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Post by cv10 on Sept 1, 2017 10:17:11 GMT -6
I will check to see if I have a similar memorandum from the late 1920s/early 1930s. I think you are right about the British being off the hit list by that point, but I'll see if I can find out for sure. Checking will take some time: I've got a nice round 1351 pages of documents to look through!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 1, 2017 12:08:02 GMT -6
I will check to see if I have a similar memorandum from the late 1920s/early 1930s. I think you are right about the British being off the hit list by that point, but I'll see if I can find out for sure. Checking will take some time: I've got a nice round 1351 pages of documents to look through! This is great. Please look through those documents while I go to DTIC for any information there. This is important, at least to me, for clarification. It is my belief that the Royal Navy was used by the US Navy as a standard against which to gauge their ships and tactics. War Plan Red and Orange were the two prevalent game plans in the 1922-1925 time frame but Red(Britain) was only used for comparison purposes. No one in the Navy really felt they were an opponent.
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Post by cv10 on Sept 4, 2017 22:17:22 GMT -6
I will check to see if I have a similar memorandum from the late 1920s/early 1930s. I think you are right about the British being off the hit list by that point, but I'll see if I can find out for sure. Checking will take some time: I've got a nice round 1351 pages of documents to look through! This is great. Please look through those documents while I go to DTIC for any information there. This is important, at least to me, for clarification. It is my belief that the Royal Navy was used by the US Navy as a standard against which to gauge their ships and tactics. War Plan Red and Orange were the two prevalent game plans in the 1922-1925 time frame but Red(Britain) was only used for comparison purposes. No one in the Navy really felt they were an opponent. Still searching, I've been pretty busy lately, but I'm going to keep looking once I get some free time. I do feel that what we are debating though is largely a moot point. Even though the Navy planned that Japan was our most likely enemy (which Japan was), I've studied interwar American foreign policy in a fair amount of depth, and short of Japan deciding to invade the Philippines in the 1920s/early 1930s, I think that the United States had only marginally more chance of declaring war on Japan of its own volition as it was to go to war against Britain. I think the big reason why we feel that we can reasonably postulate a war between the two countries during this period is due to the Pacific War. In addition, there are more issues of contention that one can point to with the Japanese than one can with the British. Sure, we wanted our money back plus the interest owed, and we really did not like their colonial dominion over so much of the world (though that would not really become at the forefront until the 1940s), but neither are issues that one goes to war over. With something like the Mukden Incident, it's easier (though not really accurate) to point to it and say that it was something that they could have gone to war over. Even with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931-1932, the United States was largely limited even it it's diplomatic response largely due to apathy on the part of the Hoover Administration and a State Department that had spent the last 8 years trying to outlaw war. I mean, we could have embargoed them, froze their assets, or done a whole bunch of other things to show our displeasure (and which we would do in 1941). The only two real sticking points between the U.S and Japan were the Japanese intentions in China (which did not boil over until much later) and the treatment of Japanese people in the United States (which was settled to an extent by the "Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907", but which was a major cause of resentment on the part of Japan towards the U.S). Yet neither country really felt that war was a good solution to any of the sticking points between them. So to an extent, the argument that the Lexington-Class should be compared to the Japanese as an OPFOR but not to the British does not hold water with me, as war between the United States and Japan during this period was so unlikely and remote a possibility (supported, I think, by the observation that it did not happen). It's even worth noting that U.S-Japanese relations did not really start to become acrimonious until 1937 with the Nanking Incident and the Panay Incident. That aside, basing the speculation of the Lexington-Class battlecruisers based on war plans is rather imperfect when one considers it. The U.S Navy planned extensively for real operations against Japan, yet largely discounted the idea of fighting the Italians or the French when we ended up fighting both those countries (though we did not do much against the Italian Navy, nor the German surface fleet). It is rather funny to consider that we fought more major naval battles against the French surface fleet (1) in World War II than we did against the Italians or the Germans (0).
