Post by edrotondaro on Mar 16, 2017 20:55:51 GMT -6
Hi gang:
I present to you a review of Osprey’s Duel title 67 “Spitfire II/IV vs Bf109F Channel Front 1940-42” by Tony Holmes (Osprey Publishing 2017). It offers some fascinating insights to the constantly evolving technical and tactical nature of the war in the air during WWII, in this case over Northwest Europe.
In many respects, this book is a sequel to one of the earliest Duel titles, number 5 “Spitfire vs Bf 109” by the same author that covers the two classic fighters during the Battle of Britain. What is fascinating is to see how the roles of the two planes became reversed and how a few simple changes to both planes changed the outcome of this confrontation.
As with all Duel titles, the design and development of the two protagonists is detailed along with their technical specifications and the overall strategic situation at the time being covered. The combatants, in this case RAF and Luftwaffe pilots are compared in terms of training and tactics. Then the contests are detailed usually in chronological order. This particular campaign took place hard on the heels of the end of the Battle of Britain, at least as the British term it which is October 31st. 1940.
For Britain it was a chance to go over to the offensive after its desperate struggle against the Luftwaffe during the Blitz. For Germany it was a chance to regroup and prepare for the invasion of Russia. Both sides began to roll out new versions of their state of the art fighters. It is interesting to note that the Fighter Command’s Air Chief Marshal, Sir Sholto Douglas was opposed to taking the war to the Germans based on his experiences in WWI, but reluctantly gave in to his higher ups. The main reason was that the Luftwaffe had begun a far more successful daylight tactical campaign using fighter bombers (Jabos in German) to conduct tip and run attacks at dawn and at high altitudes where the 109 had superior performance to the Spitfire and Hurricane fighters. The RAF countered with a variety of operations designed to attack the Luftwaffe in France and to more importantly draw out the German fighters in a war of attrition. While Britain no longer was in danger of invasion and Fighter Command was no longer in danger of losing planes and pilots that could not be replaced, the war of attrition would play out in Germany’s favor. The reason? The new Bf 109F or “Frederich” in German parlance (Germans loved to have nicknames for lettered equipment, be it gun turrets on battleships or various marks of aircraft. Not sure what this says about them as a military nation?).
If I had to pick two aircraft that were almost evenly matched at least at the beginning of their careers, it would be the Spitfire and the ME-109. Both had in-line liquid cooled engines that gave them high speeds and good rates of climb. Both featured powerful armament with the German bird having cannons as well as machine guns. Both had short ranges and were designed more for the air superiority interceptor role than for long ranged operations. The British fighter was at its best at low to medium altitudes and could outturn just about anything short of a Japanese Zero. The German plane could out climb and out dive its opponent and had a slightly higher top speed and much superior performance at high altitude. What is interesting to learn is that the Spitfire with its legendary Rolls Royce Merlin engine went from an initial horsepower rating of 1,000 to a final rating of 2,300 while still retaining the same overall displacement of 26 liters. The performance increases came from increasing fuel octane and increasing the performance of the supercharger that came with the design.
The Bf 109F was on the drawing board in 1938 and was intended to wring the utmost performance out of an already superlative fighter. The new Daimler-Benz DB 601E engine gave the fighter 1,350 horsepower at 17,750 feet. The whole plane benefited from streamlining and airframe refinements. Indeed, the Frederich was considered the penultimate version of the fighter as well as the most esthetically pleasing to the eye. It was the favored mount of Germans highest scoring aces, especially Eric Hartman. Ironically it had the least amount of firepower with only twin 7.92mm machine guns and in certain models a 15mm cannon, all nose mounted. The guns carried a decent amount of ammo, but pilots such as Adolf Galland, who later rose to command all Luftwaffe fighter pilots, complained about the decrease in firepower versus the old E (Emil) model which had three 20mm cannons plus the MGs. He had custom armed versions made for him with 13mm MGs and a new 20mm cannon. The final F model incorporated the new 20mm cannon which became one of the war’s great aircraft weapons.
The V model of the Spitfire was a compromise to replace the intended III model which had a complex two stage supercharger that proved difficult to manufacture. It had three variants depending on the wing installed. Each wing offered a different firepower option. The VA had the standard 8 .303 Browning machine guns while the B had 4 MGs and two 20mm Hispano cannons. The VB would prove to be the most numerous model of the Spitfire produced. The C model had a new universal wing that speeded up production and could be configured with all MGs, or twin cannons and MGs or finally four 20mm cannons. This heralded the final armament of all British piston engine fighters as well as its first jet, the Meteor I.
