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Post by ramjb on Sept 22, 2018 17:11:28 GMT -6
I have the same numbers for Midway, but my understanding was that they had a deck park (ie, the issue isn't that they could carry those complements - they could, and at it's highest Enterprise carried a whopping 88 aircraft for the Battle of the Eastern Solomons - but that they couldn't all be struck below deck. 88 planes was certainly beyond what a Yorktown could carry on her hangars, that's for sure. Deck parking was for sure applied there. On Midway I'm not so sure. It might have been the case but I've seen nothing that points either way. If you have some definitive source about it it would be great to read it . Congratulations again, have a splendid day!
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Post by axe99 on Sept 23, 2018 15:32:40 GMT -6
One problem that I have with the claim that the armored flight decks were all that relevant to the apparent ability of British carriers to withstand damage is that, as nearly as I can tell, most bomb hits on British carriers with armored flight decks did not strike the armored portion of the flight deck. That, at any rate, is the claim here, and appears to be supported in the damage report on HMS Illustrious found here, assuming the thick black line at the flight deck level in the ship cross-section showing bomb hit and detonation locations represents the armored region of the flight deck. (If someone has better online sources for damage reports and ships' armor coverage I wouldn't mind taking a look.) The navweaps page also cites Nelson to Vanguard as saying that only one of the kamikaze hits sustained by British carriers with armored flight decks was actually defeated by the armored flight deck; the other three kamikaze hits on British carriers off Okinawa were apparently considered likely to have failed to penetrate an unarmored flight deck such as on the US carriers.
If the bombs that hit your ship are not hitting your armor, then your armor is not meaningfully contributing to your ship's ability to survive damage. The greater structural strength resulting from placing the strength deck at the level of the flight deck rather than at the level of the hangar might possibly be contributing to the ships' apparent ability to resist damage, and the smaller number of aircraft and commensurately-smaller quantity of avgas and munitions for the aircraft carried by the British carriers might also be contributing, but these are only tangentially related to the ship having an armored flight deck.
If we're going to base arguments on hits sustained, then what hit each ship, where each hit was sustained, what the ship was doing when it was hit, and what was in the affected area(s) of the ship need to be considered, because simple number of hits or even number x type of hits doesn't provide any meaningful understanding of why one ship survived an attack that scored multiple hits with reasonably heavy bombs when another ship sank after being hit by only a relatively small number of lighter bombs or why almost a thousand people died on one ship while a similar attack against another ship killed only a handful. Congratulations.
Cheers Aeson Wife didn't run away so happily married now, although also super exhausted, so short reply from a wobbly brain. I would take that article by Worth and Slade from Navweaps with a grain of salt - the Armoured Carriers website was originally put together because of how bad that article was (and I've read other things by Worth on the RN that lead me to have a fairly low opinion of his objectivity and depth of knowledge here - he's a real mixed bag, sometimes he's excellent, but I've found him at his weakest when discussing the RN). The Armoured Carriers site (which you also linked), on the other hand, is as far as I know excellent. On the British defensive scheme, it was as much an armoured, enclosed hangar, as an armoured flight deck - so the armoured flight deck was only part of the story (although a very heavy, design-dominating part!) but my brain's in no state to recall anything specific - but if you read about the Armoured Carriers site, I honestly can't remember reading anything there that was a bit dodge (whereas Worth and Slade's article, iirc, is substantially lower quality than pretty much everything else on Navweaps, unless it's been edited or adjusted since I read it). ramjb - my understanding was that a deck park was integral to US carrier doctrine - so it would have been highly unusual for them to not use a deck park - but as per my reply to Aeson, my head's got some recovering to do before it's going to start remembering things (or where to look up things) .
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 23, 2018 16:42:17 GMT -6
From the official Naval 4 June 1942 Allocation of aircraft
Enterprise had 23 F4F-4, 38 SBD's, 14 TBD's - 75 aircraft Yorktown had 20 F4F-3, 38 SBD's, 13 TBD's - 71 aircraft Hornet had 27 F4F-4's, 37 SBD's, 13 TBD's - 77 aircraft
The AAR reports the following:
Hornet 27 fighters, 35 SBD's, 15 TBD's - 77 aircraft None reported for Enterprise and Yorktown
Naval Allocation is accurate.
