|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 27, 2020 5:51:20 GMT -6
‘The August Crisis’
Bridgeman assumed the Office of First Sea Lord at a moment of transition, with ‘Dreadnought’ and ‘Bellerophon’ twenty months from commissioning and ‘Indefatigable’ over two years away, while the pre-dreadnought battleships ‘HMS Royal Oak’ and ‘HMS Revenge’ had been suspended early in construction to finance them. Meanwhile, the four ‘Flotilla Leaders’ of the B-Class were entering service, with ‘Battle’ having commissioned the previous April, and ‘HMS Persian’ of the Persian-sub-class of the Endymion-Class due to launch in July.
Bridgeman had, essentially, been thrust into the job as there were few other suitable candidates, seeing as how the Royal Navy had been torn in two by ‘Fisher’s War’ as it was known, and Bridgeman was at least seen as a safe pair of hands. While Allington endorsed Bridgeman’s appointment privately, he deliberately avoiding making any public statements regarding the new First Sea Lord in order to avoid inflicting any controversy on the war hero. The two were not in complete agreement on naval policy, however.
Bridgeman had been Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet before his appointment as First Sea Lord and had previously been Second-in-Command of both the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets. It was his detachment of the former which fought the two battles of Fundy Bay. It was this experience he would draw on in the Strategic Naval Review (1908).
Although the previous review had only been conducted three years earlier, it was believed the strategic situation had sufficiently changed since 1905 to justify another assessment. One of the findings was that Britain could not hope to maintain a two-power standard in dreadnoughts without sacrificing in other essential areas. The United States and France were building two dreadnoughts to Britain’s three (questionably, counting ‘Indefatigable’), meaning with the ‘USS North Dakota’ the two would have a combined strength of five dreadnoughts to Britain’s three. It was accepted that Britain could build up to four dreadnoughts at a time without unduly sacrificing construction in other areas, and indeed if all resources then available were directed to dreadnought construction, the funds could be found to build five dreadnoughts at a time, though the review was keen to stress that this was not an ideal course of action.
The Review instead recommended Britain focus on building enough Dreadnoughts to match the largest other power at the time, plus an additional battle squadron in reserve. As of this time, that meant Britain would need to rapidly outbuild the United States, taking the road of building four dreadnoughts at a time.
Meanwhile, the Review took issue with the previous administration’s decision to attempt to replace all protected cruisers with ‘General Service’ and ‘Flotilla Leader’ types. The report pointed out that many of the older cruisers which Allington had sought to replace still had a clear purpose and were not yet ‘categorically obsolete’. The Review categorised existing cruisers into three roles: Fleet Cruiser (a merging of 1905’s station and scout cruisers); General Service Cruiser; and Flotilla Leader. It also sought to categorise the legacy cruisers into these categories, where appropriate.
The Cressy, Hogue, and Drake-Class armoured cruisers were categorised as fleet cruisers, with that classification to be reassessed if and when Battlecruisers became more prevalent. The Astraea and Eclipse-Classes were categorised as general service cruisers (albeit of the ‘second class’, solely because they were considered too slow if they ever had to engage modern surface raiders).
The Review also took the step of laying out exactly what was needed to protect Britain’s imperial interests. To do this, it separated the world into fifteen ‘operational areas’, of which nine required an active Royal Navy presence: the Mediterranean, West Africa, Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, North American East Coast, North American West Coast, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific. The Mediterranean would need, in the Review’s estimation, one battlecruiser, one general service cruiser, and a ‘colonial sloop’. The West Africa Station would need one cruiser and one sloop. The North American East Coast, Indian Ocean, South Africa Station, and East Indies Station would need one battlecruiser each, or one of the Centurions and a fleet armoured cruiser. The Caribbean and the Australia Station would need one fleet cruiser or two general service cruisers each. Northeast Asia would need one general service cruiser and two sloops. Finally, British Columbia would also need one general service cruiser and a sloop. In all, Britain would need five-to-eight general service cruisers, two-to-five battlecruisers, and five colonial sloops to cover foreign commitments, not including the designated fleets. In fact, the vessels already on foreign stations exceeded this, with it being judged that around 40,000 tons of shipping could be removed from the Foreign Stations, representing a significant saving in maintenance. As such, the following classes were singled out for immediate disposal, rather than Allington’s policy of replacement:
• The Leander-Class
• The Orlando-Class
• The Centurion-Class
The replacement program would continue as new ships came online, but the change in focus to providing for the colonial requirements rather than replacing the foreign station vessels like-for-like would take a great burden of the naval budget and allow the navy to turn more towards the fleet.
The disposals commenced before the end of May, with the ‘HMS Niobe’ being expended for gunnery practice, yielding interesting data regarding the use of high explosive shells.
As Bridgeman’s reforms took effect, May also saw the B-Class cruisers ‘Bellona’ and ‘Badger’ joined the fleet. ‘Beacon’ was delayed launching by a shortage of 4in guns, which were diverted to the Dreadnought programme.
June would see the decision made to cancel the remaining two Royal Oak-Class battleships, on the basis that even with construction suspended they were still taking up resources to maintain (to say nothing of the dockyard space), and they would be obsolete before they were even finished. The resources would be better used to continue building dreadnoughts. ‘HMS Persian’ joined the fleet, but ‘Beacon’ was still waiting for her gun armament.
Meanwhile, July would see Bridgeman act on the last design Admiral Allington had authorised before being forced out in May: The ‘Town-Class’ of Light Cruisers.
The Town-Class were based on the preceding Persian Sub-Class of the Endymions, but were fitted with an armoured belt 2.5in thick and mounted a modified armament of seven 6in guns, with one gun each on the fo’c’sle and quarterdeck, two guns abreast the fore-funnel, two guns abreast the aft pilot house, and the last gun atop the superstructure just abaft of the aft pilot house to fire over the quarterdeck gun. A secondary armament of ten 4in guns was also fitted, though these were once again on unshielded mounts. The ships would make 25kn and were explicitly designed for commerce protection and independent operations. They were also designed to be a more-efficient option for colonial stations, although Bridgeman’s reforms would see this role postponed for the ships. In July, ‘HMS Bristol’ was laid down as the first of the Town-Class, setting the blueprint for future cruiser design in the Royal Navy. ‘Beacon’ finally commissioned before the end of July, just as the class-leader ‘HMS Battle’ completed her working up.
Above: British Town-Class Light Cruiser HMS Bristol.
In August, the Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. shipyard at Elswick offered a deal to build another Town-Class cruiser, two months quicker than the Royal Dockyard at Pembroke, for 10% less in total cost. The offer was accepted, with the ‘HMS Newcastle’ being laid down on 10 August. Part of the reasoning for the decision was that delays were being suffered by all the Royal Dockyards as the Navy’s own procurement system struggled to cope with the pace of building. This was not helped by the decision to lay down a modified Dreadnought-Class with the new 12in gun, ‘HMS Temeraire’, in September.
British naval shipbuilding was bottlenecked. The accelerated construction of two dreadnoughts at once was taking resources faster than they could be acquired, forcing materials for other aspects of the naval programme to be cannibalised to meet the schedule. The ‘schedule’ was to catch up with American dreadnought construction as rapidly as possible. However, it was observed that the present projections indicated both ‘Dreadnought’ and ‘Bellerophon’ would be completed in 1910, whether they were rushed or not. Meanwhile, the United States would only complete one battleship that year – ‘USS Minnesota’. Meanwhile, America would finish three dreadnoughts in 1911 compared to two British ships. Since accelerating construction of the first two ships had little bearing on hulls-per-year in service, and it was argued it was costing the navy more to keep virtually-completed hulls in drydocks because materials were being siphoned for the battleships, it was decided to stop expediting the construction of the first two dreadnoughts in order to ensure the rest of the programme completed on-time.
In January 1909, the first four ‘Scorpion-Class’ destroyers arrived, after several delays. Meanwhile, tensions with Germany were deteriorating as the Allington-Tirpitz Agreement broke down with Allington’s departure, culminating in the German Naval Law of 1909 in February. This would in turn prompt the laying down of ‘HMS Superb’ as the fourth British dreadnought.
In April, Russian diplomats approached the British Government with the proposal of a security arrangement. With tensions rising across the world for the second time in a decade, Bridgeman advised the government that, instead of tying Britain’s foreign policy to Russia, which could have the effect of provoking Germany or Russia’s traditional ally France, the Russian invitation should be expanded to the entire European Congress to resolve outstanding issues. Meanwhile, Vickers reveal an improved model of the BL 14in gun, increasing the barrel length to 45-calibres.
April would also see the Admiralty conduct a rationalisation of coastal defences, with several coastal batteries being considered too poorly armed or in locations where they would serve little purpose. Two 4in batteries in Britain would be disbanded, along with the New Providence 6in battery and Nigeria 6in battery. The 9in battery in Malta would also be replaced by a 6in battery to save costs, as the threat from Italy was not seen as being as great as it seemed during the Mediterranean Crisis.
In May, the DNC notified the Admiralty that his department was preparing several design studies which mounted more than five gun turrets on the centreline. This development was pursued with great interest, but construction of further dreadnoughts would have to wait until 1910.
July saw the American dreadnought ‘Minnesota’ commission, one year earlier than expected. The design was more heavily armoured than ‘North Dakota’ and incorporated a superfiring aft turret arrangement in place of the deck-level pair on her predecessor. Otherwise, there was little difference save for an 800 ton increase in displacement and an increase from 4in secondaries to 6in secondaries. In August, ‘HMS Pearl’ commissioned.
Above: US dreadnought battleship USS Minnesota.
January 1910 would see the ‘HMS Newcastle’ be the first of the Town-Class into active service. ‘HMS Dreadnought’ also joined the fleet. On speed trials, she managed to exceed her design speed of 21kn and maintain a speed of 22kn, a good omen for the future. Meanwhile, the DNC informs the Admiralty that his department has developed a method to reinforce a ship’s forward hull to support a superfiring ‘B’ turret. This was nicely timed, as it came when design work was to begin on the next pair of dreadnoughts for the navy.
In February, Asquith’s government was looking to cut naval expenditure to finance social reforms. Bridgeman railed against the idea, with the support of McKenna, as it would prevent the navy from building enough dreadnoughts to maintain Britain’s position as the naval superpower.
March saw ‘Bristol’ and ‘Bellerophon’ enter service.
In April, Asquith’s government pushed through social reforms at the expense of the Naval Budget, although Bridgeman and McKenna were able to get the cuts watered down somewhat. At the end of the month, the Admiralty was able to purchase the Italian 340mm gun, which was of far superior quality to the British 13.5in then in service.
In June 1910, the ‘Vanguard-Class’ battleships ‘HMS Vanguard’ and ‘HMS St. Vincent’ were laid down. They featured a more efficient arrangement of the main armament, with all guns mounted on the centreline in superfiring pairs of twin turrets fore and aft and a fifth turret amidships.
Above: British dreadnought battleship HMS Vanguard.
August 1910. Tensions between Britain and Germany were at vapour point. The British King Edward VII died in May, being succeeded by his son George, who would take the throne as King George V. George V and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, despite being cousins, did not have a good relationship. What was worse was by this point figures in the German Army were calling for war with France or Russia, and Tirpitz was advising the Kaiser that Germany would have no better opportunity to fight Britain at sea, as Germany’s shipbuilding industry could not compete with the British for long.
Convinced war with Germany was imminent, Bridgeman called a meeting of the Board of Admiralty to determine how the navy should prepare. First Lord McKenna complained that it would be proper to conduct the discussion before the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), but as the meeting solely concerned the nation’s defence at sea Bridgeman argued it was not a matter for army coordination. He did agree, however, to a meeting a few days later of the CID to discuss possible use of the Army to invade German colonies if war did break out.
Germany was building a large number of destroyers: not enough to match Britain’s destroyer force, but certainly enough to be a concern. Another concern was that Germany had twelve U-boats – submarines – compared to Britain which had four, as the development programme initiated by Allington had fizzled out during the Dreadnought race. The potential of the submarine to threaten the fleet or British merchant shipping was not lost on the Board, and plans were devised to commission a number of sloops to support the fleet and merchant ships against the submarine fleet. This was made more dubious in concept by the decision that these ships should also serve as the future colonial sloops and as fleet minelayer-sweepers.
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 25, 2020 18:35:08 GMT -6
So, by my reckoning the Americans must have started building 'North Dakota' in 1905, two years before I got the technology that actually allowed me to build a battleship with more than two twin turrets (I tried immediately after getting main wing turrets and it wouldn't give me the option, and again when I got superimposed x turret, ditto.) Main Battery Wing Turrets allows you to build ships with twin turrets in wing positions, but if I recall correctly you need a 16,000t or larger hull to support heavy wing guns in twin turrets. Also, if you're just opening the design screen, setting the gun caliber, and pressing the 'add turrets' button to check what you can put on the ship, be aware that there is a size below which wing turrets will not be offered for guns larger than 6", with exactly what that size is depending on the gun caliber, so if you haven't changed the design displacement from the default 5,000 tons or whatever then it can look like you don't have the option to build ships using them.