The RAF flew numerous offensive sorties codenamed “Rhubarbs” (small groups of fighters to attack targets of opportunity), Circuses (bombers heavily escorted by fighters to entice German fighters to attack) and Rangers ( a large fighter sweep intended to destroy German fighters). While the missions gave the RAF plenty of operational experience, it would result in a 4 to 1 kill ratio in favor of the Luftwaffe. And then consider that the Germans had only two Jagdgeschwader (JG) with 250 planes total opposing as many as 300 to 500 Spitfires. On some missions, as many as 15 squadrons (300 fighters) were tasked with escorting no more than 12 bombers! The Luftwaffe rarely had more than half its total fighters in service at any given time, yet they still savaged the RAF. Why?
First off, the roles had been reversed. It was the Brits who had the long flight at the end of their endurance facing fresh German aircraft who if shot down probably had a chance of recovering the pilot over friendly territory. An extensive radar net was now warning the Germans just as the Chain Home stations had done for the British in 1940. And finally there was pilot skill.
This was the time of the “Experten”, the Luftwaffe’s term for its high scoring pilots. Keep in mind these men had been in combat since 1939 and some were already aces from the Spanish Civil War days of the Condor Legion. Galland, Molders, Priller and others made up their ranks and they were probably the best damn fighter pilots in the world (including their erstwhile Japanese allies). While Britain produced some notable aces during this time period, none came close to equaling even the lowest of these aces in kills scored. On the subject of scoring claims, this book goes a long way to shattering some of the foolishness of the Battle of Britain claims. The RAF went into this campaign in the mistaken belief that they had shot down hundreds of German fighters during the BoB. It turns out the RAF actually took far heavier losses in terms of fighters than the Luftwaffe. The actual losses versus claims are also a laugh. The RAF claimed 775 fighters in 1941. German actually lost 236, only 103 in actual combat. By contrast the two JGs defending France claimed 950 aircraft while the RAF admitted to 849 that year. At least the Germans were more accurate. It wasn’t until Rolf Pingel (27 kills) crash landed in Britain that the RAF finally got an idea how inflated their claims were, despite Germany being able to maintain operations in the face of supposed terrible losses. The RAF scoring got better during the war, but inflated claims seem to bedevil just about every combatant (although Germany was less prone to this). By the end of 1942, it was clear that the RAF had been severely mauled in the Channel offensive and with the advent of the new FW-190, the battles shifted over to this very advanced aircraft while the ME-109 started going after American bombers at high altitude.
This is a superb book for both the development of two legendary fighters and the battles that marked the point before the American daylight bombing offensive began. It is highly recommended to anybody who loves planes in general and these two iconic fighters in particular.
I present to you a review of Osprey’s Duel title 67 “Spitfire II/IV vs Bf109F Channel Front 1940-42” by Tony Holmes (Osprey Publishing 2017). It offers some fascinating insights to the constantly evolving technical and tactical nature of the war in the air during WWII, in this case over Northwest Europe.
In many respects, this book is a sequel to one of the earliest Duel titles, number 5 “Spitfire vs Bf 109” by the same author that covers the two classic fighters during the Battle of Britain. What is fascinating is to see how the roles of the two planes became reversed and how a few simple changes to both planes changed the outcome of this confrontation.
As with all Duel titles, the design and development of the two protagonists is detailed along with their technical specifications and the overall strategic situation at the time being covered. The combatants, in this case RAF and Luftwaffe pilots are compared in terms of training and tactics. Then the contests are detailed usually in chronological order. This particular campaign took place hard on the heels of the end of the Battle of Britain, at least as the British term it which is October 31st. 1940.
For Britain it was a chance to go over to the offensive after its desperate struggle against the Luftwaffe during the Blitz. For Germany it was a chance to regroup and prepare for the invasion of Russia. Both sides began to roll out new versions of their state of the art fighters. It is interesting to note that the Fighter Command’s Air Chief Marshal, Sir Sholto Douglas was opposed to taking the war to the Germans based on his experiences in WWI, but reluctantly gave in to his higher ups. The main reason was that the Luftwaffe had begun a far more successful daylight tactical campaign using fighter bombers (Jabos in German) to conduct tip and run attacks at dawn and at high altitudes where the 109 had superior performance to the Spitfire and Hurricane fighters. The RAF countered with a variety of operations designed to attack the Luftwaffe in France and to more importantly draw out the German fighters in a war of attrition. While Britain no longer was in danger of invasion and Fighter Command was no longer in danger of losing planes and pilots that could not be replaced, the war of attrition would play out in Germany’s favor. The reason? The new Bf 109F or “Frederich” in German parlance (Germans loved to have nicknames for lettered equipment, be it gun turrets on battleships or various marks of aircraft. Not sure what this says about them as a military nation?).