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Post by oaktree on Sept 24, 2018 10:41:09 GMT -6
Just got a copy of Norman Friedman's _Fighters Over the Fleet_ (https://www.usni.org/store/books/holiday-catalog-2017/fighters-over-fleet)
Since it concentrates on the RN, USN, and IJN fleet air defense I figure it might provide some further insights regarding doctrines and design decisions. And the first chapter was pretty much a short run down on carrier doctrines, designs, etc. mainly leading into WW2, though there is some discussion of post-WW2 issues as the jets came into play. From this a few quick observations on doctrines. (My summary, not Friedman's)
Something Friedman points out is that a major issue in naval aviation is navigation. Open water has no landmarks, and for naval aircraft their airfield moves as well. So part of the range requirements for naval aircraft is enough fuel to search for your target - and also search for your landing spot. And in the 20s and 30s radio beacons and such were limited in range and usefulness. This was one reason the RN went to multi-seat planes in order to carry a dedicated navigator.
RN - closed hangers, and then some armored deck stuff, before going back to unarmored decks. Early developer of carriers, and a leader thereof into at least the 20s. Economy: Very lean times right when they needed new ships and possibly some time to experiment further. Treaty Effects: No "new" BC hulls to convert into large carriers - thus stuck with smaller and older ships with smaller squadron capacities. Expected Enemy: Japan in 20s, Italy in 30s, and then Germany and back to Japan - sort of a whiplash effect towards what was needed. Aircraft Designs: Crippled by FAA essentially being under the RAF in terms of designs and procurement.
Last also limited command opportunities for anyone trained as a pilot. FAA experience was not going to get you anywhere in the RAF with its strategic bombing emphasis. (Will put a few comments on armored deck stuff at end.)
IJN - closed hangers and air group sized to hanger capacity. Tied air groups very closely to their specific carriers. Stringent pilot requirements. Economy: Navy-Army competition for resources. Treaty Effects: Two carriers (Akagi and Kaga) from capital ships. Portion of IJN very unhappy with treaties. Expected Enemy: USA from 1920s on - pretty much the reason for the IJN to grow larger. Aircraft Designs: Good designs for 30s. Zero excellent dogfighter with extraordinary range in exchange for lessened survivability.
IJN essentially a leader in developing use of carrier groups. (UK was doing it as well with 2-3 carriers, but that ended when the war started and they had to split them up for operational purposes.)
USN - open hangers and deck park allowing large air groups. Would bring in new squadrons or groups if necessary for a carrier to continue to operate. Economy: Two-ocean navy funded in the 30s and available in the 40s. Very large capacity to build and develop. Treaty Effects: Two carriers (Saratoga and Lexington) from capital ships. Expected Enemy: Japan Aircraft Designs: Perhaps a bit slow, but by start of WW2 fairly good planes available (TBF, F4F, etc.) Improved as war went on while competition essentially stagnated.
I would say the main innovations by the USN were developing (along with RN) fighter direction tactics and using radar to aid in defense. Also their development of escort carriers for multiple uses (ASW, replenishment, and invasion CAS) and logistics train to allow operation of multiple large carrier groups in the same operation at a high tempo.
Regarding the RN developing armored deck carriers. The RN armored deck carriers (Illustrious and Implacable class) were laid down between 1937 and 1939. Which means the design itself dates to an earlier period.* So, what would make the RN think that a "turtle down" strategy with a deck that could resist 1000 lb bombs?
From the wikipedia article on Illustrious-class: "Pre-war doctrine held that the ship's own firepower, rather than its aircraft, were to be relied upon for protection, since in the absence of radar, fighters were unlikely to intercept incoming attackers before they could release their weapons. Accordingly, the Illustrious class was given an extremely heavy Anti-Aircraft armament. The armament was similar to Ark Royal with twin 4.5 inch turrets (in a new "between-decks" or countersunk design) arranged on the points of a quadrant. The guns were mounted sufficiently high so that they could fire across the decks; de-fuelled aircraft would be stowed in the hangar for protection during aerial attack."
