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Post by William Miller on Aug 14, 2014 18:50:41 GMT -6
Yes, the Saratoga was hit by sub torps - but so was the Wasp, Yorktown, Ark Royal, various destroyers, some cruisers, some battleships, etc..etc..etc.. Point being, any ship was vulnerable to a torpedo hit - especially if the warships were almost running over the sub, as happened to the Wasp. Most sub attacks vs warships were by pure luck and chance as warships were usually hard for subs to intercept - unless crippled like the Yorktown. Point being, the TCD often mattered little if the torp (or worse, a spread of torps) was not spotted in time for any of the attacks and the sub crew fired a reasonably accurate spread of 4-6 torps at effective engagement ranges and angles of attack. Point being, for anyone to slap the Alaska for a poor TCD when so many ships were hit and/or lost with better TCD to me is faulty logic. Can a good TCD help to avoid danger? Sure .. IF.. you have enough warning, but with a reasonable spread of torps fired at close range and good firing angles the chances of escape were much lower for any sizeable ship. The best defense.. have DD escorts and air cover vs subs and keep up a reasonable transit speed of 15 knots+ if possible and zig-zag if deemed worth it. I think it should also be noted that if there was ANY good weapon the IJN possessed it was torpedoes - very hard to spot, fast, and they actually went bang. (Long range was pretty much irrelevant for an unguided weapon vs maneuvering or reasonably fast moving targets as was proven many times over). However, IJN sub commanders still needed to be in the right place at the right time with almost no idea when or if enemy warships would come plodding along to setup a reasonable attack. It was more often then not that sheer luck and chance prevailed in hitting a warship with sub torpedoes at sea. As to aerial dropped torps, trying to get a good spread from an attack under intense AA fire (and/or CAP attacks) was difficult at best - for that matter, torpedo attacks were often substituted for dive/glide bombing attacks (or kamikazes) as it got harder to get in close enough to launch a reasonable torpedo attack by air due to heavier and heavier air defenses on ships plus the IJN by 1944 had very few good torpedo pilots and planes left. Just my few cents on that topic.
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Post by William Miller on Aug 14, 2014 15:49:57 GMT -6
That crap took out my grandfather - who I was very close to. Very hard watching someone full of life, a rated genius who worked on secret projects, an honest and fair man, and veteran of WW2 taken down by such a slow death.
Fortunately my wife got to know him for a few years before he died and called him "a Teddy Ruxpin".
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Post by William Miller on Aug 14, 2014 4:23:45 GMT -6
That said, one comment of his was of the class being the "least maneuverable in the fleet except for old Saratoga." But I've not seen the numbers to some metric like turn radii at given speeds, and how they'd compare with those for other BC's or BB's.
Of course, the Fletcher's also had large turn radii within-class, but that didn't ultimately detract too much from an otherwise well-balanced design.
Well.. unless a ship is designed specifically to do water donuts to try and evade air attack (which no other BC was more capable of defending against then the Alaska) to avoid bombs and torpedoes I do not really think it mattered much. The Yamato could do lovely water donuts.. yet she hardly shot down any planes in her final battle and each air attack landed damaging hits. A ship that could push nearly 38 mph was never an easy target to hit.. no matter how tight the water donuts were, and for surface engagements speed and gunnery accuracy were far more important then water donuts. I remember his whole "TPS" thing as well.. not like TPS was an anti-torpedo shield and IMHO, speed again was more important then testing the theoretical TPS. One was a proven defense against being hit, the other was far more theoretical and still resulted in a damaged hull if hit which would slow the ship down anyways (unless the torp just splatted itself on thick armor plate because of being too shallow - a notorious habit of the British) plus anyone could build a better torpedo far easier then anyone could build a better TPS - as was proven repeatedly. Personally, I would MUCH rather have the better ability to kill the torpedo launching platform then to try and test a theoretical TPS. Nuff said. Thanks.
