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Post by ramjb on Sept 19, 2018 4:06:01 GMT -6
the same disregard the US had when they claimed the Saratogas were treaty compliant when they really weren't. It's not as if Japan undestating tonnages of some ships was exclusive to them - to some point or another all nations, bar the british, did it in some way or another, and you can't go around saying that they were flagrantly breaking the WT/LT... at any rate what's for sure is that whatever breach the japanese did of the Treaties wasn't related with any wish to build a "Superbattleship or supercarrier". Both the Yamato and Shokaku classes were built only after Japan had announced they were not going to renew the London Treaty. Lexington and Saratoga was according to WNT. Read the treaty, article IX. For UK and USA these converted carriers were crucial to develop carriers tactics. During this years both nations comes to same conclusion that the first hit wins. In USA there was even thinking to solve this problems by increase number of decks and building more but smaller carriers. Lucky for USA it was not done and Yorktown class was backbone of carrier force with 2 Lexingtons.. In UK this issue was raised again when threat of Italy came and they solved it by armoring carrier and creating Illustrious class. Another effect of this exercises was that USN split their carriers and create TFs so that if one TF is destroyed other can fight back. RN on opposite have all carriers in one basket that they can be defended with higher force. Different environment get different approaches as USN operated carriers in blue waters where hit and run was main strategy, UK operated carriers mainly in European theatre where you cannot hide carrier so you need to enhanced your defense capabilities to survive attack of land air power, so USN design carriers to have maximum hitting power, to operate in TFs to not jeopardize other carriers if one is under attack. On opposite UK design their carriers to maximum survivability and operating together as one force and night attack by their smaller aircraft complement. And you can see that through the war USN hitting power was on top with USN at start of Pacific war and was never matched by RN as RN defense capabilities was on top and was matched by USN only very late in the war. IJN had similar strategy with first hit first win however they neglected passive defense capabilities completely. They used one force to defend carriers but with they limited passive defense capabilities when they CAP was overwhelmed their losses rose too much. Carriers converted from capital ship hulls were limited to 30.000 ton standard displacement by the WT. The Lexingtons declared displacement was 33.000 tons (and they actually displaced maybe 1000 more pre war, way more in service). They invoked a clause of the treaty that allowed those rebuilt CVs to be later refitted with extra AAA, with a provision of extra displacement in that case for the extra equipment, which let's be honest, was just a scapegoat because those ships didn't enter service, to then after some years be refitted with more AAA guns - they were directly completed with the extra displacement. It was a clear breach of the spirit of the treaty aswell of the letter, even if the loophole they tried to use as a scapegoat was kinda accepted by the other signatories (not that they had much option, but there's that). And even after that, it still displaced more than 33k tons standard - so it DID breach the WT no matter what. AS for the rest, british CV doctrine was flawed from top to bottom because interwar UK simply didn't spend enough resources in the RN. then there's the circumstantial issue that there were no capital sized hulls on the shipyards to be converted (something the US and the japanese had plenty of), and that back on the day it wasn't really understood whether it was better a couple big carriers or three smaller ones. The resulting conversion of the Corageouses and Furious was highly underwhelming as a result, which added to an already uninspiring set of existing very underwhelming carriers (it's not as if Argus, Hermes, or Eagle were going to accomplish much) to take much of the british alloted CV tonnage. And then they didn't build anything until Ark Royal because, well, because they simply didn't have the budget to do so (nor the necessary political backing). On top of that there was the issue of the RN Fleet Air Arm depending on already strained fleet budgets, which already were being hardly fought over by the newly independant RAF. The result were a collection of horrid carrier planes (Skua, Rock, Fulmar,etc) of which the best was mediocre and the worst was just abysmal. It was clear from very early on that the british carrier planes couldn't really fight for air supremacy because their planes were...well, pretty much sh*t. On top of that there was this constant brainwashing coming from the RAF about how the "bomber will always get through"... so it was assumed that whatever plane that would come for the carriers would indeed be able to attack them. The result was the famous "armored deck" carriers, which in all due justice were more of a failure than a success - even if their ability to stay afloat came in handy it didn't do any favors to the long-term operational capability of those ships. The IJN was a different matter worth a thesis (and quite some have been written about it) - the best carrier force in 1941, mostly due to their elite airmen, operating in a navy controlled by "big gun" admirals...going against another navy with a lot of air-minded pro-carrier admirals that in any case had no option to resort to the "big gun" doctrines because all those big guns were flooded and rested on top of Pearl Harbor's bottom. Your assessment that they sacrifized too much in the offensive capabilities of their carrier force at expense of their ability to defend themselves I'm not so sure of - what I'm sure of is that the carrier force, in the highest ranks of the Navy, was considered as an accessory tool to the big-gun fleet in their way to the "big surface battle" the IJN theorized would happen early on in the war. And it was kind of kept that way even while the americans were obviously not going to come for said "big battle". mostly because their battlefleet was pretty much done for after Pearl Harbor. As a result while the USN both by force of events, and by inspired leadership made the best out of their carriers, the use of the japanese carrier force after the initial surprise attacks in PH and SE Asia was erratic at best. A pointless sortie into the indic ocean, a strike of negligible long-term consequences in Darwin, both operations that required the Combined Fleet to accumulate a lot of pretty much worthless (in the grand scope of the war) mileage, and when the big fights were to happen, instead of focusing their power in a single strike to achieve a decisive victory, they split it in either worthless (the light carriers directed towards the Aleutians), insufficient and badly managed (the operation against Rabaul), while the four remaining carriers were sent against Midway to accomplish a mission that hoped for no american carriers in the vicinity. The results...well I'm not going to say were predictable, but certainly aren't exactly surprising. |
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Post by bcoopactual on Sept 19, 2018 7:01:10 GMT -6
ramjb , you are short 3,000 tons on the initial limits for the carrier conversions. They were allowed to be 33,000 tons initially per Article IX with Part 3 Replacement; Section 1 (d) allowing another 3,000 tons for anti-sub protection and anti-air protection added on after that. Unless I missed somewhere where it specifically excluded the carrier conversions from Part 3 Section 1 (d) which is possible. Since both ships were estimated to displace around 35,600 tons in 1928 (the wikipedia page for the class references Dr. Friedman), while I would agree that the USN played somewhat fast and loose with the treaty restrictions since the ships were never completed <33,000 tons they were within the spirit of the treaty since they stayed within 36,000 tons (as far as I aware).