So, in the mid-30s the RN leadership thought that fighters would not be sufficient to protect the carrier from attack. (And the enemy at the time was believed to be Italy and perhaps Germany and thus operations would be in the Med or North Sea.) Why would fighters be insufficient? (a) Lack of good fighter direction to intercept attackers (b) Relatively small fighter wings on RN carriers. Only 36 aircraft on an Illustrious-class until they adopted using deck parks. (c) Aircraft of the time - Large changes going on in engine designs and the power they produced. Which was leading to heavier fighters with longer range, higher speed, and heavier armament. (This would almost be worthy of a separate discussion.)
* - I think a lot of military discussion overlooks how long the whole design-prototype-build-workup-build in mass process takes and that the tech on the equipment you fight with is often a generation (or two) older than what is in the lab or prototype. And that naval construction itself is a multi-year process to get a single ship out and commissioned.
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Post by aeson on Sept 24, 2018 13:06:07 GMT -6
Sounds to me like despite tensions with Italy due to the Abyssinia Crisis and the subsequent Second Italo-Ethiopian, Britain's defense planners had Japan on the mind at least as much as they had Italy on the mind when design work for Illustrious began.
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Post by axe99 on Sept 24, 2018 15:58:54 GMT -6
Great post oaktree - that book is high on my 'to get' list, and it sounds like it should only get higher .
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 24, 2018 16:20:27 GMT -6
Great post oaktree - that book is high on my 'to get' list, and it sounds like it should only get higher . I just bought it on Kindle. Unfortunately, I am reading about three books now, including the history of musical structure which is deep believe me. I will use it currently for research and to help the discussion.
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Post by axe99 on Sept 25, 2018 16:18:02 GMT -6
Great post oaktree - that book is high on my 'to get' list, and it sounds like it should only get higher . I just bought it on Kindle. Unfortunately, I am reading about three books now, including the history of musical structure which is deep believe me. I will use it currently for research and to help the discussion. Nice one, I look forward to reading your thoughts .
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Post by oaktree on Sept 27, 2018 10:56:46 GMT -6
Further into Friedman's _Fighters Over the Fleet_. In the middle of the chapter on "Fighters Without Radar" which is pretty much covering the initial evolution of carriers from WW1 to roughly 1940 I'd say. Just the section on the RN developments has been very interesting.
Post-WW1 the RN was essentially leading the way in development of carrier aviation. They had ships (Argus, initial Furious conversion, etc.), aircraft (initially operating Sopwiths), some operational experience from World War 1 (see Aside below), and a desire to develop things further. The concentration was still on the expected dreadnought vs dreadnought confrontation, but the carrier could prove to be a vital assistant.
The Royal Navy saw the following roles for carriers; Reconnaissance* (find and trail the enemy fleet), Spotting (use planes to help with very long range gunnery accuracy), Defense (mainly in terms of killing enemy spotters and snoopers, plus protecting your own spotters), and Attack (going after enemy carriers, harassing enemy fleet). They foresaw needing carriers specialized for different roles, which would include some carrying nothing but fighters while other carriers would be assigned on a battleship division basis to provide recon and spotting for those ships. And the RN underestimated the aircraft capacity of carriers and thus overestimated how much carrier tonnage they would need - part of why they wanted fairly high CV tonnages in the treaties. And this leads into the 1920s and early 30s RN carriers; Eagle, Argus, Furious, Glorious, Courageous, and Hermes. Ark Royal is not coming along until the mid-30s.
* - And the RN recognized two recon roles as well. The ability to find and report enemy ship locations. And the ability to "fight" to stay in contact with an enemy fleet once found. And their own fighters would need to be able to deal with both kinds as well.
Aside: RN operational experience. RNAS was tasked in part during World War 1 to defend against Zeppelin and later bomber attacks on England. To do this required integrated detection and interception work. Spotters to see the attackers as far out as possible, and then coordinating the fighter and AAA defense in relation to the information received. This resulted in centralized commands to filter the incoming information and then communicate it to the fighters via radio as well as tracking where everything is going if possible. Essentially the RAF system for the Battle of Britain and what a CIC is doing.
