations to allow their ships to operate without the risk of being sunk by aircraft. How can one counter this doctrine?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 14, 2017 10:22:02 GMT -6
That was an interesting discussion. My next quick question is what were the tactics and technology that were required to allow aircraft to sink ships at night. I mean the Japanese relied on night time operations to allow their ships to operate without the risk of being sunk by aircraft. How can one counter this doctrine? Night operations against ships required the development of airborne radar to be effective. Here is a good link to explain it. ethw.org/The_Night_Fighters_-_Chapter_11_of_Radar_and_the_Fighter_Directors
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Post by firefox178 on Jul 17, 2017 9:29:43 GMT -6
That was an interesting read. Also while reading the article I learned about the Yagi-Uda antenna. Which got me thinking. Since the tech in RTW2 would be around 1950 what possible additional tech research advantage would be given to the countries.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 17, 2017 10:47:50 GMT -6
That was an interesting read. Also while reading the article I learned about the Yagi-Uda antenna. Which got me thinking. Since the tech in RTW2 would be around 1950 what possible additional tech research advantage would be given to the countries. Technological advantage would be with the nations that pursue electronics and such, I don't know how to answer your question. It would be a high for me.
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Post by director on Jul 27, 2017 8:01:30 GMT -6
Turning back to a previous point for a moment: the critical point for me is not whether aircraft could control the sealanes in the Adriatic - in WW2, they did - but rather who controls them. We saw in WW2 over and over again the breakdown in command, communication and control between a navy (Italian or German) that needed airpower and an army or airforce that actually crewed and owned the planes. So the question is not whether or not you can interdict shipping with aircraft, but rather can we depend on a rival service to provide aircraft when we need them?
The resounding, conclusive answer from WW2 is: No, with minor exceptions like German strikes against Malta convoys or British strikes against Tirpitz. Those were carefully planned out and resources allocated long in advance. Over and over we see that when navies needed airpower in spur-of-the-moment fashion - as when German or Italian ships put to sea - it was not available, not provided or could not act effectively for reasons of communication and co-ordination. The lesson I take from this is this: to be reliably useful, airpower must be organic to the service.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 27, 2017 8:46:13 GMT -6
Turning back to a previous point for a moment: the critical point for me is not whether aircraft could control the sealanes in the Adriatic - in WW2, they did - but rather who controls them. We saw in WW2 over and over again the breakdown in command, communication and control between a navy (Italian or German) that needed airpower and an army or airforce that actually crewed and owned the planes. So the question is not whether or not you can interdict shipping with aircraft, but rather can we depend on a rival service to provide aircraft when we need them? The resounding, conclusive answer from WW2 is: No, with minor exceptions like German strikes against Malta convoys or British strikes against Tirpitz. Those were carefully planned out and resources allocated long in advance. Over and over we see that when navies needed airpower in spur-of-the-moment fashion - as when German or Italian ships put to sea - it was not available, not provided or could not act effectively for reasons of communication and co-ordination. The lesson I take from this is this: to be reliably useful, airpower must be organic to the service. I agree completely that aviation must be integrated into your forces and that it must train extensively and hard with all naval and land forces to execute its mission completely. The successful countries had aviation integrated early in the interwar period.
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Post by axe99 on Jul 27, 2017 16:28:54 GMT -6
More agreement on that point from me - I'd also argue that had the FAA not been re-integrated back into the RN in 1937-39 (there's a few different dates for different steps, pick your favourite then there wouldn't have been as great an improvement in British air and naval coordination during WW2.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 27, 2017 22:26:47 GMT -6
More agreement on that point from me - I'd also argue that had the FAA not been re-integrated back into the RN in 1937-39 (there's a few different dates for different steps, pick your favourite then there wouldn't have been as great an improvement in British air and naval coordination during WW2. It is simple hard to imagine how the British military could give away a lead in such advanced technology which had great promise, by moving the FAA to the RAF. Especially when at least two other nations had developed a naval air arm independent of the air forces.
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Post by axe99 on Jul 28, 2017 16:50:00 GMT -6
More agreement on that point from me - I'd also argue that had the FAA not been re-integrated back into the RN in 1937-39 (there's a few different dates for different steps, pick your favourite then there wouldn't have been as great an improvement in British air and naval coordination during WW2. It is simple hard to imagine how the British military could give away a lead in such advanced technology which had great promise, by moving the FAA to the RAF. Especially when at least two other nations had developed a naval air arm independent of the air forces. Aye - the Brits actually made a few pretty poor decisions in the interwar period in terms of naval development, not all of which can be put down to not having enough money. Not that every nation didn't make bad decisions, and from what I've read it was more politicians than the Admiralty (and politicians can mess anything up!), but the result was the same.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 28, 2017 21:52:39 GMT -6
It is simple hard to imagine how the British military could give away a lead in such advanced technology which had great promise, by moving the FAA to the RAF. Especially when at least two other nations had developed a naval air arm independent of the air forces. Aye - the Brits actually made a few pretty poor decisions in the interwar period in terms of naval development, not all of which can be put down to not having enough money. Not that every nation didn't make bad decisions, and from what I've read it was more politicians than the Admiralty (and politicians can mess anything up!), but the result was the same. I agree that mistakes were made during the interwar period but that is 20/20 hindsight. It was difficult for almost all major nations to justify large expenditures on military hardware after the War to end all wars and the depression that struck the world in the 1920's through the late 1930's. The combining of the FAA with the RAF was an organizational error of the first degree. I suspect it had much to do with what I said earlier. However, let me say that even with the low military budgets and considerable antipathy towards military institutions after WW1, there was considerable military innovation that changed naval warfare and land based combat. The latter in the area of armored forces and combine arms. So, I can see the mistakes that were made, were because the military institutions were breaking new ground.
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Post by cv10 on Jul 28, 2017 22:47:27 GMT -6
One of the big problems the FAA had until it was put back in the control of the Royal Navy was that the RAF was responsible for its aircraft procurement. This led to a problem as the RAF did not want to have to compete with the FAA to get its aircraft orders filled. At one point before the war, the FAA wanted to get a Spitfire that was capable of Carrier Operations (this would eventually happen as the Seafire) as it felt that the Skuas and other multi-seat fighters were too unwieldy, but the RAF vetoed it to ensure that delivery of Spitfires to the RAF was not hampered by the production of Seafires for the Navy.
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Post by axe99 on Jul 29, 2017 16:39:33 GMT -6
I agree that mistakes were made during the interwar period but that is 20/20 hindsight. It was difficult for almost all major nations to justify large expenditures on military hardware after the War to end all wars and the depression that struck the world in the 1920's through the late 1930's. The combining of the FAA with the RAF was an organizational error of the first degree. I suspect it had much to do with what I said earlier. However, let me say that even with the low military budgets and considerable antipathy towards military institutions after WW1, there was considerable military innovation that changed naval warfare and land based combat. The latter in the area of armored forces and combine arms. So, I can see the mistakes that were made, were because the military institutions were breaking new ground. Oh aye - it's always easier in hindsight, and the FAA and RAF is the big one. The Government in power at the time of the London Conference was a teensy bit too harsh on the Admiralty I thought as another. As you say, though, there was a heap of innovation and lots of good stuff happening as well. I wouldn't suggest for a second I'd have done better . I also think it's important to keep in mind that there'll almost always be mistakes, just part of being human and all that.
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