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Post by William Miller on Aug 14, 2014 0:33:41 GMT -6
I think there is the possibility he just wanted the pain to stop. Some people also prefer to pick their own check out date and method rather then have someone else, or some out of their control fate, do it out for them. Depression to some can be like a persistent mental torture chamber with what seems to be no exits or escapes. That is why I refrain from the term "coward". Some people may be mentally stronger then others but we all have our breaking points and society has very few real in depth human levels measures of success - but there sure are an awful lot of false and shallow measures (one of those social double standards I was refering too above). True happiness is a very personal matter and cannot be judged easily by outsiders with their own self interests and motives and no psychologist or psychiatrist in the world has all the answers (and many have little to none) and not all of them are in the profession for the true well being of humanity.
If figuring out how to fix people was an easy simple measure of "depression" or other variable human faults we would all get along just fine and suicide would never happen. It is painfully obvious from any measure of human history that humans are very complex and almost never fully understood - especially those that keep their weaknesses or frailties hidden from view to avoid feeling like a burden, a failure, treated like an outcast, or from being persecuted by the relentless and extremely anti-privacy media.
That is my few cents and closing thoughts.
Thanks
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Post by William Miller on Aug 13, 2014 2:42:17 GMT -6
There are many forms of "depression" and how it effects different people. For some its mild, temporary, and goes away like a mood swing, for others it can be like a mental cancer that destroys their personality and happiness over time. Many in society treat those with depression like a pariah as if its contagious or look at them as weak and frail - like a wounded stray animal in the street. I could go on for paragraphs about the extreme double standards society portrays on a daily basis regarding depression and the "social artificial priorities" - especially in the media, but I prefer not to **** myself off today. As to "hero" vs "coward".. unless that person making the description knows what it was to be in that persons shoes on a daily basis they have no right to pass judgement. Anyone, for any reason, at anytime, can get hit with depression. People with high levels of social pressures, responsibilities, and/or expectations can be especially vulnerable. Also, many people out there are much better at taking care of others then themselves and that part is the real tragedy as they often fall apart in silence if those around them don't know, or refuse, to intervene before its too late.
As a side note to all forum posters, lets make sure to keep this topic professional, respectful, courteous, and within the context.
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Post by William Miller on Aug 11, 2014 17:46:06 GMT -6
In terms of the BC concept my thoughts - being simplified to save time - big enough guns to cause possible dismay for a BB if needed and to fight off CRs at longer then effective CR gunnery ranges, armor protection that lands somewhere between a BB and a CA, a decent SB/AAB, good fire controls - preferably with excellent radars, and good 30+ knot maintainable speed with a long cruising range at 20+ knots.
During WW2 (where the BCs were more controversial then during WW1 when specific classes were built) the RM CD/GC classes, KM S/G, USN Alaska, MNF Dunkerques, RN Hood/R&R classes, and IJN Kongos/Hiei classes all fell into that category to varying degrees. IMHO, the Alaskas were the finest and most lethal BCs ever designed, especially considering they were the only USN BCs ever designed.
Trivia, I had the chance to talk to one of the first and last crew of the USN Alaska a few years back and the crew never called the Alaska a "large cruiser" (the political classification) and always considered her a fine ship and a definite "battlecruiser".
Thanks.
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Post by William Miller on Aug 11, 2014 17:36:28 GMT -6
I am reminded of a scene in the 1965 movie, Battle of the Bulge between Martin Hessler and his driver, Conrad. It has always stuck with me about war. Here it is, quoted from IMDB Considering that Robert Shaw is one of my favorite classic actors I know that scene quite well. Yes, some people are in love with death.. so common sense should tell countries to be prepared to defend against such people at all times. As you said.. nuff said. Thanks
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Post by William Miller on Aug 11, 2014 17:19:09 GMT -6
This should prove to anyone.. sometimes it is just as important, if not even more important, to make yourself laugh as much as you make everyone else laugh around you. There will never be a replacement for this man.. ever. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robin_WilliamsFarewell to one of the greatest comedian talents ever known.
