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Post by bcoopactual on Sept 6, 2016 3:00:43 GMT -6
oldpop2000 Thanks for linking the hyperwar article. Wasn't there a concern that the 40mm might not stop a kamikaze from continuing on and hitting the ship even after they had been "shot down"? I thought that was one of the reasons the 40mm was replaced with the 3"/70 after the war. To increase knock down power and stand off range. If that was the case, wouldn't you want your fleet carriers to have some of their own 5" guns? To provide knock down power and stand off range.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2016 7:03:37 GMT -6
oldpop2000 Thanks for linking the hyperwar article. Wasn't there a concern that the 40mm might not stop a kamikaze from continuing on and hitting the ship even after they had been "shot down"? I thought that was one of the reasons the 40mm was replaced with the 3"/70 after the war. To increase knock down power and stand off range. If that was the case, wouldn't you want your fleet carriers to have some of their own 5" guns? To provide knock down power and stand off range. Yes, the 20 mm and 40 mm were thought to be too small to destroy an aircraft, and the 3 " 70 was developed with that in mind, but the 5" 38 had a ROF of only 22 RPM where as the 40 mm had a ROF of 140 RPM. While the 5 " might have a larger bursting charge, it fires too slow for an aircraft diving at high speed. With the 20 mm and 40 mm, if you hit the weakly built IJN aircraft, they could just tumble out of the sky. In other words, I don't have to really destroy the plane just change its path and let it crash into the sea. It's like the difference between 30.06 bolt action and Thompson submachine gun. If the enemy is close and coming at you, I want the Thompson, I want to put as much lead out there as I can to stop him. In July 1945, a team was setup to study the issue of Kamikaze defense. Here are the areas they would be investigating: BTW, in my opinion, the best strategy against kamikaze is to bomb their airfield continuously. I want to get them before they take off.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2016 10:28:33 GMT -6
I want to discuss now, designing carriers. Carriers are offensive weapons but must have a defensive capability. That does not mean heavy guns, it means their primary defensive weapon is their air wing, with the assistance of some close-in high ROF guns. So what are the threats?
The primary threats to carriers are the submarine and aircraft whether land based or sea based. How do we design the carrier for both. Let's see. This won't be as detailed as Norman Friedman, his books are the best, this is just simple.
First, how do we design a carrier against submarines. Well, first we provide large air wing that can deploy ASW patrols during the day, around the ship. You can use fighters, but I believe two place dive bombers are best, they have an observer that can focus his binoculars on the water, while the pilot flying at less than 500 feet can focus on not running into the water. The next way to design a carrier to deal with submarines is ensure that she can maneuver quickly, in other words, zig zag and comb torpedoes when they are spotted coming toward the ship. Lexington class carriers were the fastest carriers we ever produced until the '50's but they had very large turning radiuses due to their length to beam and rudders. These two design characteristics along with adequate destroyer coverage with their sonar is how you protect a carrier task force. We lost all our carriers at the beginning of the Pacific War due to submarines, not bombs.
The next threat is the airplane, deployed from land or from opponent carriers. How do we protect the carrier? Well, first, we have to have good scouting out about 200 miles in the sectors that we feel the enemy carriers will appear. You fly 10 degree sector widths so a scout pattern of 180 degrees will require 18 aircraft. This is just a rough estimate but it is accurate. The scouts are deployed early, about 4 o'clock in the morning so they will arrive at their max range by sunrise. You can deploy a second group two to three hours later. It is called a two plane search, and it is the most effective. If you have researched and developed radar, then you can use the air search sets to monitor out 100 miles depending on the range of the radar. Remember that the side that discovers the opponent first and attacks, will win the battle. WWII confirms that. For defensive you will need sufficient fighters, at least 32 fighters in two squadrons. One squadron will escort the strike, one squadron will be on deck for rapid deployment if an incoming strike is discovered. This is the value of deck park and quick elevators along with open hangers. The CAP fighters can be fueled, armed and engines warmed up, ready to be lifted and launched. Your last line of defense for aircraft that have slipped by the escorts and CAP's is high rate of fire anti aircraft guns.
So, your defensive scheme is a layered one. Scouts for detecting enemy carriers, CAP air patrols to protect with backups on the deck, and AA guns. Your final defense is good damage control procedures. Fueling line that can be evacuated of fuel and foam pumped into them, hangar doors on the traverse bulkheads separate the hangars, all ordnance move immediately down below and a good CIC center down in the bowels of the ship to protect it. You will need to design your escorts which includes destroyers and cruisers along with battleships to provide this ASW and AA defense. The whole Carrier Task Force has to be a system design.