I suppose the point I'm trying to make is that if one can stretch the interwar period to postulate a war with Japan, than one can also stretch it to postulate a war with the United Kingdom. However I don't think follows that one can be considered but not the other, as both such remote and unlikely possibilities that if one is sunk for being too improbable, than the other is probably sunk as well. I think that, at least in my mind, this debate is almost as much one of logic as it is of evidence. Since each person uses a different form of logic, I'm not sure if one party will be convinced by the other. In addition, it's also a subjective issue: I think one has to compare the design to the British as well as the Japanese, as I find the prospect war with either country during this period so remote that I can't (based understanding of foreign policy during this period) discount one without the other. Your opinion is based (as I understand it) on the predominate focus of interwar Naval war-planning and preparation (the construction of overseas bases, fleet anchorages) on Japan that only the Japanese can be reasonably postulated as going to war with the United States during this period. As such, I reiterate my supposition that the Lexington-Class would not have made a good battlecruiser design, largely for being too under-armored against both Japanese and British battlecruisers that were planned on being built. In addition, while it might have been able to outgun older battlecruisers, the Amagi and G3 Class would have had equal (or in the case of the G3, better) firepower.
Ironically, all of this is based on the idea that the battlecruiser theory was not discredited by World War I, which is in of itself a whole different debate!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 4, 2017 22:47:46 GMT -6
One of the factors that is hard to figure in these discussions is the human factor. The battle-cruiser has gotten a bad name due more to human failures than their designs. We know that human factors played a part in the destruction of the battle-cruisers at Jutland. Poor ammunition handling and frankly poor tactics by Beatty who apparently did not understand or comprehend the weakness of the ships he was leading. The next candidate is Hood. Hood should never have been leading those two ships, Prince of Wales should have had the lead and Fleet Commander should have used POW as the flagship. Things might have been different. Again, the human factor enters the picture. Yes, she took a golden BB in her thin armor, but had she not been leading, then she would not have been singled out by Bismarck.
The last action is the Hiei and Kirishima, both were Kongo class battle-cruisers. Hiei should never have been used in those narrow passages where an 8 inch gun cruiser's guns could destroy her superstructure and that is exactly what happened to her. Kirishima should never been in that area especially once the Japanese had information that Washington and South Dakota were a stones throw away. Again, the human factor enters the picture.
Now would Lexington and Saratoga have been able to perform their missions. Of course, if the humans did not try to put them into a position for which they were not designed. Is that possible, to prevent. Probably not, you won with what you brung. Sometimes you don't have any choice, but if you can keep in mind the weakness of your weapons system, you might have a better chance.
I believe that the Lexington's, had they been limited to missions for which they were designed would have performed well. However, the enemy always has a say in your plans so when the shooting starts, the plans go right out the door. At that point, you pray that the designers knew what they were doing.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 4, 2017 23:12:06 GMT -6
In my previous post, I brought out the idea of the human factor and how it can affect a weapons system. I want to give you an example that I am familiar with to show how adjusting your tactics and action, using the advantages of a weapons system can make difference.
In Vietnam, the F-4 Phantom got a bad reputation as a dogfighter. It just could not outturn a Mig-17 or a Mig-21. It was too heavy and big. We had a terrible kill ratio initially until someone finally decided to develop tactics that used the F-4's strengths. Those strengths were superior engine power, high roll rate, and better electronics. Instead of dogfighting with an on-coming Mig, pilots learned to pull back on the stick, hit the burners and climb up. The Mig's could not stay with a climbing F-4 and hence they either kept moving straight ahead, climbed for bit, then rolled out. When either of those occurred, the F-4's would roll out of their climb, lock up the Mig and ruin their day. Simple, use the strengths of the weapons. If a Mig turned tight, don't follow him, pull up, roll left or right, into a barrel roll and cut across the circle to lock him up. Now you used the advantage of higher climb rate and better roll rate plus better weapons and electronics. You use the advantages of the weapons system to defeat your opponent. Now, changes were made to the F-4 to enhance the capability, but once these lesson were taught to the pilots through Top Gun and Red Flag, the kill ratios went up.