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Post by William Miller on Aug 9, 2014 17:50:26 GMT -6
Our different viewpoints reflect our different experiences. I've been through reduction in forces both in the civilian sector and service. I watched our fleet go from 600 ships to less than 300 ships. Our geostrategic capability was severely impaired. I can relate somewhat to what the RN and USN went through after the WW1. Were the decisions perfect? No and with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight we now know that but the war was at least two decades away and no matter how many war games at the war colleges and fleet exercises you perform and review, nothing prepares for war except war itself. Was the battlecruiser a good match for the war in the pacific? Possibly, but the General Board did a good job of preparing our fleet for it. The treaty navy fought the IJN to a standstill, then the wartime navy destroyed it. At times when conventional wars took 2-4+ years to be decided the complacency between wars was more forgivable.. but as conventional wars got shorter and weapons often took longer to procure and produce in quantity that sort of complacency is no longer an option. Granted some wars fought after the 1950s that took longer then WW2 were not fought conventionally but either way, expensive complex weapons are not designed and built as fast as they used to be. Example, had war erupted in Europe (WW3) it likely would have been over in weeks.. not years like Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Korea. Even GW1991 was over in days (disregarding the buildup/air campaign). FW1982 was over within weeks also.. and the RN was in no way prepared for that situation without serious help no thanks to being cannibalized by the UK government. But as it goes during wartime everyone loves the idea of "peace" (makes for great politics - but that is another story) while thinking that the worst enemy of the human race will magically be vanquished by wishful thinking.. that being human nature itself. As the saying goes - to maintain peace countries must always be prepared for war. Been that way since man could swing a club. Thanks
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Post by William Miller on Aug 4, 2014 5:19:28 GMT -6
To Dennis, You and me are on the same page regarding this historical backdrop to regarding the BCs - even if I do not agree with the decisions of the navies. If there was argument back then against the BCs then the arguments should have been stronger against the BBs which were more expensive and did less during WW2 then the BCs did - exception, the USN which did not build a BC until 1944. The simple fact remained, ships were getting faster.. except the old BBs which could barely get out of their own way, I guess few back then figured that out even though ALL navies wanted more speed out of their ships - ironic isn't it? The only new ship classes after WW1 that saved the RN from being the slow dogs in the Atlantic for catching the big German ships was the KGVs and CVs - and the KGVs were even slightly slower. If not for the R/R and Hood at the start of the war having a big gun fight would have been near impossible as the KGVs were still being finished and the early CVs had mediocre hitting power. In any event, the RN would have done just fine building less costly BCs similar in capability to the rebuilt Renown class rather then the near total waste of the Nelson class which was barely faster then a tug boat and had buckets of problems of their own. Ironically, due to the 14" gun turret issues with the KGVs the R/Rs had more reliable and heavier hitting firepower on average. The KGVs with the 15" proven turrets would have been a far better idea, and as such was done with the Vanguard class. The USN.. never needed a BB in the Pacific and for the most part won the war in the Pacific without them when you consider that none of the critical battles ever required a battleship. Only 2 times they were used for surface engagements and either one could have been handled by BCs. The RM had to use their BBs and BCs.. no CVs, same for the KM. Due to their limited capabilities in terms of naval reach, it did not really matter. Both navies would have likely saved a lot of effort and finances not even bothering with them as they were almost more of a liability then an asset in the end. Point being, regardless of what the reasons there were for a "big gun" warship (BB or BC) their days were already numbered by the time WW1 ended - just no one wanted to believe it yet. End result.. capital big gun ships were already on their way out, so building only BCs after WW1 would have made more sense IMHO. During WW2 .. BBs were not used nearly as much, many were too damned slow, and the CV was already on its way to rule the seas. The BCs would have allowed for a big gun ship for less cost that could also keep up with the new capital ships, the CVs, and be used more flexibly in terms of mission roles that simply did not require a bigger more expensive ship to accomplish. What actually did happen during history was because the "big gun" entrenched admirals were still fighting the previous war and that thinking blended in nicely with the backwards thinking political decisions. Sound familiar? Thanks
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Post by William Miller on Aug 3, 2014 4:15:40 GMT -6
I think our opinions of the BC vary a bit here,
IMHO, the BC was an excellent concept for fleet and CV escorts, battle line flank protection/pursuit, scouting (WW1), cruiser squadron leaders, convoy protection, bombardment, and hunting down convoy raiders.