So, the RN sees a lot of roles for carriers, and I think this gets them in trouble since they have a lot of roles and not a lot of planes. Military aircraft through the 20s were still pretty much in the biplane and open cockpit area. Metal is being used for more construction, but the fighter would not look that out of place from World War 1. And it seems that land-based models adapted fairly easily to full-deck naval operations. (Arrestor gear and the need for more robust designs is not quite a thing yet.) Add to this the FAA being a sub-group of the RAF, and then economic issues going into the 30s. As the FAA's 1920s fighters and other aircraft wear out and go obsolete they need to find new aircraft designs, and also (unfortunately in my opinion) start trying to multi-role their designs to much.
And things get worse as the 30s proceed. They need new aircraft with very broad role specifications right when there is a big change in aviation coming through. Attempts for the RAF/FAA to use common designs doesn't work out that well. There is an unfortunate detour down the dead-end road of the turret fighter (Blackburn Roc). And a sudden scurry to find anything that can replace the Osprey - which is how the Sea Gladiator comes about.
And the studies also lead into the armored flight deck and hanger model. As aircraft speeds increased the intercept time for fighters decreased. This, combined with fairly low aircraft capacities (RN thought ratio of recon:fighter on a carrier would be 2:1 - that's 16 fighters for a 48-plane capacity carrier) indicated that AAA might be more important. Thus time spent on development of HACS (High Angle Control System) and the associated AAA guns (4.5" and 40mm pom-pom). And the RN over-estimated the effectiveness of the system as well. Radar, of course, led to further detection ranges. And dive bombing developments made the AAA less effective, and the deck armor concept much less effective as well.
More later. Next section is on the USN in the same time period.
A second aside. The role that led to the Swordfish - TSR (Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance). A lot to ask a plane to do in 1933 since the roles want different things.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 27, 2018 16:13:45 GMT -6
I just bought it on Kindle. Unfortunately, I am reading about three books now, including the history of musical structure which is deep believe me. I will use it currently for research and to help the discussion. Nice one, I look forward to reading your thoughts . I have begun to read it, just not extensively. If there is an area you wish to discuss, put it up here, and I can go to that chapter. If you are interested in Vietnam era, I will have to be careful about what I say, NDA.
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Post by axe99 on Sept 27, 2018 16:55:51 GMT -6
I'm happy reading whatever you and oaktree (or anyone else) find interesting - great post there oaktree .
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Post by oaktree on Sept 27, 2018 17:04:38 GMT -6
I'm happy reading whatever you and oaktree (or anyone else) find interesting - great post there oaktree . It is filling in a bunch of details and going over an area of naval warfare I have had an interest in. Finer details and mentions than previous books that I have read.
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Post by dorn on Oct 10, 2018 3:04:56 GMT -6
I try to summarized the different opinion on that subject bellow.
Bomb that penetrated armored deck of HMS Illustrious in January 1941
You stated it could not be 1000 kg bomb, I provided source of US report stated otherwise that it was 1000 kg bomb. Could you give any source that it was 500 kg? Another note: 1000 kg bombs were used by Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean bombing Malta (source: The Axis's air battle for Mediterranean supremacy by Ryan K. Noppen) or 2 hits on HMS Formidable (source: damage report) Could you provide your source as I am sorry but I am not convinced by your word vs. report from people inspecting damage of HMS Illustrious and preparing official reports. Usage of US and RN carriersI do not think that US carriers were not used in dangerous environment, I am just trying to tell that RN armored carriers were specially designed for the most dangerous environment and for such reason. There was reason use US carriers in the Mediterranean on the most dangerous tasks as they cannot withstand same punishment (see reports fleet carriers damage freely available on internet and compare). Note to attack to HMS Illustrious giving crippling hits
You noted that planes do not engage if they do not have ammo. It is not true, you can engage in false attack as Fulmars did to disrupt enemy (enemy did not know you have no ammo). Dive bombing is difficult maneuver and even small lost of concentration could change the output. I think this was not only case that fighters without ammunition try to disrupt attack. Bases discussion
The difference about Pacific bases and UK bases around the world is their ability to supply and repair ships. Which US bases in Pacific could do that? Royal Navy had no important bases west of Hong Kong however there were no important land for Empire which could not be reached from Hong Kong or Singapore. Involvement of RN in Far East