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Post by dorn on Sept 19, 2018 13:00:18 GMT -6
Lexington and Saratoga was according to WNT. Read the treaty, article IX. For UK and USA these converted carriers were crucial to develop carriers tactics. During this years both nations comes to same conclusion that the first hit wins. In USA there was even thinking to solve this problems by increase number of decks and building more but smaller carriers. Lucky for USA it was not done and Yorktown class was backbone of carrier force with 2 Lexingtons.. In UK this issue was raised again when threat of Italy came and they solved it by armoring carrier and creating Illustrious class. Another effect of this exercises was that USN split their carriers and create TFs so that if one TF is destroyed other can fight back. RN on opposite have all carriers in one basket that they can be defended with higher force. Different environment get different approaches as USN operated carriers in blue waters where hit and run was main strategy, UK operated carriers mainly in European theatre where you cannot hide carrier so you need to enhanced your defense capabilities to survive attack of land air power, so USN design carriers to have maximum hitting power, to operate in TFs to not jeopardize other carriers if one is under attack. On opposite UK design their carriers to maximum survivability and operating together as one force and night attack by their smaller aircraft complement. And you can see that through the war USN hitting power was on top with USN at start of Pacific war and was never matched by RN as RN defense capabilities was on top and was matched by USN only very late in the war. IJN had similar strategy with first hit first win however they neglected passive defense capabilities completely. They used one force to defend carriers but with they limited passive defense capabilities when they CAP was overwhelmed their losses rose too much. Carriers converted from capital ship hulls were limited to 30.000 ton standard displacement by the WT. The Lexingtons declared displacement was 33.000 tons (and they actually displaced maybe 1000 more pre war, way more in service). They invoked a clause of the treaty that allowed those rebuilt CVs to be later refitted with extra AAA, with a provision of extra displacement in that case for the extra equipment, which let's be honest, was just a scapegoat because those ships didn't enter service, to then after some years be refitted with more AAA guns - they were directly completed with the extra displacement. It was a clear breach of the spirit of the treaty aswell of the letter, even if the loophole they tried to use as a scapegoat was kinda accepted by the other signatories (not that they had much option, but there's that). And even after that, it still displaced more than 33k tons standard - so it DID breach the WT no matter what. AS for the rest, british CV doctrine was flawed from top to bottom because interwar UK simply didn't spend enough resources in the RN. then there's the circumstantial issue that there were no capital sized hulls on the shipyards to be converted (something the US and the japanese had plenty of), and that back on the day it wasn't really understood whether it was better a couple big carriers or three smaller ones. The resulting conversion of the Corageouses and Furious was highly underwhelming as a result, which added to an already uninspiring set of existing very underwhelming carriers (it's not as if Argus, Hermes, or Eagle were going to accomplish much) to take much of the british alloted CV tonnage. And then they didn't build anything until Ark Royal because, well, because they simply didn't have the budget to do so (nor the necessary political backing). On top of that there was the issue of the RN Fleet Air Arm depending on already strained fleet budgets, which already were being hardly fought over by the newly independant RAF. The result were a collection of horrid carrier planes (Skua, Rock, Fulmar,etc) of which the best was mediocre and the worst was just abysmal. It was clear from very early on that the british carrier planes couldn't really fight for air supremacy because their planes were...well, pretty much sh*t. On top of that there was this constant brainwashing coming from the RAF about how the "bomber will always get through"... so it was assumed that whatever plane that would come for the carriers would indeed be able to attack them. The result was the famous "armored deck" carriers, which in all due justice were more of a failure than a success - even if their ability to stay afloat came in handy it didn't do any favors to the long-term operational capability of those ships. The IJN was a different matter worth a thesis (and quite some have been written about it) - the best carrier force in 1941, mostly due to their elite airmen, operating in a navy controlled by "big gun" admirals...going against another navy with a lot of air-minded pro-carrier admirals that in any case had no option to resort to the "big gun" doctrines because all those big guns were flooded and rested on top of Pearl Harbor's bottom. Your assessment that they sacrifized too much in the offensive capabilities of their carrier force at expense of their ability to defend themselves I'm not so sure of - what I'm sure of is that the carrier force, in the highest ranks of the Navy, was considered as an accessory tool to the big-gun fleet in their way to the "big surface battle" the IJN theorized would happen early on in the war. And it was kind of kept that way even while the americans were obviously not going to come for said "big battle". mostly because their battlefleet was pretty much done for after Pearl Harbor. As a result while the USN both by force of events, and by inspired leadership made the best out of their carriers, the use of the japanese carrier force after the initial surprise attacks in PH and SE Asia was erratic at best. A pointless sortie into the indic ocean, a strike of negligible long-term consequences in Darwin, both operations that required the Combined Fleet to accumulate a lot of pretty much worthless (in the grand scope of the war) mileage, and when the big fights were to happen, instead of focusing their power in a single strike to achieve a decisive victory, they split it in either worthless (the light carriers directed towards the Aleutians), insufficient and badly managed (the operation against Rabaul), while the four remaining carriers were sent against Midway to accomplish a mission that hoped for no american carriers in the vicinity. The results...well I'm not going to say were predictable, but certainly aren't exactly surprising. Read article IX again. There is 33.000 tons limit. UK carrier doctrine was not flawed at all. You need to consider threats that UK needs to consider. It was European theatre and UK itself is safe as long as it controls sea. They have the largest fleet in the world in 1939 with the most ambitious construction program in progress. Now you can think how they can use force projection. They have the largest capital fleet with USN (which is potential ally). So you need to project this force. They were very well aware of the threat of land base aircraft so