The above would let the BBs hold the battle line while the BCs could use their speed and firepower to handle other missions that might be a waste of resources for larger and often more expensive battleship. I do not believe the the typical carrier convoy escort (usually a CVL/CVE with few aircraft) was entirely capable of fending off a warship surface raider so the BC would still have a mission to perform in that role if there was a viable known threat. Bolstering the battle-line to help protect against non-BB warship threats, and/or to augment the firepower of the BBs, was also a viable mission if performed correctly IMHO. Many of the problems the BCs faced was conflicting ideas between the admirals on how to use BCs due to immature tactics and lack of battle experience.
Those are my thoughts.
Thanks
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Post by William Miller on Aug 2, 2014 15:09:26 GMT -6
I have posted before about being an advocate of the BC concept and that they suffered a bad rap due to poor decision making about ammo handling at Jutland and immature tactics. BCs had a higher operational tempo then the battleships in both world wars and their cruising speeds proved invaluable. As you have stated previously the CVs in many ways replaced the BC mission roles (recon, screening, engaging faster then typical BB speed targets, etc..). Even in the world of heavy armor speed still proved to be a more critical asset then armor for warships - as is proven in modern day. You simply can't armor everything and if the BB can't run away from a CV it could quickly become a sitting duck and mission killed or sunk - as was proven many times. Anything with a lower then 20+ knot cruising speed by WW2 was more of a liability then an asset. For fast dashes 24+ knots had to be maintained for *sustained* periods to avoid being attacked by aircraft during daylight. This fact alone made the Yamato class a total waste of a warship especially since it was a massive fuel hog.
During WW1 early BCs were sometimes more expensive then the BBs due to their numerous boiler requirements but later more powerful BBs were able to match pace with them but at higher cost.
In the end a ship with good AA firepower, speed to keep up with the CVs, and ability to fend off surface attacks was all that was needed in the 1940s. Heavy armor was almost a waste of time and expense especially if high speed was not part of the equation. Even the USN could have done just fine with 8-10 Alaskas instead of the more expensive NCs, Iowas, and SDs - only the Washington pulverized an enemy capital ship at sea, the Yamashiro - which the Alaska could have mauled just as easily at that range. The Surigao Straight is not even worth mentioning.. 2-3 Alaskas would have made that just more of what it already was, a turkey shoot. The Brits made good use of their KGVs due to less powerful CV air wings and usually lousy weather conditions in the North Sea but again they could have waged their naval war with numerous BCs augmented by CVs if needed.
One could argue.. that if CVs and BCs been built in reasonable numbers that the BBs were never really needed for WW2. The only reason BBs still reigned during WW1 is because CVs were not quite ready to kill them at sea yet.. but the writing was on the wall by 1918, and it would have come to pass by the 1930s had the opportunity been available to prove it. Wartime efforts evolved weapons far faster then peace time so if WW1 had lasted longer the entire CV concept could have changed naval war tactics much sooner then the 1940s.
Thanks.