As to X turret, you need at least one of the N Centerline Turrets technologies before any of the superfiring turrets can be used.
Ah, that would explain it. I should have figured really, since I'd tried to put chasers on a 600t hull previously and couldn't with any gun above 2", so I figured that was based on displacement and I'd be able to do it when I got 900t destroyers. Just didn't make the connection. Although both times I tried I was hitting auto-design with BB selected.
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 25, 2020 15:53:45 GMT -6
Also, sneak peak...
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 25, 2020 15:39:06 GMT -6
Dreadnought, the Battlecruiser, and ‘Fisher’s War’.
‘HMS Severn’ arrived with the fleet before the end of July. Despite the fact designs were currently being drawn for a ship which would render them obsolescent, the cabinet commended the Admiralty for the construction of the ‘Royal Oaks’. Meanwhile, experience with ‘Endymion’ and ‘Severn’ allowed Pembroke Docks to shorten the construction of ‘HMS Leander’ by approximately one month.
In September, several machinery manufacturers, including Parsons, were able to produce working and reliable oil-fired boilers. Despite Britain having relatively ready access to oil, Allington held off adopting the technology for a time while studies were done to determine its effectiveness. Designs also emerged from the DNC for three-gun turrets, but these were similarly put aside for the time being, not least of all because of concerns a three-gun turret would be too heavy for its bearings and the machinery to allow it to turn. The first of the ‘Foxhounds’ joined the fleet.
In November 1907, ‘HMS Dreadnought’ was laid down. Her construction would be accelerated to delay the ability of other powers to respond to her, and in order to finance her construction the construction of ‘HMS Revenge’ and ‘HMS Barfleur’ had to be suspended, in part because it was decided to use their 12in guns to speed up ‘Dreadnought’s’ fitting-out. By the end of the month, ‘HMS Leander’ had joined the fleet.
Above: British Battleship HMS Dreadnought.
However, little was it known at the time, the British had already lost the race to build the first all-big-gun battleship, as just as the first plates for ‘Dreadnought’ were cast, the ‘USS North Dakota’ slipped into the Hampton Roads. Displacing 20,000 tons, she carried ten 12in guns (although in a less efficient configuration) and fourteen 4in guns. An 8.5in belt protected her citadel and her machinery could propel her to 21kn. While the British had lost the race to build ‘Dreadnought’ before anyone else, they were at least certain their vessel was superior to its American rival.
In December, several Sheffield steel mills approached the First Sea Lord in private, proposing that the Navy push for more battleships like ‘Dreadnought’, which would clearly require the purchase of a great deal more steel, in return for them offering comparatively good rates for the steel ordered. Allington was insulted at the blatant attempt to bribe the Navy into helping boost the steel industry and rejected the offer as ‘the most blatant and audacious attempt at political corruption I have ever known!’
With Britain having lost the race for the first all-big-gun battleship, and a second North Dakota-Class on the stocks in the US, Allington started pushing for resources to catch up. He argued successfully to suspend construction of ‘Royal Oak’ and cancel ‘Barfleur’ entirely, as the Admiralty hadn’t wanted to build ‘Barfleur’ in the first place and felt she was surplus to requirements. ‘HMS Bellerophon’ was thus laid down in December, along with the second Persian-Class cruiser ‘Pearl’, just as ‘Cambrian’ left the yard at Chatham for her first training cruise.
The timing of ‘Bellerophon’ commencing construction proved fortuitous, as word then arrived that Germany had begun construction of their own ‘North Dakota/Dreadnought’ type, the ‘SMS Hannover’.
In January 1908, ‘Endymion’ and ‘Severn’ were dispatched on their first overseas deployments, replacing the older Leander-Class ‘Champion’ and ‘Curacao’, which were summoned back to Britain for scrapping. The month also saw Admiral Allington become ‘almost feverish’ about the development of more dreadnoughts, though thus far only the US and Germany had laid down any such vessels. No doubt feeling political pressure to claw back Britain’s pre-eminent position among the naval powers, he ordered the pre-dreadnought battleships of the Home Fleet placed into reserve and scrapped the Orlando-Class cruisers ‘Orlando’ and ‘Europa’ to build up funds. ‘Pelorus’ and the Phoenix-Class vessels were to be kept at home to maintain cruiser numbers pending the arrival of the B-Class, upon which they would replace the ‘Comus’, ‘Astraea’, ‘Pandora’, and ‘Arethusa’ on foreign stations.
One fortunate side effect, both of Allington’s so-called ‘Dreadnought Fever’ and of the emergence of the type more broadly, was that it solved the question which had been dividing the Navy since 1905: whether or not to merge the ‘Scout Cruiser’ and ‘Station Cruiser’ roles. Fisher had been bombarding the Admiralty with the concept of a ‘Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser’ for some time by this point, and a consensus was built that four or five of these would be sufficient to meet the terms of the 1905 Strategic Naval Review, and could fill the role of both station cruiser and battleship – a battle-cruiser – thus representing a substantial saving. Design work commenced on a battlecruiser before January ended.
In February, designs were drawn up for a large 900-ton destroyer which would become the ‘Scorpion-Class’. These ships would carry five 4in guns; two side-by-side on the fo’c’sle as bow ‘chasers’, and three mounted centreline behind the bridge, the aft pilot house and on the quarterdeck (allowing the aft pilot house gun to fire over it). They would also mount four torpedo tubes: two on either beam.
March saw the French lay down two dreadnoughts to differing designs, ‘Richelieu’ and ‘Colbert’, with the US laying down the ‘USS Connecticut’ to a new design. It was also discovered that the Imperial German Navy had pre-empted the Admiralty with regards to the Battlecruiser, as ‘SMS Vonn Der Tann’ was already under construction. The first 'Scorpions' were laid down.
In April 1908, a disarmament conference at The Hague, pressed for by Campbell-Bannerman’s government prior to the his retirement on health ground, to put controls on the naval arms race ended without agreement. ‘HMS Battle’ commissioned, becoming the first of her class to do so, as the other three ships had all suffered some form of delay due to resources being diverted to ‘Dreadnought’ and ‘Bellerophon’.
Around the same time, Vickers announced they had designed an improved 12in gun – the 45-calibre Mk.X, just in time for the Dreadnoughts to not receive them.
There were also developments in ship design, with the DNC doing an end-run around Fisher, who by now was vocally criticising the First Sea Lord, to show Allington a design sketch for a General Service cruiser with an armoured belt – a ‘light’ armoured cruiser. Although the navy was by now involved in a very public scandal matched only by the allegations in the press that the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth, had leaked design drawings of ‘Dreadnought’ to Germany through private correspondence with the Kaiser, Allington was able to authorise the development of what would become the ‘Town-Class’ before May 1908.
The scandal mentioned above resulted from an article published on 14 April 1908 in ‘The Times’. The article was written by Jackie Fisher and lambasted Admiral Allington’s handling of the Navy since 1905. Accusing Allington of having ‘delayed’ the laying down of ‘Dreadnought’ until it was too late, he also condemned the Allington-Tirpitz Agreement of 1906 and railed against the design of ‘HMS Indefatigable’, which hadn’t been laid down at that time, or even officially ordered as such. Fisher claimed the First Sea Lord had “frustrated the design process at every stage”, by demanding armour be increased and insisting on the fitting of an all-centreline armament with aft superfiring turret, arguing that the insistence on such an arrangement increased displacement and thus cost considerably. This very public outburst was the culmination of various disagreements between the First and Second Sea Lords, once allies, which had been building since the ‘USS North Dakota’ was launched. Fisher’s critics used the opportunity to argue for ‘clearing the pond’, while Allington’s Private Secretary wrote a counter-article for ‘The Times’ accusing Fisher of “bringing the navy into chaos”, pointing out that the Admiralty had agreed to increase the armour on the ‘Indefatigable’ as a whole because they were intended to fill the Fleet Scout role and so would come under fire. It was also pointed out that other nations would no doubt build battlecruisers to respond (and in fact, ‘Von der Tann’ had already been laid down before the final design was approved) and so the British ships would likely come under the fire of similar guns to their own. The dispute was referred to in the press and the navy as 'Fisher's War'.
Above: British 'Battlecruiser' HMS Indefatigable, whose construction would prompt 'Fisher's War'.
The embarrassing and disgraceful row which had engulfed the navy would destroy both Fisher and Allington. As the new Prime Minister Herbert Asquith replaced Lord Tweedmouth with Reginald McKenna, the new First Lord was tasked with bringing the situation in the Admiralty under control. Though he sympathised with Allington’s position, he informed Allington in confidence that:
“It is clear to both Cabinet and the Public that the differences which have been allowed to persist between Fisher and yourself cannot be resolved while the two of you retain your present positions, neither will it be settled if either of you should emerge the victor.”
Allington, understanding McKenna’s message, offered his resignation. In his memoirs, he would record:
“I did all I could do in practical terms to maintain the Navy’s position. I defended it at every turn. Fisher’s proposals were impractical, even by the opinions of his own subordinates, until 1907. However, matters of Naval Administration were my purview, and in truth I should have seen the situation developing between Jackie and myself far sooner than April 1908. The fault for the resulting conflict, which tore apart the Navy I so adored, is entirely mine. I allowed the situation to spiral out of control.”
Fisher would not go so quietly. After being curtly told he would not take Allington’s post, he proposed instead Admiral Arthur Wilson, who had commanded the North Atlantic Fleet in the Anglo-American War and was a supporter of Fisher. After McKenna refused to allow Fisher to dictate who should replace the First Sea Lord, especially after how publicly he’d brought the navy into disgrace, Fisher stated that he would resign if anyone but Wilson got the job, not trusting who he saw as the alternatives. McKenna immediately, “it is accepted.” Fisher would continue to attack the management of the navy for the first few months of McKenna’s term as First Lord, but the matter was solved with the departures of both Allington and Fisher.
Initially, it was expected that Charles Beresford for succeed Allington as First Sea Lord. However, regardless of the fact he was the Conservative MP for Woolwich until 1903, he had had a long-running feud with Fisher and had recently been involved in a spat with Admiral Percy Scott which indicated a sudden change in personality to one which McKenna referred to as ‘tempestuous’. Ultimately, the position of First Sea Lord would be granted to Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, who had been credited with the success of the North Atlantic Fleet at the Battles of Fundy Bay. Upon hearing the news of Bridgeman’s appointment, Allington sent the following telegraph to his old office at the Admiralty, for Bridgeman to receive upon assuming the position.
“To: Sir Francis Bridgeman, First Sea Lord
Am deeply gratified to hear you have been appointed in my stead. I hope I have left the office in good state for you, as I know that I have left it in the most capable hands. Yours Faithfully,
George Allington, RN”
This is not the end. This is not even the beginning...of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. So, by my reckoning the Americans must have started building 'North Dakota' in 1905, two years before I got the technology that actually allowed me to build a battleship with more than two twin turrets (I tried immediately after getting main wing turrets and it wouldn't give me the option, and again when I got superimposed x turret, ditto.) Poor Allington. I was always planning on retiring him before 1910, but with losing the Dreadnought race (albeit in a good position to catch up) and having already placed Fisher as Second Sea Lord, I just couldn't see Fisher letting that stand, especially with Allington and the Admiralty butchering his precious battlecruisers (I even deliberately refused to accept 'Invincible', 'Indomitable', or even 'Inflexible' as a name, considering the three ships so-named were, in order, vinced, dominated, and flexed. ) Such a public feud, as most of Fisher's feuds were, was only going to end one way.
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 25, 2020 10:24:19 GMT -6
In your example above, Britain is best served (in my opinion) by a central strategy - to concentrate forces in home waters and detach forces to other sea zones only when necessary, exercising control of the seas with the minimum necessary force. A pair of battle-cruisers, or two pair at most, is usually sufficient. Which, funnily enough, is exactly what the Invincible- and Indefatigable-Classes were originally designed for. And then they got put in the line of battle under a man who looked at shell-handling regulations and decided they were actually 'guidelines', with spectacularly catastrophic results. That said, I did have some reasonably good results using 'colonial battlecruisers' in RTW 1, and my current GB AAR may well go down the same route (with something vaguely approaching armour).
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 25, 2020 9:47:57 GMT -6
Road to ‘Dreadnought’: 1905-1907
The now-Viscount Allington, 1st Viscount Harwich, oversaw a series of reforms in the administration of the Navy. Many of these changes had been slated for 1904 but were delayed by the Anglo-American War. The first, and least substantive change, was the restyling of the Naval Lords to Sea Lords, making Admiral Allington the First Sea Lord. The most substantive reform, however, was the Strategic Naval Review (1905).