Why RN should fight Japan in her home island if they need to free their colonies in Far East as they did in 1944-5? Using of HMS Eagle in the Mediterranean
There is difference if you have class of carrier which is used all time in the Mediterranean and specially designed for that environment or have one carrier that supplement and enhanced fleet capabilities on one mission. If HMS Eagle is good ship for the Mediterranean why she was not used so and instead Illustrious class carrier were used? All carriers can try to do the job but how well? HMS Eagle was sunk, I did no do the research but I do not think that the hits she received was enough to sink Illustrious class carrier. Responsibilities of RNYou stated that RN was navy of the UK with responsibilities on the whole globe. However you forget that you take into consideration threat analysis which is most important as oldpop2000 usually correctly points out. And these threats are considered by different ways but most important is probability of the threat, possible damages and force needed to counter that threat. The Europe for UK was much more important that Far East so if there is threat in Europe you focus to counter that threat even if you know you design something which is not optimal for other theatres. Poor design of Illustrious class
You judge of that based on the comparison of this class in Pacific but you completely forget that this theatre was least important and they did not fight them till end of war (still they fight quite well in 1945) where it was not important if you have a little more optional weapon platform for that task. So evaluate ship design in environment where this weapon platform is not primary designed to fight is something really weird. Dive bombers
You mentioned only Stuka, however Swordfish was able to dive bomb too and do it regularly in North Africa (I do not know, may be somebody can confirm but against convoys they did it too). Radar
Yorktown was only one vessel fitted with early radar. But usage of the radar was behind UK, there were no fighter direction in such manner as used on UK fleet carriers. The rest of carriers got radar much later. Even later in the war the was reports of US officers on board UK ships about quality of fighter interception as superior to US. The RN need to learn a lot of lesson for Pacific war from US but not fighter interception. ConclusionMain point I am trying to explain that Illustrious class was far from ideal carrier but it was well designed for the job she was designed - for European theatre. For such theatre she was best designed till Implacable and Midway designs. This is something you cannot see and use arguing the disadvantages of this design in areas not so important for that theatre. You can compare Yorktown class in state of 1941 with Illustrious class and if you do it correctly you can easily see that Yorktown class has much higher strike power but is much higher vulnerable. And the vulnerability was key for RN who cannot replace losses as USA and who needs to fight in areas as the Mediterranean and for that theatres more important than strike power as you need to counter land air power which you cannot do by higher strike power. It is completely different to Pacific when you land on island where you hit enemy airfield, destroy land air power and you can dominate skies. It is much more similar to Operation Iceberg in Pacific.
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Post by dorn on Oct 10, 2018 3:32:37 GMT -6
Further into Friedman's _Fighters Over the Fleet_. In the middle of the chapter on "Fighters Without Radar" which is pretty much covering the initial evolution of carriers from WW1 to roughly 1940 I'd say. Just the section on the RN developments has been very interesting. Post-WW1 the RN was essentially leading the way in development of carrier aviation. They had ships (Argus, initial Furious conversion, etc.), aircraft (initially operating Sopwiths), some operational experience from World War 1 (see Aside below), and a desire to develop things further. The concentration was still on the expected dreadnought vs dreadnought confrontation, but the carrier could prove to be a vital assistant. The Royal Navy saw the following roles for carriers; Reconnaissance* (find and trail the enemy fleet), Spotting (use planes to help with very long range gunnery accuracy), Defense (mainly in terms of killing enemy spotters and snoopers, plus protecting your own spotters), and Attack (going after enemy carriers, harassing enemy fleet). They foresaw needing carriers specialized for different roles, which would include some carrying nothing but fighters while other carriers would be assigned on a battleship division basis to provide recon and spotting for those ships. And the RN underestimated the aircraft capacity of carriers and thus overestimated how much carrier tonnage they would need - part of why they wanted fairly high CV tonnages in the treaties. And this leads into the 1920s and early 30s RN carriers; Eagle, Argus, Furious, Glorious, Courageous, and