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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 4, 2018 0:45:36 GMT -6
From 1939 to the end of 1942. Totally agree with you. In the later part of 1942 onwards they became less and less effective as allied ASW became more and more effective and Enigma was cracked. From 1943 onwards, the resources devoted to U-boat construction and the development of a revolutionary new type were wasted. With hindsight sure you can say that the 100+ type XXI that were laid down but not put into service were "wasted" in the sense that they achieved little in practice, and that building for example 300 more conventional submarines where most of them could have been put into service would have been a "better" investment instead. But the practice of keeping the submarines at sea and fighting, even if the fighting was going bad was not wasted at all. The same moment the threat of submarines vanish from the Atlantic and sealanes are no longer under any threat what happens with priorities in the allies? Will they keep building escorts and assigning aircraft, men, material, fuel, research, resources and efforts to fight submarines that are no longer there? Will they keep sailing in slow convoys wasting about 30% of their shipping capacity? or Will all these efforts instead be directed towards D-Day and knocking out Germany faster? Germany needed something to turn the technological war in the Atlantic back in their favor and post war evaluations have shown that the type XXI submarine was exactly the right weapon to do it. It's more an issue of too little, too late, but the fact that everyone copied the type XXI submarine design of a high underwater speed submarine after the end of the war speaks for itself. The reason for the failures of the type XXI production also comes down to resource shortages suffered by German industry, and the fact that they experimented with ( for Germany ) revolutionary assembly line production techniques as well in this project which they failed to master leading to long delays and quality issues.
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Post by archelaos on Oct 4, 2018 6:05:12 GMT -6
Remember also that by the end of war a large proportion of german workforce were composed of people deported and forced to work. As result, they were working poorly, and many were in fact actively sabotaging the production. And the more complicated equipement the more chances to hide small acts of sabotage, that could in the end result in major problems.
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Post by ccip on Oct 5, 2018 10:31:55 GMT -6
I would also take the claims of the Type XXI as a war-altering weapon with a grain of salt, even if it worked as intended - post-war evaluations by both the Soviets and the US suggested otherwise. It was a big step forward in capability, and could have wreaked havoc for a brief period if its introduction was a complete surprise - but the Allies already had everything in their arsenal needed to effectively fight this kind of submarine, they would have just needed to adjust their tactics. The XXI still had a whole slew of technical limitations and weaknesses, too - that's not to take away from the impressive steps forward that it was in some respects, being the first true blue-water submarine, but I think people vastly overestimate its probable combat effectiveness.
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 5, 2018 10:51:54 GMT -6
I would also take the claims of the Type XXI as a war-altering weapon with a grain of salt, even if it worked as intended - post-war evaluations by both the Soviets and the US suggested otherwise. It was a big step forward in capability, and could have wreaked havoc for a brief period if its introduction was a complete surprise - but the Allies already had everything in their arsenal needed to effectively fight this kind of submarine, they would have just needed to adjust their tactics. The XXI still had a whole slew of technical limitations and weaknesses, too - that's not to take away from the impressive steps forward that it was in some respects, being the first true blue-water submarine, but I think people vastly overestimate its probable combat effectiveness. I never claimed that it was a war winning weapon though. The mere concept of thinking that a single weapon can win any sort of prolonged war is ridiculous, even more so if we are talking about the German war situation in 1944. What I did claim is that it was exactly the weapon Germany needed to help bring the technological battle of the Atlantic around ( even if just temporary ), and this seems to match well with your conclusions as well that it was a big step forward in capability and could have wrecked havoc for a brief period.
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Post by ccip on Oct 5, 2018 11:01:29 GMT -6
Then that's more than fair enough I wasn't explicitly trying to call you out, sorry about that! It's just something that I see very often (especially having been involved with the Silent Hunter community for a long time) so I try to pre-empt it. I'd love for RTW 2 to cover the impact and the back-and-forth of submarine vs. ASW in that whole period - I'm wary of outcomes where the submarine wins in the end, but I think it's incredibly important to still have some serious "oomph" to when the true "Elektroboot" appears.
