AAR Writing- how *not* to.

[garrisonchisholm]

Well!  I've just finished the longest thing I've ever written in my life, and I learned a lot.  While it is fresh in my mind, I thought I would make a couple points.

1)   As my good friend director advised, "play ahead."  Many times in this story I got to a point where I had to pause and think, "well wait a minute, how am I going to make this work now?"  If you play your game at least 18 months out from your writing then you can narrate events so-as to take advantage of opportunities which you might not expect-  for instance, my fortuitous realization that Alex's harsh deriding of England for re-seizing New Zealand had occurred exactly 12 months before England pulled out of the alliance; instant cause and affect.  You also avoid a pace-killing flashback piece to retroactively explain something; i.e. the colonial addition of the Dominican Republic.

2)   If you create a character and put him on stage, be prepared to use him.  I discovered that having come by the quasi-comical invention of Minister Kleeburg, if I did *not* use him later in the story it left his whole introductory episode with rather a "what's the point?" air.  If you breathe life into someone, you are responsible for that life.  - don't leave them lost and future-less like Commodore Hoffman and the Praga (Did he go to sea again?  Was he censured?  Did he resign?  Take up a pro-bowling career?).

3)   At a certain point you will need to decide, "Am I recording a chronicle, or telling a story?"  If recording a chronicle, the classic AAR, you are more able to simply go turn by turn with the brass tacks of what the game is giving you.  The game provides the entertainment with you as its conduit.  Once you commit to telling a story, you reach another new level of responsibility; to entertain and not disappoint (I hope I did more of the former and less of the latter!).

4)   On a personal note, I have discovered a surprising tendency in regards to writing in serial format.  I have noticed that *far* too often I have reused the Same word within the same paragraph instead of (per grammar protocol) a synonym.  I can't quite explain why this happened, but I bet I could find a dozen examples in the PLC AAR, the most egregious of which I went back to correct.  An awareness of your writing is crucial, and a 30 minute pause before posting to give you a proper last re-read is most beneficial.

5)   DON'T COMPOSE ON A WEB-PAGE!!!!!!!!!   See my chapter on the end of the Great War for explanation.  Compose in a word doc, and save often.


Those are my immediate observations of this.  -  I am very thankful for the hundred-or-so who seemed to be following the work, and while I'm at it let me say it wouldn't have happened without director 's Byzantium as inspiration.  However!  Let's keep this thread to the art of AAR writing.  Anything you learn, know, or observe that could help future authors, feel free to post it here.    Cheers!

[oldpop2000]

I would suggest to all, that the group develop a standardized format for Naval After Action Reports. I can go to DTIC and see if they have the format for actual AAR or I can provide locations for real WWII AAR as a guide. Just an idea.

[cv10]

A big +1 to everything garrisonchisholm

I'll add my two cents in for what its worth:

#1: Make sure that AAR writing fits in with how you like to play: One of the reasons that my China AAR went belly-up is that delaying my game to write the AAR did not really work with how I like to play (rushing through till the dreadnought era). As such, it was hard for me to really enjoy that China game, and it was one of the reasons that I let it die. In contrast, my SAI AAR is alive and kicking (I've been on vacation, it will resume once I return) is that AAR writing is much more compatible with my SAI playing style (slow and deliberative).

#2: Use a common heading for each major content post: I think director and garrisonchisholm did this well, and I've tried to incorporate this into my SAI AAR. Having a standard heading for each major entry really makes an AAR look sharp and helps the reader find the major bits.

#3 Imgur is an AAR writer's best friend: Imgur makes it really easy to organize pictures and place them into an aar (copy the bb code). Each turn of my SAI AAR has its own album. You just have to be careful not to ticker with them too much after you create the,. A picture is indeed worth a thousand words, and sometimes a picture of an event is far superior to a paragraph explaining what happened. This applies in particular in this game, as we are dealing with naval actions. A picture of the decisive moments can really bring an AAR to life.