If I had to pick two aircraft that were almost evenly matched at least at the beginning of their careers, it would be the Spitfire and the ME-109. Both had in-line liquid cooled engines that gave them high speeds and good rates of climb. Both featured powerful armament with the German bird having cannons as well as machine guns. Both had short ranges and were designed more for the air superiority interceptor role than for long ranged operations. The British fighter was at its best at low to medium altitudes and could outturn just about anything short of a Japanese Zero. The German plane could out climb and out dive its opponent and had a slightly higher top speed and much superior performance at high altitude. What is interesting to learn is that the Spitfire with its legendary Rolls Royce Merlin engine went from an initial horsepower rating of 1,000 to a final rating of 2,300 while still retaining the same overall displacement of 26 liters. The performance increases came from increasing fuel octane and increasing the performance of the supercharger that came with the design.
The Bf 109F was on the drawing board in 1938 and was intended to wring the utmost performance out of an already superlative fighter. The new Daimler-Benz DB 601E engine gave the fighter 1,350 horsepower at 17,750 feet. The whole plane benefited from streamlining and airframe refinements. Indeed, the Frederich was considered the penultimate version of the fighter as well as the most esthetically pleasing to the eye. It was the favored mount of Germans highest scoring aces, especially Eric Hartman. Ironically it had the least amount of firepower with only twin 7.92mm machine guns and in certain models a 15mm cannon, all nose mounted. The guns carried a decent amount of ammo, but pilots such as Adolf Galland, who later rose to command all Luftwaffe fighter pilots, complained about the decrease in firepower versus the old E (Emil) model which had three 20mm cannons plus the MGs. He had custom armed versions made for him with 13mm MGs and a new 20mm cannon. The final F model incorporated the new 20mm cannon which became one of the war’s great aircraft weapons.
The V model of the Spitfire was a compromise to replace the intended III model which had a complex two stage supercharger that proved difficult to manufacture. It had three variants depending on the wing installed. Each wing offered a different firepower option. The VA had the standard 8 .303 Browning machine guns while the B had 4 MGs and two 20mm Hispano cannons. The VB would prove to be the most numerous model of the Spitfire produced. The C model had a new universal wing that speeded up production and could be configured with all MGs, or twin cannons and MGs or finally four 20mm cannons. This heralded the final armament of all British piston engine fighters as well as its first jet, the Meteor I.
The RAF flew numerous offensive sorties codenamed “Rhubarbs” (small groups of fighters to attack targets of opportunity), Circuses (bombers heavily escorted by fighters to entice German fighters to attack) and Rangers ( a large fighter sweep intended to destroy German fighters). While the missions gave the RAF plenty of operational experience, it would result in a 4 to 1 kill ratio in favor of the Luftwaffe. And then consider that the Germans had only two Jagdgeschwader (JG) with 250 planes total opposing as many as 300 to 500 Spitfires. On some missions, as many as 15 squadrons (300 fighters) were tasked with escorting no more than 12 bombers! The Luftwaffe rarely had more than half its total fighters in service at any given time, yet they still savaged the RAF. Why?
First off, the roles had been reversed. It was the Brits who had the long flight at the end of their endurance facing fresh German aircraft who if shot down probably had a chance of recovering the pilot over friendly territory. An extensive radar net was now warning the Germans just as the Chain Home stations had done for the British in 1940. And finally there was pilot skill.
This was the time of the “Experten”, the Luftwaffe’s term for its high scoring pilots. Keep in mind these men had been in combat since 1939 and some were already aces from the Spanish Civil War days of the Condor Legion. Galland, Molders, Priller and others made up their ranks and they were probably the best damn fighter pilots in the world (including their erstwhile Japanese allies). While Britain produced some notable aces during this time period, none came close to equaling even the lowest of these aces in kills scored. On the subject of scoring claims, this book goes a long way to shattering some of the foolishness of the Battle of Britain claims. The RAF went into this campaign in the mistaken belief that they had shot down hundreds of German fighters during the BoB. It turns out the RAF actually took far heavier losses in terms of fighters than the Luftwaffe. The actual losses versus claims are also a laugh. The RAF claimed 775 fighters in 1941. German actually lost 236, only 103 in actual combat. By contrast the two JGs defending France claimed 950 aircraft while the RAF admitted to 849 that year. At least the Germans were more accurate. It wasn’t until Rolf Pingel (27 kills) crash landed in Britain that the RAF finally got an idea how inflated their claims were, despite Germany being able to maintain operations in the face of supposed terrible losses. The RAF scoring got better during the war, but inflated claims seem to bedevil just about every combatant (although Germany was less prone to this). By the end of 1942, it was clear that the RAF had been severely mauled in the Channel offensive and with the advent of the new FW-190, the battles shifted over to this very advanced aircraft while the ME-109 started going after American bombers at high altitude.
This is a superb book for both the development of two legendary fighters and the battles that marked the point before the American daylight bombing offensive began. It is highly recommended to anybody who loves planes in general and these two iconic fighters in particular.