In large part, the Review was a summary of the lessons learned in wartime: the discarding of anti-torpedo boat guns below 3in bore diameter, the adoption of Dreyer central firing, the need for massed batteries of uniform calibre to assist rangefinding, and the need to improve commerce protection. The Review also found that in most respects the 12in gun was superior to the 13.5in gun, and in several respects equivalent to the 14in gun then entering service.
The report did offer geopolitical considerations, also. It re-affirmed the need for several foreign station fleets first identified in 1900, but altered the balance of forces somewhat:
• The North Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets would need four battleships each, preferably of uniform gun calibre. It was also advised that each fleet should be assigned a sufficient number of cruisers to pursue enemy commerce raiders in wartime and scout for the fleet: three for the Mediterranean; and five for the North Atlantic, which was to be based from the Caribbean from then on and operate on the Eastern Seaboard for Canadian defence if necessary.
• The Far Eastern Fleet would need two battleships and five cruisers.
• The Home Fleet would need to number no fewer than eight battleships.
The Home Fleet’s requirements were greatly more complicated than those of the ‘foreign’ fleets. As well as needing eight battleships at a minimum, two-to-three cruisers were also desired for commerce protection, with two armoured cruisers for scouting duties and four protected cruisers for screening duties and as destroyer ‘flotilla leaders’.
The overly heavy focus on cruisers was justified by the First Sea Lord as:
“Wartime experience has shown that cruisers will be paramount in modern conflicts. Our battleships, despite inferior numbers, were capable of matching and defeating the American Fleet at sea and denying control of the seas to our enemy. Meanwhile, our cruisers were able to impose a commerce blockade on the United States’ east coast ports. It was that commercial blockade which won the conflict. There was no ‘decisive battle’. A strong battlefleet must therefore be aimed at denying sea control to the enemy whilst our cruisers starve him and force his capitulation.”
The overall construction programme was therefore identified as a need for eighteen battleships and twenty-two cruisers of all types. The cruiser requirements were separated into four categories:
• Station Cruiser: An Armoured Cruiser to lead the commerce protection and scouting efforts of the foreign fleets. Three required.
• Scout Cruiser: An Armoured Cruiser dedicated to fleet scouting duties in Home Waters. Two required.
• Flotilla Leader: A Protected Cruiser designed to lead Destroyer Flotillas in Home Waters for screening or sweeping purposes. Four required.
• General Purpose Cruiser: A Protected Cruiser to perform a range of foreign service and commerce protection roles as part of the designated fleets and foreign stations. The ‘Phoenix-Class’ would form the basis for this type. Thirteen required.
There were differences in the Admiralty over the split between Scout and Station armoured cruisers, especially given the navy had something of an embarrassment of riches for modern armoured cruisers as it was, each perfectly capable of filling either role. Attention thus focused on the Protected Cruisers. Initial plans were put in place for two flotilla leaders. These were to be armed with a larger battery of 4.7in guns for operations against enemy light forces and, as they would be operating with the destroyers, a need was identified for a speed of at least 25kn. This would evolve into the ‘Abercrombie-Class’, or ‘A-Class’ Flotilla Leader.
The General-Purpose Cruiser (also referred to as the General Service Cruiser) would, as already mentioned, follow the path already laid down by the Phoenix-Class, with the Phoenix-Class being retroactively placed in this category. However, with the advent of steam turbines, it was desired to use the new technology to increase the top speed. The result was the ‘Endymion-Class’. The new turbines afforded a top speed of 24kn with more reliable machinery than on the previous cruisers as well as a return to larger coal bunkers for long-range independent operations. Two additional 6in guns were fitted for a total of eight and a broadside of five. Armour was slightly reduced, but as cruisers with even weaker armour had stood up well under fire during the war, this was not considered an issue. The gunshields were removed from the 4in guns and their number reduced from ten to two. Showing the emphasis placed on endurance and independent operation, the ships would receive a third fire control position. Remarkably, this design came out only slightly more expensive than the Phoenix-Class at 1,000 tons more displacement.
It was also desired to equip each foreign fleet with at least one flotilla of destroyers containing eight-to-twelve destroyers each. The Ness-Class had been intended for this role, but with the advent of turbine propulsion, the ‘Ghurka-Class’ was developed. Speed was increased to 28kn, but in other respects the ships were identical to their predecessors. The first four Ghurka’s were ordered in February 1905. Developments in submarines also saw the fitting of dive planes around this time.
Above: British Ghurka-Class Destroyer
In March, ‘HMS Endymion’ and ‘HMS Abercrombie’ were laid down. The decision was also made, observing the development of submarines by other powers, to order the construction of two such vessels for the Royal Navy: ‘HMS E-1’ and ‘HMS E-2’.
Above: British Endymion-Class 'General Service' Protected Cruiser. Below: British Abercrombie-Class 'Flotilla Leader' Protected Cruiser.
By the end of the month, ‘Majestic’ and ‘Howe’ returned from their fire control upgrades, followed by ‘Renown’ and ‘Empress of India’ in April.
‘HMS Eclipse’ also emerged from her reconstruction in April, though her utility in this configuration was now in some doubt. She would be placed into the Reserve Fleet while a decision was made on what to do with her.
May saw the Russian battleship ‘Imperator Aleksandr I’ finally enter service. Armed with four 12in guns and sixteen 7in guns, these were clearly a response to the Majestics and woefully under-powered compared against the Resolution-Class. In fact, there had been no progress at all by any of Britain’s rivals towards answering the Resolutions. ‘Camperdown’ and ‘Ramillies’ were brought in for their refits in June.
Meanwhile, the new Second Sea Lord, John ‘Jackie’ Arbuthnot Fisher, began sending repeated design sketches to Allington for an ‘all big-gun battleship’ with a uniform-calibre main battery. Allington responded to these sketches with the following memo:
“The designs which you have prepared for me with regards to ‘HMS Untakeable’ are of great interest. However, I do not believe our technology is yet at the stage for such a vessel to be viable. Nonetheless, keep me apprised of developments. You have my permission to form a committee to investigate this concept.
P.S. Please stop shouting at my Private Secretary. Yes, I am getting these memos.”
September 1905 saw ‘HMS King Edward VII’ arrive with the Fleet. Still one of the most powerful battleships afloat, she would represent the pinnacle of ‘ironclad’ battleship design.
‘Ramillies’ and ‘Camperdown’ returned from their refits the same month, alongside the newly-commissioned Ghurka-Class destroyers.
The remaining three ‘Abercrombie-Class’ flotilla leaders were laid down in October: ‘Active’, ‘Aurora’, and ‘Agamemnon’. ‘Majestic’ and ‘Howe’ were sent to the Mediterranean Fleet to take over from ‘Centurion’ and ‘Repulse’, which were in turn sent to form the Far Eastern Fleet in Singapore. Towards the end of the month, the DNC informed the Admiralty that his department had developed new methods of underwater protection to cope with torpedo strikes while a vessel was underway. Anticipating another barrage of design memorandums from Fisher, Allington pre-empted him by authorising the inclusion of the system in the ‘Untakeable’ design studies. There was speculation, particularly from critics of the so-called ‘Fish Pond’, that the design committee was simply Allington’s attempt to keep Fisher ‘out of the way’, though this seems to have been apocryphal.
In December 1905, the spirit of goodwill and technical cooperation which began in 1904 was formalised by the Allington-Tirpitz Agreement, which saw British and German Companies encouraged by their respective navies to correspond and share technical developments. Shortly thereafter, four more Ghurka-Class destroyers are ordered.
‘HMS Severn’ was ordered in January 1906 as the second ship of the Endymion-Class.
In March, another flurry of memos were sent from Fisher’s office, this time giving ‘Untakeable’ a superfiring gun turret aft. An amused Allington reportedly turned to his Private Secretary and said:
“Oh dear, Robert. I think soon I should have to let Jackie build his ship or he shall have a stroke!”
In April, the ‘Phoenix’ and ‘Pallas’ commissioned, with ‘Calypso’ following in May.
In June, two more ‘Endymions’ were laid down as ‘HMS Cambrian’ and ‘HMS Leander’, followed by four more ‘Ghurkas’ in July as the previous four complete.
Also in July, there were developments in submarines which allowed them to operate out of harbours and into coastal waters.
‘HMS Abercrombie’ entered service in September 1906. Unfortunately, her turbine equipment proved somewhat underpowered and she could only maintain 24kn on sea trials, not the 25kn which she was designed for. With it now too late to fix the issue in the follow-up ships, construction was suspended while efforts were made to fix the issue in ‘Abercrombie’.
‘HMS Endymion’, on the other hand, commissioned much more smoothly and began her training cruise.
The same month saw the development of the new BL 6in Mk.VI gun, which had a barrel length of 45-calibres giving far better performance compared to the preceding models.
In October, the possibility was investigated of rebuilding the ‘Abercrombie’ with an up-rated power plant to allow her to make her design speed of 25kn. However, it was found that such a rebuild would involve almost as much cost as building a whole new ship and take more than half as long. It was also found that a new ship on the same displacement could make 26kn for little increase in cost on the same displacement. With tensions, and thus the need for the destroyer leaders, low, the revised design was authorised as the ‘B-Class’ and Allington convinced the Board to condone the scrapping of the remaining ‘A-Class’ ships on the stocks. ‘Abercrombie’, however, would complete training and be placed into reserve.
By the end of October, the ‘Redoubtable’ arrived, giving the Royal Navy a full Battle Squadron of 14in gun ships.
In November, the four ships of the ‘B-Class’ were laid down: ‘Battle’, ‘Badger’, ‘Beacon’, and ‘Bellona’. It was also planned to lay down another ‘Endymion’, but this was postponed while modifications were made using newer, more efficient turbine equipment and the newer 6in gun.
In December 1906, ‘HMS Persian’ was laid down – the first of a series of modified Endymion-Class vessels. Differences were minimal, with the only visual indicator that a vessel was a ‘Persian’ sub-class and not an ‘Endymion’ being that the gunshields were reinstated on the 4in guns.
February 1907 saw design work begin on the ‘Second Ghurka’ flotilla design, which would become the ‘Foxhound-Class’. Like the ‘Persian-Class’, these were simply improved versions of the Ghurka-Class, using more efficient turbines to allow an expansion of shell provisions. The first four ships would be laid down in March.
March also saw Liberal Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman argue for the laying down of three more battleships. Allington had deliberately held off on more battleships while more design work was carried out on the ‘Untakeable’, but with the other powers starting to catch up, Allington acceded to the Prime Minister’s request.
However, with the ‘Untakeable’ studies still not at a point where a satisfactory vessel could be laid down, the three new battleships would have to be based on the conventional paradigm. As Britain currently had six 12in battleships, and this armament had proven most satisfactory, the new vessels would be based on the Majestic-Class, while incorporating improvements made in the Resolution- and King Edward VII-Classes. The ships, named ‘Royal Oak’, ‘Revenge’, and ‘Barfleur’, would be laid down in June.
As if by fate, just as the ‘Royal Oak-Class’ were being ordered, Fisher sent another ‘Untakeable’ sketch, utilising four centreline turrets. It is said the wailing of Admiral Allington could be heard from the Royal Naval College at Osborne, across the Solent.
Design work was ordered on the new battleship in July, with an armament of ten 12in guns, an armoured belt 11in thick, cruiser-grade speed of 21kn, and displacing 25,000tons. It was a ship with no equal, which was a culmination of the various developments in naval technology since Allington took control of the Admiralty in 1899, and it was given a name to suit: ‘Dreadnought’.
So, a long post this time. I really wanted to get a dreadnought designed this 'chapter'. Otherwise, pretty cruiser-heavy. My 5in guns have equivalent range to the new 6in guns, but poorer penetration. That being said, they're also designed to fight with the fleet against lighter vessels, so that's not really an issue. Most protected cruisers only have 2in of armour, and the 5in guns can manage that well-enough. The 4in can't. Also, it helps make the flotilla leaders that much more cheaper, so frankly I can afford to lose a couple. Man did 'Abercrombie' coming out slow annoy me, though. "Goddammit, Jack! You had one job! ONE! JOB!" EDIT: Screenshots added!
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 25, 2020 3:20:15 GMT -6
Also, we're getting close to Dreadnoughts now. If I can get more than 2 main battery turrets (I can't remember what the tech's called) I think I may be able to lay the first one down before 1905 is out. The technologies you're looking for are 3 Centerline Turrets (c.1903, allows up to three main battery turrets on the centerline), Main Battery Wing Turrets (c.1904, allows wing turrets with heavy guns), 4 Centerline Turrets (c.1906, allows up to four main battery turrets on the centerline), or 5+ Centerline Turrets (c.1908, allows up to seven main battery turrets on the centerline). There is a chance to skip some of these, so you're not guaranteed to develop them in that order, and developing a later N Centerline Turrets technology automatically grants you the earlier ones.