[parrot]

I think my Ottoman semi-aar-forum-game-sort-of-thing has been a bit awkward in the way I've told the story (but good fun for all involved, I hope!). The ability to play ahead is obviously very limited: the pace of the story is determined by the arbitrary (in a certain sense) marker of when I order new ships. Maybe a good idea would be to really make the format more interactive, story-wise? People can introduce characters and help shape things based on what has transpired in-game. Have some people take a political role and some a ship-designing role? That might get around the fact that I was a bit unsure of how I wanted to do things. There was one fairly in-depth section of story telling (the coup & associated stuff), while the rest of it was mainly just some background stuff to give a bit of flavour. Then of course the write-ups of battles, given the game we're playing. I haven't introduced a single actual character by name (beyond two historical Sultans, almost in passing) in the whole thing because of the reason you've given: I'm unlikely to actually use them more than once in the story. The post about the coup probably could've done with some more names and faces, as I think it was half-written in the same way as the rest of what I'd done, despite being a more in-depth personal thing.

And yes, having lost more than one long post which I've had to write again from scratch: use a word processor and save regularly. Or at least ctrl+c what you're writing as you go!
I can also recommend imgur for your images. It's free and easy.

[garrisonchisholm]

Jul 7, 2017 16:34:09 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

I would suggest to all, that the group develop a standardized format for Naval After Action Reports. I can go to DTIC and see if they have the format for actual AAR or I can provide locations for real WWII AAR as a guide. Just an idea.

You know that sounds pretty interesting- I bet there was just a blank form that a commander would pull out of a drawer and fill out.  Probably different for each service branch of course.

[parrot]

Jul 7, 2017 23:35:27 GMT -6 garrisonchisholm said:

Jul 7, 2017 16:34:09 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

I would suggest to all, that the group develop a standardized format for Naval After Action Reports. I can go to DTIC and see if they have the format for actual AAR or I can provide locations for real WWII AAR as a guide. Just an idea.

You know that sounds pretty interesting- I bet there was just a blank form that a commander would pull out of a drawer and fill out.  Probably different for each service branch of course.

It'd be interesting to see, but I don't think it'd be particularly useful in this context. AARs here (and for most games) more often than not involve a significant story-telling element. Even if we disregard the parts outside of the battles, reports on combat tend to be given more as a story meant to entertain than a full factual recreation of events.

Having said that, I could probably benefit from a bit more rigour in writing about my battles!

[director]

In stage work it is referred to as 'Chekhov's Gun' - if you make a point of showing a gun in Act 1, then at some point that gun gets fired.

My advice is to play ahead - a long way ahead - if you are telling a story. If you are just showing off gameplay then you can take it as it comes, but if you have a tale to tell then you need to know what happens so that you can shape the arc. It would not do, for example, to tell it from the point of view of a submarine officer if you don't build any subs.

The more planning you do the happier you will be. Write down the main characters and some keys to their characters. Write down important facts (such as where the naval bases are). You may not use the information, but if you use it once and then need it again it can be painful to comb through pages and pages trying to find it. The better you understand your world and the people in it, the better you can convey it to the audience. It can be embarrassing to have a character's hair color or even name change... readers do notice.

One thing I enjoy is the challenge of weaving the game events into the narrative. Sometimes you can use a really strange one, or put enough spin on it and make it work. But - for me - the story matters above all and the game provides color. I stuck to the game and game events pretty closely in 'Byzantium' because it was intended for an audience that needed to be persuaded to buy the game. Hence, lots of 'showing off' the game mechanics and play.

I insist on composing in Word. I write, put it aside, re-read in a day or more and edit. Then once I copy-paste it on the website I re-read and re-edit - things look different on the webpage.


I don't use a lot of pictures - I am more text-oriented. But I did use a 'common header' for 'Byzantium' so that readers could easily tell what was 'official text' as opposed to casual comments. I like it - I didn't use that before but I likely would in the future.

[oldpop2000]

Jul 7, 2017 23:35:27 GMT -6 garrisonchisholm said:

Jul 7, 2017 16:34:09 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

I would suggest to all, that the group develop a standardized format for Naval After Action Reports. I can go to DTIC and see if they have the format for actual AAR or I can provide locations for real WWII AAR as a guide. Just an idea.

You know that sounds pretty interesting- I bet there was just a blank form that a commander would pull out of a drawer and fill out.  Probably different for each service branch of course.

