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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 6, 2017 21:45:05 GMT -6
I am still trying to determine who exactly he was, it might help us. These were actually pictures I took of them at the national archives, so it was no trouble! I actually found a cover for the memorandum that could possibly shed some light on the author. From it, I'm not sure who he was, but it does not seem that he was in the Navy, as his father forwarded the letter to SecNav, who then sent it to Coontz. While it is not unheard of for people to buck the chain of command and write directly to the boss, the fact that his father forwarded it for him seems to be evidence that he was otherwise not someone who would be consulted by the higher ups in the Navy. Coontz's writing on it is to request that a reply be drafted to the person who wrote the memo saying it will be given "due consideration", however one of the words is very hard to read, and it might be the word "never" or "receive". I think "receive" makes more sense. However "matter will receive due consideration" is one of those phrases that can indicate that the paper in question is to be ignored, but the sender cannot be. Since his father was influential enough to get a memo to the SecNav, it could be fair to say that Coontz felt some reply was needed, as in this case, not replying was not an option. Again, I have found nothing on the author aside from this cover letter. If he was not otherwise connected to the Navy, than in a sense, this memorandum is largely worthless: another example of a civilian interloper who felt the Navy needed his sage advice. If he was connected to the Navy, than his ideas were certainly novel, however since this did not happen and there was no further mention of it (as far as I know), than it was likely that this was simply one officer's idea who used family connections to try and bring his ideas to the highest level of policy-making.
I really hope that I have not over-represented this memo: given my observations of above, I feel that I have seriously mischaracterized this memo even just in attributing it to someone in the Navy. The mistake on my part was not looking into the author a bit more. To be frank, I should have been a bit interested in why the author did not have a naval rank (which would have otherwise been listed). Most of the documents have some sort of paper at the end that says to the effect "this memo/paper/plan was approved by _____". The lack of this should have also caused me to look at this a bit harder before posting it.Have you ever heard of the Barringer Meteor Crater in Northern Arizona? I have and I have studied and visited it. Daniel Moreau Barringer is the man who theorized that it was a meteor crater. He died in 1929 of a heart attack.
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Post by cv10 on Sept 6, 2017 23:41:25 GMT -6
I've heard of the Crater (we examined it in a Geology class I had to take), and one of the first things I looked up was Daniel Moreau Barringer. I'm not sure why he'd have had sway with the Navy Department. At first I thought there might have been a connection to Josephus Daniels, as both were North Carolinians, but Daniels would have been out of office by November of 1921. I've heard that Barringer had some connections to Republican politicians during his life, so perhaps that was his "in" with the new secretary.
This is the Harding Administration we're talking about: one of the most corrupt in U.S history (first Cabinet Member to be jailed for corruption) after Grant's Administration (Indian Ring, Gold Ring, Whiskey Ring, Credit Mobilier Scam, etc, that was a real racket). A little use of influence to get a son's memo put before the Navy Department higher-ups would be the least of the Government's worries. Not the finest hour for the Civilian administrators at the Navy Department: while the Navy seemed to have been an unwitting actor (I don't think any evidence was found to implicate that anyone in the Navy Department had been bribed or otherwise corrupt in the affair), having been involved in the process of the transfer did not make it look good to the public.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 7, 2017 8:43:10 GMT -6
I've heard of the Crater (we examined it in a Geology class I had to take), and one of the first things I looked up was Daniel Moreau Barringer. I'm not sure why he'd have had sway with the Navy Department. At first I thought there might have been a connection to Josephus Daniels, as both were North Carolinians, but Daniels would have been out of office by November of 1921. I've heard that Barringer had some connections to Republican politicians during his life, so perhaps that was his "in" with the new secretary. This is the Harding Administration we're talking about: one of the most corrupt in U.S history (first Cabinet Member to be jailed for corruption) after Grant's Administration (Indian Ring, Gold Ring, Whiskey Ring, Credit Mobilier Scam, etc, that was a real racket). A little use of influence to get a son's memo put before the Navy Department higher-ups would be the least of the Government's worries. Not the finest hour for the Civilian administrators at the Navy Department: while the Navy seemed to have been an unwitting actor (I don't think any evidence was found to implicate that anyone in the Navy Department had been bribed or otherwise corrupt in the affair), having been involved in the process of the transfer did not make it look good to the public. I don't know if this will help you but it is a link to the Barringer Family Papers at Princeton Univerity libraries. It shows that Brandon Barringer was in the Princeton class of 1921. rbsc.princeton.edu/collections/barringer-family-papers
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Post by dorn on Nov 28, 2017 7:35:09 GMT -6
Just comment on British and available battleships/battlecruisers.