I'm a bit surprised you took Midway; between the North American East Coast, the Caribbean, the North American West Coast, and Southeast Asia you're not exactly hurting for areas where you can fight the USN, and I don't think it's close enough to Hawaii or the Marshall Islands to be used as a staging ground to invade either of them even with fully-developed invasion technology. Still, I suppose at 0 points taking it doesn't cost you anything in either reparations or station tonnage requirements.
Yeah, it was pretty much just because Midway didn't cost anything and nothing else gave me any real advantage. Also, I took Midway mainly just to get some basing capacity in the mid-Pacific. While the US are the only ones who share that zone, it's close to a lot of other sea zones I share with France. It's not that useful, I agree, but eh, didn't cost me anything.
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 24, 2020 12:48:51 GMT -6
The Treaty of Fredericton
An engagement between the American and British fleets on 13/14 July ended inconclusively, with both sides retiring with serious damage during the night.
Meanwhile, a 6in Coastal Battery was completed at Nova Scotia and the ‘HMS Dependence’ completed her conversion, being sent to the Far East to raid American shipping around the Philippines.
‘HMS Rodney’ entered active service, proving easily capable of exceeding her design speed and reaching 19kn in sea trials. After working up, she would be sent to join the British battle line in Canada.
During July, American raiders sank 10 British merchantmen off West Africa, in the Caribbean, and in Southeast Asia. British cruisers all over the Empire were mobilised to respond.
On 24 August, word reached Admiral Wilson in Nassau, New Providence that the American Caribbean Fleet intended to sail within the next few days to bombard British troops in Guantanamo.
Contact was made with the American force at 2319Z on 27 August, but immediately lost with nightfall. While patrolling the channels into Port au Paix, contact was re-established by ‘HMS Cossack’. After a brief exchange of fire, contact was broken off again.
The action was inconclusive, but ‘HMS Leander’ struck a mine while screening ‘HMS Ramillies’ and had to be abandoned. Wilson, judging the area to hazardous to risk more of his ships, withdrew to the north.
September began with the US Government sending peace feelers via France, Denmark, and Argentina, looking for a negotiated peace with no concessions. However, as the army offensive in Canada had turned into a bloody stalemate costing thousands of Canadian lives, the British government refused to negotiate without ‘meaningful’ concessions.
The US merchant marine was suffering heavily from the blockade, and with winter coming, US troops losing the battle at Guantanamo, and the US Navy unable to contest control of the seas, the American Government signed the Treaty of Fredericton on 23 September 1904. Under the conditions of the treaty, the United States had to abide by the decision of an International Arbitration at the Hague over the Virgin Islands fishery dispute, cede the island of Midway to British administration, and pay substantial reparations to the Canadian and British governments. In effect, the Treaty was also the demise of the Monroe Doctrine, establishing the ability of the European powers to bring force to bear in the Western Hemisphere and the inability of the US Navy to combat them.
With the war over, the fleet was redeployed. The North Atlantic Fleet would be permanently based out of Halifax, the ‘Royal Sovereigns’ forming the battleship core of the force for the time being. Much of the fleet was recalled and placed into the Reserve Fleet.
‘HMS Resolution’ joined the fleet alongside ‘HMS Anson’ returning from refit.
In October, design work commenced on ‘HMS Phoenix’, intended to rectify the issues suffered by the British cruiser fleet during the war. With a top speed of 22kn, the ship was based on the ‘HMS Pelorus’’ hull with six 6in guns in a lozenge arrangement, with one gun fore and aft and two guns each abreast the foremost and aftmost funnels, for a broadside of four 6in guns. The design also incorporated ten 4in guns, larger shell stores, and two dedicated fire control stations using the Dreyer system for central firing.
‘HMS Drake’ commissioned into the Navy later that month. Continuing the trend established by the Pelorus and Resolution Classes, she excelled in sea trials and was able to maintain a speed of 22kn. News circulated in naval circles about the ongoing developments with steam turbines, with the new Cunard ocean liners ‘RMS Mauritania’ and ‘RMS Lusitania’ then under construction being slated to use Parsons turbines to make 24kn! Meanwhile, Vickers notified the Admiralty that it had developed a design for a 15in gun, although after the experience with the Royal Sovereign-Class’ gunnery during the war, Admiral Allington was hesitant to condone a new design with such a larger weapon still, when the 12in had already proven so effective. He was also concerned that, while Britain had stolen a march in battleship firepower with the Resolution and King Edward VII Classes, another escalation in battleship firepower might have unfortunate results.
In November, the ‘HMS Phoenix’, ‘HMS Calypso’, and ‘HMS Pallas’ are laid down, both to replace war losses and to round out the four Pelorus-Class cruisers that had initially been intended. ‘HMS President’ joined the Fleet.
In December, it is revealed that Japanese agents stole plans for British armour-piercing shot from various shell manufactories across the country. A formal protest was filed with the Japanese government.
From December, the navy embarked on a refit programme for the Majestic-Class, fitting the new central firing equipment and exchanging the relatively anaemic sub-2in armaments for a single battery of QF 12-pounder 18cwt guns, plating over the casemates in the hull and superstructure to mount them on open deck mounts. ‘Majestic’ and ‘Howe’ would be the first to ships to receive the modifications, ‘Renown’ and ‘Empress of India’ following in January. ‘HMS Good Hope’ joined the fleet. More than a decade after ‘Turbinia’ humiliated the fleet at Spithead, Parsons gave notice to the navy that he was now ready to provide steam turbines suited to the Navy’s requirements.
In the New Years Honours, Rear Admiral Bridgeman was granted the title of Commander of the Bath for his actions in the Battles of Fundy Bay, and the First Naval Lord himself made Viscount of Harwich in recognition of his service.
So, that's the war! I was expecting it to be a lot harder than that, honestly. I only took Midway because it had no points value and it was in one of the only sea zones I don't already have a base in. I could have taken Panama, Guantanamo or Haiti, but given the war was supposed to be over the Virgin Islands (which was still neutral thanks to my ultimatum) the only possession in the Caribbean I really wanted was Puerto Rico, and I only had 4 points. So, I decided to take Midway and get the boost to my economy from the reparations. No one has yet responded to the Resolutions, as far as I know. The Russians have a 16,000ton battleship building, but it hasn't launched yet and I can't get any intel on it. Also, we're getting close to Dreadnoughts now. If I can get more than 2 main battery turrets (I can't remember what the tech's called) I think I may be able to lay the first one down before 1905 is out.
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 24, 2020 10:26:45 GMT -6
The Second Battle of Fundy Bay, 12 June 1904.
On 23 May 1904, the 2nd and 3rd Destroyer Squadrons were sortied to disrupt a US convoy carrying reinforcements and supplies for Guantanamo Bay. After outmanoeuvring the American escort destroyer force, the British ships were able to get in amongst the convoy, sinking eight transports before disengaging with low ammunition. Nine transports did reach the naval base, however, leaving the action inconclusive.
‘Greltoria’ completed her conversion, being recommissioned as ‘HMS Greltoria’ and assigned to patrol the Eastern Seaboard for American merchant shipping. ‘Benbow’ returned to the fleet and was sent to join ‘Royal Sovereign’ in the Maritimes. Anson was brought into the dockyards for refit, fitting the new fire control systems developed by Dreyer. ‘HMS Redoubtable’ was laid down, on the same lines as ‘HMS King Edward VII’.
With the ‘Frederick’ having evaded her pursuers from Montevideo to the Indian Ocean via the Cape, the ‘Cressy’ was ordered through the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean Fleet to join the hunt.
On 12 June 1904, ‘HMS Empress of India’, ‘HMS Royal Sovereign’, and ‘HMS Benbow’ were leading another fleet patrol in the Bay of Fundy. At 1802Z (1402 Local), the Battle Squadron sighted three ships off the Digby Neck and moved to engage. It quickly became clear that Bridgeman had stumbled upon another American invasion force but detached from its escorts.
Around 1827Z, four American battleships appeared from the south, trying to catch up with their transports. Bridgeman ordered his cruisers back to screening duties and turned to engage the new arrivals.
Above: Here we go again...
Once again, Bridgeman successfully crossed the American ‘Tee’, his ships focusing their fire on the leading California-Class battleship. This time, however, his ships struggled to find the range, ‘Empress of India’ taking multiple 12in shell hits. At 1847Z, ‘Royal Sovereign’ finally found the range and hit the lead California-Class with her 6in battery.
At 1851Z, ‘Empress of India’ took a hit to her superstructure, splinters and vibrations destroying one of her rangefinders.
1859Z. Despite absorbing much of the American fire, the British line appeared to be getting the better of the gunnery duel. The American lead battleship hauled out of line with heavy damage while the remaining three turned together towards the British, then again to turn away. After turning in to re-engage, Bridgeman succeeded in bringing the Americans back into close action, though ‘Benbow’ fell behind in the turn.
1930Z. The American line was in disarray. With two of their battleships under fire and isolated from their support, Bridgeman decided to press his attack, ordering his Destroyers forward.
The Destroyers failed to close in and launch torpedoes, but did successfully propel the American fleet into a headlong retreat. With a Michigan and California-Class now completely separated from the rest of the American column, Bridgeman ordered his ships to cut them off, leveraging his higher speed.
2005Z. The Michigan-Class managed to keep up with the British line, engaging in a valiant 3-on-1 gunnery dual at less than 2000yds. The California-Class fell around 3 miles behind.
The two less-damaged American battleships rallied and linked up with the now-battered Michigan-Class, Bridgeman turning his battleships further south to pass on their broadside.
2018Z. The two battlelines re-engaged in a running battle heading south into the open Atlantic off Yarmouth.
2058Z. After 40 minutes of intense close combat in which both sides scored numerous large-calibre shell hits, the American battleships once again turned away, Bridgeman taking his line West to cut off their retreat.
2107Z. The US Ohio-Class battleship was now burning, but Bridgeman was forced to turn slightly to port in order to avoid the American destroyer screen.
2127Z. With his shell stores running low and his line beginning to lag behind the Americans, Bridgeman ordered his ships north. The troop convoy was scattered and half of it was now trapped between Nova Scotia and the British fleet. The US California-Class was also completely isolated and a prime target. The two battle lines passed each other once more in opposite directions, exchanging 12in and 13.5in shellfire one last time before the American fleet retires.
2158Z. ‘Empress of India’ was on fire. The fire would take 30 minutes to extinguish, during which time the British flag ship came under the full fury of the American battleship.
2317Z. Bridgeman managed to bring his battleships abreast the American on either beam, pouring heavy shells into the trapped American warship. ‘Empress of India’ launched two torpedoes from her starboard tubes, but both missed.
0113Z. After two hours of constant bombardment, the California-Class finally came to a dead stop, burning brightly in the night. With the California-Class clearly doomed and her guns silent, Bridgeman brought his battleships to a halt and ceased fire, waiting to try and pick up survivors.
“The enemy had fought with extraordinary skill and valour. Even with the loss of comrades on our side, we could not help but sympathise for our American opponents aboard the California. I resolved we would hold position to take off survivors if any could be found. They had earned as much.”
Above: USS California ablaze and adrift just before the British cease fire.
Sadly, no survivors could be found in the darkness and Bridgeman returned to port, with ‘Royal Sovereign’ flooding. The British fleet slipped into port, battered but victorious, at 0850Z, just as the sun rose over St. John.
The Second Battle of Fundy Bay was a disaster for the US. Only four of the eight transports made it back to port, and the British had sunk the ‘USS California’ and the ‘USS Barry’. In return, the British Fleet had taken no total losses. Even ‘HMS Royal Sovereign’ despite her damage and flooding, would be ready to sail again by the end of the month.
Despite the ‘Royal Sovereign-Class’ ships involved in the battle having superior fire control, ‘HMS Empress of India’ had proven more accurate, with 5.7% of her shells hitting compared to 4.6% for ‘Royal Sovereign’ herself. This was attributed to the 13.5in gun, with had a dramatically poorer effective range. This had, however, been expected.
In strategic terms, the damage dealt to the US Fleet in the engagement was so severe that for the next few months the Royal Navy were able to impose a blockade on the East Coast ports.
In June, ‘HMS Collingwood’ returned from reconstruction and was sent to support Bridgeman’s squadron, despite the issues noted at Second Fundy Bay.