they design carriers to counter that. For that purpose, Illustrious class was best design and for that task no other carrier in the world could do it better. Look on the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Arctic and you will see that their carriers do the job for what was designed. They realized even before war (I do not exactly when, but I suspect 1937) that Illustrious class has low number of aircraft so they change Indomitable. She was much better design than Yorktowns (logically as she was designed after them) as her air complement (operational not maximum) was practically same as Yorktown as soon as deck par was used. They have Courageous and Glorious and use them for reconstruction to aircraft carriers. The difference is that UK had no construction advanced too much as Japan or USA. There were G3 battlecruisers which have been already laid down and planned N3 battleships. These design was large and better than USN and IJN ships planned or in construction (at this time RN had still much more experience that USN and IJN) - read something about deployment of USN in WW1. Issue of Courageous and Furious and Glorious was that there were small hulls, UK had not large hulls that can be used and this was economically efficient solution (at that time RN was ahead in navy aviation). The thesis "bomber always get through" was not only RN thesis, USN came to same conclusion. And reality show that both nations were right. Even in 1945 with overwhelming air superiority of USN carrier force by numbers and experience did not achieve that bombers do not get through. So I cannot see flaws with resources they have. You need to understand it was time of peace so why spent a lot of money if you need to pay your debts. Eagle, Hermes was carriers which pioneered everything. You told that RN planes were mediocre at best. Compare in 1940 which planes use other nations. Buffalos? They are even worse, Japan till Zero has not good fighters. That RN had not have good fighters after that because UK fight war where main priorities were elsewhere (fighter command of home islands). You told that they can not even fight air supremacy but look at Mediterranean when usually one UK carrier fight the large land air force and usually have local air supremacy. Later RN operated Fulmars and Marlets (same as USN), later Corsairs (even earlier than USN as RN developed safe landing procedures for them). Illustrious class carrier failure? You do not think it seriously, read something that they achieved. Without these carriers RN could not supply Malta and supply North Africa through the Mediterranean, force Italian navy to passive state thus allowing Germans to supply Africa corps which means that Germany were probably able to takeover Malta, North Africa which give them access to Iraq and oil fields. Turkey can join Axis thus East front will be much more difficult for stop Axis. And this was achieved because of Illustrious class carrier and HMS Ark Royal as they can achieve local air superiority and force projection of RN. So I do not see failure I can see great success especially with limited resources RN had (some times the carrier even operated without full complement of aircrafts). No other carrier was capable of that task, look at Pacific how USN lost carriers with much lower opposition that usually single RN carrier in the Mediterranean. Yorktown class would probably not survive these attacks that Illustrious class faced (fighter direction in RN was far advanced at that time). Your assumption is all about blue ocean however the European theatre is quite different and what is best in Pacific is not best in Europe. And carriers are about force projection and where it is do not matter. For UK it was mainly Europe theatre, for IJN and USN it was Pacific. So Illustrious with Indomitable and Implacable was best at European theatre (best passive defenses, not only armor box, best fighter direction, best seaworthy for north part of Europe) and Yorktowns and Essexes in Pacific. Using them opposite way has no sense as not playing with best they have, however Illustrious class had some advantage against Japanese as their bombs could not defeat vitals of this class and usually suspended air operations for only hours. |
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Post by aeson on Sept 19, 2018 14:57:40 GMT -6
You told that RN planes were mediocre at best. Compare in 1940 which planes use other nations. Buffalos? They are even worse, Japan till Zero has not good fighters. On what are you basing this claim to the superiority of the Fleet Air Arm to its counterparts in the US and Japan? The Brewster Buffalo has a bad reputation, yes, but I am not aware of any clear evidence that the Fleet Air Arm had anything better in its Gloucester Gladiators, Blackburn Skuas, and Blackburn Rocs - certainly Finland seems to have thought the Buffalo superior to the Gladiator, and the Skuas, Rocs, and Gladiators didn't survive in front-line service as day fighters with the Fleet Air Arm much, if any, longer than the Fleet Air Arm's Buffaloes did - and the A5M seems to have fared well enough against its near-contemporaries in China in the late-1930s.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 19, 2018 16:04:48 GMT -6
Just a quick comment, then I will leave this discussion to all of you. The major issue with the Brewster Buffalo was not the design, it was the quality control. Many of the aircraft engines were time-expired airline engines reworked and reissued as new and up rated power. Many of the valve springs were over-hardened, oil pumps out of tolerance etc. The wings and fuselage had issues also. The list goes on and on. The bottom line was the company itself-Brewster. It started out as a horse-carriage builder. It was incompetent and the plane suffered for that. This is the reason for its failure, not the design itself. Reliability and pilot training all play a substantial part in the effectiveness of the aircraft. The aviation support system does also as the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Service found out.
Note: If you did not know it, the British did not order the Grumman Martlet, the French did but the Fall of France caused the British to take over most of the French orders including the Grumman F4F- that is how they got them.
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Post by ramjb on Sept 19, 2018 16:18:05 GMT -6
You told that RN planes were mediocre at best. Compare in 1940 which planes use other nations. Buffalos? They are even worse, Japan till Zero has not good fighters. On what are you basing this claim to the superiority of the Fleet Air Arm to its counterparts in the US and Japan? The Brewster Buffalo has a bad reputation, yes, but I am not aware of any clear evidence that the Fleet Air Arm had anything better in its Gloucester Gladiators, Blackburn Skuas, and Blackburn Rocs - certainly Finland seems to have thought the Buffalo superior to the Gladiator, and the Skuas, Rocs, and Gladiators didn't survive in front-line service as day fighters with the Fleet Air Arm much, if any, longer than the Fleet Air Arm's Buffaloes did - and the A5M seems to have fared well enough against its near-contemporaries in China in the late-1930s.