British has 15 battleships/battlecruisers at start of WW2 - 5 R class, 5 QE, 2 Nelson, 2 Renown and 1 Admiral. All of these battleships were more than 15 years old, some of them even more than 20 years. One of the most absolute part was armor scheme of these ships. Except Nelson class built heavily armored with AoN armor scheme, the rest ships has WW1 pre Jutland armor scheme. Even armor scheme of HMS Hood with all changes done during construction was not the scheme adopted by post WW1 ships.
British know that their ships was absolute either on armor scheme (all except Nelson class) or speed (all except Renown and Admiral class). During the interwar period the refits was light, mainly enhanced Renown class which had the worst armor from all these ships. The refits started with QE class and should proceed next with HMS Hood. There were no planned refit for R class as the plan was to replace them. As war broke out, only some of QEs were finished.
Before King George class battleships were available, Royal Navy has only 3 fast battleships (Hood, Repulse, Renown) than can catch modern German battleships. So all of these 3 ships were vital for RN and cannot be withdraw for large refit (Hood). After the fall of France, all modernized QEs were used in Mediterranean as they were best ships against Italian navy which could be spared. Because of German raiders all remaining old absolute ships with Nelson class was used to defend convoys. So the only remaining force was newly built KGV class and Admiral. Renown class were even much lighter armored than Admiral class and these ships has different duties during Bismarck raid.
Even all British battleships could be feared by Germans because of theirs 15" guns which were capable to disable German battleships. However they were not fast enough to catch them (remember Renown unable to catch Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in heavy weather) and except Nelson class their armor was much worse compared to Bismarck. And another note for Hood armor. They have better armor scheme than old QE class, however without refit the critical areas were less armored than QEs after refit.
However does somebody know why Hood was accompanied by PoW and not by KGV? I know that it was flagship of Tovey. Could reason be that Tovey do not want to move his staff?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 28, 2017 10:41:49 GMT -6
Just comment on British and available battleships/battlecruisers. British has 15 battleships/battlecruisers at start of WW2 - 5 R class, 5 QE, 2 Nelson, 2 Renown and 1 Admiral. All of these battleships were more than 15 years old, some of them even more than 20 years. One of the most absolute part was armor scheme of these ships. Except Nelson class built heavily armored with AoN armor scheme, the rest ships has WW1 pre Jutland armor scheme. Even armor scheme of HMS Hood with all changes done during construction was not the scheme adopted by post WW1 ships. British know that their ships was absolute either on armor scheme (all except Nelson class) or speed (all except Renown and Admiral class). During the interwar period the refits was light, mainly enhanced Renown class which had the worst armor from all these ships. The refits started with QE class and should proceed next with HMS Hood. There were no planned refit for R class as the plan was to replace them. As war broke out, only some of QEs were finished. Before King George class battleships were available, Royal Navy has only 3 fast battleships (Hood, Repulse, Renown) than can catch modern German battleships. So all of these 3 ships were vital for RN and cannot be withdraw for large refit (Hood). After the fall of France, all modernized QEs were used in Mediterranean as they were best ships against Italian navy which could be spared. Because of German raiders all remaining old absolute ships with Nelson class was used to defend convoys. So the only remaining force was newly built KGV class and Admiral. Renown class were even much lighter armored than Admiral class and these ships has different duties during Bismarck raid. Even all British battleships could be feared by Germans because of theirs 15" guns which were capable to disable German battleships. However they were not fast enough to catch them (remember Renown unable to catch Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in heavy weather) and except Nelson class their armor was much worse compared to Bismarck. And another note for Hood armor. They have better armor scheme than old QE class, however without refit the critical areas were less armored than QEs after refit. However does somebody know why Hood was accompanied by PoW and not by KGV? I know that it was flagship of Tovey. Could