So, that's Fundy Bay Two: Canadian Boogaloo! Well, if the situation was stable before, it's even better now. The US is down to 5 Bs on the East Coast, and three of those are under repair. I genuinely wasn't expecting to fight off another attempted invasion of New Brunswick after the last one. And yeah, the 'Royal Sovereign's' didn't impress massively. I was expecting their range to be poor - after all, that's why the British switched to the 12in gun in the first place - but their accuracy was not great. Nor was the damage, to be brutally honest. I've compared the 12in, 13in, and 14in guns now, and even the 14in Q-1 gun has poorer range than the 12in Q-1, although only just. The 14in makes up for that though in having 2in better penetration and being a bigger shell, plus both the Resolution-Class and King George VII-Class will commission with Central Firing. Once they're out, I think I might switch back to the 12in - at least for the first Dreadnoughts (we're getting close, I unlocked cross deck fire during the last few turns). Once I see what the other powers build to respond to the Resolution, I may have to re-assess that. At any rate, the Royal Sovereigns will probably get sent to the Far Eastern Fleet and the Med to replace the Centurions once the war is over. Assuming they don't get sunk in the meantime!
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 24, 2020 5:57:44 GMT -6
Battle of Fundy Bay, 5-6 March, 1904.
The issues surrounding the performance of the 6in guns of British Cruisers at Ovando Bay were beginning to divide opinion in the Admiralty. Captain Frederic Dreyer suggested that the inaccuracy of the British 6in and 4.7in guns compared to the 4in guns may have been due to the relatively small broadside of most British cruisers. The ‘Pelorus-Class’ had a full broadside of three 6in guns against four 4in guns, which meant the 4in guns had more reference points from which to construct a firing solution – a process called ‘ladder shooting’ – while the 6in gunners often couldn’t construct such an accurate solution due to the impact one or two outlying shell splashes had on a three-gun battery compared to a four-gun battery. Others in the Admiralty argued that the 6in gun was simply excessive and didn’t offer sufficient rate of fire to guarantee hits.
Ultimately, these issues would not be resolved until after the war, but Admiral Allington did commission design studies for two second-class cruiser designs: one with a broadside of four 6in guns and one with two 6in guns but ten 4in guns. As the sub-2in battery had never come into action, this was to be deleted entirely to save weight. Initially, the two ships would be built on the Pelorus-Class hull.
Meanwhile, the strategic situation was in Britain’s favour. British assessments of the endurance of American battleships appeared accurate, as most of the US battlefleet remained at their bases on the Eastern Seaboard, with only a single battleship in the Caribbean against three British battleships and a lone battleship apparently stranded in the Mediterranean, where it was believed even the under-gunned ‘Centurion’ and ‘Repulse’ could manage them.
On 3 March, reports came in that the American fleet would be sailing north, escorting a large troop convoy for an amphibious invasion of New Brunswick. The ‘HMS Camperdown’ and ‘HMS Ramillies’ were put to sea with eight destroyers to patrol the Bay of Fundy and disrupt the US landings. The ‘Calypso’, ‘Constance’, and ‘Comus’ also put to sea to patrol around Grand Manan Island and scout for the battleships.
Contact was established with the enemy at 1212Z (0812 Local Time) on the morning of 5 March. Two vessels were sighted approximately eleven nautical miles South-South-West of the British force, itself seven miles east of White Head Island. Two minutes later, ‘HMS Comus’ signalled the flagship, “lead vessel in column Battleship: California-Class.”
Above: "Lead Vessel in column: Battleship, California-Class"
Rear Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, commanding from ‘Camperdown’, ordered his ships to reduce speed. He was already in the perfect position to cross the American ‘Tee’ and hoped the reduced speed would allow his ships to land hits on the American line on its approach while most of their guns were out of battery. ‘Calypso’ and her companion cruisers were ordered back to screen the fleet.
At 1223Z, it became evident that there were eight transports in two columns proceeding from the west flank of the American battle line. Meanwhile, Bridgeman observed the US battleships turning to starboard to avoid the ‘Tee’ crossing, but were still several thousand yards outside gun range. This suited Bridgeman, who was under orders to sink the transports and not risk his ships without good cause. He ordered the 8th Destroyer Squadron to engage the transports with the cruisers while the rest of the force engaged the American battleships.
Curiously, the American battleships now turned South, leaving the transports vulnerable. Bridgeman later remarked, “It was a most peculiar development. However, as it was to our advantage, I ordered the fleet to pursue and attempt to prevent any change of action by the American commander.”
The two battle lines played a cat-and-mouse game of manoeuvre, until at 1249Z ‘HMS Camperdown’ opened fire on the American line. The Battle of Fundy Bay had begun.
Above: "A Turret, range 12,000 yards! Shoot!" 'Camperdown' opens fire.
The Americans found the range first, with a 6in shell landing just off ‘Camperdown’s’ stern at 1302. Two minutes later, a 6in shell hit one of ‘Camperdown’s’ secondary battery casemates. At the same time, the ‘Ramillies’ successfully landed a hit on the American Ohio-Class battleship second in line with her 12in main guns.
Meanwhile, ‘Comus’, ‘Calyspo’, and ‘Constance’ were engaged with four Bainbridge-Class destroyers escorting the convoy.
At 1307, the American battle line turned together into the British fleet, masking their rear guns. Now Bridgeman’s battleships had an opportunity to inflict serious damage.
At 1319, as the other two American battleships turn away under the British guns, the California-Class in the van instead turns into the British line, coming under a furious bombardment.
The American battleship was now on fire and losing speed rapidly. Only half an hour after the first rounds were exchanged, the first American battleship was in danger of foundering.
At 1330Z, the ‘HMS Calypso’ was hit by a torpedo in the bow, blowing the bow of the ship apart from the forward gun turret forward. She immediately began to sink – the first British vessel to be sunk by enemy action in three-quarters of a century.
1349Z. The American California-Class had successfully extracted itself from the British force, partly as Bridgeman was forced to break off pursuit by the return of the two other US battleship threatening to cross his ‘Tee’. However, Bridgeman was now once again crossing the American ‘Tee’.
1401Z. An American 12in shell slammed into the conning tower of ‘Ramillies’ at a range of 5000yds, destroying the bridge and killing the captain.
1413Z. The Action had closed to point blank range, with only 2200yds separating the two lead battleships. Both sides’ guns exacted a heavy butcher’s bill, but with the American destroyers closing on him, Bridgeman orders his ships to reverse course, turning simultaneously.
Having weathered the turn away, Bridgeman now resumed the broadside engagement from a range of 4700yds.
Meanwhile, the British cruisers had turned or scattered the troopships, Bridgeman ordering them back into support positions for the battleships as the main action intensified once again.
The American Michigan-Class battleship was heavily damaged, her aft 12in gun turret destroyed. At around 1440Z, the Americans once again turned to disengage. However, the California-Class which became separated early in the battle was now at Bridgeman’s rear and the Americans had an opportunity to reform their full battle line. To cut the lone American ship off from its support, Bridgeman ordered a hard turn to the East.
The damage suffered by ‘HMS Ghurka’ during the initial close action two hours earlier finally took its toll, and the ship was ordered abandoned at 1505Z.
By 1616Z, the enemy California-Class battleship had slowed to less than 5kn and was burning heavily, struggling to respond to the thunder of ‘Camperdown’ and ‘Ramillies’ guns. The remainder of the American fleet appeared to have abandoned the field.
At 1646Z, after Bridgeman ordered his battleships to cease fire on the now-helpless American battleship, his destroyers were sent in to finish the ship off with torpedoes, scoring two hits. The destroyers continued to engage even as Bridgeman resumed a patrol route across the Bay to prevent any American return, with the ‘HMS Swale’ scoring a third torpedo hit at 1815Z.
At 1839Z, the American battleship finally slipped beneath the waves. ‘HMS Rother’ was signalled to recover survivors while the rest of the fleet continued their patrol. It wasn’t clear at the time, but this marked the conclusion of the Battle of Fundy Bay.
At around 0300Z, 2200 local time, with night having set in and no sign of the American fleet, Bridgeman ordered the fleet to return to St. John. Several of his ships had taken moderate damage and his battleships had expended most of their ammunition.
Overall, this was a clear victory for the British. Not only had the American invasion failed, but the US Navy had lost one troopship and one of their most modern battleships, ‘USS Nevada’. Meanwhile, the heavy protection of the Majestic-Class had proven itself as both ‘Camperdown’ and ‘Ramillies’ returned to port with mainly superficial damage. An Admiralty inquiry would find that the loss of ‘HMS Ghurka’, while unfortunate, was acceptable and no blame could be attached. The Captain of ‘HMS Calypso’, on the otherhand, was court-martialled and heavily-reprimanded for his failure to take evasive action against an American destroyer which was well-within torpedo range and was allowed to remain there for five minutes! Once again, attention was also directed towards the gun battery of ‘Calypso’, which had failed to inflict much meaningful damage during the pursuit.
Once again, lessons were noted from the battle. The loss of ‘Calypso’ reinforced the concerns regarding the effectiveness of the 6in gun. On a more positive note, much of the damage inflicted upon the American battle line had been inflicted by 12in and 6in armour piercing shells, rather than through fires caused by high-explosive shells. Meanwhile, the heavy armour of the Majestic-Class had proved resilient to American counterfire.
Later in the month, the British fleet in the Caribbean successfully landed marines at Guantanamo Bay without resistance. Meanwhile, British cruisers operating all over the world sank eight American merchants over the course of March, with the American cruiser ‘USS Frederick’ sinking a lone British merchant off the South American Atlantic coast. ‘HMS Aboukir’ and ‘HMS Spartiate’ were dispatched from the North Atlantic Fleet to hunt the ‘Frederick’ down.
Okay, a quick one today. I was not expecting a fleet battle with the Americans so soon, but what I definitely didn't expect was for the US to try an invasion so early in the war, and for the Battle generator to only give them three Bs against my two! Really impressed with how the Majestics stood under fire too. And with Calyspo... yeah, I don't have an excuse for that one. Especially as two turns before she got hit, I noticed the American destroyer which sunk her was really close and didn't act. There was no reason to lose her, except my own stupidity. Speaking of stupidity. What other words can you use for brave-sir-Robin'ing with two Bs, leaving a third to drift into the guns of two enemy battleships, whom you had outnumbered, then turning back to re-engage with your two largely-undamaged Bs on their own with the enemy's equally-undamaged battleships? That really was just giving away an advantage. So, there's definitely nothing wrong with the 6in guns on the Bs. I'm inclined to believe it is a lack of sufficient guns to gain a firing solution which has been hindering the cruisers. As I've said, I've been playing with how to modify the Pelorus-Class hull to fit either more 6in guns or more 4in guns. I think I may still build both ships, because the 4in definitely has its uses. I'm also going to gradually start replacing the 2in guns on many of my ships with 3in guns. The only reason they were there was to represent the sub-2in calibre defence guns the ships had in real life, and they're just not doing anything. If I'm going to have the accuracy penalty for three separate gun batteries, it's at least going to be capable of sinking something. I've also moved two of my battleships from the Caribbean to the East Coast. That last fight was a little too close to fair, and I do not want to fight two invasion campaigns in two separate sea zones. Screenshots added!
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 23, 2020 11:01:58 GMT -6
I take it, then, that in your timeline the ironclad Blanco Encalada was not sunk by a locomotive torpedo at Caldera Bay in 1891 during a civil war in Chile. Chile really had a knack for doing things a lot earlier than Europeans think they were done, don't they? Fixed it.
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 23, 2020 8:44:21 GMT -6
The Anglo-American War Funds were secured for the navy in November by the sale of Jarrow side-drum boiler patents to the German Company F. Schichau GmbH. This exchange was returned later the same month by the sale of design drawings and technical expertise from Krupp for their newly designed 7,6cm naval gun. This would form the basis for the British QF 12-pounder 18cwt, with improved ballistics compared to the preceding 12cwt gun, aided in part by a longer 50-calibre barrel. The techniques developed with the cooperation of Krupp would also help with the design of the QF 4.7in Mark V gun, with a 45-calibre barrel. At the beginning of 1904, during the Annual General Meeting of the Navy League, Admiral Allington commented on the importance of Britain’s cruisers for, “securing freedom of navigation and commerce across the world. Just as the Shannon, Cherub, Phoebe and Endymion did in 1812 through to 1815.” This clear reference to the various successful British engagements of American frigates during the War of 1812 was taken as a blatant insult to the United States. To make matters worse, the decision was made at the end of January to rename the Pelorus-Class cruiser ‘HMS Phoenix’ then under construction to ‘HMS President’ – a reference to the American 44-gun heavy frigate ‘USS President’ captured by ‘HMS Endymion’ in 1815, with the London division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve being renamed ‘HMS Gannet’.