My bad on the tonnage restrictions, you guys are correct there. But still if citing the tonnage escalator clause for AAA/underwater protection rebuilds on a ship that was still on the shipyard isn't a breach of the purpose of the treaty I don't know what it is. Regarding planes - the Buffalo saw very limited service with the Navy, and was replaced very quickly by the co-developed (both were accepted into service simultaneously) F4F, which was a far superior naval fighter than anything the British had at the time. Also, the Navy Buffalo was quite the mishap, the plane received a crap-ton of added weight due to navy demands that the airframe had never been excepted to take and it ended up being a dog as a result. The quite lighter, original plane was very well liked by the Finnish, who flew it intensively, which means the plane as designed wasn't as bad as people make it to be. Or rather, that the model the US Navy insisted on having was bad, but the plane itself, as designed, wasn't. AS for the british planes, it was aknowledged by the FAA itself. In fact one of the main political arguments for letting the FAA out of the RAF's control and back into the Admiralty's hands in 1939 was that the RAF gave no priority whatsoever to naval aviation at all (focused as they were in their pursuit of the long range bomber), and accordingly the requirements for new naval aircraft were awful. Everyone knew the FAA was being mishandled and that it was the ugly duckling of the RAF, and everyone knew that with a war looming on the horizon that wasn't the best thing ever. One only has to look at the lineups aboard RN carriers during WW2 to notice how awful things were. that the best, most succesful british carrier plane of WWII was the Swordfish (which could be defined as a collection of strings, canvas, and ducttape with a windmill spinning in the front) is a testament of how mediocre the others were, or inadequate. The list of mediocre or uninspiring planes is long. Fulmar, Firefly, Barracuda, Albacore, Skua, Roc...list goes on and on. The Sea Gladiator didn't cut it anymore in a world of monoplanes, the Seafire neither had enough range for a proper carrier role nor was ever able to get rid of it's serious tendence to collapse the landing gear upon carrier landings, and the Sea Hurricane was too range limited and slow compared with the likes of the F4F and the Zero, much less if we compare them with the 2nd Gen of WW2 US carrier fighters, as the F6F or the Corsair. The end result is that most RN carriers used L&L american planes on board, because plainly stated, british ones were underpar. Heck, they even were operating F4Us out of their carriers (well the ones that could take them, the last armored deck ones didn't have hangar clearance to operate Corsairs) a year and a half before the americans did, and that at a time when they had plenty of Hellcats to put on their flattops (which they also did, in plenty of numbers). Out of escort carriers the Wildcat was the preferred plane. Out of Fleet carriers, american iron was always preferred to british, because, simply stated, british carrier planes ranged from truly awful (whoever designed the Roc was on weed) to simply uninspiring (the Firefly was decent, if uninspiring, but mostly because of it's excellent engine) What's quite funny is that actually I think that in the immediate postwar (late 45-46) the british carrier stuff coming online was better than the american stuff, both result of wartime experience, and of the FAA being under the control of the Fleet instead of the RAF. The americans had the F8F (which was tailor made for killing kamikazes and as a result had limitations in other roles) while the english had the amazing Sea Fury (imo one of the best prop fighters ever made, carrierborne or not) and the Sea Hornet was an absolute beast (moreso than the F7F ,which already was a monster on it's own). Against the japanese, the A5M model was highly satisfactory and both the navy and the pilots thought it as an excellent plane. The A6M we all know was the best carrier fighter in the 1940-1942 era (though I rate the Wildcat as being almost as effective, mostly because of the much better US air fighting doctrine making up for the difference in plane quality). Both the Vals and Kates were heads over heels better than anything the british had for attack roles until the british began putting american iron on their decks. Latewar WW2 japanese models were very good aswell and superior to anything made by the brits, but by that time the problem was that they had no proper pilots to man them and accordingly died in droves. Once again, that'd ended by late 1945 with the new incoming british carrier planes. Seriously, they were powerhouses. But they also were too late. So prewar and during WW2?.... british carrier aviation couldn't hold a candle neither against the US or the Japanese models. |
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Post by axe99 on Sept 19, 2018 17:29:57 GMT -6
While there's no question British Carrier Aviation wasn't exactly a shining light (and by no means was better than the air arms in the IJN and USN) one mistake that's often made is comparing late 1941 or early 1942 USN/IJN models with those in service in a frontline role in the FAA in 1939. My understanding of the issues weren't that the FAA started the war overly weak in aircraft design, but that the emergency early-war meant that after the Fulmar (which did what it was designed to do well enough, but was no match for other enemy carrier-borne fighters whose focus was on performance rather than an extra person for navigation and spotting) - so I don't disagree with mediocre - but the issue really got going by the delay in the next wave of aircraft (including limited resources for testing and development) caused by the emergency in 1940 and 1941, when in the face of an invasion threat the focus was yet again on land-based air. That, and combined with the very limited number of aircraft avaiable for the FAA.
On the Seafire, the FAA did eventually manage to fit it with extra fuel tanks which gave it comparable range to the Corsair (which is presumably why the FAA were able to make strikes with Seafires over the Japanese mainland towards the end of the war, when earlier than that it had been used almost purely in a fleet defence role) but it never overcame it's landing issues (although these issues themselves are often overstated by people using the accident rate of the CVEs operating Seafires off Salerno - the worst in the war and in circumstances that were far from ideal - rather than a broader average).
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Post by dorn on Sept 20, 2018 0:46:11 GMT -6
You told that RN planes were mediocre at best. Compare in 1940 which planes use other nations. Buffalos? They are even worse, Japan till Zero has not good fighters. On what are you basing this claim to the superiority of the Fleet Air Arm to its counterparts in the US and Japan? The Brewster Buffalo has a bad reputation, yes, but I am not aware of any clear evidence that the Fleet Air Arm had anything better in its Gloucester Gladiators, Blackburn Skuas, and Blackburn Rocs - certainly Finland seems to have thought the Buffalo superior to the Gladiator, and the Skuas, Rocs, and Gladiators didn't survive in front-line service as day fighters with the Fleet Air Arm much, if any, longer than the Fleet Air Arm's Buffaloes did - and the A5M seems to have fared well enough against its near-contemporaries in China in the late-1930s.
It is true that it was nothing special however in 1940 FAA started operated Fulmar. This plane was not fast enough however agile with good firepower but we need to consider whole system and how it was used. And Fulmar provide critical advantage for FAA against enemy bombers using fighter direction. At that time only Zero was better naval fighter. Gladiators were not used on modern carriers at all, Rocs only for a moment and Skuas for some time. They were nothing special but as dive bomber if they have no fighter opposition they were adequate as temporary solution. On what are you basing this claim to the superiority of the Fleet Air Arm to its counterparts in the US and Japan? The Brewster Buffalo has a bad reputation, yes, but I am not aware of any clear evidence that the Fleet Air Arm had anything better in its Gloucester Gladiators, Blackburn Skuas, and Blackburn Rocs - certainly Finland seems to have thought the Buffalo superior to the Gladiator, and the Skuas, Rocs, and Gladiators didn't survive in front-line service as day fighters with the Fleet Air Arm much, if any, longer than the Fleet Air Arm's Buffaloes did - and the A5M seems to have fared well enough against its near-contemporaries in China in the late-1930s.