This is exactly what would have had to be done with the Lexington class battle-cruisers. Use their superior speed and firepower, stay away from close gun fights and don't tangle with battleships. Sometimes that is hard, you have no choice. The Lexington's had a weakness that is not normally mentioned; poor turning circle. If there was any deficiency in their design that could cause them to be lost, it was that one design factor. They only had one rudder. Saratoga was torpedoed twice, both times because she could not turn fast enough to avoid the on coming torpedo. My dad said that that was her biggest weakness, her turning circle and speed of response.
There is no question in my mind that the human factor much be accounted for in any weapons usage and results. Most of the time, it is a human failure that causes the loss.
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Post by cv10 on Sept 4, 2017 23:45:21 GMT -6
I believe that the Lexington's, had they been limited to missions for which they were designed would have performed well. However, the enemy always has a say in your plans so when the shooting starts, the plans go right out the door. At that point, you pray that the designers knew what they were doing. I agree with all of the examples you bring up, as well as your general point. I still think that their effectiveness would have been limited due to a belief on my part that the Navy would have ended up trying to use them in the line of battle, where no battlecruiser really had any business being. Against other battlecruisers, I still think that armor is just too thin, and I think the ultimate lesson of World War I is that speed is not a good replacement for armor.
However for the true purpose of a battlecruiser as a heavy scouting unit and to run down cruisers, they would have been solid, if a bit over-gunned. However that can easily be forgiven due to the need to be able to smash other battlecrusier. Now a big flaw in my argument, which I would like to acknowledge, is that my assessment is really only valid against either the Amagi or G3 class. Against the Kongo Class or any of the British battlecruisers, save the Hood, and I'd bet my money on a Lexington easily, as a Lexington could outrun and outshoot them. Even against the Hood I think that would have had a good chance.
Even against the Amagi or G3 class, the Lexingtons would have had a fighting chance. It would come down to better fire control and the question of if a 10 or a 12 inch belt would result in better damage resistance than a 7 inch belt in a word of 16 inch shells.
So I should amend my position that: The Lexington-Class would have likely been successful in the battlecruiser role (as defined above) and against older classes. However I still feel, based on World War One results, that the issue of "battleship-sized displacement and battleship-sized guns" would have cropped up, and if so, would have come home to roost with bitter consequences.
Just a note on HMS Hood: I'm not sure why Admiral Holland was flying his flag from HMS Hood rather than HMS Prince of Wales. The two big guesses I'd make are that HMS Hood was the pride ship of the Royal Navy, and as such, Holland felt that the "Mighty Hood" was the proper ship to fly his flag from, and that since HMS Prince of Wales was so new (she still had civilian labor gangs aboard trying to get her quad turrets to work right) that Holland might have felt that the last thing such a new and still working up ship needed was an Admiral moving his staff aboard, and that the admiral should be aboard the ship without all of the technical issues. Danemark Strait was a battle where the Germans got incredibly lucky: the Hood blowing up, the British initially firing on the Prinz Eugan, and the Prince of Wales losing a fair portion of its main battery due to a mechanical error shortly into the battle. The Germans also did some pretty good shooting that day (which in fairness to the crew of the Bismarck, they were pretty accurate, particularly at the night action against Commodore Vain. Not good enough to hit or sink any of the destroyers, but close enough to keep the British at bay).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 5, 2017 8:37:21 GMT -6
I believe that the Lexington's, had they been limited to missions for which they were designed would have performed well. However, the enemy always has a say in your plans so when the shooting starts, the plans go right out the door. At that point, you pray that the designers knew what they were doing. I agree with all of the examples you bring up, as well as your general point. I still think that their effectiveness would have been limited due to a belief on my part that the Navy would have ended up trying to use them in the line of battle, where no battlecruiser really had any business being. Against other battlecruisers, I still think that armor is just too thin, and I think the ultimate lesson of World War I is that speed is not a good replacement for armor.
However for the true purpose of a battlecruiser as a heavy scouting unit and to run down cruisers, they would have been solid, if a bit over-gunned. However that can easily be forgiven due to the need to be able to smash other battlecrusier. Now a big flaw in my argument, which I would like to acknowledge, is that my assessment is really only valid against either the Amagi or G3 class. Against the Kongo Class or any of the British battlecruisers, save the Hood, and I'd bet my money on a Lexington easily, as a Lexington could outrun and outshoot them. Even against the Hood I think that would have had a good chance.