With tensions at a fever pitch, the ‘HMS Spartiate’ was involved in an incident with the ‘USS Rochester’ when the latter attempted to board a British merchantman off Jamaica on 29 January. After signals to haul away from the merchantman, the ‘S.S. County Donegal’ were ignored, Captain Howard Watson of ‘Spartiate’ ordered the ship cleared for action and instructed the gunnery officer to fire a single 3-inch gun 100 yards ahead of the ‘Rochester’, to gain the American cruiser’s attention.
In fact, ‘Rochester’ had indeed noted ‘Spartiate’s’ arrival, and her captain simply ignored her signals. Tragically, however, the ship had quietly been readied for battle, and with ‘Spartiate’s’ general alarm sounding in the distance, one gunner aboard ‘Rochester’ lost his nerve, believing the muzzle flash from ‘Spartiate’s’ 3-inch gun battery to be an attack. Captain Watson recalled later: “We were approaching the American on her starboard side. I’d estimate range to have been about 1000 yards. When I ordered [Gunnery Officer] to shoot a 12-pounder as a warning shot, I could not understand how [the ‘Rochester’] could have failed to notice our approach. When our warning shot splashed ahead, one of the Americans’ casemates opened up on us. Then, all Hell was let loose.”
The first shot by ‘Rochester’ caused confusion throughout the ship’s casemate gun deck, as no one had heard an order to open fire. Several more nervous gun crews, who assumed they’d missed the shoot command or were otherwise convinced they were under attack, also opened fire. Within a matter of seconds ‘Spartiate’ was being raked by 3-inch gunfire. Fortunately, personnel casualties were light as ‘Spartiate’ had already gone to action stations, and ‘Spartiate’s’ 6-inch casemates answered the American fire.
By a small miracle, Captain Richard U. Bellic aboard ‘Rochester’ was able to regain control of the situation and order the 3-inch battery to cease fire as ‘Rochester’ turned away to disengage, hastily signalling the ‘Spartiate’ to cease action. Captain Watson, despite being within his rights and his orders to pursue the action, declines to pursue. “I had every reason at the time to believe the engagement was accidental, as the American ship’s 6-inch battery never turned to engage us.”
The confusion did not end with the skirmish, however. Bellic told a US Navy inquiry that he had not ordered his ship to engage ‘Spartiate’, and that ‘Spartiate’ had fired first. This was technically true. He neglected, however, to mention that the shot from ‘Spartiate’ was a warning shot, and that he had deliberately ignored repeated signals from ‘Spartiate’ which caused ‘Spartiate’ to fire the warning in the first place. Meanwhile, Watson told a Royal Navy board of inquiry that he had indeed fired a single round from his 12-pounders as a warning shot, that the round landed well-away from ‘Rochester’ herself, and that Captain Bellic had refused to acknowledge repeated signals. Now Bellic denied ever receiving the signals and pointed out that ‘Spartiate’ was already at action stations when the engagement began.
Both sides accused the other of causing the incident, with the US Government going so far as demanding the Royal Navy leave the Caribbean. The British Government utterly rejects this demand and, on 8 February, 1904, a message is received by the British Ambassador to the United States, informing the British Government that a state of war now existed between the two nations. British mobilisation was rapid. New harbour facilities were still under construction in the Caribbean, so ‘HMS Camperdown’, ‘HMS Ramillies’, ‘HMS Calliope’, ‘HMS Calypso’, and four of the Ness-Class destroyers were ordered to sail to Halifax in Nova Scotia, in part to prevent or disrupt any American invasion of the Maritimes. Almost every British cruiser outside of the warzone and not on colonial duties was given instructions to “destroy any and all American commercial vessels.” The merchant vessels ‘Dependence’ and ‘Greltoria’ were requisitioned for conversion to armed merchant cruiser-minelayers. The cruisers ‘HMS Constance’ and ‘HMS Carysfort’ were ordered to reinforce cruiser numbers in the North Atlantic, ‘HMS Royal Sovereign’ sent to the Caribbean, and her sister ships ‘Benbow’ and ‘Collingwood’ sent to Portsmouth for new fire control. Preparations were also being made to land troops at the US naval base in Cuba, Guantanamo Bay. Action in Ovando Bay, 1904.
On 11 February, the cruisers ‘Psyche’ and ‘Pelorus’ were sailing in company with 4th Flotilla’s 2nd Destroyer Squadron, consisting of four Ness-Class destroyers trailed by the Derwent-Class destroyer ‘HMS Gala’. Their orders were to sink an American convoy sailing between Guantanamo Bay and Port au Prince. The 6th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of ‘HMS Aboukir’ and ‘HMS Sutlej’ was also in the area, with the 7th Destroyer Squadron and 8th Light Cruiser Squadron (consisting of ‘Conquest’ and ‘Eclipse’). Above: 'Psyche' and 'Pelorus' in company with 2nd Destroyer Sqn. At 1049 Zulu (0549 Local Time), just after dawn, fire was exchanged between 6th Cruiser squadron and enemy vessels. Five minutes later, ‘Psyche’ and ‘Pelorus’ sight four merchants sailing in line astern heading South-South-East and accelerate to engage.
The ‘HMS Teviot’ was sighted approaching the convoy on her own from the East. Knowing that ‘Teviot’ was supposed to be sailing with 7th Destroyer Squadron, Captain Hobart Lawrence of ‘Psyche’ now knew roughly where his Armoured Cruiser support was, and attempted to herd the transport ships (now confirmed as eight merchantmen in two columns) towards the action. At 1110Z hours, ‘Psyche’ sighted two US Navy Chicago-Class light cruisers approaching rapidly from the south, pursuing the ‘HMS Usk’. “Well, Fowler…” Captain Lawrence remarked to his Deck Officer, “it seems we’ve got ourselves a fight.”
Above: American Armoured Cruisers sighted!
Below: US Huron-Class armoured cruiser. With ‘Aboukir’ and ‘Sutlej’ now engaged with the Huron-Class American ships, the action began moving north. Lawrence determined to take his ships astern of the American ships in an effort to pin the American vessels against the British armoured cruisers’ guns. At 1301Z, with the two Chicago-Class cruisers pursuing him and aware that the enemy had drawn him away from the convoy, Lawrence broke off the chase to engage his pursuers and relocate the convoy. The Light Cruiser action went much more decisively for the British, with the 4-inch guns of ‘Psyche’ and ‘Pelorus’ forcing the American vessels back with damage when the Americans closed for melee action. The convoy was once again in Lawrence’s view by 1331Z. The fight became a vicious melee as the British and American cruiser and destroyer squadrons duelled in amongst the convoy ships. Meanwhile, further to the north, one of the American Armoured Cruisers was struck by a British torpedo. At 1419Z, ‘HMS Pelorus’ took a 5-inch shell hit which penetrated her protected deck and caused damage within her machinery spaces, slowing her to 20kn. 1434Z. Lawrence had managed to get ahead of the American cruisers, and now he ordered his ships to turn to port, attempting to cross the American ‘Tee’.
Both ‘Psyche’ and ‘Pelorus’ took a horrendous torrent of 5-inch shellfire, with their 6-inch guns struggling to make reply. 1509Z. ‘Psyche’ began to lose speed, her grates fouled by the constant high-speed running. The American ships were in no better shape, unable to escape the British cruisers.
Over the course of the battle, at least six of the eight American merchant ships had gone down. With the convoy effectively destroyed or scattered, Lawrence now had to option to withdraw. However, with the possibility of sinking American cruisers which could not be replaced, Lawrence chose to continue the action. At 1606Z, Lawrence signalled his destroyers to make close action with the enemy, with his cruisers now in desperate need of an opportunity to clear grates and make good damage done over the past five hours. Two minutes later, a 5-inch shell exploded near the mainmast, splinters killing the spotting crew in the fighting top. At 1657Z, with his ammunition running low and recent reports indicating his armoured cruisers were still engaged, Lawrence gave orders to break off the action as the battle neared the Haitian coast. The Americans did not pursue and the two sides lost contact around 1715Z.
Around 1800Z, ‘Psyche’ sighted a lone US merchantman, likely a remnant of the convoy, crawling away from the reported position of the continuing battle between the armoured cruisers. Lawrence’s squadron diverted to investigate and sink the transport as per his standing orders. With exasperation, the ‘Pelorus’ signalled two ships approaching in line abreast while she collected survivors from the merchantman at 1933Z. Lawrence immediately ordered ‘Psyche’ and his destroyers back to ‘Pelorus’’ position to support, believing the new contacts to be the return of the two US protected cruisers. The two US cruisers were identified but turned away as ‘Psyche’ came into view. Reforming his squadron, Lawrence turned west once more to assist ‘Aboukir’ and ‘Sutlej’.
Contact with the armoured cruisers was re-established around 2030Z, with Captain Lawrence recording,
“Out of the mist in the distance, we could discern three merchant ships fleeing in a disorganised group to the South-East. We could also make out a plume of smoke in the distance which we presumed to be from a fourth, sunk, merchantman. I clapped my glass closed and turned to my gunnery officer, ‘Look over there, John! See those merchants? See that I don’t!’”
By 2203, the remaining US merchants had sunk, and Lawrence began dividing his squadron to rescue survivors. The destroyers escorting the convoy were withdrawing to the south around Punta de Maisi before turning back to engage Lawrence’s lone cruiser, ‘Psyche’. The squadron reformed quickly and Lawrence now found himself chasing the two destroyers north-west along the coast of Cuba. Nightfall at 2300Z finally forced an end to the battle, Lawrence ordering his ships back to New Providence in the Bahamas for repairs and resupply.
In total, twelve American merchantmen had been sunk over the course of the day, with the Chicago-Class ‘USS Raleigh’ having taken heavy damage from ‘Psyche’s’ 4in guns and limping home at half-speed with heavy flooding. ‘HMS Eclipse’ also came under heavy fire from the ‘USS Pueblo’ when she closed in with the US ships to launch a torpedo, with no hit recorded. In all, British ships picked up 363 surviving American sailors from the water, with the American ships picking up an additional 187. 550 sailors had survived in total from twelve merchantmen sunk. It was the biggest loss of American lives since the US Civil War more than forty years previous. Strategically, the Action in Ovando Bay had little impact. Neither side had achieved any conclusive results against the warships of the opposing side, and the merchants were replaced fairly promptly. There were lessons to be learned however. Despite exhausting nearly half their ammunition, neither ‘Psyche’ nor ‘Pelorus’ had achieved any notable results from their 6-inch guns. Indeed, most of the hits which crippled ‘Raleigh’ had been the result of 4-inch shellfire. The 5-inch guns of the American ships had been similarly ineffective, despite being more numerous than the British 6-inch. It was speculated that with more centralised fire control, the 6-inch guns might have proved more useful, and Admiral Allington appears to have taken a similar view. Nevertheless, with the ‘Eclipse’ under repair, Allington authorises her reconstruction, removing two of her 6-inch guns and replacing the six 4.7-inch weapons with twelve 4-inch weapons. The 6-inch guns would be placed under central fire control using the Dreyer system. She would also receive a machinery overhaul to bring her top speed up to 21kn. So, I guess that answers where war was going to start first!
Screenshots will be coming shortly. So much happened during the action, I've got quite a number to go through.
As it turned out, the six-inch guns weren't overly effective at all. Neither were the 5-inch guns on 'Eclipse' or the American cruisers. So, with that information, I'm probably going to bring in some of those cruisers to have their batteries rearranged into a more Town-like configuration, since the 4-inch guns seem to be scoring more hits and more 'effective' hits. I don't think the improved fire control I unlocked last year would have made much of a difference at this stage.
Also, I probably won't post up every battle. As the first engagement in the war, and because quite a bit happened, I decided I show this battle off. I think it's got a certain Heligoland Bight quality about it, even if the action did basically boil down to "two drunks trying to have a slap-fight in the dark, while blindfolded, with spectators deliberately leading them in the wrong direction". (EDIT: Screenshots now added!)
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 22, 2020 12:00:20 GMT -6
HMS Rodney. I know they were hideous. Wash your mouth out Sir, they were, and indeed are lovely. A simple clean design which belies their potency. Ah, that's why they were nicknamed Rodnol and Nelsol!
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 22, 2020 7:53:59 GMT -6
The Caribbean and Albanian Crises, 1903.
Tensions in Europe saw a marked climbdown in September of 1902, prompting a push in Parliament for further social reform based on Seebohm Rowntree’s ‘Poverty, A Study of Town Life’, published in 1901. Efforts by the Admiralty successfully got the consequent budget cuts to the navy scaled back. Meanwhile, developments in submersible craft were approaching a point where several officers were discussing the use of such vessels for coastal and harbour defence. One naval officer, horrified by the potential of submarine craft for commerce raiding, proclaimed that any enemy sailors captured aboard such a craft should be “hanged as pirates”. In the words of the First Naval Lord:
“The capabilities of the submersible craft now being developed here and abroad should not be overstated. The inherent problems with installing steam propulsion aboard such a vessel preclude any possibility of a useful range being achieved at any effective combat speed. Further technological development may change this situation, but for now the ‘submarine’ should not be considered a serious threat, either to our vessels or those of our prospective enemies.”