My bad on the tonnage restrictions, you guys are correct there. But still if citing the tonnage escalator clause for AAA/underwater protection rebuilds on a ship that was still on the shipyard isn't a breach of the purpose of the treaty I don't know what it is. Regarding planes - the Buffalo saw very limited service with the Navy, and was replaced very quickly by the co-developed (both were accepted into service simultaneously) F4F, which was a far superior naval fighter than anything the British had at the time. Also, the Navy Buffalo was quite the mishap, the plane received a crap-ton of added weight due to navy demands that the airframe had never been excepted to take and it ended up being a dog as a result. The quite lighter, original plane was very well liked by the Finnish, who flew it intensively, which means the plane as designed wasn't as bad as people make it to be. Or rather, that the model the US Navy insisted on having was bad, but the plane itself, as designed, wasn't. AS for the british planes, it was aknowledged by the FAA itself. In fact one of the main political arguments for letting the FAA out of the RAF's control and back into the Admiralty's hands in 1939 was that the RAF gave no priority whatsoever to naval aviation at all (focused as they were in their pursuit of the long range bomber), and accordingly the requirements for new naval aircraft were awful. Everyone knew the FAA was being mishandled and that it was the ugly duckling of the RAF, and everyone knew that with a war looming on the horizon that wasn't the best thing ever. One only has to look at the lineups aboard RN carriers during WW2 to notice how awful things were. that the best, most succesful british carrier plane of WWII was the Swordfish (which could be defined as a collection of strings, canvas, and ducttape with a windmill spinning in the front) is a testament of how mediocre the others were, or inadequate. The list of mediocre or uninspiring planes is long. Fulmar, Firefly, Barracuda, Albacore, Skua, Roc...list goes on and on. The Sea Gladiator didn't cut it anymore in a world of monoplanes, the Seafire neither had enough range for a proper carrier role nor was ever able to get rid of it's serious tendence to collapse the landing gear upon carrier landings, and the Sea Hurricane was too range limited and slow compared with the likes of the F4F and the Zero, much less if we compare them with the 2nd Gen of WW2 US carrier fighters, as the F6F or the Corsair. The end result is that most RN carriers used L&L american planes on board, because plainly stated, british ones were underpar. Heck, they even were operating F4Us out of their carriers (well the ones that could take them, the last armored deck ones didn't have hangar clearance to operate Corsairs) a year and a half before the americans did, and that at a time when they had plenty of Hellcats to put on their flattops (which they also did, in plenty of numbers). Out of escort carriers the Wildcat was the preferred plane. Out of Fleet carriers, american iron was always preferred to british, because, simply stated, british carrier planes ranged from truly awful (whoever designed the Roc was on weed) to simply uninspiring (the Firefly was decent, if uninspiring, but mostly because of it's excellent engine) What's quite funny is that actually I think that in the immediate postwar (late 45-46) the british carrier stuff coming online was better than the american stuff, both result of wartime experience, and of the FAA being under the control of the Fleet instead of the RAF. The americans had the F8F (which was tailor made for killing kamikazes and as a result had limitations in other roles) while the english had the amazing Sea Fury (imo one of the best prop fighters ever made, carrierborne or not) and the Sea Hornet was an absolute beast (moreso than the F7F ,which already was a monster on it's own). Against the japanese, the A5M model was highly satisfactory and both the navy and the pilots thought it as an excellent plane. The A6M we all know was the best carrier fighter in the 1940-1942 era (though I rate the Wildcat as being almost as effective, mostly because of the much better US air fighting doctrine making up for the difference in plane quality). Both the Vals and Kates were heads over heels better than anything the british had for attack roles until the british began putting american iron on their decks. Latewar WW2 japanese models were very good aswell and superior to anything made by the brits, but by that time the problem was that they had no proper pilots to man them and accordingly died in droves. Once again, that'd ended by late 1945 with the new incoming british carrier planes. Seriously, they were powerhouses. But they also were too late. So prewar and during WW2?.... british carrier aviation couldn't hold a candle neither against the US or the Japanese models. Firstly important is what is used by FAA, not who produced these aircrafts. Year by year (on modern carriers - from Ark Royal): 1939 - Skua, Swordfish, Roc (1 squadron) 1940 - Skua, Swordfish, Albacore, Fulmar 1941 - Swordfish, Albacore, Fulmar, Marlet 1942 - Albacore, Fulmar, Marlet, Sea Hurricane, Seafire 1943 - Albacore, Barracuda, Avenger, Fulmar, Marlet, Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Corsair 1944 - Avenger, Barracuda, Seafire, Corsair, Hellcat, Firefly 1945 - Avenger, Barracuda, Seafire, Corsair, Hellcat, Firefly So you can compare to IJN an USN and you will find that the difference is not so large as you presented. If you used just UK produced aircrafts than you are right. Related to quality of planes. Yes, FAA knows that their planes are not optimal however there is 2 points: 1. time when they were deployed 2. their opposition which was mainly land based fighters If you look on naval fighters used by all main powers you will find that except zeros it was quite late in war (when the war was already decided) when naval fighters come close to land fighters. Related to dive bombers and torpedo bombers you need to think that all of them no matter how good they were has no chance if they faced enemy fighters without fighter cover. Swordfish was one of best in FAA because of its adaptibility and achievements, not performance. After Swordfish was withdrawn from fleet carriers Swordfish was found as excellent plane for escort carriers on ASW duty (slow stall speed, can flight in any weather, was rigid construction, easy to repair. I even read somewhere than one of USN captains requested Swordfishes instead of Avengers on his carrier but request was denied). And look what achieved Swordfish from Malta. There were better aircrafts as Swordfish performance was awful however sometimes the performance is not the most important (see Hurricane in Battle of Britain, Hurricane was worse than Bf-109 but still better aircraft for that battle). You can list aircraft by their performance or by their achievements. I prefer the second as it depends how, when and where the plane is used. The reason why RN has issue to have their own good planes on their carriers is well known. Before the war naval planes was under RAF and RAF does not prefer it, during critical years of war the priority was home command so FAA was behind in development of good carriers planes and Fulmar, Sea Hurricane, Seafire was just temporary best solution. Sometimes you evaluate only plane itself and sometimes overal picture (see your comparison of Zero and Wildcat). It is needed to compare one way only. Think of Fulmar, if you take its performance, it was mediocre to bad as fighter but if you look how Fulmar fought as weapon platform you can think about it that it was at least adequate, may be good because of FAA use him at middle altitude (Marlets at high altitude), with fighter direction and they did the job. FAA achieved their targets with their carriers even with quite limited resources and it is sure it was not without the struggle. You can look for actions of Saratoga and Victorious to see where RN was better than USN and where USN was better than RN. USN was quicker learner, there can be several reasons but as industrial and manpower powerhouse USA was it was much easier to achieve this. Than you can look on both theatres and see that where USN was better was more important in Pacific and where RN was better was more important European theatre. So both navies focus on what was important for them. USN could smash anything with their large fleet of Essex class carriers however none of them was available during 1939-42 and these years war critical for the war. And at these critical years they were Furious, Hermes, Eagle and mainly Ark Royal and Illustrious class aircraft carriers in European theatre and Yorktown class with help of Lexington class in Pacific which fight Axis on the most important battles and helped to win the war. Think for short time about swapping carrier force at that time 1939-42 between USN and RN and you will find that neither USN during 1939-42 in Europe or RN in 1942 in Pacific is able to achieve success that was historically done. |
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Post by williammiller on Sept 20, 2018 8:07:34 GMT -6
We are wandering somewhat off the Washington Naval Treaty discussion here - perhaps it might be a good idea for a new thread comparing the navies mentioned and their aircraft usage/timelines/etc?