reason be that Tovey do not want to move his staff? We have to consider what the Admiralty and the Prime Minister were thinking at this time. They had to contain both Bismarck and Tirpitz. Churchill, now the PM, was worried about the KG V and their 14 inch guns and weaker armor protection against Bismarck. They were also about 1 or 2 knots slower. The only ships with more powerful guns, 15 and 16 inch were the Nelsons and Hood. The Nelsons were older and had worn out boilers. In fact, Rodney was scheduled to sail from Scotland for a refit in Boston. For the British, there were four possible passages for Bismarck and Prince Eugen to take; the one she took was the Denmark Straits which is about 180 miles across at the narrowest point. Tovey decided to send Hood and POW towards Iceland because Hood was faster and had 15 in. guns. Two months earlier, Tovey had deployed the entire fleet to cover a potential breakout at point south of Iceland and realized the error because he had no reserve when the fleet ran low on fuel. In fact, during the final chase for Bismarck, both KGV and Rodney did run low on fuel and only had about two to three hours of fuel left with which to return to Scapa Flow. Tovey decided to maintain the bulk of the Home Fleet at Scapa to respond to any unfolding events. This should explain why Tovey did not deploy KG V instead of POW. Another consideration is the timing to change the command ship for the Home Fleet would have been problematic. At 10:30 PM on May 22nd, Tovey received the message that Bismarck had sailed. KG V was covering the NW portion of Iceland but Bismarck had already slipped around the north of Iceland in the Denmark Straits. There was nothing Tovey could do, but let Hood and POW tackled the job. It is my belief that historians are second guessing Holland and Tovey. The British were aware of Hood deck weakness but had assumed that improved handling procedures and better powder had solved the issue. Holland had no idea that Hood would blow up, but knew of her weakness. However, she was the best gunnery ship in the fleet and POW was new, just out of the builders yard. He could not put her out in front as many historians claim. Many historians are not naval officers and don't understand the doctrine and procedures necessary to run a fleet of ships. Remember also, that the British fleet was deployed in the Mediterranean to protect North Africa to deal with the Italian fleet which was more of a naval threat than the German ships that had to breakout to get to the Atlantic ports on the coast of France. The Italians did not have that issue so they, to the British were the biggest threat. The British also had to cover the area around Singapore and Ceylon in the Indian Ocean.
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Post by dorn on Nov 28, 2017 12:17:37 GMT -6
Just comment on British and available battleships/battlecruisers. British has 15 battleships/battlecruisers at start of WW2 - 5 R class, 5 QE, 2 Nelson, 2 Renown and 1 Admiral. All of these battleships were more than 15 years old, some of them even more than 20 years. One of the most absolute part was armor scheme of these ships. Except Nelson class built heavily armored with AoN armor scheme, the rest ships has WW1 pre Jutland armor scheme. Even armor scheme of HMS Hood with all changes done during construction was not the scheme adopted by post WW1 ships. British know that their ships was absolute either on armor scheme (all except Nelson class) or speed (all except Renown and Admiral class). During the interwar period the refits was light, mainly enhanced Renown class which had the worst armor from all these ships. The refits started with QE class and should proceed next with HMS Hood. There were no planned refit for R class as the plan was to replace them. As war broke out, only some of QEs were finished. Before King George class battleships were available, Royal Navy has only 3 fast battleships (Hood, Repulse, Renown) than can catch modern German battleships. So all of these 3 ships were vital for RN and cannot be withdraw for large refit (Hood). After the fall of France, all modernized QEs were used in Mediterranean as they were best ships against Italian navy which could be spared. Because of German raiders all remaining old absolute ships with Nelson class was used to defend convoys. So the only remaining force was newly built KGV class and Admiral. Renown class were even much lighter armored than Admiral class and these ships has different duties during Bismarck raid. Even all British battleships could be feared by Germans because of theirs 15" guns which were capable to disable German battleships. However they were not fast enough to catch them (remember Renown