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Post by William Miller on Jul 29, 2014 18:30:16 GMT -6
I think we are on the same page, in the end, the debate over CV vs BB is very academic IMHO. The CV, when it could find and attack other naval units at reasonable distances and with effective firepower, could and often did, cause the "mission kill" of not only battleships but entire armadas due to their perceived and direct threat to any other naval unit in existence. This feat was never achieved at the same level by the BB in any naval war. This fact still persists to this day with the possible exception of nuclear powered submarines, of which could be another topic in itself. (Of course the above does not even get into attacking land targets at far greater ranges - and out of range of enemy shore defenses - with aircraft)
Point being, the BB was a threat that *could* mission kill enemy naval units -IF- it could get into range with its guns. But until the 1940s faster BBs were built they were some of the slowest ships of many fleets. The CV changed that situation dramatically.. not only were they fast, the planes could reach out further then any gun and faster then any ship by many times over, and repeat the process if the situation permitted. No ship, in port or at sea, was safe from the CV. During WW1 BBs were not able to reach ships in port as easily as CVs could during WW2 - if anything, ports could become sitting duck death traps if CVs could attack the ships in port with planes (which was already being done to some effect by WW1 with further planned attacks being considered). CVs also proved extremely invaluable for countering sub threats, which a BB was almost useless against and could end up being more a target then an asset.
I think one final thought would come to mind.. a naval war could be won without BBs by around the 1930s - possibly earlier. The same was not the case without the CRs, DDs, or CVs. After the dust settled.. the BB - with the biggest guns and most armor - was mothballed as a class of modern warship... all other warship types still prevailed to this day. And before anyone goes "but the BB Iowa class came back".. only to make craters and launch TLAMs and at an extremely high operating cost of nearly $10,000 per hour - not including expensive refit and upgrade costs. To make matters worse, they were filling a role that far cheaper, and vastly more versatile, platforms/weapons (especially in overall terms of operational flexibility) could have accomplished at the time.
Thanks.
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Post by William Miller on Jul 26, 2014 14:34:19 GMT -6
Hi Dennis,
At the time of the early 1940s few realized the true potential of the CV for dictating a naval war as of yet but even as you noted, speed was life - and the old battlewagons with a cruising speed of around 15 knots, poor maneuverability, weak AA defenses, massive oil hogs (especially if going anything over 15 knots, their most fuel efficient speed was around 11 knots), etc.. were simply not tactically viable in combat zones with a CV task force that operated at an average cruising speed over around 20+ knots - which was faster then most of those battleships could sprint at. End result, they were a severe liability - especially if the CV force wanted to keep any enemy surface combatants at arms length so their airpower could do their intended work.
Even saying the above, once the CVs proved themselves to the rest of the BB entrenched thinkers at Coral Sea and Midway the results of their strategic strength was clear. No surface force could risk being caught at sea without CV air cover - especially during daylight. The IJN operations were greatly affected by the perceived threat of naval air attack as were the RM and KM.
Yes, this may be hindsight but the historical results of how and when naval units deployed during WW2 was similar in many ways to WW1 when other cheaper torpedo armed threats often caused navies to think twice about deploying their mighty fleets (mines were of course another major problem). The CV simply compounded that effect with aircraft. Anything that could be armed with a cheap and dangerous torpedo was a threat to a big fat battleship.
As to your Iowa context.. by the time the Iowa deployed the IJN CV forces were crippled and far less of a threat then during 1941 along with most of the quality IJN pilots being killed. IMHO, the F6F Hellcat was far more valuable in the Pacific then all of the SDs, NCs, and Iowas combined. The USN could, and for the most part did, win the war in the Pacific without a single battleship .. that alone speaks for the power of the CVs and their air wings.
Thanks.
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Post by William Miller on Jul 22, 2014 23:13:52 GMT -6
I have to keep this short as my week is already keeping me busy.