Thanks.
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Post by JagdFlanker on Sept 20, 2018 17:19:18 GMT -6
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Post by ramjb on Sept 20, 2018 18:25:07 GMT -6
1939 - Skua, Swordfish, Roc (1 squadron) 1940 - Skua, Swordfish, Albacore, Fulmar 1941 - Swordfish, Albacore, Fulmar, Marlet 1942 - Albacore, Fulmar, Marlet, Sea Hurricane, Seafire 1943 - Albacore, Barracuda, Avenger, Fulmar, Marlet, Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Corsair 1944 - Avenger, Barracuda, Seafire, Corsair, Hellcat, Firefly 1945 - Avenger, Barracuda, Seafire, Corsair, Hellcat, Firefly So you can compare to IJN an USN and you will find that the difference is not so large as you presented. If you used just UK produced aircrafts than you are right. Hummmm...that's kinda the point?. That the RN had severely lagged in carrier aircraft development mid war (for multiple reasons, the FAA being under RAF's control not being the smallest) and that as a result British carrier aircraft during the war were subpar quality and performance wise. They tried interim solutions and they didn't work well (Seafire, Sea Hurricane), they tried new models, they didn't work at all (Albacore, Barracuda, Firefly). That the UK resorted to use US naval planes in large quantities just underscores how bad things were because with what they were producing what they were sending their naval aircrew to fly were underpar underdogs. and that during the 20s and 30s the Royal Navy aknowledged the problem. They knew the FAA was beyond their control, they knew whatever models the FAA would get would be underaverage at best, and they planned their carriers accordingly, to turtle up when under attack instead of fighting off the attackers (which was a ludicrous proposition, but whatever) because they weren't deluded enough to believe that with those planes they could put up any effective fight in the air. And hence, the armored deck carrier was born. This seriously begs the question but... WHEN, exactly, did the RN carriers faced any kind of serious land-based fighter opposition in the ETO during WW2?. Because they came under attack several times, by quite many models of attack aircraft (from Sparvieros to Stukas, going through anything that could carry a bomb or a torpedo) but fighters were almost always nowhere to be found. That's point 1. Point 2 is that if you don't think you can protect your carriers you might aswell ditch the concept completely. The armored deck ,closed hangar, carrier concept was an abomination, plain and simple. It did not only put tremendous demands and drawbacks on the designs themselves (from hangar clearance to hull longevity when subjected to damage, there were many reasons why that concept wasn't optimal) on one hand ,and it did jack at all against real opposition. In a world where 65000 ton mammoth battleships were sunk by the exclusive use of air attack, to think that 3 or 4 inches of deck armor are going to make your carrier more survivable under the influence of enemy air superiority was nothing short of ludicrous. Depends on what you mean by "quite late in the war". And even then that's highly debatable: the Wildcat could (and did) put an equal fight against any land based fighter the Japanese could throw it's way (if it was able to keep pace with the Zero, for sure it was able to smash Oscars). And then there was the Corsair, one of the best fighters of WW2, land or carried based. That one was around in November 1942 and even while the americans were reluctant to use it on carriers (wrongly so, as USMC squadrons gave ample proof later in the war), the british were certainly not. Also, the Hellcat came around very early in 1943 and performance wise that one was not inferior in any way vs any landbased fighter of it's time (Except in topspeed). I don't think 1943 was "very late in the war" but as I said, it depends on what you mean. I'd say pretty much the opposite. Tarento was a good instance of it - the british carriers were well within italian fighter range and doesn't seem those swordfish met many. yeah, it was a night attack but then again it proves that you CAN operate carriers without any meaningful real air superiority at hand. Ditto with the repeated carrier strikes on Tirpitz. 1943-1944 there were several of those, all of them well within german aircraft range, most missions went in unescorted - they were succesful in avoiding most of the german air cover (and there was plenty on Norway, both Bf109s and Fw190s were deployed there to protect the ship). So...it seems wartime history doesn't agree with your opinions here. Like, at all. The swordfish was great because there was nothing better aboard RN carriers of the time. Simple as that. That they did their job better than the Albacores or the Barracudas is a testament of how awful those latter two were, not of how amazing the Swordfish was. Give the brave souls of victorious or Ark Royal a choice between the stringbags or a Kate during their attack on Bismarck, or during their nighttime sortie over Tarento and come back to the answer. The plain truth is that as a very lightweight biplane it was a very easy plane to handle and one of the sweetest gentle planes of the time to operate off a carrier. The plane did some amazing things ,but I credit the crews far more than the airplane. The airplane would've been considered obsolete already in 1935. By 1940 it was a relicque. No way to avoid it. by that standard, for instance, every italian plane that ever flew was crap. I'm sorry, but that's not the truth. Plane achievements depended mostly on how they were used, how they were used depended on their high command ability, adaptability and capability. An excellent plane can excel in a force that uses it right, but will give crap results in another that wouldn't be able to find it's own ass in plain daylight, with a torchlight, written instructions and a map. Many planes have gone down in history as stinkers or underperformers only because they were used wrong, not because they were bad planes (can give you a good list if you want me to). Conversely, many underpar, uninspiring or directly underaverage planes overachieved because they were used properly. But the planes are what they are - not the use they're given. A fairey Fulmar was a dead plane the second an enemy fighter pilot put his eyes on it. It's pretty much that simple. It was not only slow, it was blatantly underpowered and was too big and heavy to come close to be maneouverable enough to tangle with an enemy fighter. Given that the Fulmar (and later the Firefly, a plane with similar issues compared with it's own contemporaries) was supposed to be the air superiority plane of the RN carriers, there's no way to think it was "adequate". Again, that it was used to it's best speaks loads about the crews that flew it, the officers of the naval air wings, and the flight controllers on the carriers. Because the plane was a stinker on the role a plane like that should've covered. Surprising. I'd say that by the time the Essex came online four japanese fleet carrier (and a couple light ones too) had already sent to the bottom by the american carrier forces. I'd say that smacking 2/3 of the Kido Butai in a single stroke qualifies as "being able to smash anything", yet the USN didn't have a large fleet of Essex Carriers when they did so. They had three Yorktowns, one of them rushed and patched up from the battle damage it had taken at the Coral Sea. Now think of the same scenario. Three Illustriouses, with a handful of Fulmars, swordfishes and Albacores, instead of three Yorktowns, with around twice the ammount of F4Fs and SBDs (I don't even bring