Even against the Amagi or G3 class, the Lexingtons would have had a fighting chance. It would come down to better fire control and the question of if a 10 or a 12 inch belt would result in better damage resistance than a 7 inch belt in a word of 16 inch shells.
So I should amend my position that: The Lexington-Class would have likely been successful in the battlecruiser role (as defined above) and against older classes. However I still feel, based on World War One results, that the issue of "battleship-sized displacement and battleship-sized guns" would have cropped up, and if so, would have come home to roost with bitter consequences.
Just a note on HMS Hood: I'm not sure why Admiral Holland was flying his flag from HMS Hood rather than HMS Prince of Wales. The two big guesses I'd make are that HMS Hood was the pride ship of the Royal Navy, and as such, Holland felt that the "Mighty Hood" was the proper ship to fly his flag from, and that since HMS Prince of Wales was so new (she still had civilian labor gangs aboard trying to get her quad turrets to work right) that Holland might have felt that the last thing such a new and still working up ship needed was an Admiral moving his staff aboard, and that the admiral should be aboard the ship without all of the technical issues. Danemark Strait was a battle where the Germans got incredibly lucky: the Hood blowing up, the British initially firing on the Prinz Eugan, and the Prince of Wales losing a fair portion of its main battery due to a mechanical error shortly into the battle. The Germans also did some pretty good shooting that day (which in fairness to the crew of the Bismarck, they were pretty accurate, particularly at the night action against Commodore Vain. Not good enough to hit or sink any of the destroyers, but close enough to keep the British at bay).
Here's another issue that I want to bring up. All nations have histories and in the case of the British, a long and distinguished military history. The Royal Navy had had a tremendous victory, one hundred years earlier at Trafalgar, but since that time, in fact, the rest of the world was catching up. The actions or failures at Jutland were more a reflection of the English desire for another great victory, than good sense. This is another human factor that has to be accounted for. The same factor is prevalent in the Hood disaster. For the US, our last victory was at Santiago Bay against the Spanish and Manila Bay. Both occurred in 1898. We didn't have that long naval history acting like a harness around our neck. Also, our field of battle was not the enclosed North Sea, but the largest ocean in the world, the Pacific. One difference between the US Navy and British Navy is that we are not bound by traditions as much, we tend to plan and act in a different way than the British. We made some mistakes at the beginning of the war, but considering what happened at Pearl Harbor, we did very well. We essentially defeated the IJN with our pre-war fleet in four carrier battles, then build another fleet and destroyed theirs. Our Navy was and is more adaptable to new tactics, and technologies. We tend to think outside the box. I don't believe that we would have made the mistakes at Jutland and with Hood that the British made, we would have attacked the problems with a different view. We can't lose sight of the human factors in war, and especially historical traditions. I don't see this brought up on this forum much, we focus on the hardware, but forget that wars are won and lost by human action. I can't really say how the Lexington's would have faired against some of the battle-cruiser designs from other nations other than to say again, they would be under the command of US officers, not British officers and that might make a difference.
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Post by babylon218 on Sept 5, 2017 9:41:27 GMT -6
On the subject of the Battle of the end ark Straits, one point I would make is that Prince of Wales was the only KGV-Class Battleship immediately available to accompany Hood in pursuing Bismarck (I won't argue that Hood had no place being in the van of the formation - PoW would have had a far better survival chance at long range than Hood), and the KGV-Class was the only British Class of Battleship which had a hope in hell of keeping up with Bismarck.
Hood was largely a victim to her WWI-era armour scheme, namely her sloped deck which was designed to counter short-to-mid range shots, not near-vertical shells fired from long range. From the diagrams I've seen, the Lexingtons would have recieved a similar armour scheme. Now, let's assume the Americans were pursuing the Bismarck rather than the British: if we assume the Lexingtons were built we should also assume the South Dakota-Class (1920s) was built. It's worth asking the question: would the US Navy have built a Fast Battleship like the North Carolina-Class if they were still engaged in the Battleship building programme of the '20s?