unable to catch Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in heavy weather) and except Nelson class their armor was much worse compared to Bismarck. And another note for Hood armor. They have better armor scheme than old QE class, however without refit the critical areas were less armored than QEs after refit. However does somebody know why Hood was accompanied by PoW and not by KGV? I know that it was flagship of Tovey. Could reason be that Tovey do not want to move his staff? We have to consider what the Admiralty and the Prime Minister were thinking at this time. They had to contain both Bismarck and Tirpitz. Churchill, now the PM, was worried about the KG V and their 14 inch guns and weaker armor protection against Bismarck. They were also about 1 or 2 knots slower. The only ships with more powerful guns, 15 and 16 inch were the Nelsons and Hood. The Nelsons were older and had worn out boilers. In fact, Rodney was scheduled to sail from Scotland for a refit in Boston. For the British, there were four possible passages for Bismarck and Prince Eugen to take; the one she took was the Denmark Straits which is about 180 miles across at the narrowest point. Tovey decided to send Hood and POW towards Iceland because Hood was faster and had 15 in. guns. Two months earlier, Tovey had deployed the entire fleet to cover a potential breakout at point south of Iceland and realized the error because he had no reserve when the fleet ran low on fuel. In fact, during the final chase for Bismarck, both KGV and Rodney did run low on fuel and only had about two to three hours of fuel left with which to return to Scapa Flow. Tovey decided to maintain the bulk of the Home Fleet at Scapa to respond to any unfolding events. This should explain why Tovey did not deploy KG V instead of POW. Another consideration is the timing to change the command ship for the Home Fleet would have been problematic. At 10:30 PM on May 22nd, Tovey received the message that Bismarck had sailed. KG V was covering the NW portion of Iceland but Bismarck had already slipped around the north of Iceland in the Denmark Straits. There was nothing Tovey could do, but let Hood and POW tackled the job. It is my belief that historians are second guessing Holland and Tovey. The British were aware of Hood deck weakness but had assumed that improved handling procedures and better powder had solved the issue. Holland had no idea that Hood would blow up, but knew of her weakness. However, she was the best gunnery ship in the fleet and POW was new, just out of the builders yard. He could not put her out in front as many historians claim. Many historians are not naval officers and don't understand the doctrine and procedures necessary to run a fleet of ships. Remember also, that the British fleet was deployed in the Mediterranean to protect North Africa to deal with the Italian fleet which was more of a naval threat than the German ships that had to breakout to get to the Atlantic ports on the coast of France. The Italians did not have that issue so they, to the British were the biggest threat. The British also had to cover the area around Singapore and Ceylon in the Indian Ocean. You are probably right, Tovey need to be prepared for all contingencies. So he had his best ship as reserve. You are right about 14" guns when you consider sinking Bismarck but you need to disable ship not sink her. You need only to slow her down to hunt her with all your dispersed forces which is what really happened. I am still quite impressed how Royal Navy with old ships and limited resources were able to fight in the whole world from Arctic, North Sea, Atlantic, Mediterranean, Indian Ocen and finally Pacific. That is quite impressive, especially with that old battleships, aircraft carriers with inferior planes, cruisers built for numbers not quality as other contry designs and unsufficient number of destroyers and escort vessels.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 28, 2017 14:28:25 GMT -6
As a fleet commander, Tovey had to be prepared for all possibilities. His resources were stretched to the point, that he needed to bring Force H from Gibraltar with Ark Royal to help find and slow Bismarck down; which she eventually did. The British took some heavy loses in the first two years of the war from September 1939 to the end of 1941. Royal Oak on October 14, 1939
Prince of Wales on December 10th, 1941
Barham on November 25,1941
Hood on May 24, 1941
Repulse on December 10, 1941
They also lost Ark Royal in 1941, Courageous, Glorious in the same year.
That is a lot of ships in a very short amount of time. This does not include the cruisers that were lost plus those ships like Victorious that were in dry dock due to damage.
