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Post by RNRobert on Jan 25, 2015 18:32:37 GMT -6
I like Battle of Britain (my favorite scene was with the Polish pilots) and Das Boot (the best sub movie ever, IMHO). I saw The Cruel Sea on TV many moons ago) I also like the following:
Tora Tora Tora Midway (saw it when it came out in the theaters when I was 12; loved the Sensaround, thought they could have dispensed with the love story) The Gallant Hours (starring James Cagney as Halsey during the Guadalcanal campaign) Run Silent, Run Deep Operation Pacific We Dive at Dawn (a British WW2 sub movie)
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 23, 2015 21:50:51 GMT -6
Prior to WW2, the Japanese based their strategy on the "decisive battle." This strategy no doubt was influenced in great part by their two previous wars, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Both of those conflicts were won by the Japanese after winning a decisive naval battle against their opponents (Yalu River in the former war, Tsushima in the latter). Of course, this strategy was based on battleship fleets slugging it out, and ironically the Pearl Harbor attack meant that the decisive battle would never be fought as the Japanese planned. If any battle of the Pacific War could be considered the "decisive battle," my vote would be for the Guadalcanal campaign. The Japanese had been hurt badly at Midway, but the Imperial Japanese Navy was still a force to be reckoned with (as they would demonstrate in the waters of Ironbottom Sound), and the US Navy was still operating with limited resources (and with the Allies Germany-first strategy, the upcoming North African landings had priority). The Guadalcanal campaign was the last chance for Japan, not to win the war (which was well-nigh impossible), but to seriously hurt the American effort before the flood of new planes and ships coming out of American factories started arriving. Had the Japanese won the battle for Guadalcanal, they might have had several months in which to strengthen their defenses before the Americans were able to return to the offensive, making the war that much longer and costly. In the end, both sides were bled white, but the Americans were able to make good their losses, while the Japanese could not. More importantly, Japan frittered away the last of their experienced carrier aircrews in this campaign. While the IJN would venture forth a year and a half later with new carriers and new planes at the battle of the Philippine Sea, its pilots were nowhere near the quality of those who began the war (which is why the battle became known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot). After Guadalcanal, the Japanese were permanently on the defensive. The battleships would continue to swing at their anchors, awaiting the "decisive battle" that never came, and finally being committed when it was far too late to affect the outcome. Parshall and Tully have an interesting essay on their Nihon Kaigun website that discuss the reasons why Japan didn't commit more BBs to the Solomon Islands campaign -in short- oil, or lack thereof. The essay can be found at this link. In the hypothetical scenarios contained in the compressed folder (which I created by simply editing the existing Second Guadalcanal scenario), the Japanese decide to commit their battleships to the campaign, and Admiral Lee's battleships have a tougher fight on their hands. Scenario 1 features the Yamato added to Admiral Kondo's squadron, and Scenario 2 features the Ise and Hyuga (I got the idea from Parshall and Tully's site; on the page for these two ships, they suggested they be sent to Guadalcanal rather than being turned into hybrid battleship-carriers). Scenario 3 has the Yamato's sister Musashi as well (please be advised that I created this scenario just now on the spur of the moment by tweaking the Alt 1 scenario; I wasn't able to test it as I'm writing this on my MacBook, so let me know if it there's any problems with it). BTW, even though the Japanese outnumber the Americans in this fight, it is still an uphill fight. The American battleships can blind fire thanks to their F2 radar, which gives them a great edge. In the two times I played the Alt 2 scenario as the IJN, both Ise and Hyuga were rendered combat ineffective before they even made contact with an American ship. For a more challenging fight, play as the USN with radars off. SECOND GUADALCANAL HYPOTHETICALS.zip (4.64 KB)
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 20, 2015 19:01:30 GMT -6
The attached zip file contains the following two hypothetical scenarios: Cape Engano: On 25 October 1944 during the battle of Leyte Gulf, aircraft from Halsey's 3rd fleet savaged Admiral Ozawa's carrier force. His battleships were almost within gun range, when he received word that the jeep carriers were desperately fighting off Kurita's fleet, and broke off to head south. In this scenario, Halsey's battlewagons get to engage Admiral Ozawa's force, including the battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga. Surigao Strait Alt 1: The hybrid battleship-carriers Ise and Hyuga are used to bolster Admiral Nishimura's force, instead of operating with Admiral Ozawa's bait fleet. Leyte Gulf hypotheticals.zip (2.12 KB)
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 13, 2015 19:42:42 GMT -6
On 25 October 1944, Admiral Oldendorf's old battleships (most of which had been raised from the mud of Pearl Harbor) crossed the 'T' of Admiral Nishimura's force, annihilating it in the last battleship action in naval history. Admiral Shima with a smaller force of cruisers and destroyers arrived a short time later, but decided to retreat rather than face certain death (although he still lost a light cruiser and two destroyers). The USN is side 1, and the IJN side 2. For the Japanese, divisions 1 and 3 are Nishimura's force (placed closest to the US forces), and divisions 2 and 4 represent Shima's force, placed near the bottom of the map). You can experiment with placing Shima's divisions closer to Nishimura's, to see if it would have improved the odds any. Some of the Allied ships are left out due to size limitations, and also partly for play balance.Due to the lopsided nature of the scenario, recommend setting the AI to aggressive when playing the Americans. When playing the Japanese side, treat it as a death ride, trying to sink as many Americans ships as possible before being wiped out. SURIGAO STRAIT.txt (7.7 KB)
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 11, 2015 18:54:11 GMT -6
Helo aerosfan and welcome to the forum!