As you progress more into the carrier era, start thinking carriers, not dreadnoughts. I know all of you want to continue to fire big guns but when carriers arrive, battleships and fleet are at risk. This is very rudimentary, not detailed. As a last note, air wing size and types are variable, but I like the US air wings. Two squadrons of fighters, two of dive bombers, and one of torpedo bombers. One of the dive bomber squadrons could be a scout squadron. Squadron size can be 15 to 18 aircraft. An air wing based on 18 aircraft will mean a 90 aircraft load with about six spares. Remember though, the more aircraft on CAP, ASW patrols and scouting, the less available for strike. This is where the two carrier task force becomes important and you will have to design for this eventuality.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2016 14:13:23 GMT -6
I've been babbling long enough, so why don't all of you, pick us a direction. Here are some suggestions. Just suggestions.
1. Doctrine - This will guide your construction of carriers and aircraft, deployment and operational use. Remember geography rules.
2. Carrier designs - Tonnage, length, beam, width, draught and speed. Armored decks, construction of hangars and how many, open or closed.
3. Air wing composition, types of aircraft and numbers. Also, include combat tactics. This will guide you in your designs.
4. Opponents - Remember that the enemy always has a say in your plans and no plan survives contact with the enemy.
5. Electronic development - this includes shipboard and avionics - Remember that you are at sea and your aircraft will be flying over water. Few landmarks out there on the ocean.
We can discuss specific classes, era's and even fleet problems, I have books on those of the US.
Go for it.
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Post by axe99 on Sept 6, 2016 16:44:10 GMT -6
I can't add much, but if you're looking for direction for further conversation, air wing composition and use over time (ie, air wings for 1/2 carriers together up to when you have the crazy large CTFs towards the end of the Pacific War) could be interesting. Where does the balance between effective defence and hitting power lie?
Also - on big-gun ships, I fully agree that once you've got aircraft that can carry larger bombs (maybe 500kg/1000lb?) and 18" torpedoes that BBs are on the way out for 'at sea' fleet actions, but what about defensive forces for amphibious operations? Once night falls, if we're talking WW2 tech, aircraft lose a lot of effectiveness, so you might need something to defend beachheads/fixed points if an opponent wants to launch a big-gun strike (Surigoa strait being the obvious example)? Given historical developments and force strengths, there was no need for the Allies to build more BBs, but if the defending power isn't likely to be able to win long-term in the air (as if they were, then I'd think it'd make more sense to build aircraft), might there still be a role for BBs (or fast CAs?) in coastal defence?
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Post by steel selachian on Sept 6, 2016 19:30:00 GMT -6
We lost all our carriers at the beginning of the Pacific War due to submarines, not bombs. Er, when are you defining the "beginning of" the Pacific War? Lexington and Hornet were mortally wounded by airstrikes and scuttled by destroyers without submarine involvement; Yorktown was sunk by a sub but only after she was DIW from two air attacks. Wasp was killed by a sub and Saratoga got hit twice in the opening year of the war, but survived. After that as far as fleet/light carriers go all the damage was from air attack, including the loss of Princeton. I'm assuming you meant to say all the carrier losses early on were eventually to torpedoes. The RN did lose Courageous, Ark Royal, and Eagle to subs (in comparison to losing Glorious to surface action and Hermes to air attack), but then again the German U-boats were considerably more skilled enemies.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2016 20:13:42 GMT -6
We lost all our carriers at the beginning of the Pacific War due to submarines, not bombs. Er, when are you defining the "beginning of" the Pacific War? Lexington and Hornet were mortally wounded by airstrikes and scuttled by destroyers without submarine involvement; Yorktown was sunk by a sub but only after she was DIW from two air attacks. Wasp was killed by a sub and Saratoga got hit twice in the opening year of the war, but survived. After that as far as fleet/light carriers go all the damage was from air attack, including the loss of Princeton. I'm assuming you meant to say all the carrier losses early on were eventually to torpedoes. The RN did lose Courageous, Ark Royal, and Eagle to subs (in comparison to losing Glorious to surface action and Hermes to air attack), but then again the German U-boats were considerably more skilled enemies. Well, Hornet was hit by three bombs and one Val crashed into the island but the kill shots were from a flight of Kate torpedo bombers which scored two hits, damaged severely the electrical system and engines, she then came to a halt. After this, she was hit again by a torpedo which undid all the electrical work and engines, and now she was dead in the water for good. She now had a 14 degree list. This last hit was fatal. Lexington was hit by two torpedoes from Kates, she was lost due to a serious explosion caused by a spark from an air conditioning unit left on, this ignited the gas fumes circulating in the ship. The Yorktown, after her three bomb hits recovered and was ready for 23 knots. Yorktown began to refuel fighters and then when another raid was incoming, she was zigzagging and got hit by two torpedoes from Kate torpedo bombers. This ended it. So, you are correct, I am wrong, it was aircraft but it was torpedoes. The bombs damaged the ships, but the torpedoes sank them. That will teach me to do this from my feeble old memory.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2016 20:33:56 GMT -6
