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Post by oldpop2000 on May 22, 2018 18:28:28 GMT -6
I started this avenue of analysis to discover "the road not taken" that possibly would have prevented the War in the Pacific and essentially the destruction of the Imperial Japanese government. I now believe that I know what that "road" was. After this post I am going to continue to explore some possibilities for winning the war, or at least getting a peace treaty with the US without the long destructive war. Let's finish the answer to the "Road Not Taken".
"The Road Not Taken" was the cessation of hostilities with China, pulling their army out of Northern China, leaving Nanking and Hankow in the hands of the Nationalist Chinese, leaving a small covering force along the Northern border with Russia and returning the rest of the force home. This action, would have reduced the military requirements that were bankrupting the nation and preventing the plan for self-sufficiency and mobilization from being a reality. For once, even the Emperor had recommended to the Army ministers to stop the war and bring home the forces. It was a recommendation from the Constitutional Monarch who was given the leadership role in the government. He failed his government and his people.
This war was also alienating the nations that were the Japanese only source of funds and trade like Great Britain and the US. The US leaders knew that the Japanese were no economically strong enough to continue developing their industries alone. Many of our leaders were of the opinion that the Japanese would realize that they could not continue the war and would shut it down. Another group did not believe that they would, because they understood the Japanese psyche. They could never admit they had made a mistake.
The IJN, realizing that the oil situation for them was very bad, decided to develop their own plan and that was the Southern Operation. This plan would ultimately lead to Pearl Harbor and the Philippines and the War in the Pacific. Their only reason was to ensure that they got sufficient funding to build more warships.
The question that I now ask is whether the Japanese government could have stopped the war in China and brought home their forces. My answer is no, because they were still acting like a feudal nation with warloards, in this case, the Kwantung Army which acted on its own most of the time. China actually wasn't any better, and both nations would not move away from this feudal mentality until after the War in the Pacific and the war between the Chinese communists and the nationalist.
Could the Western nations have any real effect? Possibly without the War in Europe, they could have but once Germany took out the French, Dutch and Belgians, and put the British in a tight strategic spot in the Mediterranean, there was nothing these nations could do. Neither could the US, because she had already decided to put Europe first and because War Plan Orange was no longer the guiding plan for the Pacific. But this is another story. The "Road Not Taken" probably would never have been taken until the Japanese warlord mentality was eliminated. The War in the Pacific was probably the only road that would have worked, and it did.
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Post by oaktree on Jun 1, 2018 20:19:59 GMT -6
I believe that Toland pointed out in _Rising Sun_ that Japan had painted itself in a corner by late 1941. The US/Allied oil and other embargoes were hitting home. The IJN was lying to the Japanese government about how much oil they had stockpiled, and even that was not going to be enough for any extended period of war (and usage exceeded their estimates once the war started.)
I think the "road not taken" boils down to Japan at some point accepting that they would only be a regional power at best. And perhaps that they should have kept their navy as a smaller enterprise primarily geared towards supporting army operations. That, in itself, would have alarmed the US and UK quite a bit less.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 1, 2018 20:43:01 GMT -6
I believe that Toland pointed out in _Rising Sun_ that Japan had painted itself in a corner by late 1941. The US/Allied oil and other embargoes were hitting home. The IJN was lying to the Japanese government about how much oil they had stockpiled, and even that was not going to be enough for any extended period of war (and usage exceeded their estimates once the war started.) I think the "road not taken" boils down to Japan at some point accepting that they would only be a regional power at best. And perhaps that they should have kept their navy as a smaller enterprise primarily geared towards supporting army operations. That, in itself, would have alarmed the US and UK quite a bit less. There is no doubt that Japan had painted themselves into a corner. Two reasons are evident. They wanted self-sufficiency and they wanted an empire. Remember that since 1902, the Japanese had had a series of agreements with the British, who, in my opinion was their model. They simply said "We will do it like the British, go out and get our necessary resources by taking over other regions and developing an empire". The only direction that they could see that was close and had the resources was Manchuria and Northern China. Unfortunately that put them into conflict with the US. I don't think the Japanese realized that times had changed, there was more globalization in the world. You could not just go out and take a country without encountering the two biggest and most powerful nations in the world; Great Britain and the US. Both wanted an open door policy in China. The Japanese forgot or did not remember that the British attitude towards their colonies was generally a friendly and helpful attitude. They were not barbaric, in most cases. This was the deciding difference. The Japanese on the whole treated their fellow Asian neighbors as underlings, not equals and again this put them into conflict with the US and Great Britain. Everything after the movement into Korea, Manchuria and then into Northern China was the downhill slide. The "path not take" probably should have been to remove their Kwantung Army from Manchuria and simply use economic blocks and contractual agreements to help develop the native resources and use those resources. This most likely would have been a good path to take. But the Japanese had been a feudal society for three hundred years with Shogun's running everything, its hard to overcome that stigma in about fifty years.