This was why the attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941 was so critical, it gave them much needed help from our two ocean navy.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 28, 2017 21:47:41 GMT -6
As a fleet commander, Tovey had to be prepared for all possibilities. His resources were stretched to the point, that he needed to bring Force H from Gibraltar with Ark Royal to help find and slow Bismarck down; which she eventually did. The British took some heavy loses in the first two years of the war from September 1939 to the end of 1941. Royal Oak on October 14, 1939 Prince of Wales on December 10th, 1941 Barham on November 25,1941 Hood on May 24, 1941 Repulse on December 10, 1941 They also lost Ark Royal in 1941, Courageous, Glorious in the same year. That is a lot of ships in a very short amount of time. This does not include the cruisers that were lost plus those ships like Victorious that were in dry dock due to damage. This was why the attack on Pearl Harbor at the end of 1941 was so critical, it gave them much needed help from our two ocean navy. Courageous was actually lost right off the bat in September 1939 and Glorious in May of 1940, but yes - the British got hit hard in the first two years of the war. What's noteworthy is that Courageous, Royal Oak, Ark Royal, and Barham were all U-boat victims; Glorious and Hood were arguably lucky kills by the German surface fleet while Repulse and Prince of Wales were the victims of a very effective naval aviation arm. During that period Illustrious, Formidable, Resolution, Warspite, and Malaya also had to be sent to the US for repairs, the first four due to air attacks and the last by a Vichy submarine; at the very end of 1941 Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were also knocked out of action due to mining by Italian frogmen.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 29, 2017 11:01:35 GMT -6
The losses listed would indicate a serious deterioration of British naval strength after 1919. This was due to severe "axing" of their naval strength from fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft -carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines. This axing as it has been called, was due to the post war ailing economy and the public demands for defense cuts. The British people were tired of war and defense budgets that were out of sight, while they struggled everyday in a squalid environment. The disconnect between trade and industry with the navy was severe. I believe also that the British fleet forgot some of the lessons from World War 1 in regards to submarines and aircraft capability. I found out in reading several sources that after the Washington Naval Treaty there was a fifteen year gap in capital ship construction and that the effect on technical research, training and skilled craftsmen leaving yards was critical. This would have the effect of increasing the time it took to build new ships. This is a complex story of a tired national public, falling trade and industry in a rising global economy and a deterioration of the shipbuilding industry. All these factors had an effect on the size and effectiveness of the British navy. Here is a good summary of British warships available and some strengths and weakness. It's a good point for discussion. www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignRoyalNavy.htm
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Post by dorn on Dec 1, 2017 6:40:42 GMT -6
The losses listed would indicate a serious deterioration of British naval strength after 1919. This was due to severe "axing" of their naval strength from fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft -carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines. This axing as it has been called, was due to the post war ailing economy and the public demands for defense cuts. The British people were tired of war and defense budgets that were out of sight, while they struggled everyday in a squalid environment. The disconnect between trade and industry with the navy was severe. I believe also that the British fleet forgot some of the lessons from World War 1 in regards to submarines and aircraft capability. I found out in reading several sources that after the Washington Naval Treaty there was a fifteen year gap in capital ship construction and that the effect on technical research, training and skilled craftsmen leaving yards was critical. This would have the effect of increasing the time it took to build new ships. This is a complex story of a tired national public, falling trade and industry in a rising global economy and a deterioration of the shipbuilding industry. All these factors had an effect on the size and effectiveness of the British navy. Here is a good summary of British warships available and some strengths and weakness. It's a good point for discussion. www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignRoyalNavy.htmRelated lessons from WW1 in regards to submarine and aircraft capability, it seems to me that lesson was still there. Adaptation to U-Boat threats was quite good in relation with resources available. The loss of warships because of U-Boats were due to unappropriate use of warships at the beginning of the war. Related to aircraft usage the main reason was that FAA was not under the RN. As I know both USN through excercises and RN through analysis came to same conclusion that fighters cannot defend the fleet, always some planes get through and hit so who first hit win. USN some time play with variant more decks however this idea was rightly abandoned. RN with limited resources in numbers of aircraft and strategic deployment close to land