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Post by jeb94 on Oct 5, 2018 19:50:22 GMT -6
Alex does bring up very good points about the type XXI and u-boats in general. We who study and love this history sometimes forget how much we benefit from hindsight. When we put ourselves in the shoes of the decision makers and the information they had at the time would we reach different conclusions? I’ve done some rethinking about the type XXI program. I don’t think that it is the great waste of resources some, including myself, have made it out to be. I think it could have been a tremendous game changer in the Atlantic had it not suffered from so many delays. Many of the delays were related to the diversion of resources to the many super weapons projects and Hitler’s changing whims and demands on things like demanding the ME262 be a fighter-bomber instead of the interceptor it was ready to be. The 262 in particular could have kept allied bombers from being the huge disruptor of German industry if they’d gone into service earlier and in greater numbers.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 5, 2018 20:21:25 GMT -6
Alex does bring up very good points about the type XXI and u-boats in general. We who study and love this history sometimes forget how much we benefit from hindsight. When we put ourselves in the shoes of the decision makers and the information they had at the time would we reach different conclusions? I’ve done some rethinking about the type XXI program. I don’t think that it is the great waste of resources some, including myself, have made it out to be. I think it could have been a tremendous game changer in the Atlantic had it not suffered from so many delays. Many of the delays were related to the diversion of resources to the many super weapons projects and Hitler’s changing whims and demands on things like demanding the ME262 be a fighter-bomber instead of the interceptor it was ready to be. The 262 in particular could have kept allied bombers from being the huge disruptor of German industry if they’d gone into service earlier and in greater numbers. I have consistently stated on this and other forum’s that 20-20 hindsight is the clearest vision in the world. Chester Nimitz stated that “Hindsight is notably cleverer than foresight”. In the fifty years that I have been studying history and doing historical analysis, I have struggled personally to keep a perspective about what I was reading. I wish I could say that I have been successful, but I haven’t. It has been a struggle. Now, as to the Type XXI U-boat, it was the first true submarine and very advanced for its time. This was its downfall, it was too advanced and had many teething problems. With the wartime situation as bad as it was for Germany, it would have been almost impossible to build and maintain, along with solving all the problems associated with the vessel. She was too complex, too hard to maintain for the short period of time that she was produced in. With the shipyards and factories under constant bombing, labor and material shortages, it’s a miracle that they managed to get any build and deployed. While I believe it was a mistake to try to produce the weapon and waste the material, research and production capacity, I believe that I understand why they did it.
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Post by srndacful on Oct 5, 2018 22:05:43 GMT -6
After reading (and digesting) alexbrunius' linked study, I'm surprised that noone has pointed out the elephant in this room: how will (if at all) this affect the ASW part of the RtW2? Now, I seem to remember reading somewhere on the RtW1 part of the forum (unfortunately, no idea where at this late stage) that submarine part of the wars has been nerfed in order to give more emphasis on the battleships - but I had no idea just how much before I read that study: Currently in RtW1 - and looking at the 'maximum effort' submarine campaign an AI can start (involving 100 submarines) - player needs about 100 ships on CP to gain over 3 times as many ships on Patrol than needed, which enables him to defeat (or at least weaken) the AI's submarine campaign. This works out to about 1 CP ship per 1 submarine built (or thereabouts) - but a basic 200 tonne MS (the backbone of my - and probably your - CP's) costs about 0.5 million - while a Medium Submarine costs 3.2 million (if I recall correctly) which means that the submarine-using AI is spending 6 (or more likely 7) times as much as the player on an (ultimately) unwinnable strategy. And the only cost to player is one of mild annoyance. But according to that study, it's the Allies (in the Atlantic) and Japanese (in the Pacific) - aka the Defence - that had to spend 4 or 5 times as much money (for Escort ships only) on those campaigns - which is about 30 times more than the players are required to spend currently. Of course, this has been done deliberately by the designers for gameplay reasons - I get that. However, that was RtW1 - which (basically) dealt with the rise of the Battleship. RtW2, however, is poised to deal with the rise and fall of the Battleship - which, IMHO, puts that emphasis into question.
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Post by archelaos on Oct 6, 2018 1:16:37 GMT -6
RtW2, however, is poised to deal with the rise and fall of the Battleship - which, IMHO, puts that emphasis into question. We already know that 500t and less MS will be available only in war (like AMCs), and that we would need to spend displacement on ASW and AA. AFAIK CP duty is also separated so those smallest ships will no longer be suficient. If only 800-1000t ships will be effective escorts, or advanced ASW gear will be expensive (in cash) we could easily see the effect you are asking for.
