Aircraft Lost at Pearl Harbor.... and replaced

[oldpop2000]

Pearl Harbor-Aircraft Lost


I've been playing with numbers. At Pearl Harbor, we lost 169 aircraft destroyed, 159 were heavily damaged. Total losses were 358 aircraft.

Now, in 1941, we produced 8395 combat aircraft. If we divide that figure by 360 days, we get 23.32 aircraft produced daily.


Now, if we divide the aircraft lost or heavily damaged at Pearl Harbor by the daily aircraft production figure, 23.32, we find that it took 15.35 days to replace all those aircraft with newer aircraft.


This is what the Japanese were up against. BTW, our combat aircraft production in 1944 was 74,564. You do the math.

[oldpop2000]

I am expanding this thread from tactical level, to strategy and grand strategy of the War in the Pacific. I want to explore new ideas of why the Japanese lost, could they have won, why did we start badly and was it just overwhelming industrial capacity that decided the outcome.

I am going to include some information about the War in Europe, specifically the Allies, Russia, Germany and Italy. This inclusion will be related to the outcome in the Pacific only.

I want to examine the War in the Pacific from a different view, using actual facts, not fantasy. It is a work in progress as I am now reading and reviewing documentation and books so stay tuned.

Most of the discussions on this forum, are related to RTW and soon, RTW2 specifically about tactical level and technology. This thread will move my discussion to a higher level and hopefully provide some new insights as to how to conduct a game, from a strategic and grand strategic view.

Basically, this thread will examine "The Road Not Taken". As I have stated, this will be based on alternate paths that could and should have been take. 

[oldpop2000]

We always want defined starting points. For this thread, we could start with the Meji Restoration around the late 1870's when the Emperor, eliminated the feudal Shogunite society and brought his nation into the industrial age. He brought in the US, and European nations to begin to instructing his countrymen and building all the infrastructure that we associate with the industrial revolutionary period. The problem for Japan was that she had no natural resources upon which to build that structure. No iron ore, almost no coal, oil, tungsten, chromium, nickel, copper, rubber. These and others, are essential to building an industrial nation. As her population grew, she ran out of arable land for her staple, rice. Where does she go to get all these essential products? Well, go West young man; Korea, Manchuria and China.

It is hard for us to imagine the Japanese society in the late 19th century when we consider their society today. After the Meji Restoration and beginning of industrialization of the nation, Japanese society was, for the most part, aggressive and imperialistic. They felt they had the destiny to control and rule over the Far East. This is not an attitude that can be erased by an edict that tells the Samurai warriors to put their swords away and go find a job. It will and did find expression. In my opinion, this was the underlying cause of the War in the Pacific between the Allies and Japan.

Japan's first move westward was during the First Sino-Japanese war, in which she gained influence over Korea. In 1905, she fought the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan gained Port Arthur on Liaodong Peninsula along with Formosa and the southern half of Sakhalin island  but both were financially exhausted. Most historians believe that this was a defeat for the Russians and put Japan in position as a main Asian power. Finally, the Western powers began to take notice. This may have been the road that should "not have been taken". You gained essentially nothing, exhausted your economy, and awakened three of the most powerful nations in the world plus the Dutch who had the East Indies. This maybe where we examine "the road not taken". Should Japan have possibly tried to iron out her differences with the Russians peacefully instead of attacking Port Arthur before declaring war? Had she not fought this war, possibly the Western powers would have failed to wake up to Japan's aggressiveness. This would have given her some real advantages in the future. The search for resources could have been satisfied with diplomacy, not aggression. 

[steel selachian]

Admittedly, Japan's behavior during this period also has to be viewed through the lens of what else was going on in the area in the late 19th century - the European powers were busily carving up China and other parts of the Far East, often at gunpoint. On a certain level Japan's actions in Korea were par for the course and they saw Russian expansion into Manchuria and Korea as a direct threat.

Just recalling from my reading, the Russians were not particularly interested in diplomacy in the lead-up to the Russo-Japanese War. In particular, Czar Nicholas II was being egged on by his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II to stand up to the "yellow peril;" this may have partially been motivated by Wilhelm's desire to break up Russia's alliance with France, which did not approve of Russia's expansion into China and Korea, and create a Russo-German alliance. The Japanese made proposals to recognize Manchuria as being within the Russian sphere of influence if the Russians would recognize Korea as being within the Japanese sphere of interest; how sincere that proposal was is somewhat open to interpretation but it was not taken up by Russia. Nicholas II was dismissive of the Japanese as a race and didn't appear to think they would have the gall to actually go to war, much less defeat Russian forces. He was also convinced that Cousin Wilhelm would back him up in a war against Japan.