A few points of view,
a) The reason PH even happened the way it did was because the old BBs could not keep up with the CVs - which in turn - suggests that protecting them at sea would have been a serious liability to any faster CV, and possibly not done at all. Fast BBs had to keep up with the CVs otherwise they could not protect the CVs with AAA firepower or maintain protection for themselves. CVs would, and did, operate without BBs, but more often then not the opposite was not the case. So which was more of a liability or vulnerable to air attack? The BB or the CV? One good torp hit on a BB could, and sometimes did, keep it from ever returning to port, or if in port from going to sea for months. The bomb might have been a problem for the CV (although many times CVs were hit and still able to operate A/C soon after).. but torps could be equally crippling to many BBs at the time - examples, Yamato, Musashi, Pennsylvania, PoW, Repulse, and Bismarck - all of which were effectively knocked out of the war by just a few torpedo hits, in some cases only 1 hit was required. A BB crippled from a torpedo hit, which often forced any ship to lose considerable speed, makes it far more vulnerable. No BB ever built could defend itself against a full CV air wing.. but the CV could defend itself, and all escorts, from surface attack very effectively - even if the targets were BBs and even if they were only mission killed. Of course none of this even takes into account that any reasonable bomb damage could also lock up a BB in port for weeks or months.. if the SS is damaged enough the FCDs may be rendered ineffective making the BB a target more then a warship.
b) CVs, and land based air, dictated when surface combatants could operate - which in effect was a "mission kill" without damage being required if the surface combatants could NOT fulfill their roles in a naval theater. A surface combatant being stuck in port, for reasons of lack of self-protection, is not an asset, its a liability at worst, or at the least, a useless ship. CVs, and land based air power, made that situation a reality in WW2 like no other military asset in the history of naval warfare. All of the sudden a ship could be sunk at anytime, anywhere, if any enemy air power was a threat - especially if no one had any idea where the enemy CVs were, as happened to the IJN constantly, not even counting the times the Germans and Italians could not keep effective track of RN CVs. During WW1 torpedo armed assets were short ranged and easier to defend against.. but later on aerial assets changed everything. One could never assume that an air attack was not possible - and often those that did assume it could not happen paid dearly for it. Even the threat of naval air attack caused entire armadas to back off their missions, hide in the darkness, or try to use overcast skies as cover. Midway was a perfect example, even though the USN CVs had weakened air wings the IJN commanders could not risk pressing their luck any further. Coral Sea was also an example. Once the CVs were removed as threats to the enemy, or as the primary naval assets of the mission, the rest of the ships, no matter how big they were, instantly became seriously threatened targets - even if only by perception.
Point being.. yes, not many BBs were sunk at sea by air power, but their deployments were greatly dictated on when, or if, the enemy had aerial assets that could threaten their operations. The RN might have been a bit more brazen with their BBs due to lack of KM naval air power and poor coordination with the Luftwaffe around the Arctic and Atlantic but that was not the case in the Indian Ocean where they got spanked by Japanese aircraft on several occasions. The IJN and RM had to quickly restrict their surface combatant operations due to possible allied naval air attacks once the USN and RN CVs entered the Med and Pacific theaters. The KM was greatly restricted not just to be being vastly outnumbered in terms of surface combatants (of which many could not even catch them, and the ones that could catch them could not always outgun them) but also due to RN CVs that could catch them with good speed and even faster aircraft. Even though the RN aircraft were not always capable of flying a long distance they still allowed the CV to strike from ranges far beyond any KM gunfire, and that was all that mattered.
The side with the most CVs and effective aircraft determined the war at sea, end of story. Whether they sank many BBs at sea was almost irrelevant, especially if the BBs were kept pinned up in port due to the very threat of CVs attacking them if they attempted to deploy. A mission kill is a mission kill, whether by threat of damage or due to damage. The role of the BB was to shoot things.. not be pinned up in port, end up as bomb/torpedo sponges, or spend more time being repaired then being deployed.
Bottom line, sinking a ship was never required to win a naval war.. this simple fact even held true back to the age of sail. A warship either had the choice to be a worthy asset that could deploy and fight effectively or end up a target and/or liability.
That is my few cents. Anyone else?
Thanks Dennis.
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