Hermes. Ark Royal is not coming along until the mid-30s. * - And the RN recognized two recon roles as well. The ability to find and report enemy ship locations. And the ability to "fight" to stay in contact with an enemy fleet once found. And their own fighters would need to be able to deal with both kinds as well. Aside: RN operational experience. RNAS was tasked in part during World War 1 to defend against Zeppelin and later bomber attacks on England. To do this required integrated detection and interception work. Spotters to see the attackers as far out as possible, and then coordinating the fighter and AAA defense in relation to the information received. This resulted in centralized commands to filter the incoming information and then communicate it to the fighters via radio as well as tracking where everything is going if possible. Essentially the RAF system for the Battle of Britain and what a CIC is doing. So, the RN sees a lot of roles for carriers, and I think this gets them in trouble since they have a lot of roles and not a lot of planes. Military aircraft through the 20s were still pretty much in the biplane and open cockpit area. Metal is being used for more construction, but the fighter would not look that out of place from World War 1. And it seems that land-based models adapted fairly easily to full-deck naval operations. (Arrestor gear and the need for more robust designs is not quite a thing yet.) Add to this the FAA being a sub-group of the RAF, and then economic issues going into the 30s. As the FAA's 1920s fighters and other aircraft wear out and go obsolete they need to find new aircraft designs, and also (unfortunately in my opinion) start trying to multi-role their designs to much. And things get worse as the 30s proceed. They need new aircraft with very broad role specifications right when there is a big change in aviation coming through. Attempts for the RAF/FAA to use common designs doesn't work out that well. There is an unfortunate detour down the dead-end road of the turret fighter (Blackburn Roc). And a sudden scurry to find anything that can replace the Osprey - which is how the Sea Gladiator comes about. And the studies also lead into the armored flight deck and hanger model. As aircraft speeds increased the intercept time for fighters decreased. This, combined with fairly low aircraft capacities (RN thought ratio of recon:fighter on a carrier would be 2:1 - that's 16 fighters for a 48-plane capacity carrier) indicated that AAA might be more important. Thus time spent on development of HACS (High Angle Control System) and the associated AAA guns (4.5" and 40mm pom-pom). And the RN over-estimated the effectiveness of the system as well. Radar, of course, led to further detection ranges. And dive bombing developments made the AAA less effective, and the deck armor concept much less effective as well. More later. Next section is on the USN in the same time period. A second aside. The role that led to the Swordfish - TSR (Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance). A lot to ask a plane to do in 1933 since the roles want different things. Quite interesting info, thanks. I will try to add information that because of strategy of harassment enemy fleet and completely confidence to RN battlefleet the torpedo attack was favored to dive bombing. Air attack should slow down the ships and battlefleet should sink them. And as RN has limited resources and access to her air power RN did not develop dive bombing to the extend of other nations (Germany, Japan, USA). The reasons for low ratio of fighters on board of carriers were because of exercises that shows that fighters could not be used to prevent attack to carrier as time between sighting of enemy planes and attack is too low to effectively fight it back and even if there are fighter cover that some planes get through and hit (note: they considered mainly environment of attack from land power). So RN with knowledge of the limitation of her air power (RN knew she is behind) focus on something to enhance survivability of the ship itself. The answer was heavy AA capabilities and maximum passive protection from damage (armor citadel and heavy AA suits were just one of the aspects, the other are hangar sectioned, anti-fire passive features especially for fuel, more robust lifts etc.). As war went on and radar was used, so fighters can effectively defend the ship RN change the ratio of fighters on board. The responsible person for new class of RN carriers was Henderson which was man who pioneered a lot in that field as being in command of one of carriers, later Admiral of the carrier force. This was strategy of RN which went into the war and was mainly limited by knowledge of limiting factor of her air power and not trust that airpower can defend ships against hits so the carrier need to be able to withstand hits and continue to fight. Just another information could be useful that attack on Taranto was prepared even before war with Italy as one of possibility to fight Italy. So some RN officers was quite aware of possibilities of airpower however there were still a lot of battleships captains and admirals (as one on Glorious).