While both sides suffered a roughly equal number of casualties, at the end of hostilities Russia had lost its major warm-water port on the Pacific and had two entire fleets destroyed. That said, Japan's economy was stretched thin and they were pursuing diplomatic overtures to end the war long before Russia did; Nicholas II refused to negotiate until the Baltic Fleet wound up on the receiving end of a curb-stomping at Tsushima. The Japanese public, being unaware that Japan couldn't fight a prolonged war, was upset that the Treaty of Portsmouth only awarded them some minor territorial and railway concessions, Russian recognition of Japan's influence in Korea, and a Russian military withdrawal from Port Arthur and Manchuria without any financial reparations. I'd argue that the point where Japan put itself on the road to WWII was after Portsmouth; the popular perception was that they had resoundingly defeated a major Western power only to be denied the spoils of victory by the U.S. and Europe. That lack of awareness as to the costs of a drawn-out conflict against an opponent with superior resources bit them hard forty years later.

[oldpop2000]

May 7, 2018 19:56:31 GMT -6 steel selachian said:

Admittedly, Japan's behavior during this period also has to be viewed through the lens of what else was going on in the area in the late 19th century - the European powers were busily carving up China and other parts of the Far East, often at gunpoint. On a certain level Japan's actions in Korea were par for the course and they saw Russian expansion into Manchuria and Korea as a direct threat.

Just recalling from my reading, the Russians were not particularly interested in diplomacy in the lead-up to the Russo-Japanese War. In particular, Czar Nicholas II was being egged on by his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II to stand up to the "yellow peril;" this may have partially been motivated by Wilhelm's desire to break up Russia's alliance with France, which did not approve of Russia's expansion into China and Korea, and create a Russo-German alliance. The Japanese made proposals to recognize Manchuria as being within the Russian sphere of influence if the Russians would recognize Korea as being within the Japanese sphere of interest; how sincere that proposal was is somewhat open to interpretation but it was not taken up by Russia. Nicholas II was dismissive of the Japanese as a race and didn't appear to think they would have the gall to actually go to war, much less defeat Russian forces. He was also convinced that Cousin Wilhelm would back him up in a war against Japan.

While both sides suffered a roughly equal number of casualties, at the end of hostilities Russia had lost its major warm-water port on the Pacific and had two entire fleets destroyed. That said, Japan's economy was stretched thin and they were pursuing diplomatic overtures to end the war long before Russia did; Nicholas II refused to negotiate until the Baltic Fleet wound up on the receiving end of a curb-stomping at Tsushima. The Japanese public, being unaware that Japan couldn't fight a prolonged war, was upset that the Treaty of Portsmouth only awarded them some minor territorial and railway concessions, Russian recognition of Japan's influence in Korea, and a Russian military withdrawal from Port Arthur and Manchuria without any financial reparations. I'd argue that the point where Japan put itself on the road to WWII was after Portsmouth; the popular perception was that they had resoundingly defeated a major Western power only to be denied the spoils of victory by the U.S. and Europe. That lack of awareness as to the costs of a drawn-out conflict against an opponent with superior resources bit them hard forty years later.

The Russo-Japanese War was a product of the Russian diplomatic intervention, forcing Japan to give up the Liaotungu Peninsula and this created a serious conflict with the Japanese. It was an affront to their honor. This goes back to the national psyche. While the Japanese accepted the loss, they had committed themselves to regaining it. They managed to get the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and this kept the third powers from intervening in the upcoming war with Russia.

The Russian government certainly had a hand in creating the situation that erupted in the Russo-Japanese war, both sides were to be faulted for aggressive actions. But no matter what the Russian's did, the Japanese government was absolutely certain that the Russian's were preparing for a confrontation. It was based on this assumption, that prompted the Japanese to go to war and Port Arthur attack was the result.


France did try to persuade the Czar against this conflict but to no avail. They considered the Japanese a weak opponent and that they could easily defeat them.


Both sides were at fault but the war did awaken the Western nations to Japan's expansionism and this created the situation that only got worse in 1931. This has to be a "road that should not have been taken" in my perspective.