I will post some AAR's from WWII battles from Hyperwar but get on DTIC and see if they have any suggestions on AAR. I know the Army Historical Center does, I think.

[babylon218]

Jul 7, 2017 23:35:27 GMT -6 garrisonchisholm said:

Jul 7, 2017 16:34:09 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

I would suggest to all, that the group develop a standardized format for Naval After Action Reports. I can go to DTIC and see if they have the format for actual AAR or I can provide locations for real WWII AAR as a guide. Just an idea.

You know that sounds pretty interesting- I bet there was just a blank form that a commander would pull out of a drawer and fill out.  Probably different for each service branch of course.

I have actually read WWI After Action Reports from the Suffolk Regiments at the Battle of Arras, 1918.  They literally are a stance form file out by the CO detailing to conduct of an action, casualties, objectives, etc.  But they tend to vary in detail from just basic facts to detailed explanation.

[garrisonchisholm]

Jul 8, 2017 8:44:23 GMT -6 babylon218 said:

Jul 7, 2017 23:35:27 GMT -6 garrisonchisholm said:

You know that sounds pretty interesting- I bet there was just a blank form that a commander would pull out of a drawer and fill out.  Probably different for each service branch of course.

I have actually read WWI After Action Reports from the Suffolk Regiments at the Battle of Arras, 1918.  They literally are a stance form file out by the CO detailing to conduct of an action, casualties, objectives, etc.  But they tend to vary in detail from just basic facts to detailed explanation.

Hmm.  Probably depending upon how much time the CO cared-to/was-allowed-the-leisure-to invest in it then.

[babylon218]

Okay, here's what a WWI British War Diary (the British Army's term for an After Action Report) looked like:




You can go on the National Archives website and they have all the war diaries digitised and available to view for about £3 or for free to read at the National Archives in London.  I would not personally use this as a model for writing a forum AAR, but I could see them being useful as 'sources' for a wider AAR (possibly an excerpt from the force commander's log?).

[garrisonchisholm]

I can't tell you how much I love that because of the divisional rugby reference. 6th Welch must have been on form!

[oldpop2000]

Here is the Enterprise report on the Halsey-Doolittle Raid, I have provided the link if that is better. www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv6-Tokyo.html

Halsey-Doolittle Raid: Bombing of Tokyo
Action Report: USS Enterprise (CV-6)
Captain G.D. Murray to Admiral Chester A. Nimitz
and
1st Endorsement by Adm. Halsey

CV6/A16-3/(60-Br)
( 088 ) U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

23 APR 1942

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Via: The Commander Carriers, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of action in connection with the bombing of Tokyo on April 18, 1942 (Zone minus Ten).

Reference: (a) Articles 712, 874, U.S. Navy Regs, 1920.

Enclosures: (A) Track Chart.
(B) Executive Officer's Report.
NARRATIVE:
At 1232 (VW) April 8, 1942 this vessel stood out of Pearl Harbor in company with Task Force Sixteen, consisting of Enterprise (Flagship), Northampton, Salt Lake City, Balch, Benham, Fanning, Ellet and Sabine, under the command of Vice-Admiral W.F. Halsey,jr., U.S.N., Commander Carriers Pacific Fleet, for operations not disclosed at the time. After landing the Air Group aboard south of Oahu, a westerly, and then a northwesterly, course was set that took the Task Force 30 miles southwest of Nihoa Island. This course (310°T.) was continued with slight modifications until 0600 (Y) April 13, when a rendezvous was effected with Task Force Eighteen in Latitude 38°-00' North, Longitude 180° 00'.

Task Force Eighteen consisting of Hornet, Vincennes, Nashville, Gwin, Grayson, Meredith, Monssen and Cimarron became part of Task Force Sixteen. At this time information was disseminated to the Task Force that it would proceed to a point approximately 500 miles east of Tokyo where 16 Army bombers, (B-25) carried on the flight deck of Hornet, would be launched for an attack on the Tokyo area. Course 265°T. and speed 16 knots were then set. Except when bad weather prevented, continuous inner and intermediate air patrols were maintained during daylight and dawn an dusk search flights were conducted daily to 200 miles, 60° on each bow.