I can't add much, but if you're looking for direction for further conversation, air wing composition and use over time (ie, air wings for 1/2 carriers together up to when you have the crazy large CTFs towards the end of the Pacific War) could be interesting. Where does the balance between effective defence and hitting power lie? Also - on big-gun ships, I fully agree that once you've got aircraft that can carry larger bombs (maybe 500kg/1000lb?) and 18" torpedoes that BBs are on the way out for 'at sea' fleet actions, but what about defensive forces for amphibious operations? Once night falls, if we're talking WW2 tech, aircraft lose a lot of effectiveness, so you might need something to defend beachheads/fixed points if an opponent wants to launch a big-gun strike (Surigoa strait being the obvious example)? Given historical developments and force strengths, there was no need for the Allies to build more BBs, but if the defending power isn't likely to be able to win long-term in the air (as if they were, then I'd think it'd make more sense to build aircraft), might there still be a role for BBs (or fast CAs?) in coastal defence? It's a good place to start but you would have to begin by deciding how many aircraft in the air wing so that the carrier can be designed to house that many. Other factors now come into play like deck parts, hangar space etc.
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Post by axe99 on Sept 6, 2016 20:42:04 GMT -6
Don't feel bad oldpop, I get that all the time (memory misfires). I did think when I read your initial post "I didn't think they were all from subs", but wasn't confident enough to post anything. I forget stuff all the time - you still remember an awful lot . Anyways, on topic, doc was late this morning so was looking at the article on navweaps about kamikaze damage to US/UK carriers, and it struck me that there probably was never going to be a large enough CAG to stop kamikazes getting through, if they were able to get through the insanely large task forces off Okinawa. In that context, is there value in having some 5"/4.5" long-range AA on a CV? They can always be put below the flight deck as per the British CVs to save deckspace? Just a random thought. I didn't realise quite how many US CVs were hit by kamikazes (according to the article 16 CVs, not counting CVEs and CVLs, although some hits were worse than others). Also amurtiger and Bullethead , get your armoured or unarmoured opinions (as appropriate ) over here .
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Post by steel selachian on Sept 6, 2016 21:26:19 GMT -6
Don't feel bad oldpop, I get that all the time (memory misfires). I did think when I read your initial post "I didn't think they were all from subs", but wasn't confident enough to post anything. I forget stuff all the time - you still remember an awful lot . Anyways, on topic, doc was late this morning so was looking at the article on navweaps about kamikaze damage to US/UK carriers, and it struck me that there probably was never going to be a large enough CAG to stop kamikazes getting through, if they were able to get through the insanely large task forces off Okinawa. In that context, is there value in having some 5"/4.5" long-range AA on a CV? They can always be put below the flight deck as per the British CVs to save deckspace? Just a random thought. I didn't realise quite how many US CVs were hit by kamikazes (according to the article 16 CVs, not counting CVEs and CVLs, although some hits were worse than others). Also amurtiger and Bullethead , get your armoured or unarmoured opinions (as appropriate ) over here . Yes, after reading it the first time I figured torpedoes were what was intended. The four Japanese CVs lost at Midway also needed to be finished off by destroyer torpedoes, although it can be argued that this was after aircraft bombs had already rendered them worthless flaming hulks. Had they been closer to home it might have been possible to tow them to port, but they were likely beyond salvage. The Yorktown- and Essex-class CVs did have single 5/38 mounts below the flight deck; the former had all 8 of her guns mounted that way while the latter had 4 single mounts below the flight deck and 4 twin mounts fore and aft of the island. It still pinched deck and possibly hangar space a bit, and of course the issue with the below-deck mounts was they had a restricted arc of fire compared to the twin mounts on the island. Those guns up top might have taken up more deck space, but they had wider firing arcs provided the deck wasn't full of aircraft at the time. As far as kamikazes (and other guided missiles), the Navy figured out that the best way to stop them was to start knocking them down as far away as possible - which resulted in the development of the USN's 1st-gen SAMs, AAMs, and AEW platforms postwar.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2016 22:34:36 GMT -6
Thanks for those kind words, they mean a lot. But there is no reason for mistakes like that, when people are counting on me to give them the best information. I will do better.