[oldpop2000]

As I've gone back to review my books and documents to determine a new viewpoint for myself, I discovered an interesting irony about the War in the Pacific and Japanese-American relations. The ironic story is the connection between Alfred Thayer Mahan's book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660=1783. The book was published in 1890, and was considered very timely by the British Admiralty, Germany and especially Japan.

Baron Kaneko was in the US at the time, got the introduction and first chapters and when he returned to Japan had them translated and published in the IJN Naval Officer's Journal. The final translation of the whole book was available in 1896 and several thousand copies were sold in a day or two. The Naval and Army Staff colleges adopted it as their textbook and copies were presented to the Emperor and crown prince .

One of the most influential members of the Privy Council in Japan stated "Japan is a sea power". He argued, "Japanese leaders must carefully study Mahan's doctrines to secure command of the sea; Japan would then be able to control the commerce and navigation in the Pacific and gain sufficient power to defeat any enemy. " Later, this same person stated "The Japanese empire is the foremost sea power in the Pacific". In my opinion, this is the blueprint for the Japanese military and civilian leaders which eventually led to the War in the Pacific. It is ironic that the path to defeat for Japan was begun by a US Naval officer. They developed their naval doctrine and built their ships in accordance with his teachings. The problem, as I see it was the Japanese failure to understand that the book and his teachings were meant for the US, a nation that had the industrial power and natural resources to pursue merchantalistic imperialism based on Naval power. The Japanese did not have that capability. I am going to develop this point more as a I continue to review.

[oldpop2000]

As I have continued to research the possible starting point for the War in the Pacific, I believe I have found the first confrontation between Japan and the US. It was the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the opposition groups. It actually started in 1887 with the Bayonet Constitution. In 1881, King Kalakaua had visited Japan and urged them to send workers to Hawaii for the sugar cane fields. This eventually led to the Asian's and Japanese to actually have a greater population percentage than the ethnic Hawaiian's. The United States did have a role in the 1893 revolution when the USS Boston was in the harbor at Honolulu and landed about 160 Marines. The Japanese sent the Cruiser Naniwa and another into the harbor to protect the Asian workers.

It is generally agreed that the revolution of 1893 was American backed. In 1897 there was a counterrevolution and again, a confrontation between US Marines, naval vessels and the IJN ship Naniwa. In 1898, during the Spanish-American War in which the US gained Guam and the Philippines, it annexed the Hawaiian Island. This was an event which was an affront to Japanese pride and goals, to extend their influence to the Hawaiian islands.
In fact, the US Navy took possession of Pearl Harbor as a Naval Base on November 9, 1887. The base expansion and enhancements were started during the Spanish-American War to support operations in the Pacific. However, real attention to the harbor and its improvement began around 1901. This was due to the US government recognizing the Japanese imperialistic aggressive attitude and hoping to develop a forward base to protect our new overseas acquisitions.

I am certain that this was the first confrontation between two aggressive nations and that the loss of influence by the Japanese over the Hawaiian's might have been the underlying reason for the attack on Pearl Harbor. I've seen nothing in writing to prove that point, but I suspect there was lingering resentment over the move by the US to gain the Hawaiian Islands. I suspect that the IJN and government also learned that logistically, the Hawaiian Islands were way beyond their capability to maintain in any conflict.

It is ironic that the first real confrontation, takes place about a half a century before the event that started the War in the Pacific.

[oldpop2000]

I've gone back and explored the "Age of Imperialism" for the United States. This was in the late 19th century was characterized by economic, military and cultural influences by us on other countries. Our businessmen were seeking new international markets, as I have said in another post to sell their goods. Men like Andrew Carnegie, J.J. Rockefeller, Cornelius Vanderbilt and others were seeking new markets. We also believed in the concept of social Darwinism which said that we had a responsibility to bring industry, democracy and Christianity to the less well developed nations. These attitudes are what pushed us into imperialism. We always believed that we had a world mission to spread liberty and democracy to the world; what was later called, "making the world safe for democracy".