go different way, after Ark Royal (ideal for Pacific theatre) to Illustrious heavily armored carrier. As I know plans for Taranto was prepared before war, RN knows well the importance of aircraft carriers however RN also expected that in waters their ships will operated they will not have air superiority thus aircraft carriers in RN was more support vessels for the fleet (limited resources vs. large air opposition). I remember I read somewhere report of ABC that in Mediterranean to achieve local air superiority he needs 2 aircraft carriers. As future prove it was real to achieve this with 2 carriers however it could not eliminate completely that enemy aircraft could get through and hit ships. If you look when Illustrious class carriers were defences were overhelmed in Mediterranean that you find that it was due to exhausted stock of fighters due to continues air attacks. At this time (1941-2) FAA was probably best in disrupting attacks on ships due to use radar on carriers for fighter direction (pioneered on HMS Ark Royal), much ahead from other navies. I find quite interesting the different approaches for aircraft carries in WW2 - IJN and USN vs. RN. It was clear that by 27.000 tons displacement that was impossible to build carrier with large air group and good passive defence capabilities. Essex class focus on the first, Illustrious nad Implacable on the second. It could be seen that Implacable class if build with same displacement as Essex class (I have never understand why they werent) they could have air group similar to Essex class but not the endurance and support spaces as Essex class. Essex class was really best achievement to focus on hit&run and sustaining long term superiority as I&I classes to defence capabilities (not only armored box). These ships were quite difficult to put out of action.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 2, 2017 11:09:17 GMT -6
The losses listed would indicate a serious deterioration of British naval strength after 1919. This was due to severe "axing" of their naval strength from fifty-eight capital ships, 103 cruisers, twelve aircraft -carriers, 456 destroyers and 122 submarines. This axing as it has been called, was due to the post war ailing economy and the public demands for defense cuts. The British people were tired of war and defense budgets that were out of sight, while they struggled everyday in a squalid environment. The disconnect between trade and industry with the navy was severe. I believe also that the British fleet forgot some of the lessons from World War 1 in regards to submarines and aircraft capability. I found out in reading several sources that after the Washington Naval Treaty there was a fifteen year gap in capital ship construction and that the effect on technical research, training and skilled craftsmen leaving yards was critical. This would have the effect of increasing the time it took to build new ships. This is a complex story of a tired national public, falling trade and industry in a rising global economy and a deterioration of the shipbuilding industry. All these factors had an effect on the size and effectiveness of the British navy. Here is a good summary of British warships available and some strengths and weakness. It's a good point for discussion. www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignRoyalNavy.htmRelated lessons from WW1 in regards to submarine and aircraft capability, it seems to me that lesson was still there. Adaptation to U-Boat threats was quite good in relation with resources available. The loss of warships because of U-Boats were due to unappropriate use of warships at the beginning of the war. Related to aircraft usage the main reason was that FAA was not under the RN. As I know both USN through excercises and RN through analysis came to same conclusion that fighters cannot defend the fleet, always some planes get through and hit so who first hit win. USN some time play with variant more decks however this idea was rightly abandoned. RN with limited resources in numbers of aircraft and strategic deployment close to land go different way, after Ark Royal (ideal for Pacific theatre) to Illustrious heavily armored carrier. As I know plans for Taranto was prepared before war, RN knows well the importance of aircraft carriers however RN also expected that in waters their ships will operated they will not have air superiority thus aircraft carriers in RN was more support vessels for the fleet (limited resources vs. large air opposition). I remember I read somewhere report of ABC that in Mediterranean to achieve local air superiority he needs 2 aircraft carriers. As future prove it was real to achieve this with 2 carriers however it could not eliminate completely that enemy aircraft could get through and hit ships. If you look when Illustrious class carriers were defences were overhelmed in Mediterranean that you find that it was due to exhausted stock of fighters due to continues air attacks. At this time (1941-2) FAA was probably best in disrupting attacks on ships due to use radar on carriers for fighter direction (pioneered on HMS Ark Royal), much ahead from other navies. I find quite interesting the different approaches for aircraft carries in WW2 - IJN and USN vs. RN. It was clear that by 27.000 tons displacement that was impossible to build carrier with large air group and good passive defence capabilities. Essex class focus on the first, Illustrious nad Implacable on the second. It could be seen that Implacable class if build with same displacement as Essex class (I have never understand why they werent) they could have air group similar to Essex class but not the endurance and support spaces