Now, as to your question. Air defense consists of four vital parts: sensors, both visual and electromagnetic, communications, coordination and response, both air and ground. At Okinawa, we lacked coordination. We had all sensors sending information to Combat Information Centers via radio communications and from radar returns on the ships. We had sufficient air assets and sea born assets. Our problem was a lack of overall coordination to focus assets at the necessary point or points. I worked in NORAD during the late '60's and early '70's. I saw our visual and electromagnetic raw data transmitted to NORAD where all of it, was coordinated, collated and then projected on one map, so that all the assets both air and ground could be focused. This was why a special task was established in Maine to review and make recommendations as to how to fix the problem. All the 5 ", 40 mm and 20 mm guns, fighters etc. are of no value, if they are sent to the wrong zone or zones.
Kamikaze's came in from many directions but mostly from Formosa, and the Japanese home islands. They came in at altitude and on the deck. Any aircraft coming in at wave height will be missed by an air search set on a carrier's island, up well over 100 feet. An aircraft moving at 200 knots is traveling at 337.56 feet per sec. In one minute, he will move 3.8 miles. If he is visually sighted within 5 minutes, he will be on you before you can breathe. There's the problem and no 5 " gun is going to help, you need rate of fire.
I am not disagreeing with you, just trying to ensure that you understand the problem with air defense. It isn't just assets, sensors, radios, it's the whole system that has to be coordinated.
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Post by axe99 on Sept 6, 2016 23:38:41 GMT -6
Both those responses sound very sensible from my angle . @steel salachian, totally agree on the firing arcs, sorry, should have mentioned that - I've got no doubt the flight deck 5" gave better bang-for-buck (in terms of flexibility) than the below deck guns on British CVs. oldpop2000, I have no doubt that working at NORAD would have been an eye opener and no mistake. What about the automatic 3"/50 and 3"/70 guns - quick enough ROF to make worth mounting on a CV (too late for WW2, but used in practice and I'd think potentially within the late-game for a RtW2)?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 7, 2016 7:27:02 GMT -6
Both those responses sound very sensible from my angle . @steel salachian, totally agree on the firing arcs, sorry, should have mentioned that - I've got no doubt the flight deck 5" gave better bang-for-buck (in terms of flexibility) than the below deck guns on British CVs. oldpop2000 , I have no doubt that working at NORAD would have been an eye opener and no mistake. What about the automatic 3"/50 and 3"/70 guns - quick enough ROF to make worth mounting on a CV (too late for WW2, but used in practice and I'd think potentially within the late-game for a RtW2)? I believe that the 3" weapons would be a welcomed addition to the carrier, as long as they can occupy the cat walks along the sides of the hangar. The decks must be clear. Those weapons have a high ROF, better range than either the 20mm or the 40mm. A mix of 3" and 40mm might be a good idea. As to NORAD, we weren't at sea, but it gives you a model to use to understand how the parts of an air defense system work.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 7, 2016 8:24:41 GMT -6
I thought we should have some data to review for assessing the action against suicide attacks.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 7, 2016 9:12:10 GMT -6
My research is showing that the US Navy had a highly organized strategy for dealing with Kamikaze attacks. There were AA coordination plans, which provided long-range 5in gunfire protection against targets at max range via the Task Group AA Coordinator. All target information was channeled through this central control point via a dedicated VHF circuit. Each group was divided into four sectors, and ships in each sector, on an alert being triggered, supplemented search radars with fire control radars. The plan still left unrestricted freedom of action to individual ships in repelling air attacks. This is a piece I've put in here from a book " Kamikaze: To Die for the Emperor".
At Okinawa, 2027 enemy aircraft fired on between March and August 1945, 793 were suicide, for a total of thirty-nine percent. At Okinawa, they focused on smaller warships with 86% hitting destroyers and lesser targets. Figures show that it took 51 regular aircraft to sink an Allied ship against 3.5 suicide attacks to do the same job. Stat's show that the battleship was the most effective at shooting down planes with carriers next, cruisers and then destroyers. The figures are 21% in a ratio of number of actions versus aircraft destroyed, 11% for carriers, 8% for cruisers and 3% for destroyers.
I will let you draw your own conclusions. I still believe that 5" guns and turrets should not be on the carrier decks, that more rapid fire, weapons like the 40mm are more effective for short range, last ditch defensive fire.
Update: It just occurred to me that when you add 5" gun turrets to the area fore and aft of the island, you add extra weight that has to compensated for, on the port side. Additionally, you can't fire those guns across deck so effectively they are almost worthless except for very high angles. I am referring to the blast effect. I know that my dad said that after the torpedo hit the Sara in January of 1942, they went into Pearl Harbor and the 8 inch guns were removed. I am not certain, but they might still be in the coastal gun platforms on the island of Oahu. This has to be taken into account and that is another two reasons, I would put them on the carriers.
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