This attitude of Social Darwinism was universal in the world at this time, the Japanese subscribed to it. The difference was their lack of raw materials but importantly their arrogance- a view of the country as the land favored by the Gods, the land that others should recognize as superior. This attitude was entirely different from the Western Christian nations and their treatment of their colonies and areas of influence reflect this attitude that they were superior. In my analysis, this is the point of conflict between the United States and Japan. We had a good trade relationship with Japan and with the proper government in Japan, we got along just fine. But the military was, in my estimation still stuck in the Feudal Age and the Bushido code, they meant they treated even their own people as slaves and underlings. This probably, more than anything, caused the eventual rift between the US and Japan. The post World War 1 events in China from 1931 onward to the attack on Pearl Harbor only accentuated this attitude and pushed the Japanese closer to war with the US and Western Nations.

I am now reading the first chapters of "Rising Sun" by John Toland. He is relating the internal politics after the 1923 Tokyo Earthquake and the post assassination conflict. I will get back later because I think this line of history has merit for my alternative paths for the Japanese.

[oldpop2000]

I am now focusing my historical analysis on the 1920's especially after the Tokyo Earthquake of 1923. This period from this disaster to Pearl Harbor seems to hold the key events and elements of my attempt to find an alternate path "not taken" by the Japanese. I am using "Rising Sun" by John Toland, "Culture Shock and the Japanese-American Relations by Sadao Asada along with a few websites.

[oldpop2000]

I think I have finally settled on the answer as to whether there was another road for the Japanese. There was another road and should have been taken by Emperor Hirohito despite his post-war testament that he was a prisoner. He was not a prisoner. The Meji Constitution granted the Emperor absolute power and on three separate occasions he demonstrated that power. In 1929 he forced the resignation of his prime minister; in 1936 he overruled his military advisors to insist on the harshest treatment of the young officers involved in the coup d'état; finally in August 1945 he overruled his advisors by insisting on a Japanese surrender. He had the power to stop Japan's military adventurism in the 1930's but he decided to do nothing. His former aide-de camp Vice Admiral Hirata stated "What his majesty did at the end of the war, we might have had him do at the start".

So the "path not taken" was Hirohito stopping the march toward war, which began in China and Manchuria. He could have brought the army in that area home. He could have insisted on a peace overture to the US to guarantee Japan would have access to raw materials, and I suspect Roosevelt probably would have gone along with it.

Fascinating, what you find, when you dig deep enough and open your mind to different ideas.

[steel selachian]

May 13, 2018 22:16:01 GMT -6 oldpop2000 said:

I think I have finally settled on the answer as to whether there was another road for the Japanese. There was another road and should have been taken by Emperor Hirohito despite his post-war testament that he was a prisoner. He was not a prisoner. The Meji Constitution granted the Emperor absolute power and on three separate occasions he demonstrated that power. In 1929 he forced the resignation of his prime minister; in 1936 he overruled his military advisors to insist on the harshest treatment of the young officers involved in the coup d'état; finally in August 1945 he overruled his advisors by insisting on a Japanese surrender. He had the power to stop Japan's military adventurism in the 1930's but he decided to do nothing. His former aide-de camp Vice Admiral Hirata stated "What his majesty did at the end of the war, we might have had him do at the start".

So the "path not taken" was Hirohito stopping the march toward war, which began in China and Manchuria. He could have brought the army in that area home. He could have insisted on a peace overture to the US to guarantee Japan would have access to raw materials, and I suspect Roosevelt probably would have gone along with it.

Fascinating, what you find, when you dig deep enough and open your mind to different ideas.

The problem with the latter example though is that there was a coup attempt within the IJA to prevent Hirohito's surrender speech from being read and force continuation of the war; that was with Japan's military had been ground to a pulp, the cities burnt to cinders, the populace starved, two nuclear strikes, and the Soviet Union jumping off the sidelines. I can imagine that had Hirohito attempted to defy the militarists in the 1930s he may have faced a more serious and organized challenge to his rule. Even with the supposed respect for the emperor, extremists get funny ideas when the guy in charge doesn't call things to their liking. I'd also say his description of his role as a "prisoner" was convenient exaggeration, but I also doubt he could have checked the ambitions of the militant factions in the 1930s. As we discussed in another thread regarding the short conflict between the Soviet Army and IJA, the Kwantung Army was practically a rogue force by the time of that conflict and attacked the Soviets without orders from Tokyo. That lack of respect for the chain of command does not suggest an edict from Hirohito would have forced the IJA to quit China and Manchuria.