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Post by Airy W on Jun 9, 2018 1:23:04 GMT -6
The question that I now ask is whether the Japanese government could have stopped the war in China and brought home their forces. My answer is no, because they were still acting like a feudal nation with warloards, in this case, the Kwantung Army which acted on its own most of the time. China actually wasn't any better, and both nations would not move away from this feudal mentality until after the War in the Pacific and the war between the Chinese communists and the nationalist. I think you are overstating the political atavism of Japan rather drastically and China somewhat as well. Japan had been an increasingly democratic nation in the 30s and they wouldn't have industrialized in the first place were in not for the fact that they had all the institutions of a modern economy. Japan was hardly the only nation in that period to backslide on democracy at the hands of military strongmen; it's downright cliche to talk about south american "juntas" taking that path. Not every junta lead to war. In China the feudal label is closer to the mark because much of the country was indeed still in the control of warlords however it's worth noting that the part of the country not in the control of warlords was by far the most important part economically, socially and politically. It's possible for the country to drag the cities of China back into the past, as happened in the cultural revolution and Tainamen Square massacre but it's also possible for the cities of China to drag the country along with them, as has happened more recently.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 9, 2018 12:48:49 GMT -6
The question that I now ask is whether the Japanese government could have stopped the war in China and brought home their forces. My answer is no, because they were still acting like a feudal nation with warloards, in this case, the Kwantung Army which acted on its own most of the time. China actually wasn't any better, and both nations would not move away from this feudal mentality until after the War in the Pacific and the war between the Chinese communists and the nationalist. I think you are overstating the political atavism of Japan rather drastically and China somewhat as well. Japan had been an increasingly democratic nation in the 30s and they wouldn't have industrialized in the first place were in not for the fact that they had all the institutions of a modern economy. Japan was hardly the only nation in that period to backslide on democracy at the hands of military strongmen; it's downright cliche to talk about south american "juntas" taking that path. Not every junta lead to war. In China the feudal label is closer to the mark because much of the country was indeed still in the control of warlords however it's worth noting that the part of the country not in the control of warlords was by far the most important part economically, socially and politically. It's possible for the country to drag the cities of China back into the past, as happened in the cultural revolution and Tainamen Square massacre but it's also possible for the cities of China to drag the country along with them, as has happened more recently. My comments are based on the verdict of history. By the Japanese officers and civilians who survived the war, and historians who were in Japan after the war. Your comments are always welcomed, thanks.
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Post by steel selachian on Jun 10, 2018 9:52:44 GMT -6
I don't consider myself a political scientist, but the sheer level of factionalism present in Japan's government and armed forces at the time certainly suggests "feudal" as an adjective if nothing else. Prior to the war assassination was being used as a political tool and the Kwantung Army was a rogue force in China, going so far as to start an armed conflict with the Soviets without orders from Tokyo.