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 6, 2018 15:11:10 GMT -6
Now, as to the Type XXI U-boat, it was the first true submarine and very advanced for its time. This was its downfall, it was too advanced and had many teething problems. With the wartime situation as bad as it was for Germany, it would have been almost impossible to build and maintain, along with solving all the problems associated with the vessel. She was too complex, too hard to maintain for the short period of time that she was produced in. With the shipyards and factories under constant bombing, labor and material shortages, it’s a miracle that they managed to get any build and deployed. While I believe it was a mistake to try to produce the weapon and waste the material, research and production capacity, I believe that I understand why they did it. Technically the type XXI isn't that complex. The Japanese deployed an experimental submarine surpassing the Type XXIs submerged speed already in 1938, and developed multiple fast submerged submarines since they wanted to go after enemy warships with them ( but their doctrine and handling of such weapons was not up to par so these submarines achieved surprisingly little during the war, and few know much about them ). Further reading: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_No.71www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htmThe type XXI IMHO certainly isn't more technically complex than the ASW weapons developed by the allies to fight submarines like for example anti-submarine homing acoustic air droppable torpedoes: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_24_mineThe revolutionary thing with the type XXI was the realization that submarines facing air-power and improved escorts needed to be designed to fight mainly underwater, this is not a technical problem but one of combat experience. No new batteries or electrical engines had to be developed to achieve the underwater speed, it was just a question of adding more of what the existing submarine models already had. The two main technical innovations as far as my reading has shown was semi-automatic torpedo reloading and a firecontrol that allowed submerged firing of torpedoes on a sonar bearing, but these were not what made the type XXI revolutionary.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 6, 2018 15:33:20 GMT -6
Now, as to the Type XXI U-boat, it was the first true submarine and very advanced for its time. This was its downfall, it was too advanced and had many teething problems. With the wartime situation as bad as it was for Germany, it would have been almost impossible to build and maintain, along with solving all the problems associated with the vessel. She was too complex, too hard to maintain for the short period of time that she was produced in. With the shipyards and factories under constant bombing, labor and material shortages, it’s a miracle that they managed to get any build and deployed. While I believe it was a mistake to try to produce the weapon and waste the material, research and production capacity, I believe that I understand why they did it. Technically the type XXI isn't that complex. The Japanese deployed an experimental submarine surpassing the Type XXIs submerged speed already in 1938, and developed multiple fast submerged submarines since they wanted to go after enemy warships with them ( but their doctrine and handling of such weapons was not up to par so these submarines achieved surprisingly little during the war, and few know much about them ). Further reading: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_No.71www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htmThe type XXI IMHO certainly isn't more technically complex than the ASW weapons developed by the allies to fight submarines like for example anti-submarine homing acoustic air droppable torpedoes: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_24_mineThe revolutionary thing with the type XXI was the realization that submarines facing air-power and improved escorts needed to be designed to fight mainly underwater, this is not a technical problem but one of combat experience. No new batteries or electrical engines had to be developed to achieve the underwater speed, it was just a question of adding more of what the existing submarine models already had. The two main technical innovations as far as my reading has shown was semi-automatic torpedo reloading and a firecontrol that allowed submerged firing of torpedoes on a sonar bearing, but these were not what made the type XXI revolutionary. www.uboataces.com/uboat-type-xxi.shtml - This article tells me that there were too many NEW items technologically integrated into one boat, far too many at one time. The best way to develop a new weapons system is to install new innovations gradually, so you can test them in service and fix the problems, not install them all in one boat and expect it to work reliability. Reliability comes from gradual testing, and more testing before deployment. The German's never had the time to do that. The boat was too technically complex for reliability in service. There is no question in my mind or any real submarine expert articles that I've read.
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Post by axe99 on Oct 6, 2018 15:46:41 GMT -6
I've also read that the Type XXI had a bunch of issues because it tried do to too much too quickly (both in terms of it's technical design, and the components-built-in-different-places-and-assembled approach to production). That said, in an alt-history situation it's also perfectly feasible that the design could have come together earlier, with a more refined version available within a 1900-1950 perspective, so I don't see a 'reliably operational' Type XXI as being historically implausible (noting that my view isn't entirely reliable ).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 6, 2018 15:51:40 GMT -6
I've also read that the Type XXI had a bunch of issues because it tried do to too much too quickly (both in terms of it's technical design, and the components-built-in-different-places-and-assembled approach to production). That said, in an alt-history situation it's also perfectly feasible that the design could have come together earlier, with a more refined version available within a 1900-1950 perspective, so I don't see a 'reliably operational' Type XXI as being historically implausible (noting that my view isn't entirely reliable ). Yes, I agree and so do most historians. Had the German's developed this boat earlier in the war, and it was possible, it could have made difference. In a game, it would nice to be able to develop and deploy such a weapon. Here is a complete article with pictures of the U-boat. www.ipmsstockholm.se/home/u-boot-type-xxi-in-detail-part-i/The German’s always had an irrational faith in technology. They always had faith in wonder weapons. The Type XXI was one of those wonder weapons. The fact that the submarine was built in sections, then transported to their launch points made fixing problems even harder. The hydraulic torpedo loading system didn’t work until engineers worked extra hours to fix it. The engines and steering were complex and were defective. Those issues were eventually ironed out. But the submarine never worked to perfection. It was plagued constantly by problems. I am reminded of the axiom that only the simple in war works.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 6, 2018 21:16:26 GMT -6
I thought I would provide the Design Study on the Type XXI U-Boat conducted by the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in 1946. It is about as complete as you could hope with technical comments that should provide good information. U-boat Archive - Design Studies - Type XXI.pdf (1.73 MB)
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Post by alexbrunius on Oct 7, 2018 3:47:10 GMT -6
www.uboataces.com/uboat-type-xxi.shtml - This article tells me that there were too many NEW items technologically integrated into one boat, far too many at one time. The best way to develop a new weapons system is to install new innovations gradually, so you can test them in service and fix the problems, not install them all in one boat and expect it to work reliability. Reliability comes from gradual testing, and more testing before deployment. The German's never had the time to do that. The boat was too technically complex for reliability in service. There is no question in my mind or any real submarine expert articles that I've read. My point was that it wasn't mainly these NEW technical items that made the uboat revolutionary, it was the application of old and known battery and electric engine techs in larger amounts + optimizing the hull for underwater travel. So we can conceive a similar uboat ( more like the ones the Japanese made from 1938 onwards ) which just focus on the high underwater speed instead, and it would have been almost as revolutionary, but not suffering all these technical issues.
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