Additionally, since we've already mentioned the Russo-Japanese War, remember that at this point Japan has been two for two in obtaining territorial and resource gains by inflicting a sharp, shocking defeat against what appeared to be a much larger continental power - perhaps three for three if counting their apparent successes in China during the 1930s. While some of the more nuanced thinkers like Yamamoto knew that the U.S. would crush Japan in an extended war, they were marginalized and even threatened - one of the reasons Yamamoto was posted to the Combined Fleet was out of concern that he would be assassinated by the militarists if he remained ashore. To the militarists, what they were doing was the same thing that had worked before - fighting the last war, so to speak. The extent to which the Japanese military was using the same playbook as it had in the Russo-Japanese War is telling.

As an aside, one of the more thought-provoking novels I've read was, funnily enough, Matthew Stover's Shatterpoint, which is set in the fictional Star Wars universe and contains plenty of nods to Heart of Darkness and Apocalypse Now. Much of the narration from the viewpoint of the main character (the Jedi Master played by Samuel L. Jackson in the prequel movies) is on his concept of "shatterpoints" - points in time and space where a single action can change the course of history, much as a single chisel tap at a precise point on a diamond will shatter it. In another time or place, that same action would not have the same effect. The example given at the novel's opening is how killing the leadership of the Separatist forces prior to the start of open hostilities might have ended the Clone Wars on its opening day, as opposed to being ineffective six months into the fighting. Applied to this discussion of prewar Japan, it's a question of if and when a singular event such as an edict from Hirohito could have forestalled the Japanese march to regional empire and war, or whether that would have required a wholesale sea change in Japanese politics and culture decades before Pearl Harbor. I would argue that absent a severe military setback in China discrediting the Japanese militarists, the train had already left the station in the early 1930s. Five or ten years earlier, maybe it could have been stopped in its tracks and war averted. By 1945, it would take national catastrophe and years of foreign military occupation to change Japan.

[oldpop2000]

It is my personal belief that Hirohito was not strong enough, personality-wise to have stopped the march toward war with the US. Here is something I thought was interesting; "Writing a few weeks after the monarch’s death, John Whitehead, Britain’s ambassador to Japan, stated: “A man of stronger personality than Hirohito might have tried more strenuously to check the growing influence of the military in Japanese politics and the drift of Japan toward war with the western powers.“The contemporary diary evidence suggests that Hirohito was uncomfortable with the direction of Japanese policy.

Does this mean he was unable to stop the path taken? No, I am not a believer that one person or event charts a course in history. I also am not a believer in determinism. But if Hirohito had at least tried, openly, to chart a new course, possibly many of his aides and government official and officers, who were supportive of a new course, might have taken this as a sign that something had to be done. Had the US even got a hint of his attempt to steer the Japanese in another direction, they might have assisted in some way, economically.

In a new book titled "Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, the author states that the Japan was antagonistic racially and this was in their constitution. The Imperial Constitution of Great Japan of 1889, known as the Meiji Constitution was built on absolutist power. It gave the Emperor enormous military and civil powers essentially defining as the superintendant of the powers of sovereighnty. However, in reality the cardinal rule of Japanese consitutionism was that the responsibility for decision-making lay not in the emperor, where the power actually lay, but in his cabinet,composed of ministers who were supposedly responsible for the advice they gave him, but the author states they were not.

I really have to continue my studying of this period, 1925 to 1945 to get a full understanding, but it would seem, that the Emperor had to bluff his people in to thinking he was all powerful, but he was not. He eventually had to shift the power to the military to control his people and this led to the War In the Pacific. Again, I have about four books to read and then I will understand all this better.

I am currently reading a good article on the Kwantung Army and it effects on the relations with China, which caused the rift with the US.

As to your idea that a wholesale change in the government and the attitude of the people might have been the requirement to stop the war, that is entirely possible. It might be that the "path taken" was the only one to eliminate the Japanese problems with the rest of the world and especially Asia. 

[steel selachian]

Other factors that may have influenced Japanese intentions prior to the 1930s were two key treaties - the Treaty of Portsmouth to end the Russo-Japanese War, which we already touched upon, and the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. It can be argued that in both cases, the expectations of the Japanese militarists and the civilian population were far beyond what Japanese diplomats could practically achieve.