One of the factors that led to Japan's downfall in WWII was that the IJA and IJN made interservice rivalry in the US look like the Army, Navy, and Marines were all sitting around the campfire singing "Kumbayah." The IJN and IJA acted like they were fighting entirely separate wars, which to some extent they were.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 10, 2018 10:32:13 GMT -6
I don't consider myself a political scientist, but the sheer level of factionalism present in Japan's government and armed forces at the time certainly suggests "feudal" as an adjective if nothing else. Prior to the war assassination was being used as a political tool and the Kwantung Army was a rogue force in China, going so far as to start an armed conflict with the Soviets without orders from Tokyo. One of the factors that led to Japan's downfall in WWII was that the IJA and IJN made interservice rivalry in the US look like the Army, Navy, and Marines were all sitting around the campfire singing "Kumbayah." The IJN and IJA acted like they were fighting entirely separate wars, which to some extent they were. I am not a political scientist but I did take courses in college in political geography for my degree. The factionalism, good term, was widespread in the Japanese government and military. In my readings you hear of the Kwantung Army almost a feudal region trying to get autonomy for itself, basically a feudal area like the Middle Ages. They pulled the IJA into invasion of Northern China and then into the Invasion of the South around Nanking and Hankow. Even the Army leaders could not stop them but did want restraint. In fact, they did not want to invade the Philippines because they had decided it would bring us into the war, it was the IJN that pushed that. Your comment about separate wars is absolutely true, the War in China was separate from the Pacific War.
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Post by steel selachian on Jun 10, 2018 15:35:01 GMT -6
One of the things that struck me about the IJA/IJN disconnect was that the IJA actually constructed and operated several escort carriers (a mix of proto-LHA amphibious ships and ASW escorts for troop convoys) and a number of small cargo submarines. Taking off from a carrier deck and operating a submarine are two of the most technically challenging aspects of naval operations; for the IJA to enter them speaks volumes about how much they trusted the IJN to support their operations.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 10, 2018 15:40:49 GMT -6
One of the things that struck me about the IJA/IJN disconnect was that the IJA actually constructed and operated several escort carriers (a mix of proto-LHA amphibious ships and ASW escorts for troop convoys) and a number of small cargo submarines. Taking off from a carrier deck and operating a submarine are two of the most technically challenging aspects of naval operations; for the IJA to enter them speaks volumes about how much they trusted the IJN to support their operations. There always seem to be a contentious attitude between the two military organizations. The Japanese people are the ones that paid the ultimate price. I wonder if it was the Feudal psyche, as I liked to call it, that caused it. The army was the feudal lords for over 350 years and the navy was a newcomer.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 12, 2018 15:35:52 GMT -6
Just some interesting figures to run by everyone. The US produced 19,433 aircraft in 1941. If we divide that number by 365 days, that's about 53 aircraft per day. Now, at Pearl Harbor we lost, both damaged and destroyed, 169 destroyed and 159 damaged for a total of 358 aircraft. Now, divide that number, 358, by 53 and you arrive at the number of days you needed to replace every aircraft at Pearl Harbor. It figures out to about 6.75 days if the workers worked seven days per week which I doubt that they did.
Now, based on 1943 military aircraft production, it would be 1.5 days.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 13, 2018 10:51:18 GMT -6
Here is some more information about the problems for the civilian government in Japan, dealing with the wrangling by the Army and Navy over steel production. By 20 June 1941, this wrangling had been solved. However, two days later, the German's invaded Russia. This cut the Trans-Siberian RR permanently and cut Japan off from Germany. They had been receiving potash, mercury, machine tools, and heavy machinery for mineral smelting, oil refining and optical glassmaking plus 1375 tons of specialty steels. These import items affected the planned advanced-steel manufacturing facilities in Manchuria and it caused the Navy to lose refined specialty alloys and equipment. It also caused problems with the plant to divert labor and materials for the immediate preparations for possible war against the Soviets.