Fueling of the heavy vessels was undertaken April 17 when about 1,000 miles east of Tokyo and was barely completed when the wind increased to gale force (wind south, 35 knots; sea rough, visibility 1-2 miles). At 1439 (L) the 2 CV, 3 CA and 1 CL proceeded independent of accompanying DD's and AO's on a westerly course, averaging approximately 20 knots.
On April 18, the day it was planned to reach the 500 mile circle from Tokyo at about 1600, Enterprise launched the usual dawn search flight and combat patrol. These were maintained continuously throughout the day. The contacts and action, indicated on the track chart by capital letters, were reported by pilots of these flights. Times indicated in connection with contacts and action, April 18, are Zone minus 10.

At 0310 radar disclosed two enemy surface craft bearing 255°T., distance 21,000 yards, and at 0312 a light was seen approximately on that bearing. Ship went to General Quarters, set Material Condition Afirm and energized the degaussing gear. Course of the Force was changed to 350°T., and at 0341 the two enemy vessels went off the screen bearing 201°T., distance 27,00 yards. Our presence was apparently unnoticed by the enemy and a westerly course was resumed at 0415.

At 05008 fighter patrol and search flight were launched. At 0715 one search plane returned and, by message drop, reported sighting an enemy patrol vessel in Latitude 36° 04' North and Longitude 153° 10' East at 0558 and that he believed he had been seen. later developments indicate that this vessel made the original contact report.

At 0744 an enemy patrol vessel was sighted bearing 221°T., distance approximately 10,000 yards. There was no doubt now that our force had been detected and almost certainly had been reported. Nashville was ordered to sink the patrol vessel by gunfire as the carriers turned into the wind (320°T., 26 knots); Hornet to launch Army B-25's for attack and Enterprise to relieve patrols. The first Army bomber was launched at 0820 approximately 650 miles from Tokyo, a last one was off at 0921. At 0927 the Force commenced retirement on course 090°T., speed 25 knots.

At 1214 radar reported enemy patrol plane bearing 0207deg;T., distance 70,000 yards. This plane came within 64,000 yards of our force but passed off the screen at 1228 bearing 314°T., distance 83,000 yards.
At 1400 two enemy patrol vessels were sighted and attacked by Enterprise planes returning from search. One was sunk and the other damaged. By 1413 the enemy ship still afloat was in sight of our surface forces and Nashville was ordered to attack and sink her. A white flag was broken in the enemy ship and after taking 5 prisoners, Nashville sank her by gunfire. Apparently these two vessels were the same ones reported by radar 0310.

At 1503, 6-B-4 was forced to land in the water, near the Disposition, due to engine failure. This plane is believed to have sustained damage to its engine from the antiaircraft machine gun fire of an y patrol vessel attacked. Nashville rescued personnel, uninjured.

No further contacts were made. All aircraft were recovered at 1739 and the retirement continued.
Bombs and ammunition were expended as indicated in the table below.

.50 Cal. .30 Cal. 500 lb. bombs 100 lb. bombs
VB 800 300 8 18
VS 800 500 4 6
VF 11,000 --- - -
12,600 800 12 24

COMMENT:
The track chart, Enclosure (A), is drawn to the scale of H.O. chart No. 528, in order to best present an illuminating picture of the whole strategic area, including the objective. An enlargement of the action area is presented as an insert.
The numerous enemy contacts may give the impression that the Task Force unfortunately encountered an isolated patrol. No such assumption should be made. On the contrary, the variety and the number of patrol craft seen is a strong indication that a heavy patrol in depth is general, at least to the east of Honshu and the Kurils. This patrol probably utilizes hundreds of small craft of various types and extends 700-800 miles offshore. All y surface patrol craft are undoubtedly equipped with effective radio and apparently all are armed with machine guns. Some are camouflaged with two-tone mottled coloring. Evidence supports the belief that they are not equipped with radar.

Of interest is the weather broadcasting vessel fixed by shore RDF on April 15 in Latitude 44° 00' North, Longitude 162° 00' East -- 500 miles from the Kurils, 750 miles from the Aleutians and 1200 miles from Tokyo.