In November, the first of the new armoured cruisers was laid down as ‘HMS Drake’, with funds diverted back from the construction of ‘Rodney’ to cover her construction. With both the ‘Hogue’ and ‘Euryalus’ now in active service following working up, the Orlando-Class cruisers ‘Orlando’ and ‘Europa’ were recalled to Britain to be placed in ‘ordinary’ (or Reserve).
Above: British Armoured Cruiser 'HMS Drake'.
With tensions continuing to drop, Parliament reduced naval spending further still at the end of November. Meanwhile, naval liaisons from the Imperial Russian Navy extended an offer to purchase designs and technical assistance regarding larger intermediate battery turrets. As this would have allowed the Russian Navy to build its own counters to the Resolution-Class, this offer was rejected on grounds of national security.
Above: Parliament reduces naval spending following much debate. Below: Offer by Russian naval liaisons to purchase Medium-battery secondaries.
Due to the budget cuts inflicted by Parliament, funds had to be redirected from the construction of ‘HMS Resolution’ to balance naval expenditure.
As December 1902 approached, a concerning report crossed Admiral Allington’s desk. Italy had begun construction of a third ‘Vittorio Emanuele-Class’ battleship. Having only just gotten a handle on the ‘cruiser crisis’, Allington was now faced with the problem of trying to maintain the two-power standard as more and more potential foes developed capable battlefleets.
“At present the United States has nine battleships with an additional three building for a total of twelve. Italy has three battleships with a fourth building for a total of four. France and Russia combined have eight battleships with two more under construction for a total of ten. Germany has five with a sixth under construction. We, however, have twelve battleships with two under construction for a total of fourteen, and if only our first-class vessels are taken into account, that total becomes twelve. None of these vessels are a match for the Resolution-Class battleships currently expected in 1904, but at present the two-power standard is clearly untenable without sacrificing our imperial commitments. It would require at least eighteen battleships, with three laying down for the next two years to regain such a position within the next five years, assuming battleship numbers among the other Great Powers do not also increase in the same time.”
Above: Intelligence reports including the report regarding the construction of a third Italian Vittorio Emanuele-Class battleship.
In February 1902, ‘HMS Pelorus’ began her sea trials. During the trials, the ship was found to be easily surpassing her design speed of 21kn, reaching 22kn in speed trials. In March, a civil war broke out in Venezuela, threatening British merchants in Caracas and terminating foreign debts which Venezuela had incurred from the harm brought to European citizens during the country’s previous civil wars. There was insistence that Britain should take action to finally bring order to this chaotic part of the world, but this action was not taken on the advice of the Admiralty as, “The crisis in Venezuela may still be solved by multilateral action, and any aggression on Britain’s part which might infringe on the independence of Venezuela, in turn violating the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, would also certainly serve to provoke the United States.”
Above: The HMS Pelorus returning to Portsmouth following her successful 22kn speed trial.
In March, the keel for ‘HMS Good Hope’ was laid down. She would become the second vessel of the Drake-Class. ‘Psyche’ follows ‘Pelorus’ into service, with the third ship of their class, ‘HMS Pheonix’, being laid down in April.
In May, with funds having been released from the Ness-Class construction programme completing the previous month, Admiral Allington asked the Third Naval Lord to lay down a third ship of the Resolution-Class. However, the Third Naval Lord pointed out that since construction had begun on ‘HMS Resolution’, several advancements in hull construction and materials meant it would now be possible to provide a more efficient design with a lower cost. Sufficient differences developed between the new ship and her half-sisters that when finally laid down in June, ‘HMS King Edward VII’ would be considered her own class.
“Crisis in the Caribbean!” cried the Daily Mail on 3 June, 1903. Fishing disputes between Danish, British, and American ships in the Virgin and Leeward Islands prompted the United States to send three armoured cruisers of the Caribbean squadron into the area to ‘keep the peace’. On 1 June, while ostensibly protecting American fishing boats in the Passage Islands, the ‘USS Rochester’ pursued a Danish fishing boat into the harbour of Christiansted on St. Croix. When a Danish gunboat challenged the ‘Rochester’ to withdraw from Danish waters, the ‘Rochester’ fired a warning shot. Unfortunately, the warning shot landed too close to the gunboat and, as a live high-explosive shell had been loaded, the pressure wave buckled the gunboat’s hull and caused it to capsize after several minutes. Seeing a US cruiser apparently open fire on a Danish warship in Danish waters, the harbour defence batteries engaged the ‘Rochester’ in an hour-long artillery dual before the ‘Rochester’ withdrew.
Eighteen Danish sailors and soldiers were killed, while the ‘Rochester’ suffered three dead and twenty wounded. Both sides accused the other of firing first. The British cruiser ‘HMS Leander’, which had been making a goodwill visit at the time, confirmed to London that the ‘Rochester’ had fired first, although Captain Robert Hamilton expressed that he did not believe the shot to have been intended to cause damage, as ‘Rochester’ had not sounded general quarters and her main 6in battery was still in line for cruising.
Matters were not helped by the battleship ‘USS Arizona’ arriving later in the day and demanding the Danish forces on the island demilitarise the coastal gun batteries on St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. Jan. When the Danish governor in the West Indies point blank refused, he asked the British consul to provide assistance. As the ‘Rochester’ had attempted to impound a British fishing boat the week before, an agreement was made that ‘Leander’, ‘Pandora’, ‘Arethusa’, and ‘Phaeton’ would protect Danish interests in the Caribbean as well as the British vessels.
Such was the situation on the morning of 3 June. While the government in London was none-too-pleased that the Crown Governor in the Leeward Isles and the consulate in Christiansted had committed British military resources to the Danish defence of the West Indies, it was recognised that backing down at this stage would be both humiliating and could allow the US to gain strategic control over the islands. As such, the decision by the Governor-General was upheld by official orders from the Admiralty early on 4 June:
“To: Commander-in-Chief, North American Station
From: First Naval Lord, London
His Majesty’s Government has consented to the request issued by the British and Danish Governors of the Leeward Isles and Danish West Indies respectively. You are thereby authorised to engage in the protection of merchant and civilian vessels belonging to the Kingdom of Denmark as well as those of the United Kingdom within the vicinity of the above-mentioned territories. The Admiralty reminds you that current government policy is to pursue peaceable relations with the United States, and so it is desired where possible that no action is entered upon which might lead to conflict insofar as the above-mentioned orders allow.
Admiral George Allington, First Naval Lord, Chief of the Naval Staff.
Date: 4 June 1902, 05.42Z”
Meanwhile, a diplomatic communique was sent to the United States government via both the US Embassy in London and the British Embassy in Washington, notifying the United States that Britain was prepared to protect all shipping in the Virgin Islands and calling on the United States to accept international arbitration. The call for arbitration was accepted by the US, but only grudgingly, and negotiations throughout June were poisoned with acrimony and suspicion.
‘HMS King Edward VII’ was laid down later in June, while plans were made to send the Majestic-Class battleships ‘Renown’, ‘Empress of India’, ‘Ramillies’, and ‘Camperdown’ to the North American Station with a force of more modern armoured and protected cruisers to relieve the ‘Leander’ as a contingency for war. A flotilla of destroyers, including the first four Ness-Class vessels was also dispatched. The overall force was placed under the command of Admiral Arthur Wilson as the North Atlantic Fleet.
As July arrived, negotiations and arbitration at the Hague steadily seemed to show promise. Several proposals were put forward to resolve the tensions, but when it was suggested that the US be granted rights for largely symbolic ‘neutrality patrols’ in the Virgin Islands, the Royal Navy reaction is hostile.
“Our nation’s security on the sea depends on our right to freedom of navigation. The US has been know to reinterpret treaties between our two nations in the past, and it is entirely foreseeable that these ‘symbolic’ concessions may not be seen as such by the Americans, but as a blank cheque to establish dominance in the entire Caribbean. If the United States wishes to take a seat at the table of Great Powers, then it must follow the rules of the Great Powers, not the other way around.”
Meanwhile, Commander Frederic Charles Dreyer presented to the Admiralty a mechanical computer designed to calculate the various changes in range, roll, and pitch affecting gunfire, allowing firing of the guns to be accurately controlled from a central location by a series of speaking tubes to the guns themselves. While still in its early development, smaller and simpler versions of what would become the Dreyer Fire Control Table intended to reduce the workload on gunnery officers began to see favour with the Admiralty, with the ‘HMS Royal Sovereign’ receiving the new equipment between August and November.
In August, another crisis hit the Great Powers – this time in the Mediterranean. Tensions in Albania erupted into war, with the declaration of Albanian Independence from the ailing Ottoman Empire. The French government, without consulting the other Great Powers, proclaimed that it would protect Albanian independence and demanding the Ottoman Empire withdraw its forces.
Coming as it did on the back of the Caribbean Crisis and the Chatham Affairs, Admiral Allington knew it would not be wise to go to war with France while his best battleship forces were currently spread out across the western hemisphere. He therefore advised the government to call together the European Congress (an informal international system consisting of the main European Great Powers, born from the Congress of Vienna at the end of the Napoleonic Wars) and attempt to build an anti-French, pro-arbitration coalition to prevent the French gaining access to the Eastern Mediterranean.
The resulting Treaty of London (1903) saw Albania granted semi-autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire under the protection of Italy and Austria-Hungary. The French, infuriated at being cut out of the settlement, recalled their forces from Albania.
With tensions with France now rising, and the situation with Italy having stabilised, ‘Majestic’ and ‘Howe’ were recalled to home waters to deter from the French threat in early September.
Author's Notes: Okay, so this is a thing. Two escalations towards war with two separate countries in two separate sea zones. Yay!
So, here's what tensions look like:
I've reduced intel efforts against everyone but France and the United States. I'm not going to end up at war with Italy, Germany, or Russia without at least one month's warning, and Japan's even less likely. But war with either France or the United States is looking imminent, and the possibility of war with both isn't exactly remote.
With that said, how do my odds look against France and the US?
Well, France have two more battleships in Northern Europe than I do, but 'Majestic' and 'Howe' are on their way back from the Med and 'Royal Sovereign' will return from refit soon. If I can delay war until next year, I'll also have 'Resolution' and 'Rodney' available. That should give the French a fright!
Cruisers and destroyers are not an issue in Europe right now, though I don't know what the Yankies think they're playing at.
In the North Atlantic:
Well, I'm over my base cap in the Caribbean, but I'm building up the bases, so I should be fine as long as war doesn't break out in the next few months. Worst case scenario, I send the Battle Squadron to the Canadian coast with one of the Cressys. The protected cruiser in North America is on FS, but I decided to put four of the Derwent-Class destroyers there to reduce the load on the Caribbean ports and to make sure I had some destroyer support already in place in the area, since I only have 8 medium-range destroyers right now and the Derwents won't be able to redeploy if war does break out. Best to have them where they're going to be needed now and not need them, than need them where they aren't and not have them. That, admittedly, made more sense in my head.
Feedback is welcome. I'd also like some thoughts on the format: would you prefer more or fewer screenshots of the in-game events, for example?
|
|
|
Post by babylon218 on Oct 21, 2020 10:31:16 GMT -6
The End of an Era
At the beginning of 1901, the strategic situation for the Royal Navy was less than ideal. Tensions in Europe were rising in the wake of the breakdown of the 1900 Hague Conference. In the Mediterranean, the ‘HMS Centurion’ and ‘HMS Repulse’ were accompanied by the first-class cruisers ‘HMS Diadem’ (Blake-Class), ‘HMS Cressy’ and ‘HMS Ariadne’ (Cressy-Class), and ‘HMS Andromeda’ (Orlando-Class), as well as the now-third-class cruisers ‘HMS Leander’, ‘HMS Champion’, and ‘HMS Comus’. This force, which would be formally designated the Mediterranean Fleet in February, was matched against the Italian battleship ‘Benedetto Brin’, the Armoured Cruisers ‘Vettor Pisani’, ‘Marco Polo’, ‘Carlo Alberto’, and ‘Giuseppe Garibaldi’, the two Protected Cruisers ‘Marsala’ and ‘Nino Bixio’, and a force of twenty-two destroyers.