In any case, the Bismarck's escape was almost exactly the kind of situation the Lexington's were designed for. If the US hadn't had a Fast Battleship like the NCs available in the Atlantic, they would have sent the Lexingtons. In that scenario, the Lexingtons would have been in a similar predicament to HMS Hood - an armour scheme optimised for fighting at medium range and closer against an enemy capable of firing at longer ranges than they could protect against. In such a situation, there are effectively two options: disengage before you take any serious hits or close as quickly as possible so your armoured belt can take the hits.
Now, I reckon an American captain would have quite sensibly chosen the former in such a situation, shadowing the Bismarck at long range and trying to herd her into the guns of a larger hunter-killer force. However, this would have required at least 3 Capital Ships to provide Bismarck with such a threat in my opinion. A scenario where the US had the Lexington-Class allows this size of a force, but as already pointed out, the British didn't have this luxury: There were only two ships ready which were fast enough to catch Bismarck before it broke out into the open sea, and the rest of the fleet was still working up to try and form and interception group: Admiral Holland didn't have the luxury of herding Bismarck - he had to at least force Bismarck to slow down or turn for home.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 10:46:24 GMT -6
On the subject of the Battle of the end ark Straits, one point I would make is that Prince of Wales was the only KGV-Class Battleship immediately available to accompany Hood in pursuing Bismarck (I won't argue that Hood had no place being in the van of the formation - PoW would have had a far better survival chance at long range than Hood), and the KGV-Class was the only British Class of Battleship which had a hope in hell of keeping up with Bismarck. Hood was largely a victim to her WWI-era armour scheme, namely her sloped deck which was designed to counter short-to-mid range shots, not near-vertical shells fired from long range. From the diagrams I've seen, the Lexingtons would have recieved a similar armour scheme. Now, let's assume the Americans were pursuing the Bismarck rather than the British: if we assume the Lexingtons were built we should also assume the South Dakota-Class (1920s) was built. It's worth asking the question: would the US Navy have built a Fast Battleship like the North Carolina-Class if they were still engaged in the Battleship building programme of the '20s? In any case, the Bismarck's escape was almost exactly the kind of situation the Lexington's were designed for. If the US hadn't had a Fast Battleship like the NCs available in the Atlantic, they would have sent the Lexingtons. In that scenario, the Lexingtons would have been in a similar predicament to HMS Hood - an armour scheme optimised for fighting at medium range and closer against an enemy capable of firing at longer ranges than they could protect against. In such a situation, there are effectively two options: disengage before you take any serious hits or close as quickly as possible so your armoured belt can take the hits. Now, I reckon an American captain would have quite sensibly chosen the former in such a situation, shadowing the Bismarck at long range and trying to herd her into the guns of a larger hunter-killer force. However, this would have required at least 3 Capital Ships to provide Bismarck with such a threat in my opinion. A scenario where the US had the Lexington-Class allows this size of a force, but as already pointed out, the British didn't have this luxury: There were only two ships ready which were fast enough to catch Bismarck before it broke out into the open sea, and the rest of the fleet was still working up to try and form and interception group: Admiral Holland didn't have the luxury of herding Bismarck - he had to at least force Bismarck to slow down or turn for home. I haven't gotten into that in this discussion but the British were spread pretty thin. My only question and I should research it further, is why Holland did not realize that Hood was weak in the deck armor because she had never been upgraded, and move his flag to POW. Ok, she was new from the builders yard but still, you had a better chance of survival in her. It's like he never reviewed what happened at Jutland although that was not caused by the weak deck armor as they later determine. On the issue of a US Admiral's response, it is hard to know unless you try to use operations in the Pacific to draw some conclusions. The Battle of Guadalcanal with the two battleships might be one, but that was totally different. Hard to figure but I believe we would have taken a different course of action but I have no data to back up my assumptions.
