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Post by axe99 on Oct 27, 2018 17:22:10 GMT -6
Cheers Oaktree, very interesting stuff .
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 28, 2018 13:55:53 GMT -6
One of the most important flight characteristics of any military aircraft is thrust to weight ratio. Basically, it is Max. Thrust of the engine divided by the empty weight plus about 3,505 tons of internal fuel and weapons. As one can see, there are external factors such as external fuel tanks that are not included and do change the whole picture. So, let us look at some 1950’s aircraft.
F-84G - .29 F3D-2 Sky Night - .30 F2H-3 Banshee - .31 FJ-4 Fury - .36 F7U-3M - .36 F9F-8/F Cougar -.43 F4H-2 Demon - .50 F-8P-.66 A6E- .56 Soviet Aircraft Yak-25 - .43 MIG-21F - .69 MIG-21M - .70
These are just some samples. It isn’t difficult to calculate, just get the Maximum Thrust of the engine or engines, the empty weight but add in internal fuel capacity plus any ordnance and do the math. The real issue is external fuel tanks. The F4B would carry a standard 370 gallon drop tank on the external hardpoints along with a 600 gallon drop tank on the centerline station to maintain TOT. This greatly affected Thrust to Weight. The empty weight on an F4N(upgraded F4B) was 31,853 pounds with a maximum takeoff weight of 54600 lbs. Engine power was two 17,000 lbs. GE J-79’s-8. Those darned things were smoke bombs. The later -10’s and -17’s engines were better. So, with a loaded weight of around 41,500 lbs. and 34,000 lbs. of thrust, we can see that she had an estimated thrust to weight of about .81 and that was a rough estimate. She could carry up to 18,650 lbs. of weapons on the nine hardpoints.
This ratio is vital to determine the flight characteristics of the aircraft. However, you also have lift to drag ratios. It gets very complex.
Now, during the 1950’s with the development of radar missiles like the AIM-7 or heat seekers like the AIM-9, the US military decided that aircraft were not going to dogfight. They would use their radar to search acquire and track a target, then fire the missile and it was over. So much for that thought, Vietnam cured the military of that silly thought. Tactics change and so did the requirements for aircraft. That is where we are now.
Another issue that isn't generally documented is that as you are flying along and detect an enemy aircraft either visually or by radar, you have to identify that enemy. Now traveling at over 500 knots in a head-on pass with your enemy at a similar speed does not give you very much time to recognize and fire at the enemy. Your missiles have min ranges and if he breaks up or down, your missile may not have the capability of following him so it just flies off into the distance. How do I identify an enemy aircraft in that situation? You interrogate him with IFF on you fire control radar. If he answers with a code you recognize, you are safe. If he doesn't, now you can lock him up, and fire. However, until the advent of the APX-76 IFF system which had an interrogator, aircraft only had transponders. See the issue. The aircraft in the 1950's did not have this capability.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 28, 2018 14:39:16 GMT -6
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Post by oaktree on Oct 29, 2018 22:25:47 GMT -6
_Fighters of the Fleet_ closed out with chapters on the Falklands War and the USN "Outer Air Battle" theory going at the end of the Cold War. Some interesting discussion of tactics and desired aircraft be modified to face the main expected threat. That the Sea Harrier was primarily designed as a attack aircraft and not a air defense aircraft was not something I knew, but it did adapt well to the role.
The chapter on the Vietnam War era was fairly interesting. Revised procurement procedures (McNamara at work), The F-111 debacle, and discovering that a complex air picture did not let you fire radar guided missiles willy-nilly. Something the British also had to deal with in the Falklands since the RN and RA air defense systems could not talk to each other well.