As stated before, Japan was the first party in the Russo-Japanese War to move for peace negotiations; while Japanese forces were enjoying an unbroken string of victories casualties were mounting, their supply lines in Manchuria were getting longer, and Japan was accumulating a large foreign debt to finance the war. The only Russian territory Japan had occupied was Sakhalin Island, which they hoped to use as a bargaining chip. Russia did not agree to peace negotiations until after the loss of the Second Pacific Squadron at Tsushima; Czar Nicholas II had initially forbidden his delegates to agree to territorial concessions, reparations, or limitations on Russian military deployments in the Far East. Japan wanted recognition of their interests in Korea, a Russian military withdrawal from Manchuria, reparations, and control of Sakhalin Island. The Russians eventually agreed to recognize Japan's interests in Korea and withdraw their forces from Manchuria; however rather they proposed to trade Sakhalin in return for the Japanese dropping their reparation claims. The Japanese delegation refused and the Russian delegation made a show of packing their bags; at the same time an additional four divisions of Russian troops arrived in Manchuria. The Russian delegation knew Japan couldn't afford to continue hostilities and the Japanese had to settle for half of Sakhalin Island; this perceived discrepancy led to rioting in Japan and the collapse of the Cabinet. The popular perception was that Japan had won the war but had been "cheated" out of the spoils by the Western powers, particularly the U.S.

Advance to 1922 and Japan enters the Washington Naval Conference with one of the three most powerful navies on the globe and a mutual alliance with Great Britain. However, Japan had taken the opportunity of WWI to demand control of Germany's former colonial possessions in China and attempted to impose substantial control over China itself (the so-called "Twenty-One Demands" issued in 1915). While Japan was awarded the former German possessions and entrenched their existing interests in China, they were forced to drop their most intrusive demands, had damaged their alliance with Great Britain, and increased American suspicion of their intentions.

In 1922 the three powers were in the early stages of a new dreadnought arms race; however isolationist sentiment in the U.S. was strong, Britain was drained by WWI, and Japan lacked the material and financial resources to match the other two in an extended arms race. The U.S. was primarily out to reduce the threat from Japanese expansionism, while Japan was seeking a naval treaty with the other two powers and recognition of its territorial gains in the Pacific. Japan was at a disadvantage as the U.S. "Black Chamber" had broken their diplomatic codes. The outcome of the conference included the infamous 5:5:3 ratio, which rational minds like Yamamoto saw as a far better deal for Japan than an unchecked arms race but militarists saw as a slight to Japan. The conference also produced two other relevant outcomes - the Nine-Power Treaty which saw the formal affirmation of the Open Door Policy regarding China and the end of Japan's alliance with Britain, both of which were seen in Japan as the two dominant Western powers seeking to contain Japan. Again, the militarists and the public felt the West was conspiring to keep Japan a second-rate power by comparison, even though realistically both nations were out of Japan's league.

In the first instance, perhaps Japanese leadership could have tempered expectations from the Russo-Japanese War. By any measure the result was a victory for Japan by neutralizing its most immediate regional threat, the Russian military presence in China. It seems rather difficult to argue for reparations and territorial concessions when one fired the opening shots and only took one small piece of Russian territory. However, having read a bit now I wonder if the potential "fork in the road" we're looking for is the Twenty-One Demands issued to China in 1915. That overreach mortally wounded Japan's alliance with Great Britain and furthered U.S. apprehensions about Japanese expansionism; after 1922 Japan found itself regarded by both powers as a potential threat and made no effort to mend fences afterwards. Perhaps if Japan had not tried to take undue advantage of China during WWI it could have parlayed its support for the Allied Powers into stable coexistence with British and American interests in the Pacific. Ironically, the Japanese withdrawal from the Washington Naval Treaty that so irked the militarists sealed Japan's doom five years before Pearl Harbor; with the treaty broken the U.S. was free to unleash its own industrial base and did so.

What amuses me to this day is the perception that the U.S. was unprepared for war in 1941; while Pearl Harbor and the Philippines were woefully unready for an attack the U.S. had been rearming for several years at that point, as indicated in the original post. Many of the ships ordered under the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 were cancelled or scrapped because the war was over before they were built.

[oldpop2000]

The Treaty of Portsmouth, while not pleasing the Japanese because they had actually won the war, did end it before it had bankrupted the Japanese nation. What it did for the Japanese was make them realize that they were not economically capable of fighting a modern war. World War 1 re-emphasized this to them and they began to take action. In every war that the Japanese had fought, neutral powers had supplied the necessary financing and materials. The wars were short, they did not have to "muster the full power of the Japanese economy. However, this view was altered in 1915 with WW1. It revolutionized Japanese military thinking about modern warfare and there were no neutrals. It was in this time period, that Japan's security problems were investigated. The investigations showed that neither the home islands, Formosa, Korea, or Southern Sakhalin Island had the resources for waging a modern war. This led to the idea of taking Manchuria and Northern China. This is the key to the eventual slide toward war with the Allied powers especially the United States.