The Japanese surface patrol is particularly suited to their eastern sea frontier and is unquestionably effective. Were it equipped with radar, it could be made almost impenetrable with fewer units. In certain areas, a radar equipped small boat patrol would seem to have some advantages over long distance air patrols as we maintain them; primarily in that it is on station at the critical distance, night and day. Such a patrol might detect an attempted afternoon and night run in by a raiding force when an air patrol would not pick it up. Favorable areas in which we might use such a patrol are: Costa-Rica-Galapagos-Ecuador, off southern California, off Cape Mendocino and off Vancouver Island. A combination of surface craft and aircraft patrol should reduce the number of aircraft now maintained in specific areas and thus make possible a wider distribution of the aircraft now available.

Although specific information is lacking, it is believed that the Japanese patrol craft are not armed with anything larger than machine guns. Therefore, if future bombing raids on Honshu, similar to this one, are planned it might be advantageous to send one of more of our submarines in advance of the raiding force to "soften", by destruction and dispersal, the enemy patrol in the 600-800 miles belt across its line of advance. At this distance it seems unlikely that the enemy would take strong anti-submarine measures.

A further suggestion is that two submarines, equipped with radio apparatus similar to that installed in aircraft and in carriers, might be disposed in a selected area and by conducting lost plane procedure effectively draw enemy forces away from the area from which an aircraft raiding attack might be launched. As a means of harassing the enemy, even though no actual aircraft raiding attacks were planned by our forces, this employment of submarines seems to offer many possibilities.

All personnel, both ship and air group performed their duties in a highly creditable manner. No outstandingly meritorious, and no censurable conduct on the part of any individual was observed.

The efficiency of the ship and all munitions of war are satisfactory except for the performance of the F4F4's and the limited range of the TBD's, reported in separate correspondence.
/signed/
G.D. MURRAY.


Enclosure (A) -- Track Chart
cv6-Tokyo.jpg cv6-Tokyo.jpg


Enclosure (B) -- Executive Officer's Report


A16-3 U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)

22 April 1942

From: The Executive Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.

Subject: Conduct of Ship's Company in action incident to participation of Enterprise in operations involving the bombing of Tokyo on Saturday, April 18, 1942 (Zone Minus Ten).

Reference: (a) Art 948, U.S. Navy Regs, 1920.

On Saturday, April 18, 1942 (Zone Minus Ten) the Enterprise operated with Task Force 16, in waters to the Eastward of Japan, in connection with the launching of U.S. Army bombers from the Hornet for the purpose of bombing TOKYO.
Contacts with enemy patrol vessels were made during the day but no action occurred between Enterprise and enemy vessels or aircraft.

The conduct of the SHip's Company was characterised by routine efficiency in the performance of duty without special incident.

At about 1503 Enterprise plane B-4, Lieut. L.A. Smith, USN, Pilot, and H.H. Caruthers, AMM1c, USN, gunner, landed in the sea. Personnel were picked up by Nashville at about 1516. The cause of the water landing was reported as a probably machine gun hit on the engine received while strafing an enemy patrol vessel.
/signed/
T.P. JETER,
Commander, U.S. Navy.


A16-3 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF COMMANDER CARRIERS
Serial 0019 At sea,
24 APR 1942

1st endorsement on
CO ENTERPRISE Serial
088 of 23 April 1942.

From: Commander Carriers, Pacific Fleet (Commander Task Force SIXTEEN).
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of action in connection with the Bombing of Tokyo on April 18, 1942 (Zone Minus Ten).

The basic letter and enclosures are herewith reclassified as SECRET.

The report of the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Enterprise, is in general concurred in. Specific comments follow:

After fueling of the heavy ships on 17 April, these ships (carriers and cruisers) proceeded west without destroyers and oilers in order to permit high speed operations. Fuel conservation for destroyers was another consideration. High winds and heavy sea conditions prevailed. The destroyers rejoined the morning following the attack (19th) and the oilers (with destroyer escort) two days later (21st).