as Essex class. Essex class was really best achievement to focus on hit&run and sustaining long term superiority as I&I classes to defence capabilities (not only armored box). These ships were quite difficult to put out of action. Sorry for my tardiness, The Royal Navy did not correctly use their limited resources well at the beginning of the war, against U-boats. They decided that their carrier assets were offensive weapons and should not be used to escort convoys. They used Ark Royal and Courageous with escorts to travel around the coast of Britain checking on submarine reports. Ark Royal was nearly torpedoed on 14 September near the Hebrides and was later attacked on 26 September by Luftwaffe aircraft. Courageous was sunk by torpedoes performing that mission on 17 September. Use of the limited carrier strength in this manner was foolhardy and reeked of a lack of understanding of the problem. We know Glorious was sunk covering the withdrawal of land forces from Narvik, another foolhardy expedition. That accounts for two carriers, badly needed. However, they did managed to sink two cruisers and eight destroyers which severely handicapped the Kriegsmarine in any attempt to invade England later. In the Med, Ark Royal was sunk in November 1941 by a U-boat. I suspect that these carrier losses, including the damaging of Victorious were caused by lack of escorts and poor scouting by their aircraft on board the carriers. As to capital ships, well they lost Royal Oak in Scapa Flow because of their lack of attention to the possibility that the U-boats were better than they were in WW1 and that the base was not secure. They lost Hood to a golden BB although they knew she had a weak deck. They lost Barham in the Med to another U-boat and the Queen Elisabeth and Valiant in Alexandria to frogmen. Which is absurd. They also lost POW and Repulse through neglect, when they knew the Japanese Nell bombers at Saigon had torpedoes and had developed the tactics of attacking warships. The top cover for those ships was never requested by the fleet commander although they were available on the east coast of Malaya. All in all, it does not seem the British Royal Navy had studied the impact of air power on their maritime power. They also lost Hermes in the Indian Ocean along with Dorsetshire to IJN carrier based aircraft.
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Post by steel selachian on May 29, 2018 20:16:30 GMT -6
Figured I would refloat this thread as the most appropriate venue to discuss what I feel was the most absurd expression of Jackie Fisher's battlecruiser mania - the Courageous-class. Two main battery turrets, armor that looked thin on a Sherman tank a quarter-century later, and they required 130 tons of structural stiffening after Courageous was damaged by rough seas during speed trials.
Note: the original impetus for bringing this up was a discussion on another board where someone claimed the primary reason for the Courageous and Glorious only being armed with two dual 15-inch turrets was efficiency; the claim being that they were being designed for end-on chases rather than a broadside duel and at the time a superfiring turret was incapable of firing in a 30-degree forward arc because of the blast damage to the turret below. I can't cite a source, but I have the feeling that's bunk; the USN tested a superfiring turret arrangement on the monitor Florida (BM-9) before proceeding with the South Carolina-class dreadnoughts and all subsequent USN battleships. The RN built a superfiring turret arrangement on the Orion-class dreadnoughts and didn't seem to have any problem incorporating superfiring turrets into every battleship and battlecruiser design after that point save the Courageous-class. My impression from reading was that the two-turret arrangement on the Courageous-class was because a) Fisher was trying to sneak them into the construction program as "large light cruisers" and had to use the six available 15-inch gun turrets already built for a pair of cancelled Renown-class battlecruisers, and b) a dual 15-inch gun turret weighed 810 tons and the goal was to reduce weight and draft as much as possible.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 29, 2018 21:09:39 GMT -6
The Courageous, glorious and Furious were designed by Fisher who was going to use them in the Baltic. They would have good displacement for speed in moderate weather, restricted draught so they could move through the entrance of the Baltic; 5ft 6 in. They would have powerful armament, high speed and protection of a light cruiser with 3 in. from the waterline to the forecastle.
Most historians state that they were a reduced version of the Renown. They were the epitome of Fisher's idea of heaviest possible guns, very high speed and light protection. They were essentially designed to do light cruiser work. The actual reason for the four 15 in. guns was the lack of the guns so they had to reduce the number on these ships. It was said that end-on fire from two 15in guns was too slow and would probably not get any hits on a small fast-moving targets such as a light cruisers, which is the ship they were designed to destroy.
You are correct because the Chancellor of the Exchequer had sanctions against further construction of large warships. His sanctions stated that nothing larger than a light cruiser could be built. But, as Fisher said, the Chancellor never said how big that light cruiser could be and Fisher wanted those Baltic cruisers. The Admiralty had stipulated that the ships had to have powerful armament and to use guns and mountings already available. What they used were mounts and guns earmarked for Renown's that were cancelled.