Welcome to the forums!
Please email Chris Dean (NWS owner) at "nws-online(@)nws-online.net" [please remove the ( ) from the address] with your WC:NAW serial number, he can email you an updated version that can be patched through the forums here.
Thanks!
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 6, 2015 7:15:52 GMT -6
Just played through the Bismark battle on easy. Major brit victory. The Hood did rather better than in real life.....
The Bismark suffered devastating fire from Hood, resulting in a flash fire. The Prince Eugen then ran. I think the course of the war will now be different....
For those of you waiting for Hood to blow up, be advised. The shot that, in real life killed her, is what we called in the military "a golden BB". Yes, Holland set the conditions up by his faulty maneuvers, as did the Admiralty who built her, but the shot was a one in a million. In all the games over the years, that depicted that encounter, I've never had Hood actually blow up. This reminds me of when I played the Denmark Strait scenario in Fighting Steel years ago. I had the Prince of Wales blow up early in the battle, leaving the poor Hood to slug it out with the German ships alone (she survived, but was badly damaged).
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 4, 2015 12:35:27 GMT -6
That is an Army M5 High Speed Tractor circa 1942. It was manufactured by International Harvester from May 1942 through May 1945. It carried a .50 caliber MG on the gun ring on the starboard side, ammunition storage for 56 105mm or 24 155mm rounds. It had a range of about 150 miles, maximum speed was 30mph. The follow-on M5A1 had an enclosed cab. Thanks for the input!
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 4, 2015 12:04:58 GMT -6
While vacationing in Arkansas last September, I toured the Arkansas Inland Maritime Museum, located in North Little Rock on the Arkansas River. The centerpiece of the museum is the USS Razorback, a WW2 submarine that served until the 1970s, then went on to serve for 30 years in the Turkish Navy as the Muratreis, making her one of the longest continuously operational subs in history. The best part was, when the staff found out I was a former sub sailor, they waived my admission, and allowed me to go in places that were normally off limits to tourists, including the conning tower and bridge. You can see my photoset here. Here's a picture of me (not in the set) up on the bridge:
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 4, 2015 11:45:47 GMT -6
Last September I was vacationing in Arkansas, and while their I toured the National Guard Museum at Camp Robinson, just north of Little Rock. They had an interesting display of military weapons and other artifacts. You can see my photo set here. BTW, among the vehicles and guns on display (including a Sgt York SPAAG) was this vehicle that did not have a sign identifying it. Can anyone here help me identify it?
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 2, 2015 20:27:46 GMT -6
About a dozen years ago, Michael Emmerich created a mini-campaign for Fighting Steel titled "Operation Fernost" (Fernost is German for "far east"). You can download the Fighting Steel scenarios and their descriptions here. Operation Fernost is a hypothetical campaign. The German high command is disenchanted with their surface fleet following the loss of the Bismarck in 1941, and upon the attack on Pearl Harbor, agree to a Japanese request to send some of their units to the Pacific. The scenarios involve the German forces evading British patrols in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans (while taking on an occasional convoy) until rendezvousing with Japanese warships in the Pacific. The remaining scenarios involve operating with Japanese warships against the USN (including participating in some of the historic battles of the Guadalcanal campaign). I realize the premise is rather far-fetched. Even if the Germans agreed to such a scheme, the logistical difficulties in getting into the Pacific would be formidable. Additionally, the Japanese might have found it difficult to provide the spare parts and ammunition that would be needed to keep the Kriegsmarine ships operational. However, a couple months ago, I decided just for the heck of it to port the scenarios over to WC-NAW. In all of the scenarios, Side 1 is the Axis side, and side 2 are the Allies. I should also point out that there are some differences between Fighting Steel and WC-NAW that make for some difficulties when converting from the former to the latter: Battles 1 through 4, 6, and 9 should be disengagement type battles (In Fighting Steel, there were disengagement missions where one side earned victory points for successfully breaking off contact with the enemy). Therefore, in playing these scenarios in WC-NAW, I recommend setting AI aggressiveness to high when playing the Germans, and low when playing the Allies. Battles 5,7 8, 10 were convoy missions. However, in WC-NAW, there are no merchantmen, so these scenarios are simply straightforward battles. Finally, the Wickes-40 DDs portraying the APDs in Battle 14 are slightly more powerful than the APDs in Fighting Steel (four 3" guns instead of three, and they carry torpedoes, which the APDs did not). I edited the scenario to reduce their speed (since they were slower than the un-modified Wickes class DDs), and I doubled their point value to reflect their value as troop transports. The attached zip file contains all 15 scenarios, plus the overview and scenario descriptions from Michael Emmerich's website. OPERATION FERNOST.zip (15.98 KB)
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 1, 2015 15:05:06 GMT -6
On September 5, 1942, three Japanese destroyers of the "Tokyo Express" surprise and sink two APDs, USS Gregory and USS Little off Guadalcanal. The skipper of the Gregory, LCDR Harry F. Bauer, received a posthumous Silver Star for this action. I used the Wickes-40 to represent the APDs. They are a bit more heavily armed than the APDs were, but the odds are still in favor of the IJN. LUNGA POINT.zip (534 B)
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Post by RNRobert on Jan 1, 2015 13:34:21 GMT -6
Artrx,
If you download the scenario packs, there are three tutorials - one for WW1 and two for WW2.