the TBD into this equation, the DEvastator was an awful,awful obsolete coffin by that time). Facing Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu, with their top-elite aircrews on A6M2s, D3As and B5Ms. Who in his sane senses says the british win that?. Because I certainly don't. About the rest...well, British RN carriers were pretty much nonexistant in the Pacific until 1945 ,with the exception of the limited deployement of Victorious with the USN late in 1942. And the USN wasn't impressed with the ship. Terribly limited air complement, very limited storage of avgas and ordinance for the planes were only two of the things they didn't like at all about them. and they weren't present in the Pacific until 1945 because everyone on charge back then knew those carriers couldn't hold a candle to the japanese carrier force. Only after the complete massacre of the Marianas, and later on the Leyte Gulf battles, did the RN venture in force beyond the Indic and into the Pacific. Not a coincidence. I'd say there's no reason why the USN carriers couldn't have achieved exactly the same the british did in the atlantic and mediterranean (if not better), and I FOR SURE don't see how on earth would the british carriers do what the americans did at Coral Sea ,much less at Midway. BTW, "Germany first" policy applied to the US Army and USAAF. The best of the best of the US Navy and USMC was in the pacific. The only ships the americans operated on the atlantic were those which weren't immediately needed in the Pacific, and in what regards to carriers, the only one that was always deployed there was the USS Ranger, which the americans knew was a terribly flawed ship and didn't want to put in the way of any kind of japanese attack of the likes Lexington, Enterprise, Yorktown or Hornet were being subjected to in the Pacific, because they knew it wouldn't last long even if a japanese looked wrong it's way, much less bombed or torpedoed it. They already were forced to get Wasp out of the Atlantic, where it was supposed to stay put, because of the loss of Yorktown at Midway and the loss of Hornet and KO of Enterprise at Guadalcanal. And of course Wasp went down the second it took a torpedo hit, for it was yet another badly flawed ship (exactly the reason why it had been stationed in the Atlantic since Pearl Harbor to begin with, and only brought into the pacific when the situation was dire, because the US Navy knew the ship couldn't take a hit). Yet another proof that the USN was keeping the worse ships in the Atlantic, while bringing only the best to the Pacific. The big US carriers were all in the other side of the globe from the ETO. Which made sense because, on the naval front, the Allies had already an overwhelming superiority on the ETO with the Royal Navy alone (and that was mostly because of the awful war the italians waged at sea, but now we're running REALLY off topic here), they didn't need the big american fleet carriers there, so (Exception, of course, made, of the ASW assets to fight the Battle of the Atlantic against the U-boats) all that was stationed there was what was considered either surplus from the Pacific, or directly inadequate to put in the way of Japanese attacks. That's pretty much it. speaking of which I agree with the above poster, this has little to do with the WT anymore. I'll leave this discussion for another time and a more appropiate thread, enough of hijacking this one  |
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Post by dorn on Sept 21, 2018 1:17:14 GMT -6
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Post by britishball on Sept 21, 2018 4:04:08 GMT -6
Now think of the same scenario. Three Illustriouses, with a handful of Fulmars, swordfishes and Albacores, instead of three Yorktowns, with around twice the ammount of F4Fs and SBDs (I don't even bring the TBD into this equation, the DEvastator was an awful,awful obsolete coffin by that time). Facing Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu, with their top-elite aircrews on A6M2s, D3As and B5Ms. Who in his sane senses says the british win that?. Because I certainly don't. ------ Who knows what would have happened? On paper the Swordfish shouldn't have got close to the Bismarck before being shot down. On paper the RN should have lost at Trafalgar and the Spanish Armada and so many other battles. But 3 carriers equipped with Seafires and Swordfishes (relics or not) may have got the upper hand. Or it might not. The RN plays to its strengths, either it would have had better planes if it had been tasked with destroying the Japanese Carriers or it would have done it some other way.
The one thing I do know is that many have made the mistake of underestimating the RN and most have ended up at the bottom of the sea for their hubris. |
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Post by ramjb on Sept 21, 2018 6:26:13 GMT -6
Just a slight comment -Bismarck had an awful AAA. Single shot 37mms, dissimilar 105mm mounts, and an AA fire director so overcomplex it didn't work properly. The only AA worth a thing on that ship was the 20mm battery and that one wasn't stellar either. So that part about "on paper swordfishes shouldn't have gotten close to the Bismarck" is on one side incorrect because Bismarck couldn't shoot a paper plane down if a chance had arisen, and on the other side completely irrelevant because one thing is going up against a large ship with a worthless AAA suite, another going up against a four-carrier CAP made up of Zeros at the low altitude torpedo runs demanded. Not to mention Seafires wouldn't have had the range to escort strike groups to the japanese carrier force and make it back, on one hand, and on the other hand brit carriers of the time had no viable divebombers and what sank those four carriers were 1000 pound bombs dropped off SBDs. -There was no way the RN was supposed to lose Trafalgar. The whole spanish admiralty was well aware that going after Nelson was suicidal because of the much better training of the british crews, the relatively poor mainteinance on their own ships, and furthermore the tremendous incompetence of the combined fleet admiral. But they weren't the ones calling the shots, they were under orders from an incompetent french admiral who was in a gloryseeking mission to try and save face with Napoleon, who had already given orders to relieve that incompetent off his command. Same with the Spanish Armada. "On paper" the terrible weaknesses of the spanish invasion plans are only too blatantly obvious, and the incoming disaster is only too predictable: the ships were too drafty to operate off the flanders ports and to take soldiers on board, it completely ignored weather, the fleet was woefully prepared and enlisted, lacked long range artillery, had few gunners with experience in sea fighting andwas led by an "Admiral" who the closest he had ever been to the sea was to his bathroom sink and had no military background nor experience, the army at Flanders was far too busy to go around boarding barges to cross the channel ,etc etc etc. The only impressive thing about that "Armada" was the numbers involved - but the ships themselves weren't up to the task the mission demanded, most of them far too big, cumbersome, undergunned and unmaneouverable. For all it counted for naval combat they might aswell have been rowboats for all it mattered. "On paper" the whole operation was an unmitigated disaster and (unsurprisingly) it ended being an unmitigated disaster. -You might think that many have made the mistake of underestimating the RN and ended up badly. I'd say that many brits have overestimated their own RN, many times, and ended up badly because of it too. Finisterre (which was a far worse disaster for the british than what the "armada" ever was for the spanish) or Almeria Gulf (vs the spanish). Medway and four days campaign (vs the dutch), Batry bay ,Beachy Head, Chesapeake and Menorca (vs the French) Cartagena de Indias (again vs the spanish,and one of the most shameful naval defeats in history). Jutland,Colonel, Scapa Flow, Loss of Glorious, or Crete (vs the Germans), Java Sea or the loss of PoW (vs the Japanese), and quite a list of other battles the British lost because they thought being brit meant they were going to win by default when what wins battles are quality of command, numbers of ships, quality of ships,and quality and training of the men. Not flying the Union Jack. And when carriers became a thing, those things won or lost battles following the same parameters: quality of command, numbers and quality of planes, and quality and training of men and officers. Not some voodoo enchantement conjured by singing God Save the King (or Queen) that instantly meant they were going to win because of... reasons  . |