Generally these ships were given the title of light battle cruisers, interesting in my opinion. They were involved in the last big-ship action of the war but it was always considered a fiasco but Fisher was happy man about their performance. They were always give the titles of Helpless, Hopeless and Useless. Funny unless you are stuck on those ships.
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Post by steel selachian on May 29, 2018 21:32:41 GMT -6
The Courageous, glorious and Furious were designed by Fisher who was going to use them in the Baltic. They would have good displacement for speed in moderate weather, restricted draught so they could move through the entrance of the Baltic; 5ft 6 in. They would have powerful armament, high speed and protection of a light cruiser with 3 in. from the waterline to the forecastle. Most historians state that they were a reduced version of the Renown. They were the epitome of Fisher's idea of heaviest possible guns, very high speed and light protection. They were essentially designed to do light cruiser work. The actual reason for the four 15 in. guns was the lack of the guns so they had to reduce the number on these ships. It was said that end-on fire from two 15in guns was too slow and would probably not get any hits on a small fast-moving targets such as a light cruisers, which is the ship they were designed to destroy. You are correct because the Chancellor of the Exchequer had sanctions against further construction of large warships. His sanctions stated that nothing larger than a light cruiser could be built. But, as Fisher said, the Chancellor never said how big that light cruiser could be and Fisher wanted those Baltic cruisers. The Admiralty had stipulated that the ships had to have powerful armament and to use guns and mountings already available. What they used were mounts and guns earmarked for Renown's that were cancelled. Generally these ships were given the title of light battle cruisers, interesting in my opinion. They were involved in the last big-ship action of the war but it was always considered a fiasco but Fisher was happy man about their performance. They were always give the titles of Helpless, Hopeless and Useless. Funny unless you are stuck on those ships. The nicknames I heard were Outrageous, Uproarious, and Spurious. I had also read that Baltic operations were a secondary rationale for the shallow-draft design; previous RN capital ships such as the QEs were in practice found to operate closer to deep load than anticipated, which reduced their speed ( Hood would suffer badly from this, to the point where she was referred to as "the largest submarine in the Navy"). The Second Battle of Heligoland Bight was certainly a poor showing; Courageous and Glorious fired 149 main battery rounds for one ineffective hit and both suffered blast damage from their own guns. Overall, once all three hulls were rebuilt as aircraft carriers it proved to be a much better use. What about the perception of blast damage from superfiring turrets being a problem? As stated earlier, my impression was this was a non-issue by the time those three ships were constructed.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 29, 2018 22:32:04 GMT -6
The Courageous, glorious and Furious were designed by Fisher who was going to use them in the Baltic. They would have good displacement for speed in moderate weather, restricted draught so they could move through the entrance of the Baltic; 5ft 6 in. They would have powerful armament, high speed and protection of a light cruiser with 3 in. from the waterline to the forecastle. Most historians state that they were a reduced version of the Renown. They were the epitome of Fisher's idea of heaviest possible guns, very high speed and light protection. They were essentially designed to do light cruiser work. The actual reason for the four 15 in. guns was the lack of the guns so they had to reduce the number on these ships. It was said that end-on fire from two 15in guns was too slow and would probably not get any hits on a small fast-moving targets such as a light cruisers, which is the ship they were designed to destroy. You are correct because the Chancellor of the Exchequer had sanctions against further construction of large warships. His sanctions stated that nothing larger than a light cruiser could be built. But, as Fisher said, the Chancellor never said how big that light cruiser could be and Fisher wanted those Baltic cruisers. The Admiralty had stipulated that the ships had to have powerful armament and to use guns and mountings already available. What they used were mounts and guns earmarked for Renown's that were cancelled. Generally these ships were given the title of light battle cruisers, interesting in my opinion. They were involved in the last big-ship action of the war but it was always considered a fiasco but Fisher was happy man about their performance. They were always give the titles of Helpless, Hopeless and Useless. Funny unless you are stuck on those ships. …... What about the perception of blast damage from superfiring turrets being a problem? As stated earlier, my impression was this was a non-issue by the time those three ships were constructed. From my research the real issue was the fact that the British ships had a firing hood for local control which by the time of these three ships, the problem had been solved so I don't think super-firing was an issue. It was for some of the Japanese ships because they were patterned after British ships.
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