The necessity for launching the Army planes at 0820 on the 18th about 650 miles east of Tokyo was regrettable. The plan was to close to the 5600 miles circle and there launch one plane to attack at dusk and thus provide a target for the remaining planes which would strike about two hours later. This plan was evolved by Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle, in command of the Army flight, and was designed to inflict the greatest damage with the least risk. The remote location of the desired terminus for the flight was also a factor influencing the selection of this plan of attack. However, contacts with enemy surface vessels early in the morning compromised the secrecy of the operation, and after the third contact, at 0744, the decision was made to launch. Japanese radio traffic was intercepted indicating that the presence of the raiding force was reported. The prime consideration then was the launching of the Army planes before the arrival of Japanese bombers.

The successful launching of the 16 Army bombers from the Hornet in the unfavorable wind and sea conditions reflected great credit on the Army pilots and on the Commanding Officer of the Hornet.
The amount of damage inflicted on enemy patrol vessels by the Enterprise aircraft, in consideration of the number of attacks made, was disappointing. It is again indicated that more time must bed available for training when air groups are at shore bases. This need is becoming more emphatic as time goes on.

The number of Japanese patrol vessels encountered at such distances from Japan was astounding. From positions in which found it was indicated that they probably operate in pairs and have mother ships to provide services. It is suggested that the prisoners captured by the Nashville be interrogated with an effort to obtain information on the operations and locations of these craft. It is noteworthy that, contrary to popular belief, these prisoners showed the white flag and chose surrender rather than suffer the consequences.

The comment in the basic report that the two patrol vessels attacked about 1400, on the 18th, were apparently the same vessels reported by radar at 0310, is not concurred in. The range at which one of the vessels sighted at 0310 disappeared from the radar screen (27,000 yards) indicated larger vessels, possibly mother ships carrying supplies and relief crews for the picket vessels.

Enroute westward the Task Force proceeded northwest about thirty miles west of Nihoa Island. It is suggested that this and other isolated islands of the Hawaiian group be investigated for enemy agents.

The opinion that the patrol and picket vessels are armed only with small caliber automatic weapons is concurred in insofar as those contacted are concerned.

Limited range and endurance of F4F-4 type carrier VF is a serious defect in these new planes. Action looking to improvement in this regard has been initiated by dispatch, copy to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

COMMUNICATIONS
Radio silence was maintained on all circuits until return to the Hawaiian Area, with the following exceptions:
Radar, YE, and TBS frequencies.
6-B-17 transmitted a contact report on 6540 kcs at 1240 (L.Z.T.) on the 18th.
Various fighter direction transmissions on 6970 kcs during the period 1250 to 1340 (L.Z.T.) on the 18th.
Transmitted Commander Task Force SIXTEEN dispatch 180825 to NPM. Several transmissions incidental to the lost plane were made on 6540 kcs during the period 0900-1100 (L.Z.T.) on the 21st. Commander Task Force SIXTEEN dispatch 230541 was transmitted to NPM on the 23rd.

A strong continuous signal, believed to be enemy interference was heard on 6970, 6835, and 6540 kcs during the period 1254-1351 (L.Z.T.) on the 18th. This was a CW signal and therefore did not seriously interfere with fighter direction communications.

Definite enemy interference was experienced when an attempt was made to transmit Commander Task Force SIXTEEN dispatch 190825 to NPM on 12795 and 12705 kcs. Each time the operator started to transmit on these frequencies, an unknown station would start sending Japanese characters. The dispatch was finally delivered to NPM on 16400 at 0847 (G.C.T.) without interference.>
Need for ultra-high frequency equipment for fighter direction is emphasized with each operation of carriers in wartime. Dispatch action has been initiated, copy to Commander-in-Chief, U.S.Pacific Fleet.
Reports from other units of the Task Force will be forwarded when received.

/signed/
W.F. Halsey
Copy to:
CO ENTERPRISE.
CO HORNET

[garrisonchisholm]

Well, I can't say I'd ever think to post a forum AAR that way, but its cool as heck. :]

Thanks Pops! Our "Resident Forum Researcher" ^.^

[oldpop2000]

Jul 8, 2017 21:55:45 GMT -6 garrisonchisholm said:

Well, I can't say I'd ever think to post a forum AAR that way, but its cool as heck. :]

Thanks Pops! Our "Resident Forum Researcher" ^.^

I agree, it is a bit much. But it does give a sense of what the AAR has to accomplish. I am not certain the whole forum will agree that I am the "Resident Forum Researcher" but those were kind words and appreciated.