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Post by babylon218 on Sept 6, 2017 11:11:08 GMT -6
On the subject of the Battle of the end ark Straits, one point I would make is that Prince of Wales was the only KGV-Class Battleship immediately available to accompany Hood in pursuing Bismarck (I won't argue that Hood had no place being in the van of the formation - PoW would have had a far better survival chance at long range than Hood), and the KGV-Class was the only British Class of Battleship which had a hope in hell of keeping up with Bismarck. Hood was largely a victim to her WWI-era armour scheme, namely her sloped deck which was designed to counter short-to-mid range shots, not near-vertical shells fired from long range. From the diagrams I've seen, the Lexingtons would have recieved a similar armour scheme. Now, let's assume the Americans were pursuing the Bismarck rather than the British: if we assume the Lexingtons were built we should also assume the South Dakota-Class (1920s) was built. It's worth asking the question: would the US Navy have built a Fast Battleship like the North Carolina-Class if they were still engaged in the Battleship building programme of the '20s? In any case, the Bismarck's escape was almost exactly the kind of situation the Lexington's were designed for. If the US hadn't had a Fast Battleship like the NCs available in the Atlantic, they would have sent the Lexingtons. In that scenario, the Lexingtons would have been in a similar predicament to HMS Hood - an armour scheme optimised for fighting at medium range and closer against an enemy capable of firing at longer ranges than they could protect against. In such a situation, there are effectively two options: disengage before you take any serious hits or close as quickly as possible so your armoured belt can take the hits. Now, I reckon an American captain would have quite sensibly chosen the former in such a situation, shadowing the Bismarck at long range and trying to herd her into the guns of a larger hunter-killer force. However, this would have required at least 3 Capital Ships to provide Bismarck with such a threat in my opinion. A scenario where the US had the Lexington-Class allows this size of a force, but as already pointed out, the British didn't have this luxury: There were only two ships ready which were fast enough to catch Bismarck before it broke out into the open sea, and the rest of the fleet was still working up to try and form and interception group: Admiral Holland didn't have the luxury of herding Bismarck - he had to at least force Bismarck to slow down or turn for home. I haven't gotten into that in this discussion but the British were spread pretty thin. My only question and I should research it further, is why Holland did not realize that Hood was weak in the deck armor because she had never been upgraded, and move his flag to POW. Ok, she was new from the builders yard but still, you had a better chance of survival in her. It's like he never reviewed what happened at Jutland although that was not caused by the weak deck armor as they later determine. On the issue of a US Admiral's response, it is hard to know unless you try to use operations in the Pacific to draw some conclusions. The Battle of Guadalcanal with the two battleships might be one, but that was totally different. Hard to figure but I believe we would have taken a different course of action but I have no data to back up my assumptions. Holland was aware of Hood's vulnerability: it's why he tried to close with Bismarck as fast as possible. As for why he chose Hood as his flagship... Other than that Hood was still considered the Pride of the Navy, Bismarck had a top speed of 30kn; Prince of Wales a top speed of 28kn and Hood a top speed of 31kn as built, although armour improvements reduced this to 28kn by 1941. Hood also had 15" guns compared to PoW's 14". Holland may have believed he had a better chance of keeping up with Bismarck and doing significant damage with Hood in the van. Another possible factor is that PoW was not fully ready when she departed Scapa Flow: she still had hundreds of civilian contractors on board completing her fitting out and her gun turrets were unreliable (during the battle, both her quad turrets jammed without damage. This problem had already been discovered during trials on KGV). By comparison, Hood was tested by 20 years of active service with a well-trained crew.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 11:35:18 GMT -6
I haven't gotten into that in this discussion but the British were spread pretty thin. My only question and I should research it further, is why Holland did not realize that Hood was weak in the deck armor because she had never been upgraded, and move his flag to POW. Ok, she was new from the builders yard but still, you had a better chance of survival in her. It's like he never reviewed what happened at Jutland although that was not caused by the weak deck armor as they later determine. On the issue of a US Admiral's response, it is hard to know unless you try to use operations in the Pacific to draw some conclusions. The Battle of Guadalcanal with the two battleships might be one, but that was totally different. Hard to figure but I believe we would have taken a different course of action but I have no data to back up my assumptions. Holland was aware of Hood's vulnerability: it's why he tried to close with Bismarck as fast as possible. As for why he chose Hood as his flagship... Other than that Hood was still considered the Pride of the Navy, Bismarck had a top speed of 30kn; Prince of Wales a top speed of 28kn and Hood a top speed of 31kn as built, although armour improvements reduced this to 28kn by 1941. Hood also had 15" guns compared to PoW's 14". Holland may have believed he had a better chance of keeping up with Bismarck and doing significant damage with Hood in the van. Another possible factor is that PoW was not fully ready when she departed Scapa Flow: she still had hundreds of civilian contractors on board completing her fitting out and her gun turrets were unreliable (during the battle, both her quad turrets jammed without damage. This problem had already been discovered during trials on KGV). By comparison, Hood was tested by 20 years of active service with a well-trained crew. I agree with your conclusions that the best ship was, in fact, Hood although she had a weakness, good tactics might have mitigated that weakness. I am going to go through documents on the HMS Hood Association website to see if there is any information about this. The idea to choose the better ship was something I just thought about but as I go through the records on the Hood website, I don't think he had much choice because originally, if I remember he was going to have Repulse with him, but POW became almost ready so they chose it. It might have been too late to make any changes to command location plus Hood might have been configured as a flagship. I will continue to research the sequence of events.