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Post by axe99 on Oct 30, 2018 16:14:39 GMT -6
Cheers again Oaktree and for the info Oldpop . I didn't know RN and RA air defence systems didn't work well together in the Falklands - would have thought they'd have sorted something out by then!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2018 17:07:30 GMT -6
_Fighters of the Fleet_ closed out with chapters on the Falklands War and the USN "Outer Air Battle" theory going at the end of the Cold War. Some interesting discussion of tactics and desired aircraft be modified to face the main expected threat. That the Sea Harrier was primarily designed as a attack aircraft and not a air defense aircraft was not something I knew, but it did adapt well to the role. The chapter on the Vietnam War era was fairly interesting. Revised procurement procedures (McNamara at work), The F-111 debacle, and discovering that a complex air picture did not let you fire radar guided missiles willy-nilly. Something the British also had to deal with in the Falklands since the RN and RA air defense systems could not talk to each other well. The problem in Vietnam is just what I explained somewhere. We did not have IFF interrogators at the beginning and we had an order to only fire when you can see the target visually. As I have stated, with a possible closing rate of 1000 MPH, this does not give you much time. Now, Red Crown would warn the attack squadrons of take offs from the three North Vietnamese airfields around Hanoi. These would be Bach Mai, Gia Lam and Hoa lac. However, even with that warning, the escorts had to identify with Mark 1 Eyeballs. Eventually, we installed APX-76 IFF Systems with interrogator and Mode C which was an Altitude transmission. They were a pain in the butt to repair. You had to test them in copper cages grounded deeply because if you did not, you could cause a real stir in the area if you were testing the emergency function. The attack squadrons would close up immediately upon receiving the incoming from Red Crown. It was always touch and go, but it worked. The other problem was that the AIM-7 Missiles were never tested in the a wet climate and they failed due to moisture. Many times you had to ripple fire multiple rockets to get one to fire and head toward the target. No one thought to coat them with anti-moisture coatings and they were tested in the desert at Yuma and Nellis AFB. Wonderful. However, the real threat was the active SAM and AAA/AW defense. The MIG's were potential threats, but they generally came up, fired their guns and missiles and kept on going home.
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Post by oaktree on Oct 30, 2018 20:17:35 GMT -6
Cheers again Oaktree and for the info Oldpop . I didn't know RN and RA air defence systems didn't work well together in the Falklands - would have thought they'd have sorted something out by then! RA Rapier system had IFF issues and the RN radar also interfered with the Blindfire radar system that supported it. So there was additional lag time to fire since there were verification issues with whether the target was Argentinian or a Sea Harrier. And since Rapier was relatively short-ranged it was a decision that had to be made pretty quickly.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2018 21:41:37 GMT -6
Cheers again Oaktree and for the info Oldpop . I didn't know RN and RA air defence systems didn't work well together in the Falklands - would have thought they'd have sorted something out by then! RA Rapier system had IFF issues and the RN radar also interfered with the Blindfire radar system that supported it. So there was additional lag time to fire since there were verification issues with whether the target was Argentinian or a Sea Harrier. And since Rapier was relatively short-ranged it was a decision that had to be made pretty quickly. Generally as a blindfire system searches through 360 degrees, there will be an IFF Pretrigger which fires the IFF transmitter, interrogating any target in the area and that interrogation with show up on the PPI scan as a code. After the IFF Pretrigger, then the radar trigger fires the radar off. The only problem I can see is whether the friendly aircraft transponders were correctly coded for identification and/or whether they were not compatible with the Rapier Blindfire system.
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Post by oaktree on Oct 31, 2018 6:32:59 GMT -6
Friedman had no notes on what the specific issue was. That there were IFF issues with the Rapier was something I picked up off the Wikipedia page on the Rapier itself.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 31, 2018 8:27:55 GMT -6
Friedman had no notes on what the specific issue was. That there were IFF issues with the Rapier was something I picked up off the Wikipedia page on the Rapier itself. here is a decent article on the Rapier System with a reference to the IFF problem. It was a friendly fire incident during the war - ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Rapier_(missile).htmlHere is the explanation for the incident - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1982_British_Army_Gazelle_friendly_fire_incidentApparently, the problem was procedural, as the Army helos had their IFF turned off and the Navy just assumed that it was an unfriendly target. If you follow the footnote on the first article to #12, there was a board of inquiry into the loss of the Gazelle. I researched this, and found the second article.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 18, 2018 18:00:36 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 20, 2019 17:44:56 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 12, 2019 11:06:37 GMT -6
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Post by dorn on Mar 9, 2019 7:42:02 GMT -6
Does anybody know if HMS Ark Royal (91) was anybody together some of the Illustrious class? And if in this case is there any existing photo?
I think that they were never operating together even not met in port as HMS Ark Royal was in Force H and Illustrious class operated at that time in east Mediterranean through Cape o Good Hope.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 9, 2019 10:06:59 GMT -6
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