All four British first-class cruisers compared at least somewhat favourably to their Italian counterparts, though there were concerns about ‘Diadem’s’ lack of belt armour as a protected cruiser, but the Leanders were not considered suitable for fighting the ‘Marsala’ and ‘Nino Bixio’, even in a three-against-two engagement, on account of their slow speed and relatively-poor armament. Individually, the ‘Benedetto Brin’ was superior to each of the Centurion-Class battleships, but both vessels together was considered sufficient to handle the lone Italian battleship until the two Italian ‘Vittorio Emanuele-Class’ battleships entered service – expected in 1903.
The cruiser situation was difficult to resolve however, as the only second-class cruisers available were the ‘Carysport’, ‘Constance’ and ‘Cleopatra’ of the Astraea-Class, and the ‘Eclipse’, ‘Canada’, ‘Conquest’ and ‘Cordelia’ of the Eclipse-Class, all of which were needed against the German and Russian cruiser forces in the North Sea in light of the rising tensions. None of the first-class cruisers could be dispatched either, as in this department Russia had a superior force at its disposal.
The destroyer situation could be handled satisfactorily, however. Eight destroyers were dispatched to the Mediterranean to form the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla.
In response to what Admiral Allington was increasingly referring to in internal memos as the ‘cruiser crisis’, the DNC was requested to devise a new protected cruiser design based on the Eclipse-Class. Requirements were limited to a speed of at least 21kn.
‘HMS Empress of India’ commissioned into the Royal Navy at the end of January 1901, just days after her namesake Queen Victoria, royal sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the longest-reigning monarch in the nation’s history, died. Her eldest son, Albert Edward, Prince of Wales and her grandson the German Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II, were at her deathbed. Victoria’s reign had seen the expansion of the British Empire to become the greatest the world had ever seen, upon which the ‘sun never set’. It had been an era of technological, industrial, and social transformation. It had been an unprecedented period of peace between the Great Powers of Europe, often called the ‘Pax Britannica’. It was an era that now came to an end.
Above: The Funeral Procession for Queen Victoria, 2 February 1901.
The Queen-Empress had passed just as a banking crisis forced Salisbury’s government to impose currency controls to avoid a run on the Bank of England. Several large-scale businesses and factories in North West England collapsed almost overnight. As a result, Salisbury’s Unionist government was compelled to bring in a series of Public Works programmes and social reform as the Labour movement gains momentum. Inevitably, some of the money to finance these schemes was to be diverted from the naval budget. In an effort to minimise the impact on the navy, Admiral Allington suggested that the government encourage poor relief through several non-conformist charities such as the Quakers.
Despite the budget cuts, and the shock of the Queen’s death, February would nevertheless see construction work begin on the new second-class cruisers ‘HMS Calliope’ and ‘HMS Calypso’ to the improved Eclipse design. The Calliope-Class was armed with four 6in guns, placed in pairs in shielded deck mountings on the fo’c’sle and quarterdeck. This maximised end-on firepower while maintaining a three-gun broadside at most angles. The six 4.7in guns fitted to the Eclipse-Class were retained. Speed increased to 21kn, at significant cost, resulting in displacement increasing from 5,600 tons to 5,800 tons. In terms of economy, the class was criticised for its reduced armament, given the cost of one Calliope-Class was £21.7mn compared to just £20.4mn for an Eclipse-Class. It was well-understood in naval circles that this cost increase came from the increase in speed from 20kn to 21kn, leading to arguments that the cost was not justified for the sake of one extra knot of speed, especially as they sacrificed an actual three-gun 6in broadside for a theoretical one. With the Third Naval Lord, Rear Admiral Arthur Wilson, coming under fire in the press, Allington released the following statement to The Times:
“The challenge given to the Controller and his department was to provide a cruiser of the second class with a top speed no less the 21 knots within the shortest space of time and lowest cost which could be reasonably achieved. The responsibility for any deficiencies in the Calliope-Class will be mine, and mine alone.”
Above: British Calliope-Class Protected Cruiser
Admiral Wilson would be sent to command the Channel Squadron in March, being given the ‘HMS Majestic’ as his flagship. Meanwhile, Allington ordered work to begin on a larger cruiser to a new design with the aim of laying the new ships down the following year.
In June 1901, the DNC informed the Admiralty by memo that his department was prepared to develop destroyers, “with a displacement greater than 500 tons, we suppose with a limit at this stage of no more than 600 tons.” Meanwhile, perplexed looks were exchanged between the various Naval Lords and aides-de-camp at news that the United States had ordered construction of two new battleships, ‘USS California’ and ‘USS Nevada’, from French shipyards. Word also arrived of the details of the new Italian battleship ‘Italia’ under construction. Armed with four 11in guns and twelve 7in guns, the news was received with a mix of relief and concern. Combined with their comparatively weak armour, these ships could probably be contained by just the two Centurions with a Royal Sovereign of Majestic in support. On the other hand, this was the third new battleship design the British had learned of armed with 7in guns as opposed to 6in guns. The DNC was confident that British battleships could be built with an intermediate battery of 8in guns, but this would have to wait until 1902.
Above: Internal memorandum by DNC to Admiralty Below: Intelligence reports concerning US battleship construction
Above: Italian Vittorio Emanuele-Class Battleship 'Italia'
In July, the Vickers-Armstrong company approached the Admiralty with a design for a new 14in gun of superior characteristics to the 13.5in weapon aboard the Royal Sovereign-Class.
Above: Vickers advertisement for their 14inch 40-calibre naval gun.
The international economic situation improved markedly in September.
Above: Economic forecast, September 1901
With the ‘Aboukir’ and ‘Bacchante’ due to launch in November, October saw the DNC present the design for the ‘Pelorus-Class’ second-class cruiser to the Admiralty. Armed with six 6in guns in an arrangement similar to the Calliope-Class but with two guns positioned on either beam amidships to restore an absolute 3-gun broadside with certain angles presenting a four-gun battery. Weight savings and improvements in shipyard and design efficiency also allowed a larger shell store on a 6,000 ton displacement. The six 4.7in guns were replaced by eight 4in guns for a superior rate of fire and to ease spotting given the similar shell splashes produced by 4.7in and 6in shells. The 4in guns were also approximately 100 tons lighter than the six-gun 4.7in battery. To improve engine efficiency, a third funnel was added.
Above: Early design drawings for Pelorus-Class.
Around the same time as the arrival of the two Cressy-Class ships, the DNC further notified the Admiralty that his department believed they could mount guns as large as 10in as an intermediate battery on new battleships.
Above: Internal memo from DNC regarding larger secondary batteries.
In November, reports from agents within the French Navy indicated the French were running at a high budgetary deficit, suggesting France would not be able to maintain her current rate of construction. The month also sees ‘HMS Pelorus’ and ‘HMS Psyche’ laid down at Chatham.
Above: Intelligence reports on French Naval finances.
With the arrival of December, Allington authorised design work to commence on a new class of destroyer to operate with the Far Eastern and North Atlantic fleets. The new class would be the ‘Ness-Class’, seeing an increase in 100 tons displacement for improved range and 4in guns in place of the 3in weapons.
Above: Early design drawings for the Ness-Class Destroyer
1902 began with the ‘Chatham Affair’, as a French Agent was captured at Dover attempting to board a ferry home to France. In his possession were documents and drawings related to the construction methods of the battleship ‘Camperdown’ and the cruisers ‘Hogue’, ‘Pelorus’, and ‘Psyche’. Unfortunately, it quickly emerged that these only represented a portion of the intelligence which he and an accomplice had gathered at the Chatham Royal Dockyards. Worse, his accomplice had already arrived in France with the second portion of the stolen documents. Overall, it was estimated around two years-worth of British developments in hull construction had been stolen. Despite the best efforts of the security services, the press inevitably got wind of the affair, forcing the Foreign Office to release a statement condemning the French espionage and demanding the documents’ return along with the agent who had smuggled them to France in the first place. The French rejected the demand, calling the accusations “ridiculous” and claimed the agent arrested in England was “a florist from Tourville, with no connection to the Republic’s government,” demanding his release and accusing the British of fabricating the affair to escalate tensions.
Meanwhile, the first four ships of the ‘Ness-Class’ were laid down as Vickers announced an improved version of the 9.2in BL gun used on the navy’s armoured cruisers. The BL 9.2in Mark X gun had an increased barrel length of 46.7 calibres, greatly increasing muzzle velocity and by extension range and penetration.
Above: Vickers advertisement for the BL 9.2in Mk.X.
In February, the battleships ‘HMS Camperdown’ and ‘HMS Ramillies’ entered service.
With the recent developments in gun design and the belief by the DNC that a battleship could be designed with such a heavy intermediate battery, Admiral Allington requested a design on the following specification in March:
• Main battery armament of four 14in guns.
• Intermediate battery of at least eight 9.2in guns.
• An increased defensive battery of 4.7in guns.
Above: Early design specifications for the Resolution-Class battleship.
In April, an official in the Italian Navy boasted to the press how new Italian designs were being drawn up “based on design studies acquired from the British”. The Admiralty denied having given such expertise to the Italians, and it became very clear that Italian agents had broken into the Manager, Construction Department’s (MCD) office at Chatham and stolen several working-drawings for designs proposed over the past few years by the DNC but which had been rejected by the Admiralty at the last moment. The second security breach at Chatham in a year, a much more rigorous security regime was ordered, and strict orders were issued for designs to only be passed from the DNC to the Dockyards once construction had been officially authorised. Plans were also put in place for the covering of the drydocks adjacent No.1 Basin (Docks No.5-8) in order to conceal any following battleships under construction. Yet again, the affair leaked to the press and a formal denunciation of Italian intelligence operations was issued.
With tensions with Italy rising further, the Battleships ‘HMS Majestic’ and ‘HMS Howe’ were sent to the Mediterranean to reinforce ‘HMS Centurion’ an ‘HMS Repulse’ alongside ‘HMS Aboukir’, ‘HMS Cordelia’, ‘HMS Canada’, and four more destroyers to reinforce 3rd Flotilla. Admiral Jackie Fisher was placed in command of the now-formidable Mediterranean Fleet. Construction began on 9.2in coastal batteries at Malta and Gibraltar.
Confusion further abounded at the Admiralty in May when agents in France were able to send details of the US California-Class battleships then being constructed. The designs puzzled the Admiralty as the specification contained nothing that seemed to be outside the scope of American shipwrights.
Above: US Battleship 'USS Colorado'.
June saw the laying down of the ‘HMS Resolution’, a 16,500 ton battleship armed with four 14in guns in two twin turrets, with an intermediate battery of eight 9.2in MkX guns in four twin twin turrets (two on either beam), and sixteen 4.7in casemated guns for anti-torpedo boat defence. She was larger and more heavily-armed than any other battleship in the world.
Above: British Resolution-Class Battleships.
In July, the Italian immigrant baker Leonardo Silviano was arrested within the Chatham Royal Dockyards. On his person were an early ‘Kodak’ photographic camera and annotated sketches of ‘HMS Resolution’ in the still-uncovered No.5 Dock. Upon further investigation, it was revealed that Mr Silviano was actually Tenente di Vascello (Ship-of-the-line Lieutenant) Giuseppe Brazziri, formerly naval attaché at the Italian Embassy in London. The Admiralty announced the arrest in hope of dissuading any further espionage at Chatham and restoring confidence in naval security. More diplomatic recriminations followed. ‘HMS Rodney’ was laid down the next week at Devonport, supposedly to keep her being subjected to any further Chatham security breaches. In fact, it had already been planned to build ‘Rodney’ at Devonport to avoid disrupting the covering of the docks at Chatham and also because the ships were approaching the limits of what the Chatham dockyards could handle.
As July closed, the ‘HMS Euryalus’ left Pembroke Dock to join ‘HMS Hogue’, which had launched the previous May. Following ‘Euryalus’ out of Pembroke were the ‘HMS Calliope’ and ‘HMS Calypso’, heading out for sea trials.
In August, four more ‘Ness-Class’ destroyers were laid down and design work began on a new first-class armoured cruiser to counter the Russian ‘Bayan’ and ‘Rossiya’ Classes. To be based on the Cressy-Class, these ships would receive four of the new 9.2in guns, which could penetrate the armour of the Russian ships. It was desired to keep costs down, however, and so the new ship could be no faster and no greater in displacement than the preceding ships.
Above: Russian Rossiya-Class Armoured Cruiser Below: Russian Bayan-Class Armoured Cruiser
While design work on the new cruiser progressed, Allington ordered the large budget reserves freed up by the commissioning of the three cruisers the previous month be partially diverted to accelerating the construction of ‘Resolution’ and ‘Rodney’ until the new cruiser design was ready.
August would also see the coronation of King Edward VII, following surgery for appendicitis which could have claimed the life of the second British monarch in eighteen months! In honour of the new King, Admiral Allington made plans for the next battleship laid down to be named ‘HMS King Edward VII’.
|
|