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Post by britishball on Sept 21, 2018 8:03:10 GMT -6
Just a slight comment -Bismarck had an awful AAA. Single shot 37mms, dissimilar 105mm mounts, and an AA fire director so overcomplex it didn't work properly. The only AA worth a thing on that ship was the 20mm battery and that one wasn't stellar either. So that part about "on paper swordfishes shouldn't have gotten close to the Bismarck" is on one side incorrect because Bismarck couldn't shoot a paper plane down if a chance had arisen, and on the other side completely irrelevant because one thing is going up against a large ship with a worthless AAA suite, another going up against a four-carrier CAP made up of Zeros at the low altitude torpedo runs demanded. Not to mention Seafires wouldn't have had the range to escort strike groups to the japanese carrier force and make it back, on one hand, and on the other hand brit carriers of the time had no viable divebombers and what sank those four carriers were 1000 pound bombs dropped off SBDs. -There was no way the RN was supposed to lose Trafalgar. The whole spanish admiralty was well aware that going after Nelson was suicidal because of the much better training of the british crews, the relatively poor mainteinance on their own ships, and furthermore the tremendous incompetence of the combined fleet admiral. But they weren't the ones calling the shots, they were under orders from an incompetent french admiral who was in a gloryseeking mission to try and save face with Napoleon, who had already given orders to relieve that incompetent off his command. Same with the Spanish Armada. "On paper" the terrible weaknesses of the spanish invasion plans are only too blatantly obvious, and the incoming disaster is only too predictable: the ships were too drafty to operate off the flanders ports and to take soldiers on board, it completely ignored weather, the fleet was woefully prepared and enlisted, lacked long range artillery, had few gunners with experience in sea fighting andwas led by an "Admiral" who the closest he had ever been to the sea was to his bathroom sink and had no military background nor experience, the army at Flanders was far too busy to go around boarding barges to cross the channel ,etc etc etc. The only impressive thing about that "Armada" was the numbers involved - but the ships themselves weren't up to the task the mission demanded, most of them far too big, cumbersome, undergunned and unmaneouverable. For all it counted for naval combat they might aswell have been rowboats for all it mattered. "On paper" the whole operation was an unmitigated disaster and (unsurprisingly) it ended being an unmitigated disaster. -You might think that many have made the mistake of underestimating the RN and ended up badly. I'd say that many brits have overestimated their own RN, many times, and ended up badly because of it too. Finisterre (which was a far worse disaster for the british than what the "armada" ever was for the spanish) or Almeria Gulf (vs the spanish). Medway and four days campaign (vs the dutch), Batry bay ,Beachy Head, Chesapeake and Menorca (vs the French) Cartagena de Indias (again vs the spanish,and one of the most shameful naval defeats in history). Jutland,Colonel, Scapa Flow, Loss of Glorious, or Crete (vs the Germans), Java Sea or the loss of PoW (vs the Japanese), and quite a list of other battles the British lost because they thought being brit meant they were going to win by default when what wins battles are quality of command, numbers of ships, quality of ships,and quality and training of the men. Not flying the Union Jack. And when carriers became a thing, those things won or lost battles following the same parameters: quality of command, numbers and quality of planes, and quality and training of men and officers. Not some voodoo enchantement conjured by singing God Save the King (or Queen) that instantly meant they were going to win because of... reasons . Bismarck didn't have awful AA: 16 × 10.5 cm (4.1 in) SK C/33 (8 × 2) 16 × 3.7 cm (1.5 in) SK C/30 (8 × 2) 12 × 2 cm (0.79 in) FlaK 30 (12 × 1) Some AA didn't work against the Swordfish and some did it was at worst below average for the time really its only lacking the close in AA which doesn't really prevent attacks but rather damages the craft after they've dropped, it could still be manually directed but they still failed to shoot down the Swordfish. At Trafalgar the vastly outnumbered and outgunned RN should have been screwed, and the Spanish Armada didn't ignore the weather it was a freak storm nobody could have predicted. We can sit here and cherry pick examples of when one side did well or when it did badly, any country around as long as Britain is going to suffer a few disasters here or there. I'm not claiming we didn't lose any ships such as the Prince Of Wales or Glorious, I was simply saying that people have ruled the RN out before when they shouldn't have. And that had the RN been required to deal with the Japanese (for example if USA hadn't been in WW1 and wasn't going to lend lease or anything in WW2) then it would have developed a way of fighting them then, rather than relying on the USN. You have an entirely linear perspective on this. I haven't dove too far into looking into what else you've got wrong there, I haven't got the time, this is all off the top of my head. But last time I checked Jutland was a British victory, just one where we happened to lose more ships (hey I'm not trying to say Battlecruisers are a great idea) and Almeria was when a British fleet were attacked at anchor? Hardly sporting, nor really a standard by which to judge the entire RN. What even is the point of what you are trying to say? Not only is this thread meant to be about Naval Treaties but generally RTW2 will be about potential 1900-1950 timelines in which various countries "rule the waves" it is about trying to accurately simulate Naval warfare as a whole. You think the RN should be stuck down a path of having only biplanes because that's what happened in history? If you want it to play out like that then watch "The World At War" don't come here. To come on here and list a serious of events in which real people lost their lives for nothing more than petty point scoring is disrespectful and autistic. By all means if you have something to say about the development of RTW2, I'd love to hear it, but if you want to play "let's list off every battle 'X' nation has ever lost" then I'm more than happy to break out the Wikipedia and get snidey too! |
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