I am going to present more information in this line of thought over the coming days because this was the key to the War In the Pacific.

Now as to the war preparations, Pearl Harbor was still being prepared as the Naval Headquarters for the newly created US Pacific Fleet. The radar network was not completed although radars had been placed and a rudimentary fighter control center established. The Naval Repair station was not completed and the new Red Hills Fuel Storage in the mountains was not completed. Admiral Richardson explained this to Roosevelt and told him the fleet needed to return to San Diego and San Pedro. He was fired because of his comments. The Philippines were going to be sacrificed because the Navy could not reach them in time to save them without taking the Central Pacific for repair, and refueling bases. This was long in the Naval planning especially after War Plan Orange was eliminated as a naval planning document. No one in the military or the civilian government expected those islands to survive a Japanese invasion. They just wanted them to hold out as long as possible, which they did.


The idea that we were not prepared for war is not sensible. We lost about 159 aircraft damaged and 169 destroyed. We replaced or could replace those aircraft in fifteen days at the current production levels. Only the deals to supply Britain and Australia with aircraft slowed the process. We were prepared or preparing for war, the attack on Pearl was a surprise as to location, but not its actual occurrence. The US figured the Philippines would be the target.

[oldpop2000]

After the report in 1915 about Japan lack of a strong domestic economy and adequate resources for a long war, the Japanese embarked on a two phase solution. Improve the economic strength of the country which would make mobilization better and develop a mobilization plan for an extended war. This would take place in around 1917.

The actual beginnings of the plan to improve the economy and industries, along with developing a mobilization plan began in 1924. The plan developed in 1927 encompassed all of Japan's economic activity. They would track all persons in the country who were working, labor actions and management profits were to be controlled and all factories would be controlled by direct military supervision. Personally, I don't see this as a capitalist economy but as a socialist economy, I could be mistaken.

The Japanese understood that this economic and mobilization plan would not be accomplished overnight but would take at least five years and needed peace to be done. The plan was almost ready by September 1931 but then events at Mukden on 18 September changed the deadline.

The key to the plan, as related, was the need for resources. Here is quote from one of my books which does tell it better than I can.

Japan could not confine its attempt to achieve self-sufficiency to preparing the domestic economy for total mobilization. As Koiso’s initial studies had indicated, the economy lacked adequate quantities of nearly all the materials needed for modern warfare—and this realization added an economic dimension to the already considerable strategic attractiveness of controlling nearby territories in China. The logical starting point was Manchuria.
Mukden is of course, in Manchuria. The incident was of no consequence and it has been discovered that the Japanese Kwantung Army actually caused the railroad explosion to provide a reason to invade Manchuria and make it an autonomous state. The rail line that was hit by the explosion was the line running from Mukden to the port of Dairen on the Liaotung Peninsula, where Port Arthur was located. This line would be used to transport troops rapidly northward to the border in case of a war again, with Russia. The line, South Manchurian Railway Co. would be able to transport the newly excavated mines resources to the port for transportation to Japan. It was key to the self-sufficiency drive and plan for the Japanese government. There were coal mines at Fushun, a central lab and a geologic institute new large iron or deposits in Anshan. Eventually, near Fushan, the first synthetic oil facility would be built.

The IJN needed self-sufficiency also because this was the time when ships were being converted to oil and Japan did not have adequate oil reserves. She had 100,000 barrels from North Sakhalin island through Sinclair Oil but it was not enough for wartime naval operations. As the Japanese began to build a huge fleet, that oil supply was even less. The IJN had to find a source besides stockpiling oil from the US and Borneo. During a war however, the Japanese could not count on these two suppliers and Formosan research proved negative. The two sources possible were to move south and take Borneo, and develop Manchurian Oil Shale.
Now we can see that both branches of the Japanese military had economic interests in Manchuria. This should also illustrate the beginnings of the Southern Operation that initiated the War in the Pacific. It was this drive for self-sufficiency and the Japanese attitude toward other nations and their people, are what drove them to the final end; WWII in the Pacific.