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Post by oaktree on Oct 27, 2018 11:32:59 GMT -6
Back to reading _Fighters Over the Fleet_ after a vacation. (Too big a book to haul with me.)
Up into the 1960s and early 70s. The jet age put a lot of various pressures on naval carrier defense.
- Attackers would be faster and possibly attacking from relatively high altitude. This puts a lot of stress on detection of attackers and available reaction time to intercept them. So fighter aircraft needed speed, climb ability, and enough range to reach interception points.
- Attackers (presumed USSR) was developing stand-off attack weapons (AS-1 and successors). This puts stress on engaging as far from the fleet as possible.
- Since fighters also needed to escort strikes the carrier fighter had to have sufficient performance to combat enemy land-based fighters. So a stress on speed, range, and combat performance.
Add to this issues with development of catapults and requirements that the aircraft be capable of launching and landing on a carrier. Which is a heavy stress on weight and stall speed.
The 50s to 70s is the USA and UK attempting to develop solutions to these issues. Expectations and design requirements were already being drawn up in the late 40s. Experience from the Korean War modified things as well. An interesting thing to read about has been BuAir holding design competitions every couple of years as they tried to get the future generations of aircraft, engines, and weapons into at least prototype stage for potential purchase. (And budget hits at various times killed a number of projects since the USN, for instance, went from a medium-range nuclear strike aircraft on their carriers to the Polaris project as their main nuclear deterrence option.)
Command and control of detection, integration of data, and control of interception follows a continual evolution of the CIC. Which includes smaller vessels such as pickets or AEW aircraft getting some capability to communicate with fighters and help with interception direction.
And a few further details: a. The detection issue was addressed by a few developments. First of all the task forces became more dispersed. Destroyer and submarine radar pickets further from the center. And development of AEW (airborne early warning) that started with the "Cadillac" adaptation of TBM to carry large radar that could report to a CIC in 1945. Plus eventual carrying of radar by the fighters as well - though that was generally shorter range and for weapons control for the most part. At the same time shipborne radar continued to develop as carriers and other surface ships needed stronger and more varied radar for various tasks. (This also complicated CIC functions since more and more data needed to be collated and shared.)
b. Handling of heavier and faster aircraft was addressed by modifications to the larger existing carriers and development of "super carriers". UK developments of the angled deck (allowing jets to land while maintaining deck parks or simultaneous use of the forward catapults), mirror landing system (LSO reaction time an issue with faster landings), and the UK steam catapult as it proved superior to competing USA designs (hitting some limits on use of hydraulics or gunpowder.) VTOL was also pursued as a means for a smaller deck carrier, or even a cruiser, to provide some point defense interceptors.
c. Weapons development proceeded since an intercept would have to be a high-speed head-on pass, or a longer beam or behind chase that took longer. Cannons had a limited range. FFAR (rockets) were tried but generally proved to be inaccurate. Which led to missiles such as Sparrow, Sidewinder, and eventually even longer ranged designs such as Phoenix. And early Sparrows and Sidewinders were limited in range, guidance systems, and aspect in which they could successfully attack.
Tactics were also developing in that the fighters would engage farther out and SAM carried by ships would be inner layer of defense with guns as the close in defense. Since CAP would be operating further out the aircraft needed endurance in addition to performance. This was a design specification which affected things, and also led to the need and development of air-to-air refueling and a percentage of a carrier's aircraft and tasks to be devoted to tanker aircraft.
The development and lifespan of naval fighter aircraft in the 40s-70s period is quite interesting. Some aircraft hang around for a long time, even when semi-obsolete. The F2H Banshee was around from 1948 to 1971*. Mainly due to successor aircraft projects failing. Others came in and out of fleet service quite quickly due to design bugs or other issues. Engine development was a major factor. If a design was based around an expected engine that failed to live up to expectations it was often underpowered, unreliable, and prone to be replaced quickly. (The "gutlass" Cutlass for instance.)
* - I pay attention to the F2H in particular since my father served in a VF squadron from 1955-57 that flew them from the USS Yorktown at that time.
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