According the Japanese after the war, this caused the largest steel production plant at Yawata to have its production priorities changed. Now as they revised their plans, after the movement of troops into Southern Indochina, the American freeze on petroleum products took place. This freeze was unexpected and this forced the Japanese to execute the Southern Operation into Southwest Pacific. This meant areas like Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Philippines and Rabaul would be invaded. The Southern Operation had been the lower priority operation, the move into the Soviet Union had been higher, but now, the reverse was true. The Southern Operation now put the Japanese at war with the US, Great Britain
All this action, caused the downfall of the civilian government and General Tojo took over prime minister and the slide towards war occurred. How amazing that your ally in the Tripartite Agreement is the one who probably pushed the Japanese nation into a war with the worst possible enemy.... The United States. The one positive was the fact that the IJN was concerned that delaying the Southern Operation gave the US more time to increase production and deploy more carriers and other ships into the Pacific. Now, this forced the Japanese to move forward into the South Pacific. This might catch us in a non-ready position. The problem with that was the Navy was never, and had never intended to try to save the Philippines. The IJN never knew this. This meant that War Plan Orange was still viable, but the timing had changed.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 13, 2018 16:01:53 GMT -6
I've got to read through some more of my books that deal with the economic situation in Japan near the start of the war. But after June 1941, supplies of oil were down in the army, 11 percent. Civilian usage of materials was down 45 percent from already depressed level. Japan at this time had made the decision to execute the Southern Operation knowing it would mean war with the US, Great Britain and the Netherlands. But they were executing this operation and starting the War in the Pacific on a shoestring, as one author has stated "and a ragged one at that".
The Prime Minister still held out hope that the war could be averted, but the Atlantic Charter basically announced the Axis that there would be no more appeasement or discussions, it was war. This was a rude shock to the Japanese government. After this time, there were numerous meetings between Konoe and Tojo. What I see is a navy that knows that it cannot admit that it could not face the US without being exposed in the nation as useless and the expenditures for the past 10 years to build it up, had been a wasted effort.
What is interesting is that the army had already begun to move the ten divisions southward in preparations for the move and felt it could not stop this movement. It did delay it to give more time to negotiations but everyone knew the game was up, the Allies were not going to negotiate anymore. The army decided to let the navy and government decide, if they stop the movement and reversed it, the army would have no responsibility for the results. At this point, Konoe resigned and Tojo became Prime Minister. The die was cast.
To me, this is simply astounding that a nation could go to war, in an economic crisis of monumental proportions. They had almost no food, oil or anything, yet they were going to go to war with the two most powerful naval and economic forces in the world. It does boil down to the one person, with the ultimate power to stop the move and negotiate wisely. That person was the emperor and he just approve all the moves.
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Post by director on Jul 13, 2018 12:25:40 GMT -6
I believe Japan's real Achilles' Heel was the inability of her civilian leaders to impose strategic order on the army and navy. The army went into China in a way that alienated Britain, while the navy (and the nation) might have been better served by keeping the alliance with Britain. Galling as it would be to accept being the junior partner, only Britain or the US could satisfy Japan's resource requirements and provide political cover for limited movement into China. Once the army went into China (and they way it went into China) a break with Britain and the US was inevitable.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 13, 2018 13:20:46 GMT -6
I believe Japan's real Achilles' Heel was the inability of her civilian leaders to impose strategic order on the army and navy. The army went into China in a way that alienated Britain, while the navy (and the nation) might have been better served by keeping the alliance with Britain. Galling as it would be to accept being the junior partner, only Britain or the US could satisfy Japan's resource requirements and provide political cover for limited movement into China. Once the army went into China (and they way it went into China) a break with Britain and the US was inevitable. I believe that they are partially responsible but we have to add the Emperor and the Army because the Japanese Army tried to control the Kwantung Army of Manchuria whose goal was to make Manchuria an autonomous state. They are the ones that began the armed conflict with Northern China and no one could stop it. The Emperor and the government did not want to lose face with the rest of the world by pulling out and admitting they were in too deep. The navy, concerned about the increased funding moving to the army, then developed the southern operation and that is what actually started the war. There is enough blame for all. This was a systemic problem in the Japanese governmental system and the national psyche. Always try to avoid the trap of "reductionism". This means looking for one person, group or action that causes a problem. This was a group effort here, everyone failed and the Japanese people paid the ultimate price... which is generally what happens. They are the ones that were in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Tokyo and other bombing efforts that killed over a 1 million people and many more maimed for life.
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Post by director on Jul 13, 2018 20:09:43 GMT -6
Don't assume that all US aircraft production would go to the Pacific; a majority was dedicated to the Atlantic theater.
Please see previous post: "I believe that they are partially responsible but we have to add the Emperor and the Army because the Japanese Army tried to control the Kwantung Army of Manchuria whose goal was to make Manchuria an autonomous state." I can't see that it is reductionist; it sounds to me like we both said the same thing.
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