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 6, 2017 13:41:24 GMT -6
I would provide a little information which may be pertinent to this discussion; taken from A Marine Forensic analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismark by Bill Jurens:
1. Hood was sunk at circa 16,650 yards (not at long range). 2. Hood's weight breakdown by weight shows 30% armour which is highly respectable for her day (consistent with a Battleship) but contrasts with circa 40% for Bismark. 3. Hood had a long tradition as acting as a flag ship.
Prince of Wales subsequently fulfilled the role of flagship so she was certainly capable of fulfilling the role. Would the raw crew be considered a factor?
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 6, 2017 13:55:44 GMT -6
Agree with Oldpop2000's comments on human factors associated with the loss of the Battlecruisers at Jutland. Many of the "lessons" learned appear to be deliberate attempts by senior officers to divert attention from the culpability of Beatty, Jellicoe and other senior officers for the losses.
Many of the Battleships had similar thickness of turret armour to to the Splendid Cats and would have been similarly vulnerable to flash fire spreading from turret to magazine.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 14:09:13 GMT -6
I would provide a little information which may be pertinent to this discussion; taken from A Marine Forensic analysis of HMS Hood and DKM Bismark by Bill Jurens: 1. Hood was sunk at circa 16,650 yards (not at long range). 2. Hood's weight breakdown by weight shows 30% armour which is highly respectable for her day (consistent with a Battleship) but contrasts with circa 40% for Bismark. 3. Hood had a long tradition as acting as a flag ship. Prince of Wales subsequently fulfilled the role of flagship so she was certainly capable of fulfilling the role. Would the raw crew be considered a factor? Good information and thanks for reminding me about all this. I haven't reviewed Juren's article on Navweaps in a while. Here is link for all to use - www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Hood.phpHere armor scheme was deficient in certain areas though and the Admiralty was aware of it and made comments on it. However, they never did perform the upgrade. I wonder if it was lack of funds because I know that many of the shipyards that had been used to build the naval vessels had gone out of business.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 14:14:21 GMT -6
Agree with Oldpop2000's comments on human factors associated with the loss of the Battlecruisers at Jutland. Many of the "lessons" learned appear to be deliberate attempts by senior officers to divert attention from the culpability of Beatty, Jellicoe and other senior officers for the losses. Many of the Battleships had similar thickness of turret armour to to the Splendid Cats and would have been similarly vulnerable to flash fire spreading from turret to magazine. It is just part of technical discussions that we lose sight of the fact that battles, as I have stated, are fought by humans and therefore, subject to human mistakes and frailties. It is natural after such disasters like Jutland for militaries to close up and around their fellow officers to protect them. I suspect, as I have seen myself, this can be dangerous to solving the issues. I believe that quietly they knew where the mistakes had been made. But the officers and men who caused the mistakes were dead, so it didn't make any sense to go after them. It was better just to quietly change the procedures for handling ammunition and enforcing them along with learning the lessons of battle tactics gained from the battle. Just my view. Any design mistakes or oversights were already corrected in the later fast battleships of the QE class ships.
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