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Post by RNRobert on Feb 11, 2014 7:20:18 GMT -6
Update: After consideration, I wonder how we answer the question: "When did commanders realize the carrier was more important than the battleships". The standard answer is Pearl Harbor. That's silly, because Taranto should have been the convincing operation. The Fleet Problems conducted by the US and Japan along with other nations, the table top exercises; all of these games finally showed us how vulnerable surface ships actually were to a concentrated air attack. The real issue is that those were games, not necessarily accurate in their depiction of actual combat. It wasn't until Taranto, Pearl Harbor actually showed navies, what 21 inch torpedoes and 1000, 2000 lbs. AP bombs could do, that it was finally realized how dangerous carriers and their air wings actually were.
The problem with Taranto and Pearl Harbor is that both attacks were against moored targets (which are much easier to hit than ships that are underway), plus both attackers had the advantage of surprise (the Italians weren't expecting a night-time air raid, and the Pearl Harbor defenders were in peacetime mode). The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse showed that aircraft could sink battleships that were at sea and maneuvering at high speed (although the attack was carried out by land based bombers, and not carrier planes). I think the operation which showed the strength of the carrier was the battle of the Coral Sea, where the battle was waged by carrier planes, and the combatant warships never made direct contact.
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Post by RNRobert on Feb 10, 2014 20:16:54 GMT -6
I have a book from 1943 titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team" and what I find interesting is that even though at this time carriers had proved their potential, the author still saw the battleship as the primary naval warship, and considered the cancellation of the Montana class to be a serious mistake. Even at that late date, the battleship was still considered the queen of the fleet, remarkable isn't it. We can't blame the Japanese for Yamato, since we should have known better. The Montana's would have been worthless. At least we had to good sense not to build the Montanas...
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Post by RNRobert on Feb 10, 2014 17:25:50 GMT -6
I would posit that the Guadalcanal campaign was the "decisive battle" of the Pacific War, although the Japanese didn't realize it. The IJN, despite losing four flattops Midway, still was a formidable force. The USN was still recouping from Pearl Harbor. We only had four operational carriers in the Pacific at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign, and of these, Wasp and Hornet would be sunk, Saratoga would be damaged and take no further part in the campaign, leaving only Enterprise available by the end of the year, and herself in a damaged state. On the other hand, the Japanese frittered away what was left of their carrier aviators, a loss from which they never recovered. Both sides suffered heavy losses in cruisers and destroyers as a result of the night actions in the waters of the Solomons (and the Japanese lost two of their older battleships to boot). However, the US was able to make good their losses, and the Japanese were not, which meant that the tide swung inexorably in favor of the US. I cannot disagree with you. It was the decisive operation of the Pacific War.... and with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight we now know that. Unfortunately decisive operations and battles are not recognized until the history is written. For the Japanese, it did not seem to be the decisive battle.
Update: After consideration, I wonder how we answer the question: "When did commanders realize the carrier was more important than the battleships". The standard answer is Pearl Harbor. That's silly, because Taranto should have been the convincing operation. The Fleet Problems conducted by the US and Japan along with other nations, the table top exercises; all of these games finally showed us how vulnerable surface ships actually were to a concentrated air attack. The real issue is that those were games, not necessarily accurate in their depiction of actual combat. It wasn't until Taranto, Pearl Harbor actually showed navies, what 21 inch torpedoes and 1000, 2000 lbs. AP bombs could do, that it was finally realized how dangerous carriers and their air wings actually were.
I have a book from 1943 titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team" and what I find interesting is that even though at this time carriers had proved their potential, the author still saw the battleship as the primary naval warship, and considered the cancellation of the Montana class to be a serious mistake.
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